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This thesis explores the potential for upward movement in international rankings by 
individual institutions, in the context of the Australian higher education sector. It addresses 
three inter-related but distinct questions. The first explores the ability of ‘underdog’ 
universities to move up the global rankings, the second examines strategies by which such 
upward movement might be accomplished, and the third considers the consequences of such 
an achievement. It ranges across literature on the higher education system and global 
rankings, on successful, world-class and entrepreneurial universities, and on organisational 
change. A mixed methods design was employed. It comprised an international comparative 
analysis of rankings achievements at the institutional and national levels, in combination 
with an organisational case study incorporating both quantitative and qualitative data, using 
document analysis and unstructured interviewing techniques. The comparative analysis 
demonstrated that Australia has done well in its global rankings performance. Several 
possible explanations are proposed, including the nature of the Australian university system, 
and the interplay of national and international trends in higher education. The seven-year 
case study yields the story of a dramatic turnaround at an Australian University from a state 
of decline to the achievement of a ‘top 100 universities under 50 years of age’ rankings goal. 
It analyses the University’s success from the perspective of senior management, exploring 
the successes, the failures, and the costs and the benefits for the organisation. The 
contributions of the study include a model of trend analysis that tracks individual institutions 
in their national context and an explanation of the improving performance of Australian 
institutions. The study also demonstrates the value of exploring the internal context of the 
university as an organisation, employing a longitudinal approach, and mobilising aspects of 
the organisational change literature to generate a rich picture of the organisational 




List of Abbreviations 
ACT    Australian Capital Territory 
ANU   Australian National Unviersity 
ANZIG  Australian and New Zealand Institute of Governance 
ARWU  Academic Ranking of World Universities 
BRIC   Brazil, Russia, India, China 
CCAE   Canberra College of Advanced Education 
CAE    College of Advanced Education 
CHE-Hochschul Centre for Higher Education Ranking, Germany 
CIT   Canberra Institute of Technology 
CSP   Commonwealth Supported Place 
DBAHEM Doctor of Business Administration in Higher Education 
Management 
EFTSL   Equivalent Full Time Student Load 
ERA   Excellence in Research for Australia 
HEFCE  Higher Education Funding Council for England 
HR   Human Resources 
KPIs   Key Performance Indicators 
NATSEM  National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling 
PEAS   Performance Expectations for Academic Staff 
QS   Quacquarelli Symonds 
RMIT   (originally) Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology 
TAFE   Technical and Further Education 
THE   Times Higher Education 
THE-QS  Times Higher Education–Quacquarelli Symonds 
TNE   Transnational Education 
UC   University of Canberra 
UCPH   University of Canberra Public Hospital 
UK   United Kingdom 
USA    United States of America 
USNWR  United States News and World Report 









Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Why this research question 
The starting point for this thesis was a broad question concerning the impact of the rise of 
global rankings on the university sector. Following a review of the global rankings and 
higher education literature, my research questions became progressively more defined as 
the less well traversed aspects of this research field emerged, and thus the potential for a 
scholarly contribution more evident. There is a significant research literature on the 
emergence of global university rankings and on the interactions between global rankings, 
national policy and the higher education sector (Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b, 2018, 
Lim and Øerberg, 2017, Shattock, 2017). There are also well-developed literatures on the 
indicators measured by various global rankings (Bekhradnia, 2016, Moed, 2016), on 
methodological aspects of the rankings (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Marginson, 2014, Marginson 
and van der Wende, 2007) and on why the rankings privilege, and will continue to 
privilege, elite institutions with strong historical reputations and robust financial resources 
(Hazelkorn, 2015b, Shattock, 2017).  
There is a more modest literature focused on the differences in national performance, 
particularly as it relates to the performance of institutions within specific countries (Lim 
and Øerberg, 2017, Shattock, 2017). The rise of elite Asian universities, for example, is 
certainly well documented, with some reference to the resulting downward pressure in the 
rankings tables on Anglo-American institutions (Altbach and Salmi, 2011, Holmes, 2015, 
Mok and Hallinger, 2013). Research on national comparisons concerning changes over 
time within the Anglo-American context are less common, and there is quite a limited 
literature on what individual universities can do, and have done, to improve their standing 
in the rankings tables. Progressively, my research interest focussed down on to questions 
of whether individual universities were improving their positions in the global rankings 
tables, and if so, what were the factors that made improvement in rankings performance 
possible. 
By shifting the focus to individual universities and their responses, the question narrowed 
to the actions and responses of individual universities, and away from the broader construct 
of ‘impact on the higher education sector’. It is clear that historically elite universities will 
continue to be privileged by a rankings game where their position is effectively pre-
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determined by the rules of the game. It is also clear that large scale financial investment 
and strong national policies can support the rise of a set of new elite universities on the 
global stage, as has been the case with the new elite Asian universities. What was less 
clear, and therefore became the focus of this research, was how universities could achieve 
gains in the international rankings ‘against the odds’, that is in a national higher education 
policy context which was relatively stable, and where there was no case for further national 
investment in specific institutions. The ‘policy levers’ available to individual institutions 
will inevitably be influenced by the context of the national higher education system within 
which they operate (Davies, 1987, 2001, Salmi, 2011, Shattock, 2003). 
This shift to the level of individual institutions brought with it the concept of institutional 
agency, which began a move toward both the literature on strategic change in universities 
(Marshall, 2007b) and the theoretical literature that explores how organisational change 
occurs (Balogun et al., 2015, Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, Nadler and Tushman, 1989, 
1997, Pettigrew, 1990, 1997). The intellectual context for this thesis, then, sits across and 
draws on three distinct literatures. The first of these is the literature on global rankings and 
higher education in the international and national context. The second is the literature on 
the pursuit of rankings aspirations by individual institutions, and the related literature on 
what constitutes successful universities in the contemporary world, including broad policy 
trends in higher education and the ways in which universities change or seek to change to 
enhance their performance in a changing world. The third is the literature on organisational 
theory, with a particular focus on organisational change and how universities engage in 
organisational change. 
My research question, then, led to a broadly-based literature review, rather than one 
focussed on a specific and narrowly defined body of literature. This review of the literature 
is set out in Chapters 2 and 3. In seeking a research focus that would provide a genuine 
contribution to existing knowledge, it is perhaps not unexpected to find a greater 
opportunity for original work located at the intersections of existing fields of knowledge.  
As my understanding of the relevant literature was deepening, my attention was 
increasingly caught by the rankings aspirations of my own institution, the University of 
Canberra. As early as 2008, the University had publicly committed to a ten-year vision of 
achieving recognition on the international stage, and by 2011 this had been explicitly 
translated to entering the top 100 universities aged under 50. As a relative ‘under-dog’ in 
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the university performance stakes, the University of Canberra seemed an unlikely ‘success 
story’. It was performing poorly in both teaching and research metrics, compounded by 
declining student load, financial problems and the potential threat of regulatory 
intervention from the Federal Government. Through the prism provided by my DBA 
cohort, I simultaneously became aware that the Australian focus on global rankings, which 
I took for granted, was not shared by my British and North American colleagues. Their 
focus, as academic managers, at that time was very much more on national rankings. My 
work environment at the University of Canberra combined with my educational 
experiences at the University of Bath, in the context of my growing engagement in the 
academic research literature on rankings, drew me forward on a dual path. Was there 
something distinctive about the way in which Australian universities were approaching 
global rankings? And could a University move itself up the rankings hierarchy ‘against the 
odds’? 
It is generally recognised that Universities with no history of rankings performance, and 
without a substantial injection of resources, would be better placed to look to aspirations 
that do not involve global rankings (Hazelkorn, 2014, 2015b, Shattock, 2017). In the world 
of global rankings, ‘them that’s got will have, and them that’s not will lose’, and there is 
little by way of ‘turn around stories of the university’ that can lead to rankings success 
stories among the underdog institutions (Shattock, 2003). It is of course, another question 
as to whether this is a meritorious game to play. Should a university pursue rankings 
success is an equally valid question to ‘how can a university pursue rankings success’, but 
it is the second question that is the focus of this thesis. And as the qualitative data from the 
thesis developed, it became clear that the ‘rankings aspiration’ was as much a lever in 
bringing about organisational change as it was an outcome of that change. 
The research presented in this thesis was undertaken over a seven-year period. Inevitably, 
the nature of academic rankings research changed during this time, but in this case so too 
did the fields of policy and practice, in Australia and elsewhere. In Britain and in North 
America there was growing awareness of global rankings, and increasing, if reluctant, 
engagement with them. In the preceding years it had been the countries with something to 
prove about their higher education systems, not only Australia but also countries in South-
east Asia and India, that had been the ‘early engagers’. While the way in which individual 
institutions might work within their national context to achieve better recognition in global 
rankings attracted more attention, it has remained a relatively scarcely populated field. And 
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simultaneously, the early indications of rankings success at the University of Canberra 
were followed by further ‘rankings gains’. The University that I began to study in my 
earliest thesis chapter drafts had evolved considerably by the time the thesis was complete. 
By 2018, it was ranked 58th in the Times Higher Education Young Universities global 
ranking, having entered the top 150 for the first time in 2016. The first part of my research 
question, can an ‘underdog’ university achieve rankings success, was more clearly 
answered by 2018 than I could ever have imagined in 2012. 
Over time, this thesis which began with a question about whether ‘underdog’ universities 
could improve their rankings performance evolved, as it became evident that the 
University of Canberra was achieving a degree of rankings success. A thesis that began as 
a ‘mystery question’ (can it be done) had turned into an analytic narrative concerning how 
it was done. In the process it became clear that three specific questions were at the core: 
How did the University of Canberra’s rankings performance compare in the 
national and international context?  
How did the University of Canberra achieve a ‘turn around’ in its 
performance? 
What were the consequences for the organisation? 
1.2 Theoretical and Methodological Frames 
The rankings literature provided a rich source of analysis on the evolving relationship 
between higher education and global rankings, at both the national and international level. 
It also provided some conceptual guidelines on what might be involved in achieving 
rankings success, albeit not a theoretical framework from which to study how that success 
might be brought about at an organisational level (Chapters 2 and 3). It did provide a 
valuable understanding of key drivers of policy and practice at the national level, which 
served to inform the analysis of why Australian universities had performed well in the 
global rankings (Chapters 5 and 8). 
The analysis of successful universities provided some indications of key goals and 
objectives as well as connections through to the organisational change literature, but again 
not an organisational change framework that could be applied to ‘turn around a university’ 
and bring it into the global rankings path. The organisational change literature provided a 
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valuable supplementary platform from which to explore the process of change at the 
University of Canberra. The seven year time period under study lent itself to a processual 
analysis as advocated by Pettigrew and colleagues (Pettigrew, 1987, 1990, Pettigrew et al., 
1988, Pettigrew et al., 2001), but the constraints imposed by a sole authored thesis did limit 
full conceptual and methodological implementation of this approach. Close analysis of the 
qualitative data, combined with several iterations through potential theoretical frames 
(Balogun et al., 2015, Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, Hailey and Balogun, 2002), 
consistently demonstrated a close affinity with Nadler and Tushman’s classic model of 
‘frame-bending’ (Nadler and Tushman, 1989, 1990).  
In its final form, the thesis draws on key elements of processual analysis as developed by 
Pettigrew (1990, 1997) as well as the model of frame-bending developed by Nadler and 
Tushman (1989, 1990). The emphasis on temporality, on the significance of the external 
context, and the ongoing interaction between internal context, external context, the process 
of change and the content of change strongly influenced the framing of the qualitative 
analysis, as well as leading to the inclusion of extensive analysis of historical documents. 
Nadler and Tushman’s model of frame-bending was used particularly in organising the 
write-up of the material on organisational change. 
The research methodology, as is set out in Chapter 4 utilises a mixed-methods approach to 
data collection. The choice of methods, consistent with a pragmatic approach to data 
collection, was driven by the research question. Consistent with this methodological 
approach, the meta-theoretical paradigm adopted in this thesis is that of critical realism, 
enabling a focus on both the pre-existing social reality that shapes the structure and 
processes of organisational forms, as well as on the ways in which the organisation is 
generated, reproduced and transformed Reed (2006). 
1.3 Contributions of this research 
This thesis sits at the juncture of the higher education literature on global rankings, and the 
literature on organisational change. It is this location at the intersection of two kinds of 
inquiry that underlie the potential for contribution to the literature, but it is a location that 
has proved to be an uneasy alliance. What is common knowledge in one field is not well 
explored in the other, and visa versa. Much of the work on the literature review was in 
endeavouring to bridge the two fields in ways that enabled the scope to be contained, 
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whilst still making a contribution that was well grounded in each literature. The result has 
proved to be a compromise, but one that nonetheless targets a set of questions where only a 
limited amount was already known.  
The research describes the comparatively positive trajectories that have been followed in 
the rankings tables by Australian universities in recent years, and posits a series of 
explanations for that success. It situates that analysis in in international context, examining 
the paths of individual universities analyses within national frames. This takes our 
understanding of national performance in global rankings beyond the usual approach of 
aggregate levels of analysis that do not explore the paths of individual institutions within 
national locations. 
The analysis of individual institutional pathways within nations over time generated a large 
amount of data. This led to the development of an innovative methodological strategy to 
compress the data into a manageable and intuitively comprehensible format, while 
retaining ‘closeness’ to the intrinsic variability of rankings data. This method is set out in 
Chapter 4. 
The detailed case study analysis provides insight into the kinds of levers available to an 
individual institution, the way in which those levers resonate with the existing literature, 
and the consequences of significant organisation change. It is both a study of ‘rankings 
success’ against the odds, and simultaneously something of a cautionary tale. As such, it 
provides a testing ground for a number of attributes that have been associated with 
‘successful universities’, both in the context of rankings success and beyond.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
In Chapter 2, the influence and impact of global rankings systems is explored in relation to 
both national systems of higher education and individual institutions. The chapter begins 
with an historical overview of the development of global rankings, followed by a summary 
of the major criticisms that have developed in counterpoint to the rise of rankings tables. 
Attention then turns to the way in which global rankings have impacted on nations and 
higher educations institutions, and on their responses. 
Chapter 3 builds on the preceding chapter in order to explore what the literature has to 
offer in terms of the potential for individual institutions to move up or down the rankings 
tables. The core intellectual mystery at the heart of this thesis is with the kinds of policy 
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and practice levers that could be effective for universities wishing to move up the rankings 
tables ‘against the odds’. Several kinds of literature are examined to glean potential clues, 
beginning by revisiting the rankings literature itself, then moving to the literature on 
successful universities and change specifically in the university context and concluding by 
considering what might be learnt from the broader literature on organisational change.  
Chapter 4 sets out the methodological approach employed in the study, including the 
development of the research questions, the meta-theoretical paradigm and the rational for 
the selection of a mixed methods case study approach in addressing this line of research 
inquiry. The implications and limitations of the methodology are reviewed.  
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the thesis. Chapter 5 is a quantitative 
investigation of the performance of individual institutions within the context of their 
national environment, using two major global rankings (the THE and the ARWU) and the 
THE Young Universities ranking. The chapter explores the extent to which rankings 
success can be achieved by individual universities, beginning with the University of 
Canberra, and moving progressively outward to the national and then international 
comparative context. 
Chapters 6 and 7 present an analysis of change at the University of Canberra, an institution 
in pursuit of international rankings success. Chapter 6 draws on university reports, 
presentations, performance metrics and interviews with senior management to describe the 
process and content of change at the University over three successive stages of 
organisational change. In Chapter 7, the central concern moves from the ‘what’ and ‘how’ 
of change at the University to the ‘why’, and more specifically with exploring from the 
perspective of the senior management team why the University of Canberra was able to 
move up the rankings. Key elements addressed concern what worked, what didn’t, what 
were the costs and what the benefits. 
Chapter 8 presents a discussion of the findings in the context of the guiding literature in 
relation to each of the three core questions addressed in the thesis. It also summarises the 
conclusions of the thesis, including its contributions to the higher education literature and 




Chapter 2 Global rankings: a review of the literature 
2.1 Introduction 
In the 15 years since the first international university rankings were released by Shanghai 
Jiao Tong University, global rankings have become a powerful force in higher education, 
influencing national policy, institutional strategy and practice, academic staff behaviour, 
student decision-making and industry engagement. For nations, the standing of their higher 
education institutions matters not only for intellectual prestige, but also for their ability to 
attract national and international research funding and potentially lucrative industry 
research and development partnerships. For countries such as Australia where the higher 
education system is heavily cross-subsidised by international student fees, rankings 
influence the attractiveness of universities to those students, and hence the robustness of 
the sector. With higher education the 3rd largest export earner in Australia, there are flow 
on effects for the balance of trade (Australian Government, 2017). For individual 
institutions, both reputation and access to resources (human and financial) are on the line, 
through the potential for enhanced attraction of high quality staff and students, educational 
fees and research grants. This makes good performance in the rankings important to 
established and upwardly mobile institutions alike.  
The core question addressed in this thesis concerns the upward movement of universities in 
global rankings. It sits at the intersection of three distinct literatures, each of which makes 
an important contribution to the topic at hand. The first of these, the literature on global 
rankings and higher education, is addressed in this chapter (Chapter 2). The opportunities 
and challenges facing individual institutions are closely linked to both their national higher 
education sector and policy environments, as well as to the international context as a 
consequence of the globalisation of higher education.  
The second set of literature concerns the pursuit by individual institutions of rankings 
achievements, as well as enhanced performance more broadly in the context of a changing 
and increasingly competitive higher education sector. The policy and practice change 
levers available to individual institutions are central to this thesis, and its focus on how 
universities might succeed in the rankings game ‘against the odds’. In exploring the kinds 
of responses available to individual institutions, the central question of thesis also led to 
the analysis of a third literature relating to organisational change, both within the university 
context and at the conceptual level. These literatures are reviewed in Chapter 3. 
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The present chapter begins with a section on context, including an overview of the 
historical development of global rankings, a description of the major rankings, and a 
summary of the key criticisms that have developed as counterpoint to the rise of this 
phenomenon. In the second section, the issue of how rankings influence higher education 
systems and institutions is examined, including the potential consequences for institutional 
homogeneity, shifts in institutional mission and impact on staff morale. The third section 
focuses on the responses of higher education to the rankings challenge, including the rise 
of competition, and the range of strategies employed in changing, joining, playing or 
‘gaming’ the rankings game. The emphasis in this chapter is on global rankings and the 
way in which they have interacted with higher education at the international, national and 
institutional levels. 
2.2 Context 
The relationship between what is measured by global rankings, what is meant by a high 
quality higher education institution and what is understood by the concept of a world class 
university is an uneasy one. There would be little disagreement with the statement that 
rankings are a collection of performance metrics that capture some aspects of quality, but 
not all. That rankings capture performance against metrics that describe a traditional model 
of excellence based in a western cultural context is also broadly agreed. The question as to 
whether rankings performance should be equated with world class university status is 
somewhat less clear, but there is a degree of acceptance that this conjuncture, whether right 
or wrong, has already come to pass.  
Hazelkorn (2015b) suggests that global ranking and world class status have arguably 
become interchangeable, reminding the reader that from its inception the Shanghai Jiao 
Tong ranking: 
was developed to highlight the position of Chinese universities vis-à-vis 
competitor universities in response to the government’s desire to establish 
world-class universities (Hazelkorn, 2015b, p.28).(emphasis added) 
Similarly, Lim and Oerberg (2017) discuss the way in which the concept of world class 
university has been equated with ‘top ranked’, and Shattock, while criticising the concept 
as ‘nebulous, ill-defined and redolent of public relations spin’ (2017, p.9) recognises that 
global rankings are used to legitimate claims to world class university status.  
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There is a strongly argued case that leading ranking systems (including the Academic 
Ranking of World Universities, Times Higher Education, Quacquarelli Symonds, Leiden 
and SCImago) uncritically accept and proselytise a particular kind of ‘world class 
university’, generally with a strong historical heritage, high levels of endowment, English 
speaking (and English publishing), incorporating the bio-medical sciences and a research 
intensive history and culture (Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Marginson, 2009, 
Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Sheil, 2012). 
Both Hazelkorn (2015b) and Shattock (2017) argue that the structure of rankings 
inherently privileges institutions that have benefited from long periods of high levels of 
resourcing. None of the top 50 institutions were founded less than 50 years ago, and most 
more than 100, arguably a demonstration of the Matthew principle: 
institutions that attract more resources at a certain point develop a permanent 
lead over their peers and accumulate a magnetic power to attract outstanding 
talent (Shattock, 2017, p.10). 
In this way, rankings are self-reinforcing, with an elite group of successful universities 
defining success in ways that ensure their own status and reputation continues by virtue of 
their control of the ‘rules of the game’. The rise of Asian universities propelled by large 
resource investments, a strong commitment to high levels of educational attainment and 
fuelled by large population bases, could lead to some shift in this traditional paradigm, but 
to date the western model of what constitutes world class excellence in universities itself 
remains largely unchallenged (Mok and Hallinger, 2013, Ishikawa, 2009, Li and Chen, 
2011).  
The inter-relationships among these concepts of highly ranked institutions, high quality 
higher education and world class universities are important and require acknowledgement. 
While not central to this thesis, it is recognised that in many ways the concepts of high 
quality higher education, world class universities and top global rankings are fellow 
travellers on a journey where higher education institutions are increasingly part of a 
competitive global knowledge economy.  
2.2.1 History 
The fifteen years since the release of the first global rankings have seen a number of 
definitional and historical accounts of global rankings systems, as well as assessments of 
strengths and weaknesses, benefits and costs to the higher education sector (Enders, 2014, 
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Hazelkorn, 2011, 2015b, Marginson, 2009, Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Shattock, 
2017).  
Hazelkorn (2011) commenced her highly influential and detailed study of the Impact and 
Influence of Rankings on Higher Education Decision-Making and Government 
Policymaking only two years after the publication of the first Shanghai Jiao Tong 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) in 2003 and the Times Higher 
Education Quacquarelli Symonds World University Rankings (THE-QS) in 2004. In that 
short period: 
 [I]it had become clear that global rankings were capturing the public’s and 
policymakers’ attention, and higher education institutions were taking notice 
and action (Hazelkorn, 2011, KL 120-126). 
Funding flowed from the OECD, the International Association of Universities and in 2008 
via the Institute of Higher Education Policy (funded by the Lumina Foundation.) to support 
the project, demonstrating significant international interest in the topic. Hazelkorn (2011, 
Ch.1) described a number of university, nation state and transnational entities (including 
the EU and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference) that produced statements of 
strategic intent within five years of the first release of the ARWU. In 2007, Marginson and 
van der Wende similarly emphasised the growing impact at both institutional and policy 
levels: 
The global rankings immediately secured great prominence in higher 
education, policy, and public arenas and have already had discernible effects in 
institutional and policy behaviours (Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, 
p.310).  
By 2011, the proliferation of international and national rankings scales had reached 59, 
with the majority of those being national (Hazelkorn, 2011). By 2018, the number had 
increased substantially, to more than 150 national or specialists rankings and just under 20 
global rankings (Hazelkorn, 2018).  
Many national schemes predate the international rankings. In 1983 the release of the first 
U.S. News and World Report Best College Rankings (USNWR) provided a nationally 
based consumer-oriented guide on reputation, inputs and outputs targeting college students 
and their parents. In Europe, the CHE-Hochschul Ranking was developed in 1998 by the 
Centre for Higher Education Development (Hazelkorn, 2015b).  
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Arguably, countries with strong well-established national rankings systems, and strong 
internal markets, exemplified by the UK, the USA and Canada, were slower to engage with 
global rankings in comparison to Australia and Asia. Hazelkorn (2015b, Ch.2) presents 
data indicating that Asian and Australian universities generally attach more importance to 
improved rankings positions than their European and North American counterparts. This is 
consistent with the findings of the HEFCE report that higher education institutions in 
England perceived national tables (Sunday Times University Guide, The Times Good 
University Guide and The Guardian University Guide) to be more important than global 
rankings (Locke et al., 2008). Similarly, in the USA, there was a strong perception that 
USNWR was more important than global tables developed and published in England, 
China and Europe (Redden, 2014). Australia, by contrast, was a relatively early adopter, 
with global rankings featuring in university marketing almost from their inception, and 
appearing in public strategic planning documents from 2006  in the case of RMIT, and 
2010 from the University of Melbourne (RMIT, 2008, University of Melbourne, 2010). 
Discussed openly by University of Canberra managers from 2008, by 2013 this had 
evolved to a specific public commitment to achieving a top 100 under 50 world university 
ranking (University of Canberra, 2013b). 
Following the release of the ARWU and THE-QS rankings, other international rankings 
emerged. These included Webometrics (first published by the Spanish National Research 
Council in 2004), the Taiwan Performance Ranking of Scientific Papers for Research 
Universities (HEEACT) in 2007, USNWR’s World’s Best Colleges and Universities in 
2008, the Leiden Ranking (2008), SCImago (2009), the Russian Global University 
Ranking (2009) and after the split between the Times Higher Education and Quacquarelli 
Symonds, separate QS World University Rankings and Times Higher Education (Thomson 
Reuters) World University Rankings (2010) (Hazelkorn, 2011). The Russian Round 
University rankings followed in 2010, in 2014, the first U-Multirank ranking was released, 
and in 2018 the THE Europe Teaching rankings were released, these last three arguably 
more oriented to teaching than earlier rankings (Holmes, 2018a, 2018b). Several of the 
more influential are briefly described below.  
To date, the Shanghai Jiao Tong ARWU and the Times Higher Education (THE) rankings 
retain their positions as the two most influential (Shattock, 2017), with the QS rankings 
also commonly cited but not as prominent as the other two. Some commentators position 
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these three rankings as the most influential (Yudkevich et al., 2015). Bekhradnia (2016) 
references the four main rankings’, including the above three plus U-Multirank. The 
ARWU rankings focus entirely on research performance, combining bibliographic metrics 
with several other measures (see Table 2.1). The THE-TR and QS rankings set their 
parameters more broadly, combining indicators of teaching ‘quality’, reputational survey 
data, and internationalisation measures with research performance metrics. 
The Leiden and SCImago rankings are differentiated by their exclusive focus on 
bibliometric indicators (Table 2.1), arguably providing a ‘purer’ measure of research 
performance, excluding the Nobel indicators, leading researcher metrics and the model of a 
composite index based on arbitrary weightings used in the ARWU (Marginson, 2009). 
SCImago uses SCOPUS citation data, and explicitly rejects the rankings model, with its 
web-site tag line of ‘Not Yet Another University Ranking’ and an emphasis on providing 
‘useful scientometric information to institutions…so they are able to analyse, evaluate and 
improve their research results’ and (capitals in original) ‘[T]he SIR reports ARE NOT 
LEAGUE TABLES’ (SCImago Research Group 2013) (capitalisation in the original). 
In 2008, the European Commission began developing U-Multirank, in part to provide a 
ranking with a European orientation, and critically to move away from the dominant model 
of a single composite measure generating an overall ranking in favour of identifying and 
ranking separate fields of activity, including teaching and learning and other measures of 
university performance. U-Multirank was designed from the outset to be accessed via a 
web tool interface, enabling users to identify the elements of most significance to them (U-
Multirank, 2013). The first ranking was released in 2014, and included five dimensions: 
teaching and learning, research, knowledge transfer, international orientation and regional 
engagement. The 2014 edition included a ‘whole of institution’ ranking as well as subject 
level rankings for a small number of fields of study, with the latter expanded in recent 
years (U-Multirank, 2018). Elements of this innovative multi-dimensional and interactive 
user-oriented approach were subsequently ‘adapted, and arguably surpassed, by the major 
players’ (Hazelkorn, 2018, p.6). 
Over time, the number of different kinds of rankings generated by the major players has 
proliferated. QS and THE both released their first subject based rankings in 2011. In 2012, 
the THE released its first ranking of ‘young universities’, closely followed by QS in 2013. 
The QS now publishes regional rankings for Asia, the Arab region, ‘Emerging Europe and 
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Central Asia, Latin America and BRICS, while the THE offers regional rankings for Latin 
America, the Emerging Economies (formerly BRICS), Japan and Asia.  
Another development has been the diversification of university rankings to explore 
additional metrics. One illustration of this phenomenon is the BOCOM (Bank of 
Communications) Sea Turtle Index, focused at the level of cities and emphasising the 
marketisation of international education. The Sea Turtle index focuses on five areas of 
‘return’ for investment or sub-indices which are weighted to form the headline indicator: 
educational returns, work experience, social experience, financial returns and real estate 
returns. The emphasis here is on the 41 million students studying overseas in 2010, the 
investment they and their families make, and the likely return for that investment (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit and the Bank of Communications, 2013). Another entrant is 
the Universitas Indonesia GreenMetric World University Ranking which aims to assess 
Green Campus initiatives and Sustainability in Universities all over the world (Universitas 
Indonesia, 2010). Both rankings are focussed on metrics which do not reproduce the 
traditional dominance of well-endowed, historically embedded, English-speaking research 
universities in their rankings scheme.  
Finally, the development of the QS Best Student Cities ranking (QS Top Universities, 
2018) is an intriguing ‘second order’ ranking, where eligibility is determined not only by 
such predictable elements as student views, affordability, and employer activity, but also 
an inclusion requirement that the city must have a minimum of two universities in the most 
recent QS World University Rankings.  
2.2.2 Summary of five influential rankings 
Five major rankings systems are succinctly summarised in Table 1, covering inclusion 
criteria, indicators and associated weights and data sources (Moed, 2016). These five 
comprise the three ‘dominant’ rankings (THE, QS and ARWU) and an additional two 
influential rankings (Leiden and U-Multirank) (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Horseman, 2018, Lim 
and Øerberg, 2017, Shattock, 2017). Further detailed analyses of the methodologies and 
measures underpinning these rankings are available elsewhere (Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 
2015b). 
In addition to the measurement aspects of the rankings, there are also underlying issues of 
orientation and context. Lim and Øerberg (2017) differentiate among the three main 
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ranking entities, describing the use of objective indicators by the ARWU and its academic 
setting in Shanghai Jiao Tong University, the media base of the THE and it increasing 
investment in data analytics, and the QS as a more business oriented ranking system in the 
context of a consulting firm. The authors also identify differences in audiences, particularly 
for the THE (senior academics and ‘thought leaders’) and the QS (international students). 
2.2.3 Criticisms  
The rise of global rankings has been accompanied by the development of an increasingly 
sophisticated counterpoint of criticism and dissent. Such detailed critiques are not 
intrinsically germane to the core questions of this thesis, and are dealt with here only at a 
summary level. 
The core methodological criticisms of rankings have been explored in detail in the 
literature. They are broad ranging, concerning the details of rankings methodologies, with 
weighting systems, with what is and what is not measured , the unit of analysis 
(universities versus programmes), the representativeness of survey populations and the 
adequacy of response rates, the statistical significance of reported differences, the use of 
absolute output metrics versus per capita or equivalent metrics which take account of 
institutional size, and their susceptibility to ‘gaming’ by modifications to the data supplied 
for the rankings process (Bekhradnia, 2016, Harvey, 2008, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.2, 
Holmes, 2015, Johnes, 2018, Marginson, 2014, Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, 
Shattock, 2017). The quality of data remains a perennial concern (Bekhradnia, 2016). 
Appropriateness of a single metric 
There is a ‘higher level’ methodological debate about the appropriateness of any single 
metric based ranking system to measure the performance of a diverse higher education 
sector across many different countries, leading to arguments in favour of multiple indices 
(for research, teaching, internationalisation etc.) which are not added together (Billaut et 
al., 2010). This rejection of a single metric drove the development of U-Multirank (Ziegele 
and van Vught, 2017) and is used in promotional material for the QS star rating system (as 





Table 2.1 Comparison of Five Global  Ranking Systems  
Aspect   ARWU World University Rankings 2015 CWTS Leiden ranking 2016 QS World University Rankings 2015–2016 THE World University Rankings 2015–2016 U-Multirank 2016 Edition 
Website  http://www.shanghairanking.com/ARWU2015.html http://www.leidenranking.com/ http://www.topuniversities. com/university-rankings https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings 
http://www.umultirank.org  
Universities included  
Every university that has any Nobel Laureates, Fields Medallists, Highly Cited Researchers, or papers published in Nature or Science, or significant amount of papers indexed by SCIE/SSCI. The best 500 are published on the web 
All 842 universities worldwide with more than 1000 fractionally counted Web of Science indexed core publications in the period 2011–2014 are included inthe ranking  
918 universities are included  800 universities with at least 200 articles per year published in journals indexed in Scopus, and teaching at least undergraduates in each year during 2010–2014 
In principle all higher education institutions can register for participation. The current version includes about 1300 institutions. 
Indicators/ dimensions and their weights 
Quality of Education Alumni (10%) Awards (20%) Quality of Faculty Highly cited researchers (20%) Publ. in Nature, Science  (20%) Research output Publications (20%) Per Capita Performance (10%) 
Publication counts Articles in English, authored, in core journals Citation Impact Nr., % top 1, 10, 50% publications Mean Normalizd Citation Rate Collaboration Nr., % publ. from different institutions Nr., % publ. with geographical collab distance under 100 or over 5000 km 
Academic Reputation (40%), based on QS survey Employer Reputation, based on QS survey (10%) Faculty Student Ratio (20%) Citations per Faculty (20%) International Students (10%) International Faculty (10%) 
Performance indicators Teaching (30%), mainly based on reputation survey International Outlook (7.5%) Research (30%), mainly based on reputation survey Citations (30%) Industry Income (2.5%)  
Over 30 indicators covering the following main dimensions Teaching and learning Research Knowledge transfer International orientation Regional engagement Typical examples of indicators: Quality of teaching (based on survey); citation rate; income from regional sources; nr. spin offs 
Data sources used  
Databases on Nobel prizes and Field Medals Thomson-Reuters Web of Knowledge and HiCi researchers; data on academic staff from national agencies 
All bibliometric data are extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science  
QS Academic Reputation Survey; self-reported data from universities; data from government and other agencies; bibliometric data from Elsevier’s Scopus 
THE Reputation Surveys; self-reported data from universities; bibliometric data from Elsevier’s Scopus  
U-Multirank student surveys; self-reported data from universities; bibliometric data from Web of Science and PATSTAT database on patents 
Source: (Moed, 2016)  
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Inadequate focus on education 
The major rankings are criticised for their strong focus on research, with little or no 
emphasis on education quality. Indeed, the absence of measures relevant to education is as 
much a source of criticism as is the nature of any metrics that are employed.  
Staff-student ratios are a commonly used metric, more because the data are readily 
available than because of intrinsic value (Bekhradnia, 2016, Marginson and van der 
Wende, 2007). Student satisfaction measures, while possessing more face validity, are 
criticised as being not only open to manipulation, but also potential drivers of lower quality 
educational outcomes as popularity can drive out excellence in what is seen by some as a 
‘race to the bottom’. The relationship between student satisfaction and quality of education 
is not uncontested (Bedggood and Donovan, 2012, Mark, 2013). Some commentators 
argue that research metrics can be predictive of student success and satisfaction, and more 
so than some teaching oriented measures (Holmes, 2017a). The educational missions of 
universities have traditionally proved resistant to capture via simple metrics. 
New developments in performance metrics such as the Teaching Excellence Framework in 
the UK and in the development of rankings that endeavour to better reflect teaching (U-
Multirank and the THE European Teaching Rankings) have yet to significantly redress this 
imbalance, but the impact of such developments will inevitably take some time. At this 
time, there are no internationally comparable teaching metrics (Hazelkorn, 2015b). 
Consistency across rankings tables 
The lack of consistency across ranking tables has been used to question the validity of their 
results. For example, Moed (2016) concluded that analysis of the five major ranking 
systems demonstrated that there was no identifiable group of ‘the’ top 100 universities, 
with only 35 institutions included in the top 100 lists of all five systems. On the other hand, 
Shattock (2017) uses similar information to argue that the main conclusion to be drawn 
was consistency over time, with the same institutions retaining their position in the 
rankings hierarchy. The frame can be either difference or similarity, but there does appear 
to be agreement that a set of institutions appear at the top of several rankings systems and 
remain there over time—but not all institutions. 
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Reputational measures 
The inclusion of ‘reputational measures’ (used by the THE and QS) raises the issue that 
perceptions fuelled by existing rankings are being used as an input to future rankings, 
creating a circularity in the rankings process. Critics also argue that the reputational survey 
component rewards the achievements of university marketing departments more than it 
does academic achievement in boosting rankings performance (Marginson, 2007). These 
criticisms apply to reputational surveys in both research and teaching quality. There is an 
inherent disadvantage for newer universities, or those building their reputations, as lag 
factors mean that institutions with long established reputation will inevitably perform 
better. There is evidence of geographical bias, with English speaking countries being more 
heavily represented (Bekhradnia, 2016, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.2, Kehm, 2014, Marginson 
and van der Wende, 2007, Salmi and Saroyan, 2007).  
On a broader issue of potential geographical bias, Moed demonstrated substantial 
geographical differences among the five major rankings:  
It follows that the systems define the ‘world’ in different manners, and that….. 
each system has a proper orientation or bias, namely U-Multirank towards 
Europe, ARWU towards North America, Leiden ranking towards emerging 
Asian countries, and QS and THE towards Anglo-Saxon countries (Moed, 2016, 
p.984). 
Citation metrics 
While some assume citation measures are an ‘objective’ measure, others argue that citation 
rates also have inbuilt biases – they are closely correlated to English language journals, to 
large ‘self-citing’ societies such as the USA, and to article-based fields, including multi-
author publishing, particularly privileging the hard and medical sciences (Altbach, 2006, 
Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Holmes, 2015, Ishikawa, 2009, Li and Chen, 2011, 
Marginson, 2009, Mok and Hallinger, 2013, Salmi and Saroyan, 2007, Soh, 2013, Tofallis, 
2012). Citation rates can be manipulated via gaming (Holmes, 2017a), a point which is 
discussed further in Section 2.4. The bias in favour of science and against the humanities, 
arts and social sciences has been partially addressed by the broadening of the databases 
used, but differential patterns of publishing and the nature of inquiry within disciplines and 
fields mean that disadvantages remain. The criticisms of citations are only partially 
addressed by inclusion of normalised or field weighted citations. Hazelkorn, referring to 
the use of citation metrics in general, commented: 
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The chorus is growing for adopting a broader approach to assessing university 
based-research ….. and making a clean break with citations (Hazelkorn, 
2015b, p.80). 
Internationalisation metrics 
Internationalisation metrics, particularly those based on the proportion of overseas staff 
and students, are criticised as simultaneously re-inforcing the marketization of 
international higher education and inappropriately boosting the performance of particular 
countries, with the UK and Australia being commonly cited examples (Marginson, 2007). 
The definition of international also comes into play. Holmes cites the curious example the 
THE separating Hong Kong and Mainland China in the 2016 rankings, with the result that 
the number of ‘international’ collaborators increased as did the international orientation 
scores (Holmes, 2016a). 
Nobel prize winners and Fields medallists 
There are a number of other elements that have attracted specific criticisms of metrics to 
particular ranking systems. Foremost among these is the ARWU metric based on Nobel 
prize winners and Fields medallists, partly because it advantages large, long established, 
science-based institutions (Nobel prizes in peace or literature are excluded from the 
ARWU ranking index) and partly because it is heavily skewed in favour of wealthy nations 
(Altbach, 2006, Marginson and van der Wende, 2007). The ARWU now provides a 
ranking option that excludes Nobel prize-winners and Fields medallists as well as its 
traditional version.  
This brief overview of context, history and major methodological strands of criticism 
evident in the rankings literature has stopped short of some important but less well 
articulated areas of debate. One example is the limited analysis of the relationship between 
global rankings, ‘quality’, and national research assessment exercises of the kind now 
commonplace in the UK (REF), Australia (RAE) and New Zealand (PBRF) (Edgar and 
Geare, 2013). The work of Pascarella (2001), Dill and Soo (2005), Salmi and colleagues 
(Salmi, 2009, Salmi and Saroyan, 2007), and O’Connell (2013) are important contributions 
to this scant literature, yet the relative absence or analysis on this topic raises interesting 
questions about the nature and shape of the global rankings debate.  
Chapter 2 Global rankings 
35  
2.3 Consequences 
Ten years ago, this discussion would have commenced with an assessment of whether 
rankings do or do not matter, rather than with their spheres of influence and the forms that 
influence takes. Even five years ago, there would have been some attention devoted to 
justifying that global rankings have implications for institutions, national education 
policies and the higher education system. Times have moved on. Now the debates are 
about the nature and pervasiveness of the influence, and about the spheres in which those 
influences operate. There is also consideration of the negative consequences, both actual 
and potential, of ‘the simplistic beauty of rankings systems’ and their ‘seductive and 
coercive power’ (Enders, 2014, p.16).  
These influences are generally described and discussed at three levels: internationally in 
the context of the global higher education market or the higher education sector (for 
example O’Connell, 2013), nationally in the context of national policies, particularly 
higher education polices (for example Mok and Hallinger, 2013), and individually with a 
focus on universities themselves (for example Elken et al., 2016). These levels of influence 
are not discrete, and indeed interact with each other. Neither are these interactions and 
influences unidirectional in nature. While higher rankings may impact and influence 
through reputation, and through reputation to revenue and resources, the consequences are 
also influenced by the responses of both nations and universities. 
Rankings influence reputation, and through reputation both revenue and resources. 
Revenue and resources may flow from student fees, research grants, other forms of 
government grants, through community or industry grants and partnerships and 
philanthropy. In a contemporary age, there are also potential financial benefits to be gained 
from start-ups and university owned companies based on innovation, as well as more 
traditional areas such as patents. All of this in its turn feeds reputation. This cycle is 
perhaps one of the central reasons why rankings have gained increasing leverage in higher 
education, and why criticisms, no matter how intellectually well founded, have gained no 
serious traction.  
2.3.1 Institutional homogeneity 
If rankings affect reputation and resources, universities and national governments are likely 
to respond in terms of the attributes valued in ranking systems. By responding within the 
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rules of the game, research performance or internationalisation metrics may be pursued as 
ends in themselves, with less attention to other strategic imperatives—with rankings tables 
reinforcing the pursuit of one particular kind of world class university (see Section 2.2). 
This in turn raises concerns that ranking systems will lead to increased homogeneity 
through the ideological capture of nations and institutions alike by the rankings game 
(Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Marginson, 2009, Sheil, 2012). 
Concerns about the methodological underpinnings of rankings tables thus quickly 
transition to conceptual and policy concerns that such ranking systems both assume and 
drive homogeneity in higher education. In a diverse and changing world, multiple kinds 
(size, research or teaching focussed, fields of study) of higher education institutions are 
needed to suit the particular purposes in particular countries and regions (Billaut et al., 
2010, Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Salmi, 2009, Salmi and Saroyan, 2007, 
Marginson, 2009).  
Nationally, some governments have sought to address the potential drive toward 
homogenisation by establishing individual institutional compacts, encouraging universities 
and colleges to identify their areas of differentiation and include them in ‘mission 
compacts’ or ‘mandates’ (Pizarro Milian, 2017). Australia, Ireland and Canada (Alberta 
and Ontario) have all moved in this direction in recent years. With limited or no financial 
incentives, however, such models are hamstrung in their ability to counteract the upward 
aspirations of individual institutions, many of which have been captured by the idea of the 
reputational and resource gains to be made by moving up the reputation ladder. Even apart 
from the lure of rankings, higher education institutions have a tendency to experience 
mission drift, as in the case of the movement of Irish Institutes of Technology up the 
national higher education qualifications scale and toward increased research performance, 
and from there to pursuit of reclassification as ‘Technological Universities’. This evolution 
from Institutes and Colleges to Universities is a recognisable historical pattern elsewhere, 
including the post-Dawkins universities in Australia in 1988 and the post-1992 universities 
in the UK.  
Focusing on and pursuing on one model of excellence at the level of the individual 
institution may have unintended consequences for the higher education system as a whole. 
As Hazelkorn pithily concluded: 
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Such an approach promotes world-class universities rather than world-class 
systems (Hazelkorn, 2018, p.19). 
National priorities may not be best served by the pursuit of world class universities.  
Aspiring to individual institutional excellence for some may inevitably lead to lower levels 
of resourcing for the many—a ‘two-tier’ or vertically differentiated university system. 
Salmi (2009) argued that the pursuit of world class excellence clearly requires a degree of 
differentiation, as not all institutions are or can be created equal. The result may be 
national systems dominated by vertical differentiation in their higher education systems, 
with a small set of privileged institutions (and staff and students) at the top, and a large 
rump with more limited resources. Some countries have a tradition of inequality within 
their higher education sectors, others are more focussed on equity of access and equitable 
distribution of resources. If funding is channelled to specific elite institutions to ensure that 
individual nation states are represented in the ‘top 100’, while other priorities such as 
broadly based socio-economic access and the availability of an array of educational options 
are pushed aside, then tensions emerge between national educational priorities and the 
pursuit of rankings, and between the civic mission and values of a university, and its 
pursuit of rankings position. 
The allocation of resources in the pursuit of rankings is likely to be an expensive exercise, 
whether at the national or institutional level, and in many instances, if not most, it is also 
likely to be unsuccessful (Altbach and Hazelkorn, 2017a, Shattock, 2017). If decisions are 
not taken for the public good, and scare public resources are allocated with the sole aim of 
moving up the tables, then the morality of such decision may be questioned. Moreover, 
such actions are likely to lead to the further intensification of the marketisation of 
international higher education (Enders, 2014).  
2.3.2 The consequences for teaching 
The failure of the major rankings to capture the educational mission of universities is 
widely recognised. This failure has the potential for negative impacts through reduced 
value and resources associated with the teaching functions of universities (Hazelkorn, 
2007, 2011, Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Pizarro Milian, 2017, Shattock, 2017). 
These concerns pertain to institutional missions, to the education of students and to the 
situation of staff within the university sector. 
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Historically, tertiary education has been seen as the primary function of universities, 
providing professional and technical skills as well as creating the social and cultural capital 
essential to contemporary society. At a time when the transition to knowledge-intensive 
economies has place a higher premium on human capital than ever before, and the 
demographic patterns in developed countries are affected by the greying of the baby 
boomer generation and a falling percentage of young people (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.1), the 
talent wars are on our doorstep. The education functions of universities are important.  
If research excellence is pursued to the detriment of educational quality, then arguably 
institutional missions can be distorted in pursuit of particular kinds of performance metrics. 
There is little evidence that rankings performance and teaching quality go hand in hand, 
and indeed some to the contrary (Pike 2004). While there is little evidence to date that 
educational quality has actively suffered, the literature resonates with concern that this 
could happen. Logically, such a pattern would be difficult to detect in its early stages, 
given the limited longitudinal data on educational outputs, and presumably difficult to 
arrest and reverse in the longer term. 
The impact on staff, as well as institutions, has also been questioned. If research is the 
measure of prestige and teaching is a sideline that must be completed to get by, then what 
is arguably the larger mission of the university is at risk (Hazelkorn, 2007, 2011, 
Marginson and van der Wende, 2007). If staff for whom teaching is a priority are forced 
out of the university sector or down the reputational ‘food chain’ to less and less well-
regarded institutions, then the human capital of the sector is inevitably eroded. If high 
performing researchers or research departments are rewarded to the detriment of others, 
then tensions and problems of morale are a likely consequence (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.3). 
If staff are set high performance standards in both teaching and research, work pressure 
escalates (Leisyte et al., 2009). If students receive a qualification with a higher reputational 
value but less intrinsic educational value, then we might expect consequences for the 
tertiary education sector, and society more broadly, in the long run. According to Altbach 
and Hazelkorn: 
Teaching and undergraduate students, as well as the arts, humanities and 
social sciences, often take a backseat when decisions are made or resources are 
allocated. Some universities report preferential attention and benefit being 
given to research ‘stars’ over longer-employed or domestic faculty (Altbach 
and Hazelkorn, 2017a, p.9).  
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2.3.3 Discipline mix 
The quote above also serves to highlight the potential for adverse impacts on disciplinary 
mix. It is well-recognised that some disciplines lend themselves to higher research 
rankings performances than others, in particular the hard and medical sciences are 
advantaged and the humanities and liberal arts disadvantaged. Language teaching is 
perhaps one of the classic examples of an area which will inevitably underperform in 
research terms; yet it underpins international exchange and communication and the broader 
internationalisation agenda.  
It is difficult to draw a causal link between global rankings and the falling numbers of 
language departments across universities in both Australia and the UK. But there is 
evidence of the rise of medical and hard sciences as nations and universities become 
increasingly pre-occupied with demonstrable productivity and research impact. In 2016 
Yale, arguably one of the world’s universities least likely to need to set strategies that align 
with rankings performance, announced just such an intention, based on the perceived 
‘discrepancy’ between its top 3 performance in national rankings and their 10–15th 
performance in global ones: 
This discrepancy points to an opportunity, and that opportunity is science, as it 
is the sciences that most differentiate Yale from those above us on such lists 
(Yale spokesperson quoted in Holmes, 2016b, para. 6). 
Performance and impact are harder to demonstrate in the social sciences then in the 
sciences, and harder again in the arts and humanities. This tension has not gone 
unchallenged (Hazelkorn, 2015a, Withers et al., 2017), but it is set to continue.  
2.3.4 Morale 
Performance in global rankings can affect staff morale outside the teaching versus research 
tension described above. The 2008 HEFCE report found that: 
Staff are affected by league tables. Despite widespread scepticism about league 
tables and their methodologies within HEIs, rankings affect staff morale (Locke 
et al., 2008, p.6).  
Hazelkorn (2015b) also argues that staff are affected by rankings position, feeling more 
positive if their institution is well ranked. More indirectly, staff benefit from the flow-on 
effects of higher institutional rankings, not only in relation to ‘hard’ indicators such as 
access to resources but morale is also positively influenced by the ability to recruit high 
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performing staff. The corollary is that staff are negatively impacted when key positions 
remain unfilled or attract less well qualified candidates.  
2.3.5 The benefits  
The preceding sections have canvassed various potential effects of the pursuit of improved 
rankings performance. They include homogenisation of the higher education sector, pursuit 
of institutional excellence to the detriment of sector wide excellence, vertical 
differentiation within the sector, with some agendas suffering and others advantaged, the 
increased marketisation of higher education, the neglect of educational functions and 
associated consequences at the sector, staff and student levels, pressure on staff to meet 
sometimes conflicting objectives, distortion of discipline mix, and adverse effects on staff 
morale. There appears to have been more written on the potential negative aspects of the 
growth in influence of global rankings, than there has on the positive. 
Are there benefits? Rankings can support evidence of performance (for those at the top) in 
an increasingly competitive and commodified higher education section. As higher 
education is drawn ever more closely into the maelstrom of knowledge production in 
knowledge-based economies in a globalised world, being able to demonstrate (or claim to 
demonstrate) performance is attractive, albeit more so for those higher up the rankings 
ladder.  
But what else? Marginson addresses what may well be the central potential benefit, asking 
whether or not rankings improve quality. He describes the potential for a virtuous circle 
‘between ranking, strategy, efforts to improve, better performance, then back to better 
ranking, and so on’ (Marginson, 2017, p.7). However, there are problems, including the 
absence of attention to teaching and learning, the disciplines where the research metrics are 
outside the virtuous circle, such as the humanities and most professional disciplines, and 
the differences amongst rankings themselves. For science, and publication/citation based 
rankings (ARWU, Leiden and SCImago), he is positive about rankings driving better 
research and increased investment in university scientific capacity, but in other disciplines, 
in teaching and learning, and in multi-indicator metrics (THE and QS), much less so 
(Marginson, 2017).  
One more straightforward area of improvement is undoubtedly better data, both within 
institutions and across the higher education sector. As early as 2009, the HEFCE report on 
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the impacts of league tables in the United Kingdom noted as a key finding the 
improvement in data quality and data submissions by higher education institutions (Locke 
et al., 2008). Hazelkorn (2015b, Ch.3) took this a step further to document the rise of 
institutional research or strategic planning units targeting not only the monitoring of 
results, but importantly assessing and improving the quality of the institutions data and its 
submissions. Other authors have drawn attention to the improvement in data quality and 
the enhanced attention to data compilation that has come in the wake of global rankings 
(Lim and Øerberg, 2017), as well as the risks attendant on failing to pay attention to data 
quality (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, Sauder and Espeland, 2009).  
Finally, where better resourcing has flowed to universities either as a result of nations 
seeking to achieve better rankings performance or because of enhanced reputation, it is 
possible to suggest this is a positive outcome. To the extent that other institutions, 
potentially with equally important missions, are disadvantaged then the positive outcome 
for one is not necessarily a positive outcome for the sector or society. The rise of new types 
of rankings, particularly field-based rankings, the regional rankings and the young 
universities rankings, provide an interesting twist on this familiar tale. While the hegemony 
of the major rankings remains largely unchallenged, the alternate rankings inevitably create 
alternate spheres in which performance can be recognised and rewarded. The 
differentiation of rankings may thus eventually contribute to the development of a broader 
suite of definitions of world class universities. 
2.4 Rankings and higher education: the response 
Commentators have varied in their views on the extent to which rankings shape university 
strategy or national policy. Over time, however, as rankings have garnered increasing 
attention, there has been a degree of convergence on recognising rankings as an important 
force. In 2008, a major report by the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE) indicated that while English universities may have responded to league tables 
and rankings in various ways, they were not making strategic decisions on core 
institutional activities in response to them (Locke et al., 2008). Hazelkorn’s international 
work at a similar point in time suggested stronger engagement, with ‘the majority of 
respondents have [ing] taken either strategic or academic decisions or actions’ (2007, 
p.12). Her subsequent work (2011, 2015b) demonstrated the growth of this influence, and  
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how rankings continue to drive profound transformation of our higher 
education systems and institutions’ (Hazelkorn, 2015b, p.xi). 
Higher education has been subject to substantial pressures and changes in recent decades. 
It is not my intention in this thesis to suggest that rankings are the key driver of higher 
education reform, but rather that in the context of the globalisation of higher education 
they have influenced and mediated responses at both the national and university level. The 
process by which this occurs is attracting increasing attention (Lim and Øerberg, 2017), 
although disentangling the effect of rankings from other drivers including the rise of a 
knowledge intensive international economy and the marketization of higher education 
presents difficulties (Naidoo et al., 2011, Olssen and Peters, 2005).  
In focusing on responses to global rankings, this section focuses initially on the interplay 
between global rankings and competition at both the national and institutional levels. It 
subsequently explores four somewhat more specific sets of responses, summarised herein 
under the rubrics of changing the game, joining the game, playing the game and gaming 
the game. 
2.4.1 Global rankings and competition 
In an increasingly market driven higher education sector, global rankings make visible and 
legitimise a view that universities can be, and indeed have been, clearly ranked against 
each other on an agreed standard of excellence. Over recent decades, the much-discussed 
globalisation and internationalisation of higher education has brought in its wake 
competition amongst institutions as much as it has led to collaboration (Enders, 2004). 
More recently, Shattock has argued that rankings have intensified the level of competition 
among universities (2017). At the national level, Hazelkorn describes the response as 
approaching a ‘policy panic’: 
 with policymakers making a simple correlation between rankings, (elite) 
higher education and global competitiveness(Hazelkorn, 2015b, p.170). 
Internationally and nationally, universities are in competition to secure the best students, 
the best staff, the best collaborative partnerships and the best funding, whether it be for 
research, education or infrastructure, from government sources, industry, philanthropy or 
student fees.  
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Many national ranking systems were initially developed to inform prospective students, 
and global rankings are now used in a similar way in both the domestic and international 
contexts. Competition for domestic students is typically about securing the highest 
performing entrants, but in Australia competition was intensified by the uncapping of 
Commonwealth funded places from 2012.  
The Australian higher education sector is heavily dominated by public sector universities. 
Under the current funding model, Commonwealth supported courses (broadly all 
undergraduate courses and a minority of postgraduate courses) attract both a 
Commonwealth contribution (paid direct to the institution) and a student contribution. 
Students may opt to pay their fees ‘up front’, but typically access an attractive income 
contingent loan scheme, the Higher Education Loan Programme (HELP), which has been 
available in one form or other for 30 years. Other sources of government revenue include 
infrastructure and research funding programmes, domestic student fees for ‘full fee paying 
courses’ and international student fees. 
Until the full implementation of the demand driven system in 2012, the Federal 
government funding model shaped the nature of the University sector via its control of 
Commonwealth Supported Places (CSPs), typically managed on a bi-lateral basis between 
the Department and each individual university. This constrained not only the total number 
of places on offer in an institution, but also the broad fields of education to which they 
were allocated. Between 2009 and 2014, the number of CSPs increased from 440,000 to 
601,000 (Noonan, 2015). This shift occurred against an historical context where per 
student funding had deteriorated since 1994 (Australian Government Department of 
Education, 2011). The shift to demand driven funding had several implications for 
universities.  
First and foremost, the opportunity for growth in CSP supported student numbers provided 
the opportunity for growth in revenue. This led directly to increased competition, both for 
student numbers and for high performing students. The results were immediately evident in 
increased advertising expenditure targeting the domestic market, increased use of global 
rankings by universities where that option was available, and in increased student 
admissions. Less obvious but arguably more pernicious was the subsequent widespread 
manipulation of entry requirements so that reputation could be maintained (and 
competitive standing enhanced) via high publicly available entry scores, supplemented by 
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various covert practices which allowed entry to students with much lower entry scores in 
order to maximise student numbers and revenue. This widespread mis-representation of 
entry requirements led to a major review and changed Federal Government reporting 
requirements on admissions in Australia (Higher Education Standards Panel, 2016).  
Competition for international students is driven by prestige factors, attraction of high 
quality talent and in some countries financial incentives in the form of international student 
fees. In the UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, there has been a significant 
reliance on international student fees to support university budgets (Adnett, 2010, Green 
and Ferguson, 2012, Marginson, 2011a, Marginson, 2011b). In Australia, international 
students fees have been used to cross-subsidise domestic students and research activity for 
decades, and beyond the university level, international education is a significant part of the 
economy. In 2016–17, international education activity contributed $28.6 billion to the 
economy, making it Australia’s largest services export industry and its third largest export 
industry overall (Australian Government, 2017).  
While the Commonwealth government tightly controlled domestic student numbers and 
fees, Australian universities were given control over international student numbers and fees 
from the 1980s (Zigarus, 2011), creating strong financial incentives for universities to 
increase their international student enrolments. Between 1986 and 1991 full fee-paying 
students increased from 2,000 to 48,000 (Marginson et al., 2010). Rapid growth in 
international student numbers continued through the 1990s and 2000s. While the United 
States and the United Kingdom have a larger share of international students (28% and 11% 
respectively, to Australia’s 7%), international students make up a much larger proportion 
of the higher education student population in Australia (24% in 2017) than elsewhere 
(Institute of International Education, 2018). As the proportion of international students in 
the system increased, so the stage was set for the growing economic reliance of Australian 
universities on international students (Adnett, 2010, Marginson and van der Wende, 2007). 
Although there is no evidence of a downturn in the demand for international education 
(Zigarus, 2011 p.118), there is evidence of increased competition for international students 
(Altbach and Welch, 2011). From 2009, for example, as public universities in the USA 
began to encounter reductions in public funding (and reduced investment earnings from 
endowment funds), full fee paying international students become increasingly attractive 
(Green and Ferguson, 2012). In the United Kingdom, Naidoo (2010) suggested that while 
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British universities had largely been able to rely on ‘brand’ attraction in the past, the 
increasing competition for international students may require more aggressive recruitment 
strategies at the institutional level. 
In the last decade, Germany, Japan, France, New Zealand and Canada have also 
implemented strategies to increase their attractiveness to international students (Institute of 
International Education, 2018). Moreover, increased levels of provision in South-east Asia 
have further diversified sources of competition. Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong and 
China are not only building capacity for domestic markets, but have explicitly indicated 
their intentions to attract significant numbers of international students (Mok, 2011, 
Mazzarol and Soutar, 2008, Yang and Welch, 2012, Zigarus, 2011). 
There is now substantial evidence that global and national rankings are taken into account 
by students and their parents in selecting an overseas university. Mazzarol and Soutar’s 
influential study identified reputation as a key determinant in attracting international 
students over a decade and a half ago (2002), while more recently Hazelkorn (2015b) has 
demonstrated the use of rankings employing a variety of evidentiary sources. Data from the 
large scale International Student Barometer Survey covering students from 200 nations 
indicate that while rankings are important, students from Asia (the major source of 
Australia’s international students) placed more emphasis on rankings and reputation than 
students from other geographic regions (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.4).  
There is also some evidence to suggest that the correlation between rankings and the 
number of applications may be more important for less well-established universities 
compared to more established ones , a result that may apply to Australian universities 
regardless of their age and status. The University of Melbourne was reportedly 15% below 
its international student enrolment target prior to being ranked 22nd in the world in the 
2004 THE-QS ranking; the following year it met its target with ease (Hazelkorn, 2015b, 
Ch.4). Other data suggest that rankings are of particular importance to international 
students attending Australian universities, with between 64 and 70% citing rankings as the 
key determinant of university choice (Lawrence 2009; 2013; cited in Hazelkorn (2015b, 
Ch.4)). 
Rankings are also used by governments and foreign aid organisations that provide financial 
support for international study. Scholarships provisions have been tied to universities that 
are highly ranked in countries including Brazil, Chile, and Russia (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.5, 
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Marginson, 2012). In 2014, Russian President Vladamir Putin initiated a scholarship 
programme for high performing graduates to undertake study abroad—but only in leading 
universities included in the ‘the three world rankings’ (Sudakov, 2014).  
The competition, of course, is not only concerned with international students. With the 
globalisation of higher education has come greater geographic mobility of academic staff, 
with concomitant competition for high quality staff amongst universities world-wide 
(Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Wildavsky, 2010). National research assessment 
exercises as well as global ranking scales have led institutions to recruit more aggressively 
for talented academic staff. The world-wide growth of higher education has further fuelled 
the demand for highly qualified academics. In a circle of continuing re-inforcement the 
Internationalisation of university staff provide opportunities for further recruitment 
pathways through personal networks, in a curious echo of the historical patterns of ‘chain 
migration’ whereby family members and townspeople followed other earlier immigrants, 
written about in periods of mass immigration to Australia, Canada and the US over half a 
century ago. The ability to attract and retain high quality academic staff is part of the cycle 
of resources and reputation which fuels future rankings performance.  
In the competitive world of higher education, industry partnerships are important 
revenue and resource streams at both the institutional and the national level, and global 
ranking position can help attract high quality partnerships. Similarly, partnerships with 
other universities are increasingly viewed as a highly effective strategy in leveraging 
resource and reputational gains (Ishikawa, 2009). Global rankings are used by institutions 
and nations in assessing the value of potential partners, and high profile partnerships are 
expected in their turn to positively influence future rankings (Hazelkorn, 2011, Marginson, 
2012, Salmi and Saroyan, 2007). 
2.4.2 The emergence of new metrics: ‘changing the game’ 
Since the emergence of the Shanghai Jiao Tong University ranking in 2003, a plethora of 
new rankings have emerged (see Section 2.2.1) and a wide range of theoretical and 
methodological critiques have been offered (see Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3). One motivation 
for both the development of new rankings and the criticisms of existing ones is the desire 
to change the rules of the game so that particular institutions or nations can achieve better 
standing.  
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It is a commonplace now to observe that actors, whether individual universities, groups of 
universities or nationals will elect to employ rankings which show them to best advantage. 
Rankings have been a contested territory, as institutions have sought to gain influence over 
their nature and their outcomes. Early on, this often took the form of a refusal to engage, 
interspersed with and increasingly moving to criticisms concerning validity. As early as 
2008, English universities were complaining that they did not have sufficient influence on 
the content and methodology of rankings (Locke et al., 2008).  
Arguably, the ‘young university’ rankings had their genesis in a suite of criticisms 
concerning not only the entrenched standing of world leading universities in the UK and 
the USA, but also in the methodological criticisms of the reliance of both the QS and the 
THE on reputational surveys. The establishment of the young university rankings served to 
diffuse that criticism, simultaneously setting up a new game where a range of new players 
could succeed to top positions. Similarly, the development of regional rankings, such as the 
THE Emerging Economies Rankings (formerly BRICS) can be seen as a response by 
rankings agencies that simultaneously re-inforces the hegemony of global rankings, while 
offering an alternative ‘game’ which recognises ‘the strength and potential of a diverse 
range of emerging economies’ (THE World University Rankings, 2018).  
Another version of ‘changing the game’ is to switch between preferred ranking systems. In 
2009 Denmark set a specific goal of having one Danish university in the European top ten 
of the THE-QS by 2020. In 2010, when the THE-QS rankings split into two systems, 
Denmark responded to its subsequent plunge in the THE ranking by refocusing on the 
emerging EU MultiRank project (described as a ranking tool more consistent with 
European priorities) and the Leiden ranking (Lim and Øerberg, 2017). India’s response to 
its absence in top global rankings included the initiation of a process of national rankings 
(Varghese, 2018), as well as a series of robust interactions among India’s policy and media 
communities and the higher education ranking community that led amongst other 
outcomes to the development by the THE of an ‘India-only Reputation Ranking’ that only 
ranked Indian institutions in terms of their performance in the THE’s reputational survey 
(Lim and Øerberg, 2017).  
2.4.3 Aspirations: ‘joining the game’ 
Hazelkorn’s earlier research (2007, 2011) on universities and global rankings provided a 
compelling account of strategic intent by nations and individual institutions alike to 
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improve their positions in international league tables. On the basis of wide-ranging 
empirical research, she concluded in 2011.  
There is plenty of evidence that rankings, or more precisely, doing well and 
being seen to do well, is now a significant factor driving institutional and 
government policy with priorities and resources aligned to indicators 
(Hazelkorn, 2011, KL 3508-3510).  
Her examples range across world regions, including the University of Oslo’s aspiration to 
‘achieve a leading position in the Nordic region and be among the 20 best in Europe’ in 
recognized international rankings (2011, KL 112-119), the University of Iceland’s  
declaration that ‘in order to best serve the Icelandic society … (it) has set itself the long-
term goal to become one of the 100 best universities in the world’ and the strategic plan for 
Hacettepe University in Turkey which included improving its position in international 
rankings within the next five years (Hazelkorn, 2015b, p124). These aspirations and plans 
date from the mid-2000s.  
RMIT University in Australia also made an early public commitment in its 2006 strategic 
plan to a target of entering the top 100 universities internationally as measured by the 
Times Higher Education Supplement (as it was then known) (RMIT, 2008). The University 
of Malaya included ‘improved world standing through improved global rankings’ in its 
strategic plan (University of Malaya, 2011) and the UAEU signalled its intent to be in the 
top 100 universities internationally (His Highness Sheikh Nahayan Mubarak Al Nahayan, 
2009). The University of Canberra, the case study discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this 
thesis, chose and publicly announced in 2012 the target of entering the top 100 under 50 
years of age (University of Canberra, 2013b). 
In the first decade of the 21st century, the majority of universities tended to avoid 
specificity in publicly announcing rankings targets. Recent years have seen more frequent 
public statements with a direct link to rankings intentions or aspirations. So, for example, 
in 2015, (then) Indian President Mukherjee said:  
If we provide enough funds to the top 10 to 15 institutions for the next four to 
five years, these institutions will certainly storm into the top 100 of global 
academic rankings (quoted in Baty, 2015).  
In 2017, the new Vice Chancellor of the University of Newcastle (UK) announced a target 
of the top 100 universities globally in the first week of taking up his appointment 
(Whitfield, 2017). Morphew and colleagues (2018) (2018) have suggested that the more 
Chapter 2 Global rankings 
49  
highly ranked an institution already is, the more likely to set a specific target in public 
documents. As the influence and ‘taken for granted’ nature of rankings has accelerated, the 
language of rankings as part of university or national strategic intent seems to have become 
more commonplace. Aspirations to an improved ranking position are a growing part of 
university life, and have even achieved their own pseudo-medical classification— 
‘rankophilia’, or the ‘irrational and obsessive concern with position and prospects in global 
rankings’ (Holmes, 2017b). 
2.4.4 Investment: ‘Playing the game’ 
While it is one thing to aspire (publicly or privately) to improved rankings positions, it is 
another to invest resources or make strategic decisions with the explicit intent of improving 
rankings positioning. In 2008, the general tenor of the HEFCE report on the impact of 
league tables in England was that national league tables, and to a lesser (albeit growing) 
extent global rankings, were being used as key performance indicators and in some case 
strategic targets, but were not being used to make strategic decisions concerning core 
institutional activities (Locke et al., 2008). Ten years on, and examples of both national 
and institutional responses are well documented in the research literature (Bekhradnia, 
2016, Hazelkorn, 2015b, 2018, Lim and Øerberg, 2017, Marginson, 2017, Shattock, 2017). 
Institutional responses 
Hazelkorn’s 2014 survey provided important international data on the value attached to 
rankings by higher education institutions, and their responses. These striking statistics 
demonstrate, for example, that 83% of surveyed institutions were unhappy with their 
current ranking, and 84% had a formal mechanism to review their institution’s rank. Over 
50% indicated they had taken strategic, organisational, managerial, or academic action in 
relation to planning or decision-making, with the percentage rising when specific prompts 
were provided (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.3). Nonetheless, institutions vary in their willingness 
to explicitly discuss details of the way in which rankings influence policy or organisational 
decisions, and an aura of secrecy, akin to university attitudes to ERA submissions in 
Australia (Diezman, 2018), appears to shroud some aspects of institutional responses. 
There are very few examples of detailed case studies that document institutional strategies 
to achieve rankings success.   
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Sauder and Espeland’s work (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, Sauder, 2008, Sauder and 
Espeland, 2006, 2009) on law schools and national rankings provided further valuable 
insights into institutional level responses. These included decisions made at the university 
president level to allocate ‘new money’ based partly on programme quality as defined by 
USN rank  and the pressure by senior management on law school deans to achieve improve 
rankings (including an example of a dean forced to resign on the back of a drop in the 
school’s rankings (Espeland and Sauder, 2007). Sauder and Espeland (2009) described the 
consequences of the continuous surveillance that rankings generate, and consequent 
influences on the decisions made by deans. They described the way in which an obsession 
with rankings performance grows and, over time, becomes ‘a key reference point in 
decision-making’ (2009, p.70), contrasting (in the following excerpts) interview responses 
from a novice and experienced law school dean.  
The new dean: 
 I was one of those [faculty] …... who would say that we should disregard the 
rankings completely, and we should do whatever we need to do to make this a 
great place for our students and faculty. Now [as dean], I don’t think I have 
any choice but to think in terms of the rankings (Sauder and Espeland, 2009, 
p.70). 
The more experienced dean: 
What happens, unfortunately, is that I end up making decisions with an eye 
toward those rankings rather than—I’m overstating this to make a point—
rather than what’s best for the school. The best thing for the school might not 
be student–teacher ratio right now. Maybe I should be putting the money I’d 
pay a faculty member into something else. But I’m thinking, “Oh man, if I can 
get that student–teacher ratio from 14.6 to 13.6 that will look very, very good in 
the rankings.” (Sauder and Espeland, 2009, p.70). 
Other examples of investment in specific areas include strategies to enhance LSAT scores 
(Sauder and Espeland, 2006) and investment in career services, including with a view to 
improving performance on the metrics as much as on actual outcomes:  
The dean made some investments in career services staff. She put an emphasis 
on getting a full survey return for placement purposes so we didn’t have any 
uncounted graduates (Sauder and Espeland, 2009, p.71). 
This attentiveness to detail allows administrators to focus on how specific changes in 
resource allocation or other activities such as improving survey response rates can 
potentially boost rankings performance. Such activities can be on the borderline of 
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investment and organisation change, on ‘being good versus looking good’ (Gioia and 
Corley, 2002), or managing statistics in order to ‘game the system’. Be it implicitly or 
explicitly, by intent or by action, there appears to be a degree of consensus that institutions 
are modifying their strategies and behaviour in pursuit of maintaining or building 
reputation via the rankings hierarchies. 
National level responses 
Lim and Øerberg (2017) have provided a nuanced account of the national policy response 
in both India and Denmark. Through the policy development process of Denmark’s 
‘Growth Forum’ of 2010 and 2011, global rankings were identified as ‘the most important 
international  indicators of university performance’ and led to a recommendation to focus 
‘more resources on the strongest institutions’, a shift away from the previous policy 
framework of ‘relatively uniform incentives for the quite diverse eight Danish universities’ 
(Lim and Øerberg, 2017, p.96). In the case of India, they also provide an example of an 
individual institutional response, the recommendation that the IIT Delhi should ‘work 
closely with a particular ranking service to ensure a more targeted performance especially 
in research’ (2017, pp.98-9). 
Shattock (2017) analysed a number of sharp changes in government policy targeting 
national prestige and the pursuit of world class universities, ranging across the UK, China, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland. His examples include the French reforms of 2007 
which were ‘explicitly linked by President Sarkozy with France’s failure in the global 
rankings’ (2017, p.8) , and the Excellence Initiative in Germany, first implemented in 
2006-7 and repeated in 2012. The Excellence Initiative was aimed at driving at least some 
German universities into much higher ranked positions through the vehicle of selective and 
targeted funding (Shattock, 2017), and involved a large investment of 4.6 billion euros 
(Wissenschaftsrat, 2014). Similarly, Russia’s ‘5-100-2020’ project involves an investment 
of over US$400 million per year to 15 top universities with the goal of having 5 Russian 
Universities enter the top 100 by 2020 (Altbach and Salmi, 2017).  
Other commentators (Allen, 2017, Froumin and Platonova, 2017, Li and Chen, 2011, 
Platonova and Semyonov, 2018) have referenced the concentration of resources on elite 
universities as part of national initiatives aimed at building world class universities in 
countries such as Russia, India and China. Hazelkorn (2015b, Ch.5) provided a range of 
examples from a diverse array of countries, including Finland, Malaysia and Korea, as well 
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as more detailed treatments in relation to Germany and Japan. The strategies in each 
country vary, and as Hazelkorn points out some involve a combination of elements. 
However, they commonly involve the three approaches identified by Salmi (2009): 
selection and investment in existing universities (as in the German example), mergers (as 
in the case of France) and the establishment of brand new universities as in the case of 
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology in Saudi Arabia. 
Mok and Hallinger (2013) also described programmes of investment to build world class 
universities in a number of Asian nations, as well as the strong focus on the 
internationalisation agenda in countries such as Japan and In Singapore, with a view to 
enhanced global standing. Regardless of broad strategy, the evidence provided by these 
authors on national policy responses across a diverse array of geographic spheres paint a 
clear picture of extensive investment in many countries to achieve world class universities, 
and to perform more strongly in global rankings. 
Differentiated responses  
Institutions and nations may be playing the ‘rankings’ game, but responses differ, and are 
mediated by position and context. In general, those universities at the top of the hierarchy 
(examples include Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard, the University of Melbourne) are less 
likely to exhibit ‘status anxiety’ than those further down. Their resource base is secure, as 
is their brand and market position, and their performance is demonstrably high. Significant 
shifts in institutional policy are not only unnecessary but potentially counter-productive; 
consolidation and use of the rankings to further enshrine their position is the optimal 
strategy. Those further down the hierarchy of institutions will either move to strengthen 
their position (or perhaps to avoid losses) or ignore the changes until a response is 
unavoidable; their positions will depend on their particular history, circumstances, 
leadership, context and organisational culture.  
Locke found evidence of this differential response in the United Kingdom: 
Those outside, but aspiring to the top echelons focused on tackling weaknesses 
and no longer tolerating poor performance, and were more willing to make 
resource allocations in an attempt to reach the position they felt they deserved. 
The highly-ranked university focused more on what a ‘top-10 university should 
be doing’…..(Locke, 2014, p.83). 
At the national level, where countries have a well established and well ranked higher 
education sector, there have been little by way of national policy interventions. The UK 
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and the USA are both examples of this, although it is also noteworthy that both have 
strongly established internal national rankings systems, which tend at a national level tend 
to either dominate or hold equal sway with the global rankings (Locke et al., 2008). 
Espeland and Sauders influential work on American law schools (Espeland and Sauder, 
2007, Sauder, 2008, Sauder and Espeland, 2006, 2009) focused on the national U.S.News 
ranking. In 2014, when the U.S.News released its first global ranking, their chief data 
strategist commented that while there had been little interest in global rankings among the 
general American public to date, ‘maybe people will pay more attention to the ones we 
do’(Redden, 2014).  
Another mediating influence on response to rankings is time. Lim and Øerberg (2017) 
illustrate this process in describing the changing response of the Danish government from 
initial criticism and rejection of their validity in 2003, through use in peripheral matters of 
policy, to formal setting of a global rankings target by 2009. Espeland and Sauders (2007) 
provide a conceptual basis for this process, in their description of commensuration and 
self-fulfilling prophecies as two means of inducing reactivity. While commensuration can 
emerge quickly, self-fulfilling prophesies may emerge over time, so that university 
reactions may initially be dismissive of rankings, then as others use them become more 
serious in their appraisal, moving through actively seeking to understand the rankings, to 
engage with those undertaking the ranking and to modify their own data submissions and 
indeed their strategic decision-making.  
2.4.5 Gaming the game 
As indicated in Section 2.4.3, there is a grey area where working to improve a university’s 
performance in institutional metrics with an eye to improved rankings performance crosses 
over from careful management of data quality and an awareness of the potential impact of 
metrics into mis-representation of institutional performance. While each end of the 
continuum is quite clear, there will inevitably be murky areas in the middle. There is no 
single point that distinguishes gaming from strategic responses (Espeland and Sauder, 
2007). 
In 2011 at the University of Canberra, for example, there was a concerted attempt to 
improve the documentation of staff with a PhD, in order to improve the university’s 
performance on the relevant metric. In the period from 2010 to 2012, there was also a 
process of academic renewal with the declared aim of changing the staffing profile of the 
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university so that (amongst other things) a higher proportion were PhD qualified. The 
former goes to improved data quality, and the second to an organisational change. Neither 
would be described as gaming. But what of the exclusion of adjuncts from faculty data, as 
Morphew and Swanson (2011) described in the case of a US institution, against the 
relevant instructions, and with a consequent benefit in ranking standing. At what point 
does putting the best data forward become mis-representation of the data? 
Competition for high profile research stars is intense in the contemporary higher education 
environment, and the payment of high salaries and provision of well supported research 
environments is commonplace. Similarly, the appointment of high profile researchers on a 
part-time (and sometimes geographically distant) basis is a not uncommon practice to build 
university research profile. And what point does that go beyond strategic use of resources 
and move into gaming the system? Kehm and Erkkila (2014) cited the example of two 
Saudi Arabian universities offering payments of around $70,000 per year to highly cited 
researchers with minimal obligation attached other than listing their affiliation to the Saudi 
Universities on all publications. Both universities subsequently entered the top 200–300 
universities in the ARWU. Kehm and Erkkila described this as ‘buying the reputation of 
researchers to build their own reputation’ (2014, p.3). Many would see this as coming 
down on the gaming side of the continuum. 
There are more clear cut examples. Hazelkorn described several US universities that have 
publicly admitted to deliberately misrepresenting their data (2015b, Ch.3), Locke 
documented attempts by UK institutions to improve their student survey results by 
manipulating the survey population (2014), and Morphew and Swanson (2011) reviewed a 
number of ‘manipulative tricks’ employed by US colleges and universities focused on 
gaming their rankings position. Johnes (2018) drew on the potential for manipulation and 
gaming as a major danger inherent in the rankings system to argue for an alternative 
methodology. 
Espeland and Sauders focused attention on gaming the numbers as ‘perhaps the most direct 
form of reactivity’ to rankings (2007, p.30). Their respondents described a wide range of 
gaming strategies from inaccurate reporting to mis-representation. Importantly, Espeland 
and Sauders pointed to the consequences of gaming within academe itself, as distinct from 
its potential impact on rankings, arguing that: 
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… it breeds distrust. Distrust speeds the diffusion of gaming strategies because 
it increases people’s anxiety about what colleagues might be doing, especially 
among closely ranked schools (2007, p.30). 
The stage is set for competition, and the actors are already engaged in the ‘academic arms 
race’. While national policies (particularly in higher education, but also in immigration and 
employment) and national investment can advantage individual institutions, the question of 
how individual institutions can influence outcomes is less well understood. The rise of 
some Asian universities is explained in terms of large national investment, enabled by 
strong economies and demographic drivers. The continued strong performance of those at 
the top is explained in terms of resources, reputation, history and underpinning all of this, 
the notion that these are the institutions that determine the rules of the game. Outside these 
broad frameworks, however, what evidence is there to explain the ways in which 
individual institutions can improve their rankings positions? This question is explored in 
Chapter 3. 
2.5 Conclusion 
In the decade since the first international global rankings of universities were released, 
rankings have achieved an increasingly powerful influence and impact on individual 
institutions, national policies and practices and on the higher education sector. The number 
of rankings have proliferated, but the Academic World Ranking of Universities (formerly 
Shanghai Jiao Tong) and the Times Higher Education Ranking remain the most influential, 
followed by Quacquarelli Symonds (QS). These rankings, together with the 
bibliometrically based Leiden and SCImago rankings, serve to reinforce a traditional 
model of world class universities wherein an elite group of privileged universities not only 
dominate the top positions, but control the rules of the game. The heterogeneity of the 
higher education sector, its responsiveness to national and regional agendas and the social 
equity agenda of higher education are all potentially at risk. 
At the national level, governments worldwide have sought ways to ensure that their 
countries are represented in the top rankings. The rise of a number of Asian institutions in 
the rankings has been fuelled by national investment, enabled by strong economic and 
demographic growth. Elsewhere, in contexts of more modest economic and demographic 
growth, ‘mergers and acquisitions’ and investment in individual institutions have 
supported improved performance. Improved data management and reporting has been an 
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unintentional but important sector wide impact as universities and countries compete for 
improved ranking positions. 
For individual institutions, the options for ‘bootstrapping’ improved performance in the 
rankings are less obvious. Increased resources can fuel improved performance, but if there 
are no philanthropic or government windfalls, existing resources must be re-deployed to 
achieve better performance, and existing behaviour and cultures re-oriented to support 
changed agendas. The next chapter builds on the literature presented in this chapter in 
order to explore the levers available to upwardly mobile institutions in pursuit of improved 
rankings performance.  
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Chapter 3 Universities and change: a review of the literature 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the influence and impact of global rankings on higher 
education in both the international and national context. It drew on literature where the 
primary focus is on the way in which rankings have influenced, or have the potential to 
influence, higher education as a system at the global level as well as literature on the 
impact of rankings at the national level and national policy responses. The literature 
addressed in Chapter 2 provides the background for the first of the three core questions 
addressed in this thesis, which was to examine the University of Canberra unexpected 
rankings success in both national and global contexts. (The empirical analyses relating to 
this question are presented in Chapter 5.) 
The second and third core questions concern how the University of Canberra was able to 
enter and rise in global rankings tables, and what the consequences were for the 
organisation. (The empirical analyses relating to the second and third questions are 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7.) These questions shift the frame of inquiry away from 
external drivers of change and their impact on higher education systems and institutions, 
and into the intricate world of the university as an organisation, and its ability to read the 
external environment, to strategise, and to bring about organisational change.  
Initially, I had conceptualised the logic of my research inquiry as a linear process, moving 
progressively down from the global to the national and ultimately to the institutional level. 
And indeed it is possible to extract components or elements from the literature on rankings 
and higher education which point to potential levers or strategies that can be employed at 
the institutional level. What I failed to appreciate in those earlier stages of literature 
analysis, however, was the extent to which the frame of reference (in this case global 
trends, national polices and their potential consequence for higher education) would not 
only shape the nature of the debates and the results of the analyses, but also created a kind 
of ‘conceptual silence’ in the literature on higher education institutions and rankings from 
the perspective of the individual organisation. 
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Fumasoli and Stensaker’s (2013) review of 25 years of historical themes in organisation 
studies in higher education described the dominance of analyses that tackle external drivers 
of change, specifically policy reforms, and their structural impact. They concluded: 
Hence research in higher education has somewhat neglected the complex 
reality of the university as an organization possessing its own structures, 
cultures and practice. This implies that national policy agendas have 
dominated organizational research in higher education, while the views of 
practitioners such as institutional managers and administrators have not been 
sufficiently addressed (Fumasoli and Stensaker, 2013, p.479).  
In highlighting those differences in perspectives, their review illuminated my conceptual 
error. The logic of my research inquiry was not linear, but rather required a flipping of 
perspective, to examine the questions from what might loosely be conceived as a bottom 
up perspective, as well as a top down one. This perspective is informed by the work of 
pioneering researchers such as Clark (1998, 2004), Davies (1987, 2001) and Shattock 
(2003) on successful universities and the ways in which they respond to challenges and 
opportunities in the external environment. This literature informs both the second and third 
questions, but particularly the third, concerned as it is with what was achieved, and what 
was not, what was intended, and what was not, as a consequence of the process of 
organisational change that occurred at the University of Canberra as it pursued entry into 
the global rankings.  
The second question as to how organisational change was accomplished at the University 
(the process of change) required a closer inspection of the literature on organisational 
change at the level of the individual institution. The material on bringing about change 
within universities was highly relevant (Marshall, 2007b), but relatively sparse. By way of 
contrast, the literature on managing and driving change in the private sector was large, and 
the theoretical literature on organisations and organisational change was enormous. The 
task in this section of the literature review was to draw selectively from the smorgasbord of 
options in order to supplement, but not overwhelm, the primary research focus of the 
thesis.  
In Section 3.2, then, the literature on higher education and rankings already presented in 
Chapter 2 is re-interrogated to glean potential mechanisms or strategies which could be 
employed by individual institutions in pursuit of rankings excellence. In Section 3.3, the 
focus shifts to the literature on successful universities and in Section 3.4 to that on driving 
strategic change in universities. Finally, in Section 3.5, some selected approaches to 
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organisational change are presented and reviewed for their utility in guiding the present 
research project. 
3.2 Re-interrogating the literature on rankings and higher 
education 
While global markets may contribute to the shape of higher education, universities are first 
and foremost located within and the product of nation states, in their regulation, their 
cultural engagement and their role in educating the professional, industrial, technical, 
cultural and social elite (Enders, 2004, p.365). National policy shapes the contexts in 
which universities strategise and perform, in ways both intended and unintended. In 
Australia, for example, the ‘uncapping’ of Commonwealth places in 2012 saw 
unprecedented rates of growth in the university sector, underpinned by intense competition 
for students and concomitant drops in entry requirements, some more significant than 
others and some more transparent than others. The rules of the game change, and the 
players respond.  
Rankings influence brand and reputation, and through them access to human and financial 
resources and opportunities for both industry and academic partnerships. Resources and 
opportunities are the fuel of achievement, which in turn brings advantage to brand and 
reputation, and to rankings. The cycle is self-reinforcing, and supports those already at the 
‘top of the game’. This effect is further enhanced where reputational surveys are part of the 
rankings methodology (Bowman and Bastedo, 2011). One consequence is a degree of 
concordance in the universities at the top of the rankings year after year (Aguillo et al., 
2010, Moed, 2016).  
Marginson (2009, p. 32) argued that in established status elites of this kind, ‘outsiders may 
try to ‘game’ the competition so as to lever themselves upwards, but membership of the 
elite remains largely stable over time’. More recently, Shattock (2017, p.18) commented 
that ‘there is little evidence [in the national league tables]….. of institutions improving 
their position significantly except over very long periods’. Altbach and Hazelkorn have 
argued that middle ranked or unranked universities would be well advised to ‘quit now’ — 
that ‘without massive financial and other resources, it is almost impossible for academic 
institutions to improve their ranking status’ (2017b, p.9). Evidentially, the strong 
commitment of national resources has enabled the rise of some Asian universities in global 
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rankings (Li and Chen, 2011). But in the absence of national investment or re-structuring, 
what policy and strategy levers are available to individual universities who wish to subvert 
the status quo by moving up the global rankings?  
3.2.1 A ‘shopping list’ of strategies 
If the literature on higher education and rankings is focussed more on the national and 
global implications, and on national and sector wide responses, it is not surprising that the 
literature on moving up the rankings primarily follows a similar perspective. The most 
common elements relate to using government resources—either concentrating resources to 
advantage a small number of pre-existing potentially elite universities, or to support 
mergers among pre-existing institutions with potential for the required synergies for an 
elite university, or alternatively to create entirely new ‘elite’ institutions (Salmi, 2009). The 
rankings literature does not tend to focus explicitly on what individual institutions can do 
or have done to improve their rankings position.  
It is nonetheless possible to re-examine the rankings literature with a view to gleaning 
potential mechanisms or strategies that might be employed at the institutional level. This 
shift of perspective yields a kind of ‘shopping list’ of elements that could relate to rankings 
success, rather than an integrated conceptual framework. Moreover, the elements are 
gleaned from scholarly work with a different dominant orientation and consequently a 
different dominant intent. It would be misleading, therefore, to suggest that the authors 
cited in the following discussion have necessarily presented these elements as part of a 
system intended for implementation. Indeed, some have been gleaned from examples of 
‘perverse incentives’ that rankings-based strategies can encourage. 
If a large injection of funding is an important basis from which to successfully pursue 
enhanced rankings performance (Altbach and Hazelkorn, 2017a, Lim and Øerberg, 2017, 
Shattock, 2017), the strategies to increase the resource base available to the institution is 
an obvious first element on the list. This can involve lobbying government for special 
treatment or throwing support behind proposed policy changes which will produce 
differential benefits, as was the case with the powerful ‘Group of Eight’ in Australia when 
they came out in support of the policy reforms proposed in the 2014 Federal Budget to 
uncap university fees. Other options include major philanthropy drives (such as the 
successful ‘Boundless’ fundraising campaign launched by the University of Toronto in 
2011 with a target of $2 billion), industry partnerships and commercial endeavours. 
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Cutting costs, while less easily marketed as part of a university strategy, can also increase 
the resources available to the institution for strategic purposes.  
With citations and reputation an important element in rankings (Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 
2015b, Marginson and van der Wende, 2007), then recruiting and retaining high 
performing researchers (whether highly cited or prolific publishers, Nobel prize winners 
or Fields medallists, or top research income earners) is inevitably an important strategy. 
While national research bodies (e.g. in the UK and Australia) are increasingly pre-occupied 
with measuring innovation and impact, these metrics are as yet not regarded as core 
elements in a ranking strategy, and hence do not have the direct potential impact of 
publications, citations and research income.  
Internationalisation is also a core strategy, directly for its effects on rankings metrics that 
measure the proportion of international staff and students, and indirectly for the benefits 
associated with recruiting high quality staff and students regardless of whether they are 
domestically or internationally based. International partnerships also feature is this cluster, 
bringing intellectual benefits, recruitment opportunities, maximising citation rates and (in 
the case of highly regarded partners) reputational gain. Increased teaching and publishing 
in English rather than in national languages  is another element in this category, although 
not always applauded (Gunn and Mintrom, 2013, Ishikawa, 2009, Mok and Hallinger, 
2013, Wang et al., 2011). 
Redirection of resources within the institution to maximise performance may involve a 
concentration of research funds on high performing areas (whether in ‘real’ or ‘metrics 
based’ terms), with concomitant reductions in other areas. Taken further, it can involve the 
closure of departments that are not contributing to key research performance metrics. It can 
also involve the designation of some staff (whether individually or by department) as 
teaching only or teaching oriented, while others are freed up to focus on their research 
(Edgar and Geare, 2013, Enders, 2014). A focus of resources on particular areas, often 
combined with public branding of the institution as has been the case with (for example) 
Loughborough University and sport, can be undertaken to improve performance and boost 
reputation.  
 
More generally, a number of authors have drawn attention to the increased role of 
marketing and branding in improving institutional reputation (including the redirection 
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of institutional resources) , and through improved reputation, improved rankings 
performance (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, Naidoo et al., 2014).  
Mergers (or ‘acquisitions’) involving appropriate institutions can offer a rapid boost in 
performance as well as potential economies of scale and associated resource opportunities 
(Salmi, 2009). In the public system, mergers are rarely an option available to institutions 
unless driven by government agendas (as was the case in France, for example). Mergers 
may or may not benefit a specific institution, and even where there are benefits do not 
always lead to improvements in global rankings (see, for example, Shattock’s account 
(2017) regarding the University of Manchester). The sale of university assets (including 
those acquired through mergers) is a potential strategy for boosting available resources, 
although not commonly discussed. Infrastructure upgrades and development can increase 
the attractiveness to staff and students alike, making an organisation more competitive in 
the talent wars. However, mergers, like all structural change, also bring associated costs. 
Improved educational quality is rarely if ever mentioned in this context. Moving to 
increase the proportion of postgraduate students in the student body is perhaps the closest 
element to an ‘education-oriented’ strategy. This reflects the strong research orientation of 
the major rankings. In 2018, the THE published its first teaching oriented rankings, the 
THE European Teaching Rankings, albeit still with a strong research component (Holmes, 
2018a, 2018b). The introduction of the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) in England 
could help to rebalance the emphasis on research by creating a new teaching focussed 
measure of performance that will ‘raise the profile of teaching and ensure that it is better 
recognized and rewarded’ (Ashwin, 2017). Both examples address the issue by the creation 
of a new metric, rather than changes to the existing major global rankings systems, 
although it is noted that U-Multirank includes a strong teaching component (Holmes, 
2018b).  
Changing the culture of an institution, particularly changing staff behaviour or 
developing staff capacity to meet different or higher levels of performance metrics, is 
rarely mentioned as a strategy to move up the rankings. It is more commonly included as 
an explanatory factor as to why high performing institutions do well, and why it is difficult 
for medium or low ranked universities to move up the rankings ladder. Shattock 
summarises this as a combination of  
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both the presence of staff recruited for a previous institutional role and the 
persistence of an organisational culture attuned to a particular style of 
operation (Shattock, 2017, p.14). 
The perception of tension between the research and educational goals of higher education 
institutions can manifest itself at the organisational, departmental and individual levels, 
with one consequence being the pressures on individual staff to meet ‘competing’ 
objectives in education and research metrics (Leisyte et al., 2009).  
Leadership is an important element in organisational change, although there is little direct 
research in relation to rankings performance. Salmi (2009) included leadership as a key 
element in achieving world class excellence, while Shattock (2017) argued that while 
leadership is important, there is little evidence that leaders can improve rankings 
performance—in large part because universities leaders typically do not serve for the 
lengthy periods of time required to achieve rankings improvement. The importance of 
university leadership in the changing context of higher education remains an important 
consideration, nonetheless (Kok and McDonald, 2017, Middlehurst, 1995).  
Improving data quality can produce substantial short-term gains where pre-existing data 
capture and reporting was poor. Indeed, the improvement of data quality on the university 
sector may be one important impact sector wide of the rising importance attached to global 
rankings (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, Locke et al., 2008, Salmi and Saroyan, 2007). 
Flagrant manipulation of data (whether through direct mis-representation, redefining 
denominators and influencing survey outcomes) is also an option, bringing with it some 
possibility for reputational risk (Morphew and Swanson, 2011).  
All of this, of course, assumes a willingness and a capacity for universities as organisations 
to embrace and implement organisational change. How universities can bring about 
such changes, particularly in the absence of substantial resource injections, is not well 
understood. The recipe for improved performance may contain elements from this 
‘shopping list’, but the exact mix of ingredients and the method for combining them is less 
well understood. The success rate of institutions seeking to implement the recipe is 
relatively low. What separates universities who are able to ‘turnaround’ their rankings 
fortunes from the rest is the key focus of this thesis. The literature on rankings and higher 
education has yielded some pointers, summarised above, on how that turnaround might be 
achieved. The literature on successful universities is the next step in this investigation. 
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3.3 The successful university 
In this section, the focus shifts away from success in moving up the rankings and moves on 
to the literature on successful universities and on world-class universities. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, rankings are based on the collection of performance metrics that capture some 
aspects of quality, but not all. As such, an important caveat in this thesis is to recognise 
that success in rankings performance does not directly equate to a successful or world-class 
university. The literature on how successful and world-class universities respond to change 
does, however, provide fertile ground for exploring strategies that may enable individual 
universities to improve their overall organisational performance, and hence potentially 
achieve greater success in the global rankings. 
Since the establishment of the University of Al Qaraouyine in the ninth century, 
universities have existed in and adapted to a world of social change. But in the past quarter 
of a century, scholars of higher education have been particularly focused on the degree of 
change confronting the university sector. Economic globalisation, internationalisation, 
massification and marketisation of the higher education sector, the growing demand for 
knowledge workers, the impact of disruptive technologies and in many western countries 
fiscal constraints on the public sector, all bring in their wake a series of challenges for 
universities. While these themes have become more common in the higher education 
literature in the course of the 21st century, the impact of change on universities, and the 
continuing nature of that change, was attracting attention from the 1990s. In their case 
study of managing change at the Karolinksa Institute, Colville and Tomkins (1994) 
emphasised the importance of adaption to change:  
Organizing for academic excellence …..  inevitably means organizing for 
change (Colville and Tomkins, 1994, p.355).  
The rate of change has accelerated since the late 1990s, a trend that is clearly evident in 
European higher education (Enders et al., 2011) but is also present in Australia (Davis, 
2017, Parker et al., 2018, Shah and Jarzabkowski, 2013). Integral to the view that 
universities must organise to respond to a changing world is the concept of the university 
as an organisational actor.  
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3.3.1 Universities as organisations 
Historically, the extent to which universities could be described as strategic actors has been 
questioned, indeed higher education served to provide the exemplar of ‘organised anarchy’ 
for Cohen and colleagues in their development of the iconic garbage can model of 
organisational choice (Cohen et al., 1972). The two phenomena underpinning this concept 
of anarchy were decision-making in the absence of consistent, shared goals and an 
understanding of participant action in a context where the attention patterns within the 
organisation do not follow a predictable or pre-ordained path. Even in 2019, these ideas 
still resonate to a degree with aspects of the management of contemporary universities. 
Nonetheless, universities are increasingly emerging as corporate actors. De Boer and 
colleagues (2007) map a pathway from models of weak organisation leadership through to 
becoming a corporate actor, from Weick’s (1976) loosely coupled organisation to a move 
along the pathway to becoming a complete organisation (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson, 
2000), albeit to differing extents (Seeber et al., 2015). With investigations of the 
consequences of the new public sector managerialism for higher education, and 
particularly enhanced institutional autonomy, has come growing recognition of the 
strengthening of higher education institutions as organisations (De Boer et al., 2007, 
Enders et al., 2011).  
McNay’s classic depiction of the traditional ‘collegium’, defined by loose policy definition 
and loose implementation control, suggested a lack of such organisational integrity, 
whereas the emergence of an enterprise university, or in more common terminology an 
entrepreneurial one, posits a strengthened steering core and stronger managerial control of 
both policy and implementation (Clark, 1998, Davies, 2001, McNay, 1995).  
As the second decade of the 21st century draws to a close, there is arguably more emphasis 
than ever before on university management and university leadership to ensure the ongoing 
success and survival of higher education institutions (Kok and McDonald, 2017). Navarro 
and Gallardo (2003) argued that the combination of an increasingly complex and unstable 
external environment and the internal intricacy derived from a sophisticated mix of 
knowledge and skills make universities particularly reliant on their capacity to set strategic 
direction and manage strategic change. More recently, Uslu (2018) has explored the 
relationship between flexible strategic thinking, organisational adaptivity and highly 
productive universities. Thoenig and Paradeise (2018) analyse the relationship between the 
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level of strategic capacity demonstrated by an academic institution and its organisational 
capability. Implicit in this kind of analysis is the assumption that universities are indeed 
‘institutional actors’. 
It remains reasonable to expect, however, that scholars will continue to question the extent 
to which universities are indeed coherent organisations, as distinct from groups of aligned 
and unaligned entities, as well as the extent to which coherence can be sustained over time. 
Temporality is an important but perhaps less often explored factor in studies of strategic 
intent. And just as coherence may alter over time, so too may it change as the level of 
analysis is shifted from the university as a whole to the level of the department (Edgar and 
Geare, 2013, Kok and McDonald, 2017) or to the level of larger entities such as faculties 
and thus to the role of deans and pro-vice-chancellors (De Boer and Goedegebuure, 2009, 
De Boer et al., 2010, Meek et al., 2010).  
Global rankings themselves may have contributed to the development of organisational 
identity, and organisational identity has been described as an important resource in 
strategic positioning (Stensaker, 2015). Despite the increasing availability of field specific 
information, rankings are strongly focused at the institutional level, continuing to ‘valorize 
the individual university, more than the disciplinary unit’ (Marginson, 2009, p.30). Enders 
has argued even more specifically that rankings can act as a trigger to help universities to 
develop the sense of organisational identity required to enter the rankings race as coherent 
organisational actors: 
 By comparing and ranking universities as a whole they contribute to the idea 
that the organisation matters, that strategic actorhood of universities as 
organisations has to be developed, that reputation management and 
organisational branding are needed (Enders, 2014, p.13). 
As a corollary, it can be argued that rankings can serve as a policy lever in their own right, 
acting as both a rhetorical and strategic device to bring about organisational change. As 
was discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, it is now common for universities to use rankings of 
one kind or another either publicly or privately in their strategic planning and goal setting. 
Hazelkorn (2015b, Ch.3) has suggested that rankings themselves can be employed as a 
policy lever, to motivate, to speed up change or to assist in pursuing a particular agenda.  
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3.3.2 Becoming a successful university 
The literature on what individual institutions can do or have done to improve their rankings 
positions is scant. The more frequent focus is at the national level and generally on 
focussing government resources to advantage specific institutions—either a small number 
of pre-existing potentially elite universities, or mergers among pre-existing institutions 
with potential for the required synergies for an elite university, or creating new world-class 
universities from ‘scratch’ (Salmi, 2009). The field narrows even more when the topic of 
interest is improved performance in organisations of quite modest reputation and 
aspirations, or the ‘turnaround’ of a university in a downward spiral (Shattock, 2003, 
Ch.10). There is, however, a literature on successful universities (Shattock, 2003), on 
world class universities (Altbach and Salmi, 2011, Salmi, 2009, Shattock, 2017) and on the 
rise of the entrepreneurial university model (Clark, 1998, Davies, 2001, Etzkowitz and 
Viale, 2010) that can be mined for insights into the drivers of improved organisational 
performance within the university context. 
The world class university 
The concept of world class universities was previously discussed in Chapter 2, but in 
relation to the national level. Here, attention turns to the aspects of the world class 
universities model that relate to individual institutions, and their potential for improving 
their academic standing. 
In his influential work on establishing world class universities, Salmi (2009, 2011) set out 
and subsequently tested a ‘three sets of factors model’: concentration of talent, abundant 
resources, and appropriate governance. Talent includes both staff and students, in the 
international as well as the domestic context. The ratio of postgraduate to undergraduate 
students is part of the concentration of talent. The second factor, abundant resources, is 
closely tied to government funding, but the importance of diversifying funding sources is 
also recognised, via philanthropy and competitive research funding. Salmi’s third factor, 
‘appropriate governance’, appears to straddle both the national level and institutional 
levels; he emphasises the importance of a (national) regulatory environment which 
supports competitive behaviour and encourages academic and managerial autonomy.  
However, Salmi also stated that while resources, talent and good governance are necessary 
elements in pursuit of world-class excellence, they are not sufficient: 
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The establishment of a world-class university requires, above all, strong 
leadership, a bold vision of the institution’s mission and goals, and a clearly 
articulated strategic plan to translate the vision into concrete programs and 
targets. …. Universities that aspire to better results engage in an objective 
assessment of their strengths and areas for improvement, set new stretch goals, 
and design and implement a renewal plan that can lead to improved 
performance (Salmi, 2009, p.52). 
These additional elements resonate, albeit with a slight shift in language and emphasis, 
with central components set out in relation to the development of the entrepreneurial 
university — the importance of strategic planning, the value of increased managerialism 
and a strengthened steering core, combined with a strong flavour of vision and enhanced 
by exemplary leadership (Clark, 1998, Davies, 2001). It is to the literature on 
entrepreneurial and high performing universities that we now turn. 
Managing for success and the emergence of the entrepreneurial university 
The emergence of the ‘entrepreneurial university’ can be traced to Davies (1987) 
influential work on ‘The Entrepreneurial and Adaptive University’. Taken together with 
Burton Clark’s 1998 case study based monograph Creating Entrepreneurial Universities, 
the idea of the entrepreneurial university has continued to evolve and influence the 
development of the higher education sector (Clark, 1998, 2003, 2004, Davies, 2001, 
Etzkowitz and Viale, 2010, Marginson and Considine, 2000, Pinheiro and Stensaker, 2014, 
Poole and Robertson, 2003, Shattock, 2003). 
Burton Clark’s (1998) frequently cited model of the entrepreneurial university is 
characterised by five elements. Clark (2001) subsequently described the challenge of 
developing these five categories as a problem of establishing the mid-range of 
generalisation—sufficiently specific to avoid abstract levels of ‘cloudy rhetoric’ and 
sufficiently general to sit above the ‘gritty, messy details’ of individual university’s 
particular realities. Importantly, his intent was to identify pathways to change: 
This is what I was attempting to do in my study—to identify some major steps 
taken inside universities that added up to a major transformation. I focused on 
….. changes in structure and culture that added up to a substantially revised, 
even new, overall organizational character (Clark, 2001, pp.11-12). 
The first of the five categories is a strengthened steering core, which combines academic 
and managerial values, and enables the organization to respond quickly, flexibly and in a 
focused way to changes (and turmoil) in the external environment. The second element, an 
expanded development periphery, concerns readiness and capacity to reach outside the 
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university; whether for more traditional alumni, fundraising or continuing education 
activities, or as inter-disciplinary project-oriented research centres aimed at mediating 
between departments and the outside world, and extending to a range of non-traditional 
units oriented to critical issues in social and economic development. The third element is a 
diversified funding base, bringing into play a the ‘third stream’ of funding derived from 
industrial firms, local governments, philanthropic foundations, earned income from 
campus services and so on, beyond traditional teaching and research revenue from 
government sources. The fourth element, the stimulated academic heartland, essentially 
concerns the engagement of traditional departments and faculties with the preceding three 
elements, that is, their acceptance of a modified view of the nature of the university’s work 
and organizational structure; according to Clark altered heartland departments are an 
essential part of the transformation (2004). The fifth element, the integrated 
entrepreneurial culture, takes this one step further to develop a culture that embraces 
change. This shift in culture and belief is based on and interacts with the previous four 
elements and signals an institutional acceptance of a competitive and ambitious trajectory 
for the university (Clark, 1998). 
Davies (2001) analysis adds to the discussion the importance of understanding ‘pre-
entrepreneurial culture’ as part of the evolution toward the entrepreneurial university. He 
described a low level of corporate identity and presence with limited tendencies to 
intervene in most areas of university activity, a focus on individual autonomy associated 
with defensiveness and denial of the need for university or faculty wide strategic responses 
or change, discomfort with the role of the market in higher education, and potentially a 
reluctance to recognise or to confront problems. Goals are ambiguous, time horizons are 
limited, and major policy decisions are slow (Davies, 2001).  
By contrast, in the entrepreneurial culture, Davies identified an acceptance of the need for 
university wide strategic planning, open and quick decision-making, open communication 
within the university, transparent decision-making in relation to resource allocation and in 
the assessment of organisational strengths and weaknesses, a willingness to recognise and 
address problems and an expectation of academic and financial accountability. Davies 
emphasised mutually supportive and informal relationships within the organisation, an 
awareness that the successes or failures of individual areas affect the entity as a whole, and 
a willingness to experiment and take risks. There is also an emphasis on the ability to 
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‘learn collectively’ from experience, linking to the concept of the learning organization 
(Davies, 2001). 
Davies also postulated three general strategies for driving change. The first was the 
importance of leadership, and of matching the right leadership approach (the 
rational/empirical approach, the normative or educational approach, and the power or 
coercion-based approach) to the right situation at the right time. The second concerned the 
levels of permeation—through the individual, the discipline, department or faculty, the 
institution as a whole and externally in relation to stakeholders. The third describes the 
approach to change—from comprehensive, top down vertically and horizontally integrated 
grand strategy from the outset, through to an incrementalist position which empowers 
colleagues, reduces barriers gradually, and progressively assembles (if successful) cultural 
change through a ‘jigsaw’ approach (Davies, 2001). 
Shattock’s (2003, 2006, 2009) work in the first decade of the 21st century extended these 
ideas further, exploring the relationships among university management, leadership, 
governance, the entrepreneurial university and university success. His book on Managing 
Successful Universities is of particular relevance to this thesis because it focuses on the 
relationship between management and success and management and decline. He set this 
out in the very first sentence of the book: 
Successful universities are successful primarily because of their teaching and 
research, not because of their management, but good management can over 
time provide the conditions in which teaching and research can flourish, just 
as, more usually, poor management can undermine teaching and research and 
precipitate institutional decline (Shattock, 2003, p.ix). 
Shattock described six qualities of high performing universities in the first chapter of the 
book, which are elaborated and built upon in subsequent chapters. These six qualities 
provide an equally valuable basis from which to consider the capacity of an organisation to 
bring about improvement in performance or indeed to avoid decline. These six qualities are 
summarised as follows: 
a strong organizational culture, a strongly competitive approach both 
externally and internally, an adaptability to the environment without changing 
fundamental identity, a willingness to make bold decisions, a conservative 
approach to finance in general and an open collegial approach to decision-
making which does not flinch from ‘constructive confrontation…   (2003 p. 21). 
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Several of these qualities relate to organisational capacity to recognise change in the 
external environment, to make decisions concerning the appropriate response to those 
changes, and to implement those decisions—a continuing process of institutional adaption. 
The importance of change readiness is evident in much of the literature discussed in this 
section, and arguably a dominant theme in much of the literature on entrepreneurial and 
successful universities.  
The value and meaning attached to both change itself and responsiveness to change has 
become an intriguing element in debates around higher education in recent years. A core 
contextual factor in Clark’s assessment was that of a ‘demand-response’ imbalance which 
placed universities in a situation of overload with widening demand from many 
stakeholders with constrained capacity to respond—‘a time of disquieting turmoil that has 
no end in sight’ (Clark, 1998, p.xiii). The entrepreneurial university was in this sense an 
adaption to change, and a way of strengthening institutional self-reliance, demonstrated in 
Clark’s 2004 monograph on sustaining change and through the use of language around the 
pro-active and innovative university (Shattock, 2009, Clark, 2004). This kind of 
responsiveness to and engagement with the external environments have not, however, gone 
uncriticised, as demonstrated in the analysis by Marginson and Considine (2000) of the 
implications of the ‘enterprise university’ in the Australian context.  
Work undertaken by Etzkowitz and colleagues has continued to position change in an 
adaptive and positive light, suggesting that rather than ‘contending with’ and ‘getting over’ 
change, change is and will continue to be intrinsic to the higher education sector. This 
body of work argues that the nature of knowledge intensive economies rests in a ‘Triple 
Helix’ of relationships between academia, industry and the state; that these are a matter of 
cultural evolution and hence that systems can be expected to remain in ‘endless transition’ 
(Etzkowitz, 2003, Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000, Etzkowitz and Viale, 2010). The 
centrality of change in the contemporary higher education sector is uncontested. The way 
in which change can occur within the university context is the focus of the next section. 
3.3.3 Driving change in the university context 
The issue of adaptive capacity or ‘the capacity to strategise’ has received particular 
attention in recent work by Thoenig and Paradeise (2016, 2018), structured around the 
interplay between organisational capability and strategic capacity. Thoenig and Paradeise 
(2018) argue that ‘off-the shelf’ and ‘one size fits all’ approaches to bringing about 
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strategic change are largely ‘fairy tales’. Their argument rests on four separable but 
interconnected elements: firstly that administrative recipes and procedural techniques are 
typically a-contextual, secondly that strategy is too often considered as little more than the 
production of a formal policy statement, thirdly, that the emphasis on those in charge of the 
institution underestimates the importance of middle management in both policy 
development and implementation and fourthly that there is insufficient attention paid to the 
complexity involved in constructing and re-constructing the university as an organisation, 
from top to bottom, across various departments, as it moves forward through time. 
Their approach emphasises the continuous and co-creative nature of strategy, the 
importance of temporality, of the external environment, organisation resources and inner 
context, and organisational involvement and engagement with strategy. This analysis 
resonates strongly with the practice and theory of Pettigrew’s processual analysis of 
organisational change, including the emphasis on the continuity of change, on internal as 
well as external context, on the process and content of change, and the importance of 
temporality (Pettigrew et al., 1988, Pettigrew, 1990). Thoenig and Paradeise (2016, 2018) 
built on this aspect of that work in order to develop descriptors of internal organisational 
capability and connect these elements to their previous published four-fold typology of 
universities—organisations with weak strategic capacity, robust strategic capacity, the 
‘venerables’ and the ‘wannabees’ . For the purposes of this thesis, however, it is the 
elements described above that relate to strategy and organisational change that are 
particularly relevant. It is to the more specific literature on how change can occur in 
universities that we now turn. 
Case studies of change 
The literature on specific cases of driving change in an higher education institution is 
somewhat limited, and there has certainly not been the level of attention lavished on 
driving change in the private sector. In 2003 Shattock wrote that while the business world 
abounds with success stories of the turn-around of ‘the firm’, there is little by way of an 
equivalent literature on higher education organisations, and fifteen years later the statement 
still rings true (Shattock, 2003, Ch.10). There are, however, case studies of change in 
individual institutions, and in this section the question of conceptual approaches to such 
studies is briefly interrogated. 
Chapter 3 Universities and change 
73  
Stephanie Marshall’s (2007b) collection, described by Ewart Wooldridge (2007) as ‘a 
series of compelling stories of change, told with honesty and enthusiasm’, was a major 
contribution to exploring strategic leadership and change in UK universities. It was, and 
still is, a valuable practical resource for scholars and managers alike, and informed the 
development of the early stages of this thesis. The book drew on the experiences of 25 
Leadership Foundation Fellows funded by the Leadership Foundation for Higher 
Education to implement change initiatives in their respective universities. The size and 
scope of the change projects varied from the implementation of a leadership development 
pilot programme (Stevenson and Howlett, 2007) to major university wide changes of 
leadership and strategy (Valentine and Constable, 2007). 
Marshall draws on the case studies presented in the book to argue that the contributions of 
influential private sector change management writers such as Kotter (1996) and Kanter and 
colleagues (1992) do resonate in the higher education sector. She notes: 
‘‘it ain’t so different in HE’ as some like to suggest’ Marshall (2007a p.2) 
and goes on to draw parallels between the 13 pointers to successfully planning and 
delivering programme change in higher education that emerge from the 25 case studies, the 
‘eight stage process’ described by Kotter (2013) and the ‘10 commandments for bringing 
about lasting change’ set forth by Kantor and colleagues (1992). Those 13 pointers are set 
out in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Leadership Foundation Fellows 13 pointers for planning and delivering change 
Source: Marshall (2007a, p.6) 
Marshall draws on the 25 case studies to identify (post-hoc) three approaches to bringing 
about change. The first of these, the structured framework for managing change, is a top 
down strategically planned approach that works best when change was primarily focused 
on administrative staff. Marshall (2007a) describes this as a project management type 
approach, consistent with the four stages of project analysis, planning, action and 
integration as set out by Bullock and Batten (1985).  
The second, the incentivised approach to change, encourages staff to not only accept the 
change but become champions of it. Examples of incentives include time (e.g. sabbaticals, 
‘buy-out’ of certain activities), training and development opportunities, recognition and 
pump priming. Marshall comments on the value of such an approach for change initiatives 
that involve not so much ‘a change from what was, but rather represented the need to 
create something that wasn’t’ (2007a, pp.8-9). Here Marshall draws on Nadler and 
Tushman’s (1997) congruence model, identifying their four co-dependent components of 
an organisation—the formal organisation; the informal organisation; the work and the 
people—as essential to understanding organisational dynamics during a change process.  
Planning stage 
1. Identify what needs to change 
2. Determine leadership and the ability to state the goal clearly 
3. Deliver a clear vision 
4. Identify significant steps in the change process 
5. Avoid undue haste 
6. Determine how to align people behind the change – identify change agents and resistors 
7. Inspire confidence by: forestalling problems (planning for contingencies); and determining 
the means of monitoring and regular communication. 
Actioning the change strategy 
8. Provide leadership and build the team – develop trust, show compassion and understanding 
to casualties. Be as open and honest as you can. 
9. Communicate throughout – explain, listen, ensure understanding, question, guide, 
acknowledge feelings and seek feedback. 
10. Involve people – seek and develop commitment, participation, motivation and ownership. 
11. Seek and celebrate early success 
Monitoring and evaluation 
12. Learn from experience 
13. Plan continuous improvement 
Chapter 3 Universities and change 
75  
Marshall’s third approach to successful change, capacity building, focuses on the use of 
pilots and snowball effects to progressively win over groups within the university to the 
desired change, based on the dissemination of successful change and the learning that 
comes from it. Marshall (2007a) locates this as consistent with the model of three stage 
process of organisational change put forward by Schein (1992)—unfreezing, by creating a 
motivation to change; followed by learning new concepts and meanings; and finally 
internalising new concepts and meanings. 
In Colville and Tomkins (1994) study of managing change at the highly regarded 
Karolinksa Institute in Sweden, they described their approach as a theory of cultural 
change that provided an account of action, focused in particular on what they describe as 
‘facilitating conditions’, and a recognised need to move the internal context in the direction 
of desired change, consistent with emergent external events. In this context, they cite the 
work of Pettigrew and colleagues (1992). In a more recent case study of strategic change in 
a Nordic university, Pinheiro and Stensaker (2014) opted to employ Greenwood and 
Hinings (1993) concept of organisational archetypes, arguing that just as organisation 
archetypes may serve as a way of driving conformity amongst organisations in a particular 
organisational field, so too could they be seen as potent drivers of organisational change. In 
this instance, their conceptual premise was the rise of the entrepreneurial university as a 
new organisational archetype in higher education.  
The use of these various theoretical frames provided limited, and indeed conflicting, 
guidance as to an appropriate premise in exploring the process of organisational change at 
the University of Canberra. In canvassing the literature on empirical studies of change in 
higher education institutions, I found there was a variable extent to which theory was 
incorporated into or actively informed the research focus. In some instances, the analysis 
or description of change in higher education research is largely empirical, and essentially 
atheoretical in nature. In others, the theoretical frame is implicit, or, as in the case of 
Marshall’s (2007b) analysis of the 25 higher education institute projects, a post hoc 
application of theory to group projects in such a way as to identify patterns in the strategies 
adopted after the fact. This approach generates a series of elements identified in the 
processes of strategic change, a perspective that meets the requirements of practice related 
research, but does not allow for reflection on the underlying paradigm which informs the 
work being undertaken, or the way in which the ‘lens’ will shape both the nature of the 
study and the results obtained (Morgan, 2006). 
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My preference had been to identify a conceptual approach to organisational change in a 
university that I could adopt and use to underpin my thesis. Despite my efforts, this search 
proved unsuccessful. The task that emerged was to directly explore the theoretical 
literature on organisational change in order to supplement and strengthen the conceptual 
grounding for this study. While the enormous body of work on organisational change was 
well beyond the scope of this theses, there were some pointers in the literature described 
above, to authors such as Nadler and Tushman, to Pettigrew and to Greenwood and 
Hinings. This exploration of some selected components of organisation theory is set out in 
Section 3.5  
Before doing so, Section 3.4 draws together the recurrent themes that have emerged from 
the higher education literature as it bears on rankings, on successful universities, and on 
bringing about positive change in university performance.  
3.4 Recurrent themes 
While adopting somewhat diverse approaches and addressing somewhat different 
questions, some consistent themes emerge from the literature reviewed in the preceding 
sections of this chapter. The emphasis and framing may differ, but there is a degree of 
consistency around a number of key elements.  
Drawing on the literature related to rankings success, these elements include the 
importance of financial resources, high quality academic staff, the ability to change the 
culture of an organisation, strong leadership and a clear strategic vision. The literature on 
change in universities, and on the rise of entrepreneurial universities, shares some of the 
same conclusions, but also contributes a suite of additional elements, many of which draw 
on a more managerial orientation.  
These additional elements include strong management, recognition of the value of 
university wide strategic planning, a robust assessment of the organisation’s strengths and 
weaknesses, readiness to identify problems and respond to them, willingness to experiment 
and embrace change, financial accountability and indeed a degree of frugality, academic 
accountability, communication and transparency in decision-making, the capacity to 
analyse the external environment and a strong and positive organisational culture.  
There are also some less commonly described elements from the rankings literature, which 
are nonetheless worthy of further consideration. These include internationalisation and 
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marketing and branding, both of which are evident in the literature, albeit not quite as 
visible. Improved educational quality is mentioned more in the negative than the positive 
sense, as a component that is typically not taken into account in the rankings, or indeed 
may be negatively affected by pursuit of rankings. In other literature reviewed here 
educational quality is recognised as a core part of the mission of a contemporary 
university, but there is a kind of silence around the role of improvements in educational 
quality as a potential strategy to enhance the standing or success of a university. The 
importance of good quality data is mentioned infrequently, and when it is mentioned often 
in relation to strategies for gaming the system. 
Figure 3.2 presents an integrated summary of these themes organised under two broad 
rubrics of dominant themes and other themes. Material is gathered up under 14 categories, 
financial resources, human resources, leadership, a whole of organisation focus, vision and 
strategy, analysis, agility, an external orientation, a competitive approach, 
internationalisation, marketing, mergers and acquisitions, data quality and educational 
quality. 
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Figure 3.2 Recurrent and other themes 
 
  
Dominant themes Indicative related literature 
1. Financial resources  
Increased (or sufficient) financial resources, redirection or 
focusing of financial resources, careful financial management, 
financial accountability 
Allen 2017, Altbach and Hazelkorn 
2017a, Clark 2004, Edgar and Geare 
2013, Enders 2014, Froumin and 
Platonova 2017, Salmi 2009; 2011, 
Shattock 2003 
2. Human resources 
High quality academic staff, high performing researchers 
Clark 2004, Enders 2014, Hazelkorn 
2015, Marginson and van den Wende 
2007, Salmi 2009; 2011,  
3. Leadership 
Strong leadership, strengthened steering core, leadership suited to 
purpose 
Davies 2001, Kok and McDonald 2017, 
Marshall 2007, Middlehurst 2007, Salmi 
2009, Shattock 2003, 2017 
4.Whole of organisation  
Permeation through the institution, stimulated academic 
heartland; organisational coherence, mutually supportive and 
informal relations, communication  
Clark 2004, Davies 2001, Marshall 
2007, Pinheiro and Stensaker 2014, 
Shattock 2003, 2017, Thoenig and 
Paradeise 2016, 2018, 
5. Vision, planning and targets 
Bold vision connected to a clearly articulated strategic plan, 
concrete programs and targets, setting of stretch goals 
Davies 2001, Marshall 2007, Salmi 
2009, Shattock 2003 
6. Analysis 
Assessment of organisational strengths and weaknesses, a 
willingness to recognise and address problems, ability to analyse 
the external environment 
Davies 2001, Salmi 2009 
7. Agility 
Ability to respond quickly and flexibly to changes in the external 
environment, to embraces change, willing to experiment and take 
risks, learn collectively from experience 
Clark 2004, Davies 2001, Etzkowtiz 
2003, Etzkowitz and Viale 2010, 
Shattock 2003 
8. An external orientation 
Stakeholder engagement, expanded development periphery, 
diversified funding, industry and government partnerships, 
regional relationships, identifying commercial opportunities 
Clark 2004, Davies 2001, Etzkowtiz 
2003, Shattock 2003 
Other themes  
9. Competitive and ambitious approach Clark 2004, Shattock 2003 
10. Internationalisation Gunn and Minton 2013, Mok and 
Hallinger 2013 
11. Marketing and branding Espeland and Sauder 2007, Marginson 
2007, Shattock 2003 
12. Mergers and Acquisitions Salmi 2009, Shattock 2017 
13. Good quality data Bekhradnia 2016, Espeland and Sauder 
2007, Locke et al 2008, Salmi and 
Saroyan 2007 
14. Educational quality and high quality students  Morphew et al 2018  
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Taken together, it is an informative list of attributes, all of them relevant to driving positive 
change in an upwardly mobile university, and a useful framework for testing against the 
material gathered in the case study. This literature informs us about ‘what’ an upwardly 
mobile aspirational university might do to improve its standing, and some aspects of ‘how’ 
that change might be brought about, but less about the process of how organisational 
change occurs, and little on what might constitute a coherent framework for bringing about 
these organisational changes, and studying how successful organisational change might 
occur. This is the subject matter of the next section. 
3.5 Organisational change: selected approaches  
The final stage of this literature review involved a scan of the organisational change 
literature in order to strengthen the conceptual underpinnings of the thesis relating 
particularly to the process of organisational change. Reed’s (2006) overview of 
organisational theory provided a valuable orientation, locating different intellectual 
traditions and approaches within this broad and complex terrain. From a meta-theoretical 
perspective, a critical realist paradigm has much to offer the present study. It is consistent 
with the pragmatic methodological framework of a mixed methods inquiry, and well suited 
to understanding the ways in which patterns of change are created and understood in open 
systems.  
Critical realism enables the development of explanatory models of historical and structural 
change in organisational forms and processes, while recognising the complexity of 
organisations as they are constituted as open systems, the interplay of pre-existing 
constraints and future possibilities, the recognition of agency and structure and supports an 
explanatory focus (Reed, 2006 pp.40-41, Clark et al., 2008). At the same time, it supports 
the identification of ways of intervening to change patterns of organisation behaviours and 
individuals in organisations (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Greenwood and Hinings (2006) identify the mid-1980s as a pivotal period in the 
development of theories of organisational change. Prior to this, they describe a period 
where organisational contexts and strategies were relatively stable, and change was 
constructed as something both adaptive and modest. They describe a transition from the 
1960s to the late 1970s whereby change moved from being non-problematic (structural 
contingency theory and strategic choice theory) to problematic (resource dependency 
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theory, configuration theory, institutional theory and ecological theory), as the focus on 
obstacles that hindered change gained pace.  
From the 1980s on, they identify theories of organisation which can be described explicitly 
as theories of organisational change – neo-institutionalism, punctuated-equilibrium theory 
and continuity and change theory. Nadler and Tushman’s work, emerging from punctuated 
equilibrium theory, strongly influenced the early development of the present research 
study, while the approach developed Pettigrew and colleagues became increasingly 
influential in the latter stages of fieldwork and in the analysis. In bringing this research 
project to completion, I have found myself in the uncomfortable intellectual position of 
drawing on various literatures—some connected, and some disparate—in order to identify 
a frame that fits the nature of this research endeavour. Such an approach is not part of a top 
down model theoretically informed of empirical research, but is consistent with my 
methodological frame of mixed methods research and a critical realist paradigm. It also 
resonates with Aaron Wildavsky’s (1989) explication of the way in which we can learn to 
understand and use theory in social science: 
The reader cannot take existing theory for granted. Rather his task is to make 
theory out of disparate and disconnected material. This is a formidable task, 
which is one of the reasons there is so little available for the taking. Theory 
cannot just be picked up; it has to be searched for, chiselled, shaped, pounded, 
reorganised and reoriented. Creating coherence out of existing bits of theory is 
like getting an inside straight in poker (Wildavsky, 1989, p.29) 
The pursuit of an organisational theory of change that aligned with an informed my study 
of change at the University of Canberra led me to a process of multiple iterations between 
my data, the empirical literature, and the conceptual literature, relating to rankings, to 
successful universities, and to organisational change. I explored a number of possible 
options, and tested them in the data through a process of coding, analysis and writing to 
identify the best fit to the data itself. The central approaches explored were those following 
the work of Pettigrew and colleagues processual approach to the study of organisational 
change (Pettigrew, 1987, 1990, 1997, Pettigrew et al., 1988, 1992, 2001), Greenwood and 
Hinings and associates  (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993, 1996, 2006, Greenwood et al., 
2002, 2014), Nadler and Tushman (1989, 1990, 1997) and Hailey and Balogun’s (Hailey 
and Balogun, 2002, Balogun et al., 2015) change kaleidoscope.  
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3.5.1 The influences from Nadler and Tushman 
Nadler and Tushman’s (1997) congruence model of organisational behaviour focused on 
the degree of ‘fit’ among the various components of an organisation, arguing that the 
higher the degree of fit the more effective the organisation. The congruence model 
incorporates a process of transformation with four inter-dependent components at its 
heart—the work; the people; the formal organisational arrangements and the informal 
organisation. This approach was described by Marshall (2007a) as one with aligned with 
studies of change in universities where: 
The change initiative didn’t so much represent a change from what was, but 
rather represented the need to create something that wasn’t (Marshall, 2007a, 
pp.8-9) 
This model of four inter-dependent components informed the research project from its 
earliest stages, and remained an important organising framework in the final write up of 
the description of the organisational change at the University of Canberra presented in 
Chapter 6. During the data collection and data analysis stages, however, I became 
increasingly attracted to Pettigrew’s (1990, 1997) processual change model, in part 
because of the longitudinal nature of the study and in part because of the interaction 
between the organisation and the external context. This is discussed further in the next 
section. 
The four components of Nadler and Tushman’s (1997) congruence model can be briefly 
summarised as follows. The work refers to the activities undertaken in the organisation in 
furtherance of the company’s strategy, including an understanding of the nature of the 
tasks, patterns of work flow, and other more complex characteristics including the 
knowledge skills required, rewards and levels of stress and uncertainty. The people in this 
context involves identifying the important characteristics of the people responsible for core 
work—their skills, knowledge, experience, expectations behaviour patterns and 
demographics. The formal organisational arrangements are the structures, processes, and 
systems that organise the work and guide the activity of the people. The informal 
organisation is intended to capture the informal and unwritten guidelines that influence 
behaviour, also referred to as organisational culture, and encompasses practices and 
political relationships, as well as the values, beliefs and norms of individual people within 
the organisation (Nadler and Tushman, 1997, p.32). 
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By its inclusion of people and informal organisation, it allows for the inclusion of 
organisational culture, an aspect of universities which is more often mentioned in terms of 
their capacity to resist change (herding cats) than in understanding the centrality of these 
elements to the process of achieving change. Ghoshal and Bartlett argue strongly that this 
is the key factor in enabling change and creativity. They use the term ‘internal 
environment’, but in their words: 
 Whether described as culture, climate or context, it is the smell of the place 
that prevents companies from creating the capability of entrepreneurship, 
learning and self-renewal (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1988, pp.142-3).  
Nadler and Tushman’s (1989, 1990) work on types of organisational change, and more 
specifically re-orientation or ‘frame-bending’, proved valuable in relation to both the 
account of organisational change presented in Chapter 6, and the analysis of why change 
had been successfully implemented, as well as the associated costs and benefits, presented 
in Chapter 7. The typology was built on two intersecting axes—the first being the scope of 
the change (from one aspect of the system through to the whole organisation) and the 
second the relationship to key external events (reactive or anticipatory change) (see Figure 
3.3).  
The positioning of the change The scope of the change  
 Incremental Strategic 
Anticipatory Tuning Reorientation 
Reactive Adaption Re-creation 
Figure 3.3 Typology of organisational change 
Source: Nadler and Tushman (1989 p.196) 
Reorientation or reframing is described as ‘strategic change made with the luxury of time 
afforded by having anticipated the external events that may ultimately require change’. 
While there is fundamental change throughout the organisation there is also continuity, 
hence Nadler and Tushman’s use of the term ‘frame-bending’ to encapsulate the idea of 
‘bringing about major change without a sharp break with the existing organisation frame’ 
(1989, p.196). Nadler and Tushman set out the principles of effective frame-bending under 
the headings of initiating change, the content of change, leading change and achieving 
change. These principles are set out in Figure 3.4.  
This model re-iterates a number of the attributes identified earlier in this and the preceding 
chapter, and previously summarised in Section 3.4. It also identifies or elaborates some 
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additional elements relevant to the present study. Developing a sense of urgency around 
the need for change is one that emerges here, and resonates with one of the eight steps 
proposed by Kotter (1996). The concept of the ‘magic leader’, who is able to create an 
inspiring vision, demonstrate tenacity in sticking to key change themes, employ a mix of 
management styles and energise staff through a combination of a high level of personal 
performance and high expectations of others is perhaps the most important additional 
element. Several other elements—including broadening the leadership to build a strong  
Figure 3.4 Principles of effective frame-bending  
Source: summarised from Nadler and Tushman (1989) 
 
management team, combining planning with opportunism, and the ‘many bullets’ principle 
of working change agendas through multiple levels of the organisation and in multiple 
ways—resonate and build on the themes identified in earlier sections of this chapter and set 
out in Figure 3.2. 
Nadler and Tushman’s approach benefits from being organised into a coherent framework, 
incorporating elements identified in the literature on rankings and the literature on 
Initiating change 
 strong analysis of external challenges and internal strengths and weaknesses 
 a clear vision values, performance objectives, rationale, organisational structure or processes 
and operating style 
 a sense of urgency or energy to build motivation 
Change content 
 central to the core strategic issues of the organisation 
 a limited number of major themes through which managers articulate the changes (the rule 
of three) 
Leading change 
 The ‘magic leader’: creating an inspirational vision, energising by high standards of personal 
behaviour and creating an enabling environment for change (also the ability to create a sense 
of urgency, tenacity in sticking to the key themes and using a mix of management styles) 
 Broadening the leadership base into executive management and beyond 
Achieving change 
 Combining careful planning with opportunism 
 Motivating and initiating change on many levels and in many ways (the ‘many bullet’s 
principle) 
 Significant investment or resources including senior management time, and over the long 
term (typically 3 -7 years). Ongoing need for organisational motivation. 
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successful universities and expanding on them, and particularly in relation to ‘frame-
bending’ or ‘re-orientation’, is directly relevant to the qualitative data gathered and 
analysed in the present study. Nonetheless, there is a focus on organisational stability and 
change as an episodic event that did not fully capture the constantly evolving environment 
of the modern-day Australian university, or indeed this study of ‘changing’ at the 
University of Canberra over a seven-year period.  
3.5.2 Continuity and change: following Pettigrew’s model of processual analysis 
The model employed by Pettigrew and his colleagues (Pettigrew, 1987, Pettigrew et al., 
1988, Pettigrew et al., 2001) across several studies of large-scale organisational change 
explores continuity as well as change, the process of change, and the interaction between 
the internal workings of the organisation and the external context. This model is well 
suited to the present study, as it supports a processual approach to exploring change, as 
well as the interaction of the organisation with its own history, internal contextual elements 
and the external context. Importantly in the context of the present study, a central concern 
is with how organisation manage change, with the processes and mechanisms through 
which changes are created, and as Greenwood and Hinings put it, an emphasis that is ‘less 
on change and more on changing: 
For these authors, emphasis should be less on a change and more on changing. 
Therefore, they suggest that change be understood through the unfolding 
interaction of three constructs: content, context and process (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 2006, p.831). 
Pettigrew’s model is set out in Figure 3.5 below. The content of change refers to the 
transformation under investigation, whether a wholistic change or multiple changes 
occurring in sequence or in parallel. Pettigrew divides context into two areas. Outer context 
concerns the economic, political and social environment outside the organisation as well as 
the way in which it is perceived nationally and regionally. Inner context refers to the 
structural, strategic, cultural and political environment within the organisation. Process 
refers to ‘the actions, reactions and interactions of the various interested parties’ as they 
seek to bring about change (Pettigrew et al., 1988, pp.300-01). Put simply, Pettigrew 
equates content with the what of change, outer and inner context with the why of change 
and process with the how of change. 
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Figure 3 5 Outline Analytical Approach to Change 
Source: Pettigrew et al. (1988)  
While deceptively simple in terms of the schematic design, the focus on the interplay of the 
elements and historical aspects of change combine to create a comprehensive lens through 
which to view broadly based organisational change. Indeed, the emphasis on the 
‘continuous interplay’ between content, process and context over a significant period of 
time in order to produce ‘theoretically sound and practically useful research’ (Pettigrew et 
al., 1988, p.300) combined to set a very high bar indeed for a single researcher embarking 
on a doctoral thesis. Pettigrew and colleagues set out the research task as follows: 
The task is to identify the variety and mixture of causes of change, to examine 
the juxtaposition of the rational, incremental, political and cultural views of 
process, quests for efficiency and power, the role of exceptional people and of 
extreme circumstance, the untidiness of chance, the variable interplay of policy 
and structural context, and to explore some of the conditions in which these 
mixtures occur (Pettigrew et al., 1988, p.301). 
The approach was an attractive one given the aims of this thesis, and became increasingly 
influential during the data collection, coding and analysis of my qualitative data, and 
therefore the results. It led to some important methodological modifications relating to my 
enhanced appreciation of the importance of temporality in a longitudinal study of this kind. 
I undertook a more detailed analysis of historical documents over the seven-year period of 
the study, as a way of grounding the qualitative interviews and more fully documenting the 
process of change (as documented in Section 4.5). At a conceptual level, the ability to 
explore change as a continuous rather than an episodic process, the importance of context 
and particularly recognising the ongoing interaction between changes in the external 
 
     Outer 
Context 




Content Process  
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context and the inner context, and the simple but elegant conceptualisation of the 
connection between content, process and context with the what, how and why of change, 
proved invaluable to my understanding of the changes occurring over the period from 2007 
to 2013 at the University of Canberra.  
3.5.3 The final framework 
Pettigrew’s (1990, 1997) approach resonated with the practical mission of this research 
project, which was to understand not only how a university could move up the rankings 
table against the odds, but also the content and process of change over a seven-year period 
and the interaction between the university and its external context. It allowed for and 
indeed encouraged the combination of qualitative interviews and reviews of documentary 
evidence, and was a good fit with the ongoing nature of change at the University of 
Canberra, and the way in which that change was closely connected to the external context. 
It provided a valuable framework for the high-level coding of the qualitative interviews. 
The flexibility of the model also enabled me to connect the process of changing within the 
higher education literature on successful universities and upward movement in the global 
rankings tables, specifically the major recurrent themes, as identified in the literature 
review in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, and summarised in Figure 3.2. The interplay of the 
processual model of change integrated well with the analysis of the literature on successful 
and upwardly mobile universities in the context of global rankings. At the same time, 
however, the broad scope and the flexibility inherent in the approach generated challenges 
for a single researcher undertaking a doctoral thesis. The sheer volume of potential work 
meant that full implementation of the processional analysis was difficult to sustain, and in 
that sense at times became an aspirational framework rather than one that was fully 
implemented. 
If Pettigrew’s conceptual model served the study well in analysing the qualitative data, it 
was Nadler and Tushman’s (1997)four categories of the work, the people, the informal 
organisation and the formal organisation that proved useful in organising the write up 
stage of those data across the three ‘periods of change’ identified from the qualitative 
material. While the three periods were a useful heuristic device in managing the volume of 
material, they simultaneously introduced a risk of too much diversity. Nadler and 
Tushman’s four categories imposed a useful discipline on the narration of change across 
the three periods. 
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Finally, Nadler and Tushman’s (1989) concept of ‘frame-bending’ offered a valuable 
model for testing both the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of successful change at the University of 
Canberra. By providing a specific model of how change could be successfully be brought 
about, it added some structure and signposts to the wide and inevitably challenging 
landscape implicit in fully implementing a processual model of change.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has traversed a broad path, exploring literature on global rankings, on 
successful universities, the idea of entrepreneurial universities, case studies of change in 
universities and finally some selected aspects of the theoretical literature on organisational 
change. Each is a significant literature in its own right, and has necessarily been included 
in a focussed, rather than comprehensive sense, being mined for elements relevant to the 
central research questions of this thesis.  
My review of these literatures identified a number of elements and themes that resonated to 
varying degrees with the material emerging from the qualitative interviews and document 
analysis undertaken for Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. The combination of the literatures 
on higher education and rankings focussed predominantly at the sector level , and the 
literatures on successful and entrepreneurial universities, including case studies of change, 
at the organisational level, contributed to a richer understanding of what might prove 
important to an individual university aspiring to achieve upward movement in the global 
rankings, as well as a university facing a situation of the need for a ‘turn around’ to lead it 
out of a downward spiral. That is the material summarised in Figure 3.2. It fell somewhat 
short, however, when it came to the ‘how’ of bringing about organisational change in a 
university, and was supplemented by conceptual approaches derived from the literature on 
organisational change. My exploration of that literature did not, however, yield a single 
theoretical framework which suited the research questions addressed here, and which could 
be implemented within the constraints of a doctoral thesis.  
This led me to a process of multiple iterations between my data, the empirical literature, 
and the conceptual literature, as it relating to rankings, to successful universities, and to 
organisational change. Given the practical mission of this research project, which was to 
understand how a university could move up the rankings table against the odds, the content 
and process of those changes over a seven-year period, and the interaction with the 
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external context, it was perhaps inevitable that no single model would fit with the variety 
of material emerging from the study. It was also the intention of the project to move 
upward from the data, informed but not determined by one particular scholarly frame. In 
this sense, the research project was a way of explaining the observed success of the 
University of Canberra in the rankings game, consistent with a critical realist perspective 
and employing in large part an abductive approach. 
The rankings literature, together with the literature on successful universities, contributed 
to the early design stages of the thesis and the refinement of the research questions. 
Subsequently, Pettigrew’s processual change model (1990, 1997) provided the guiding 
framework for the analysis of the qualitative data, as well as influencing the 
methodological design through an expanded exploration of the historical documentary 
evidence. The emphasis on the temporal aspects of organisational change was particularly 
valuable, and the interplay of the four key areas (process, content, internal context and 
external context) characteristic of the processual model of change integrated well with the 
analysis of the literature on successful and upwardly mobile universities in the context of 
global rankings. 
But as I returned again and again to my data, there was still an element missing to inform 
my understanding of why the University of Canberra had achieved such unexpected 
rankings success. I explored a number of possible options, and tested each in turn in the 
write up stage of the data analysis. In the end, the data were telling a story that resonated 
most closely with Nadler and Tushman’s four fold framework of the work, the people, the 
informal organisation and the formal organisation (1997), and their analysis of ‘frame-
bending’ (1989). This framework was employed to organise the write-up of material as it 
related to the achievement of rankings success. Consequently, a combination of 
Pettigrew’s processual approach and the work of Nadler and Tushman became the final 
components of my conceptual ‘frame’.  
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Chapter 4 Research methodology  
4.1 Introduction 
The area of inquiry addressed in this thesis sits at the intersection of research on global 
rankings and higher education, on the pursuit of rankings success by individual 
universities, and on organisational change. The literature set out in Chapters 2 and 3 
underpinned a progressive narrowing of the research topic addressed here, from a broadly 
based interest in the impact of global rankings on the university sector, to a more specific 
research agenda concerning the opportunities for ‘underdog’ universities to achieve 
rankings success ‘against the odds’. In this chapter, the focus is on the methodological 
approach developed in order to explore this research agenda—a two stage mixed methods 
research design incorporating a case study design. 
The chapter begins by locating this mixed methods approach within its ontological and 
epistemological context. The key research questions and their operationalisation is set out 
in Section 4.3, followed by more detailed description of the two-stage research 
methodology in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the 
development of the methodology and the limitations of the approach.  
4.2 Locating a mixed methods approach: ontology, 
epistemology and the quantitative-qualitative divide 
Traditionally, the simplest (and most contested) division in social science research 
methodology has been the ‘binary divide’ between quantitative and qualitative methods. 
The degree of intensity associated with this quantitative/qualitative debate has varied over 
the past five decades, as well as across disciplines and specific areas of study. Some 
researchers take the view that the dichotomy is no longer particularly relevant, echoing 
comments made almost 50 years ago by Glaser and Strauss in their seminal work on 
grounded theory (1967). Other authors suggest that the divide has a ‘continued, even 
growing, currency’ (Bryman, 2012, p.35). Advocates of the ‘third way’ of mixed methods 
research take a position which recognises the distinction, but argue that peaceful co-
existence of the three communities (quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods) is both 
possible and desirable (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009, p.16). 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
90  
Each methodological approach is associated with a particular paradigm—although the 
degree and nature of that association is both complex and contested (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000a). In broad terms, paradigms can be understood as sets of philosophical assumptions 
relating to the nature of knowledge and reality and are commonly defined in terms of 
ontology, epistemology and methodology. Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality 
itself. Epistemology is concerned with the relationship between human beings and 
‘reality’, and thus with the nature of knowledge. Methodology is concerned with the means 
by which we gain knowledge about the world, or ‘reality’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000b, 
pp.7-25, Mertens, 2005). 
Quantitative social science research is associated with the natural science tradition, and 
located within a positivist paradigm. Ontologically, reality is both objective and external. 
In epistemological terms, scientific (or social scientific) methods can be used to measure 
and define reality in an objective way. The ‘knower’ or researcher can thus be separated 
from the knowledge that is created. By contrast, qualitative research, emerging from a 
constructivist tradition, allows for multiple realities, rejects notions of objectivity in favour 
of embracing the subjective, and focuses on understanding and interpreting social 
behaviour and its context. Another important distinction is the relationship between theory 
and research. Traditionally, quantitative research is held to privilege a deductive approach 
between theory and research, in which the emphasis is placed on testing theories which 
emerge from the literature, while qualitative research favours an inductive approach 
whereby research leads to the generation of theory (Bryman, 2012, pp.35-37). 
Like most dichotomies, the qualitative/quantitative divide is better understood as a 
continuum or a set of overlapping constructs rather than as two absolutes. The emergence 
and popularisation of mixed methods research has contributed to the sophistication of 
scholarly discourse on the shared spaces of quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as 
their differences and divisions. During the 1980s and to some extent the 1990s there was 
significant debate at the philosophical level concerning the compatibility of positivism (or 
post-positivism) on the one hand, and constructivism (and phenomenology or 
interpretivism) on the other. The ‘incompatibility thesis’ held that the distinctions between 
these philosophical traditions were so great, and the connection between research methods 
and paradigms so strong, that it was fundamentally inappropriate to mix quantitative and 
qualitative methods (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009, pp.15-17). 
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The mixed methods research community rejected not only the incompatibility thesis but 
also the binary nature of the debate, moving to develop a specific paradigm for mixed 
methods researchers—pragmatism. Pragmatism largely sidesteps the 
positivist/constructivist divide by putting the focus on effectiveness as the key criteria for 
the choice of research methods rather than with a particular view of what constitutes the 
real world. At an ontological level, pragmatists concur with the positivist notion of an 
external reality, but are closer to constructivists in questioning the existence of any one 
truth that describes that reality. Pragmatists also challenge the binary distinction between 
objectivity and subjectivity; in epistemological terms they prefer to locate these constructs 
on a continuum and allow the relationship between researchers and participants to move 
along that continuum depending on the focus of the research at a particular point in the 
inquiry (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009, pp.87-93). 
The research design developed for this thesis sits within a mixed methods research 
tradition and is most closely affiliated with the research paradigm of pragmatism, wherein 
the choice of methods was driven by the research question. Consistent with this 
methodological approach, the meta-theoretical paradigm adopted in this thesis is that of 
critical realism, enabling a focus on both the pre-existing social reality that shapes the 
structure and processes of organisational forms, as well as on the ways in which the 
organisation is generated, reproduced and transformed Reed (2006, p.41). It is recognised 
that the knowledge generated by a particular research project will be as much a result of 
the theoretical frame chosen and the methodological approaches employed as it is a 
product of the area under investigation. 
Mixed methods research combines quantitative and qualitative techniques in the same 
research study. Some authors distinguish mixed methods research from mixed-model 
research; the latter incorporates qualitative and quantitative research in a broader research 
programme, or suite of studies (Mertens, 2009, pp.292-3). Researchers may gather 
quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously or sequentially. There may be a primary 
focus on either the quantitative or qualitative components of the study, or an equal focus on 
both.  
The key strengths associated with the approach are arguably the primary focus on the most 
effective research techniques to study the identified research question, and the flexibility 
that comes with this adoption of pragmatism as the underlying research paradigm. By 
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virtue of the willingness to use multiple methods, the opportunities for triangulation 
(collecting evidence from multiple sources in multiple ways) are enhanced (Bryman, 2007, 
pp.454-5), and hence the argument for the robustness of research findings strengthened. It 
is recognised, however, that triangulation is not the sole purview of mixed methods 
researchers and can be employed in both quantitative and qualitative research traditions. 
While some see the pragmatic paradigm as a strength, it is also the source of one of the 
major criticisms levelled at mixed methods researchers, that is that they pay insufficient 
attention to the underlying philosophical framework: 
... by attending too little to philosophical ideas and traditions, many mixed-
methods inquirers are insufficiently reflective and their practice insufficiently 
unproblematized (Mertens, 2005, p.294). 
Mixed methods is a rapidly growing tradition, although opinions vary on its legitimacy and 
its degree of maturity. Its advocates claim a strong focus on relevance and utility, which is 
consistent with the paradigm of pragmatism (Doyle et al., 2009). 
4.3 Operationalising the research question 
The starting point for this thesis was a broad question concerning the impact of the rise of 
global rankings on the university sector. Progressively, my research interest focussed down 
on to questions of whether individual universities were improving their positions in the 
global rankings tables, and from there to how universities could achieve gains in the 
international rankings ‘against the odds’. As a relative ‘under-dog’ in the university 
performance stakes, my own institution, the University of Canberra, seemed just such an 
unlikely ‘success story’ when I began my DBA HEM journey in 2011, despite its 
aspirations to enter the global rankings. 
Over the course of that journey, the thesis question evolved from one about whether 
‘underdog’ universities could improve their rankings performance, to a question about how 
it had occurred in my own institution, and the frequency with which it was occurring 
elsewhere. The three specific questions at the core of this research became: 
Research Question 1: How did the University of Canberra’s rankings 
performance compare in the national and international context?  
Research Question 2: How did the University of Canberra achieve a ‘turn 
around’ in its performance? 
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Research Question 3: What were the consequences for the organisation? 
4.3.1 The research design 
This study was undertaken using a two stage mixed methods research design. Stage 1 was 
a quantitative longitudinal analysis of global rankings tables which examined the context 
both nationally and internationally of the University of Canberra’s rankings performance 
(Research Question 1). Stage 2 was a longitudinal case study design using both 
quantitative and qualitative data in order to explore organisational change in a university 
that had achieved significant success in the global rankings ‘game’ (Research Questions 2 
and 3). An overview of the research design is presented in Figure 4.1. Each of these two 
research stages is described in detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. 
The rankings analysis (Stage 1) provides both the outcome (rankings success) and the 
context (the performance of other universities, both in Australia and internationally) for the 
case study of organisational change at the University of Canberra. Stage 2 (the case study) 
explored the ‘what’ (content), ‘how’ (process) and ‘why’ (inner and outer context) of 
organisational change, as well as the consequences of that change from the perspective of 
senior management. This focus on the content, process and context of change is drawn 
from Pettigrew’s model of a processual analysis of change (see Chapter 3.3), where 
process is defined as ‘a sequence of individual and collective events, actions and activities 
unfolding over time in context’ (Pettigrew, 1997 p.338). The guiding assumptions 
underpinning Pettigrew’s approach to processual analysis are set out in Figure 4.2. 
In particular, a core premise of this project was the ambition to link the process of 
organisational change to the outcome of improved university performance on key metrics 
and thus rankings success (guiding assumption 5 in Figure 4.2). The temporal aspect of the 
present study was also of critical importance, weaving strands of analysis across the central 
case study period of 2007–2013, but also into the years preceding and, for the exploration 
of consequences, the years that followed, with senior manager interviews completed in 
2016–17, reflecting back on years past, on the present and the future guiding assumption 
(guiding assumption 2). The rankings analysis spans the period from 2008 to 2018, 
providing a broadly based context for the project, in addition to the analysis of the more 
immediate outer context, inner context and process undertaken in the case study (guiding 
assumption 3). The research project adopted a holistic rather than linear approach to the  
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 Stage 1 Stage 2 
 Research 
Question 1 




Quantitative and Qualitative Qualitative 
Data 
sources 
Three major global 
rankings: ARWU 
2008–17, THE 




Documents: Annual reports 
(2002/03 to 2013/13), Council and 
Academic Board papers 2007-2013, 
UC Media releases 2006-2013, UC 
on-line journal Monitor 2006–13, 
Key Performance Metrics, Bi-
ennial Voice Surveys 
Audio and Video recordings of the 
Vice-Chancellor’s Staff Forums 
(selection 2008-2011) 





Re-analysis of draft 
material prepared in 
relation to Research 








Event based qualitative analysis of 
documents 
Thematic qualitative analysis of 
documents and interview 
transcripts 
Time series analysis of quantitative 
data 
Thematic qualitative 
analysis of interview 
transcripts 
Thematic analysis of 
the case study 










University wide metrics 
Individual interviews 




Organisational change – including 














final method and 
analysis 2018 
Preliminary review of documents 
2013, 2016 
Main review and analysis of 
documents 2017 and 2018 
Audio and Video recording 2018 
Interviews conducted 2016–2017 
together with early test coding  
Main transcript analysis 2018 
KPI and Voice Survey analyses 
2013, 2016 
Interviews conducted 
2016- 2017 together 




Figure 4.1 Overview of the research design 
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change process (guiding assumption 4), and endeavoured to study process across multiple 
levels of analysis.  
While the present study falls short of a full implementation of the processual analysis of 
organisational change, inevitably constrained by the capacity of one researcher undertaking 
a doctoral thesis, Pettigrew’s model nonetheless played a key formative role in this thesis. 
Figure 4.2 Pettigrew’s methodological underpinnings of processual analysis  
4.3.2 The case study approach 
One of the often quoted descriptors of case study research derives from a relatively obscure 
source—a working paper published almost fifty years ago by the National Institute of 
Education in the USA Department of Health, Education and Welfare:  
 … the essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case 
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were 
taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Schramm, 1971, p.6).  
Shramm’s definition resonates well with the central research question of this thesis, 
although it fails to highlight the role of context. Changes in the university cannot easily be 
separated from the changing tertiary sector, nor from economic changes in the community. 
This investigation therefore requires the researcher to examine the case in context. A case 
study approach does allow for the inclusion of context. Using Yin’s definition, the case 
study is an empirical inquiry that: 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when  
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly identified 
(Yin, 1994, p.13). 
Five guiding assumptions in the methodological approach to processual research 
(Pettigrew, 1997, pp.341-42): 
1. Embeddedness, studying processes across a number of levels of analysis 
2. Temporal interconnectedness, studying processes in past, present and future time; 
3. A role in explanation for context and action; 
4. A search for holistic rather than linear explanations of process; and  
5. A need to link the analysis of process to the location and explanation of outcomes 
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Some authors (Yin, 1994) classify case studies by type (critical case, unique case, 
representative case), but for present purposes Stake’s distinction between instrumental and 
intrinsic frames in case study research is more useful (1995, pp.2-4). In one sense, the 
project was an instrumental case study, but it is also intrinsic in that the achievement of 
step changes in rankings position of the selected university makes this particular institution 
interesting in its own right. This design therefore incorporates both an instrumental and 
intrinsic frame, seeking to understand and explore the specific case, but in doing so to gain 
insights into the nature of organisational change in the university sector more generally. 
Stake (1995) notes that this combination of forms is not uncommon in research practice. 
Case studies allow ‘a wide range of evidence capture and analysis procedures’ (Dalcher, 
2004, p.227), and as such are not necessarily associated with a particular mode of inquiry 
or indeed a set number of cases (Stake, 1995, Yin, 1999). A case study design can be 
informed by both quantitative and qualitative research techniques. In this instance an 
emphasis on qualitative data was adopted, supplemented by quantitative analysis of 
secondary data relating to university performance. 
4.4 The research method: the rankings analysis 
The rankings analysis addressed the first of the three core research questions in this thesis, 
as to how the University of Canberra’s rankings performance compared in the 
national and international context. The aim was to explore the extent to which ‘non-
elite’ universities in Australia and elsewhere had succeeded in moving up the global 
rankings ‘against the odds’, that is, when they had not previously been strong performers in 
the global rankings tables.  
Three steps were required to operationalise this question. The first was the selection of the 
rankings system to be used. The second and inter-related step was to select the time period 
during which change was explored. The third was to develop a way to analyse changing in 
rankings position over time that took account of both individual institutions and their 
national context. 
4.4.1 Which ranking system and for what time period? 
The main rankings employed in this thesis are the Academic Ranking of World 
Universities (ARWU), the Times Higher Education ranking (THE) and the Times Higher 
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Education (THE) Young Universities ranking. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ARWU and 
THE are the most highly regarded rankings, and both have a reasonable number of data 
points to support time series analysis. While the University of Canberra was not part of the 
ARWU top 500 rankings, the ARWU is highly regarded and therefore a robust basis for 
national and international comparisons. The THE Young Universities ranking is included 
as it is focussed on the newer universities, and hence are of particular relevance in 
providing context to the case study of an upwardly mobile young institution. The time 
series incorporates the top 500 universities for the ARWU from 2008 to 2017, the top 400 
for the THE from 2012 (the time of its separation from QS) to 2015, expanding to the top 
500 from 2016 to 2018, and the top 100 in the THE Young Universities from its 
commencement in 2012 to 2018. (The final year of data included in each time series was 
the most recent available at the time the final dataset was constructed in April 2018). 
The earliest global rankings date from 2003 (ARWU) and 2004 (THE), but these rankings 
schemes have undergone methodological and scope changes in the years since. In deciding 
on the optimum time series, both factors were taken into account, as well as the intention to 
provide context for the case study of organisational change at the University of Canberra.  
Analysing and reporting results from additional databases could have strengthened the 
study’s reliability and validity; and it is arguable that the use of additional databases (for 
example the QS and Leiden rankings) would have further improved the reliability of the 
study. Such an approach, however, risked a shift of focus away from the core research 
question to a comparison of results in rankings scales. Moreover, for the international 
comparative analyses, the quantum and complexity of data generated by even three 
rankings systems over time was considerable. The more focused and pragmatic approach 
using three rankings scales was therefore adopted.  
4.4.2 Extracting and analysing the data 
Time series data from each of the major ranking systems are publicly available on the 
relevant websites. The difficulty of data extraction varied across web sites; and in all cases 
a degree of manipulation was required to prepare the data for analysis. The data were 
extracted and formatted using Excel programming tools, including VLookup in a macro 
function to transform the data for use in a case based within country time series analysis.  
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Data cleaning was then undertaken by hand, and primarily involved matching cases 
(institutions) over time where names had been changed or had been entered in slightly 
different formats year on year. In a small number of cases, mergers between institutions led 
to potential discontinuities in the data, and case by case decisions were required to either 
treat the entities as separate institutions, or allow the time series to continue under the 
rubric of the ‘dominant’ case. In the few cases where this occurred, decisions as to the 
‘dominant’ institution were made according to the ranking, size and consistency of 
trajectory pattern in the rankings.  
The final analysis of the data was undertaken in Excel, using standard programme tools.  
4.4.3 Analysing changes in rankings position 
Conventionally, the rankings performance of individual institutions is reported by changes 
in rank at two points in time (e.g. ‘since 2016, University X has moved up from 20th to 15th 
place’). The same strategy can be used for comparing the performance of several 
institutions, but as the numbers increase, so too does the complexity of presentation for 
these data. The difficulties are further compounded when attempting an analysis that 
compares institutional and national performance at the same time. 
The most common approach is to rely on aggregate counts at different time points (e.g. 
‘Country Z has improved its standing with 12 universities now ranked in the top 500 
compared to only five in 2015). Aggregate level data do not, however, provide any insight 
into the trajectories of individual institutions within the rankings table. The analysis of 
trend patterns for individual institutions is valuable because it moves beyond simple 
aggregate counts to explore the paths being taken by individual institutions. Concurrently, 
at the national level aggregate data conceal what is happening ‘below the surface’. For 
example a net increase may reflect a solid core of stable institutions with a small number of 
additions, or alternatively a state of flux with various institutions entering and exiting the 
rankings tables. 
In the present study, the question of interest concerned the trajectory of individual 
institutions over time, taking into account their national location, effectively constituting a 
bi-level analysis of trajectory over time. Visual inspection of the data in line graph format 
provided an interesting opportunity to present the data in detail at the national level, but 
with three rankings tables and multiple countries to consider, some with large numbers of 
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universities, this strategy proved impractical for comparative purposes. This is immediately 
evident from Figure 4.3, which presents data for the 23 Australian institutions represented 
in the top 500 ARWU rankings over the period 2008 to 2017. 
The main methodological challenge for Stage 1 of this thesis was to develop a method for 
presenting large amounts of comparative time series data in a way that took account of 
both the institutional and the national levels of analysis.  
 
Figure 4.3 Australian University ARWU rankings 2008-2017 
Several approaches were considered, tested and subsequently discarded, including the use 
of mean rank scores for sub-groups of institutions within country and the use of regression 
coefficients to summarise movement of individual institutions within each country. 
University rankings have by their very nature a degree of uncertainty and volatility. Any 
method that smoothed or averaged the data, thereby making it easier to handle, 
simultaneously removed the researcher from the proximity required to intuitively assess 
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have cogently argued, the responsible use of university rankings requires a method that 
takes account of uncertainty in the process of distinguishing trends: 
To some extent it may be possible to quantify uncertainty in university rankings 
(e.g., using stability intervals in the Leiden Ranking), but to a large extent one 
needs to make an intuitive assessment of this uncertainty. In practice, this 
means that it is best not to pay attention to small performance differences 
between universities. Likewise, minor fluctuations in the performance of a 
university over time can best be ignored. The focus instead should be on 
structural patterns emerging from time trends (Waltman et al., 2017).. 
Given the primary focus on trends in ranking positions over time, a method was developed 
to classify universities according to their trajectory over time, based on an iterative process 
of detailed inspection of these data over time across multiple countries and within several 
rankings systems. 
Developing the rankings bands 
Following detailed inspection of these data across multiple countries and in different 
rankings systems, the first stage of grouping identified universities according to whether 
they were moving up the rankings tables, maintaining their position or moving down the 
rankings table. This process of classification was undertaken in the context of the known 
susceptibility of university rankings tables to fluctuations resulting from relatively small 
methodological changes (Tofallis, 2012), and likely differences associated with data 
quality. For this reason, a broadly consistent data trend was required across the entire time 
period in order for an institution to be classified as moving up or down the rankings. In the 
absence of a consistent trend, the university was allocated to the ‘maintaining position’ (i.e. 
no trend) category. During the analysis, the system was augmented to include two further 
categories, those recently entered during the time series and those who exited the ranking. 
Once the strategy for classifying the directionality of change was established, the second 
stage was to develop a way of representing the degree of change as either minor, moderate 
or substantial. Again, the requirement of a broadly consistent pattern was employed, in this 
case relating to the degree of change. Adoption of the most obvious measurement strategy 
(number of places moved) was complicated by considerations of competition at the top of 
the rankings tables, as well as by the grouping of institutions into successively larger 
categories at the lower end of the rankings tables. 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
101  
Competition at the top of the global rankings is intense, and the reputational stakes are 
high. There is a degree of difficulty in achieving even modest improvements, such that 
moving up 20 places is a very different achievement in the top 50 institutions by 
comparison with those in the 100 to 150 category. This is evident in the lack of movement 
generally at the top of the tables, but it can also be seen in the metrics. For example, using 
the THE ranking scores for 2018, climbing from 50th to 30th position involved a sizeable 
‘overall score’ change from 70.8 to 79.0, whereas climbing from 150th to 130th involved a 
difference of only 55.9 to 57.8.  
At the lower end of the ranking tables, the process was complicated by the use of broad 
categories in reporting the data. For example, while institutions are scored individually in 
the top 100 by the ARWU, past that point universities are ranked in groups of 50 from 101 
to 200, and beyond that in groups of 100. For the THE, the current categories are 
individual rankings up to 200, followed by 50 places from 201 to 400 and 100 places 
beyond that. Relatively small fluctuations can lead to seemingly significant shifts in 
ranking position for institutions positioned at the top or bottom of these larger groupings 
(for example moving from the ‘upper edge’ of the 301–400 category to the ‘lower edge of 
the 201 to 300 category).  
To address this problem of disparity between movements at the upper and lower ends of 
the rankings tables, ‘bands’ representing the degree of change were developed based on a 
sliding scale. Thus the size of the band alters according to amount of detail available in the 
data set as well as proximity to the top of the rankings table, to take account of the 
increasingly detailed data, the increasing difficulty associated with even modest 
movements at the top end of the table, and concomitantly the reputational damage 
associated with even modest downward movements for those institutions in the top 100.  
For the ARWU, every ten places in the top 100 constituted one band, as did every fifty 
places between 101 and 200, and every 100 places from 200 and above. For the THE, the 
approach was generally similar. However, a more detailed breakdown was available for the 
universities ranked in the 100 to 200 category, and a more nuanced band width analysis 
was therefore possible (see Table 4.1 for further details). The THE Young University 
ranking uses individual ranks throughout the top 100, and these were grouped into bands 
comprising10 places.   
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The classification of trajectories in this way is inevitably subjective, and there are always 
cases that hover on the edge of one category or the other. However, the system has the 
advantage of remaining close to the data, and by indicating the degree of movement, 
provides an indication to the reader of the level of confidence that can be associated with 
the classification of specific universities. A sceptical reader might thus be unconvinced by 
reports of ‘minor’ change (equivalent to movement through one band), while being more 
convinced of a ‘substantial’ change (through 3 or more bands).  
Table 4.1 No. of places in each rankings system at each level equivalent to one ‘band’ 
 ARWU THE THE Young Universities 
1–100 10 places 10 places 10 places 
101-200 50 places 20 places  
201-300 100 places 25 places 2012- 2014 50 places 2015-2018  
301-400 100 places 50 places  
401-500 100 places 100 places  
 
Inclusion criteria for the international analyses 
All countries with a university in the relevant ranking system were included in the 
preliminary data analysis. In the ARWU ranking, 45 countries had universities ranked over 
the period from 2008 to 2017. For THE over the period 2012 to 2018 the comparable 
figure was 80 countries. Given the focus on changes in the trajectory of individual 
institutions within nations, only countries with a minimum of ten universities named at 
some point during the study period were included in subsequent analyses. Following the 
implementation of this exclusion criterion, 13 countries remained in the ARWU 
comparative analyses and 14 in the THE analyses.  
For the THE top 100 Young Universities, the inclusion threshold was necessarily set 
lower, at five universities. Of the 37 countries with at least one university in the top 100 
young universities during the study period, 12 countries met this inclusion criterion. The 
THE Young Universities analysis is, however, somewhat less robust than the major 
rankings analysis. The small number of institutions covered in the time series (100), and 
the associated lower inclusion threshold of five universities, reduces the number of discrete 
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cases (universities) in the analysis even as it preserves the number of countries represented. 
A degree of volatility is imposed as institutions ‘age’ past the 50 year point and 
automatically drop out of the ranking, particularly given some national patterns in creating 
a number of higher education institutions at a particular point in time (as in the case of the 
United Kingdom). Given these factors, interpretation of these data required more caution 
than was the case for the major rankings.  
4.5 The research method stage 2: the case study 
The second and third of the three core research questions addressed in this thesis were: 
How did the University of Canberra achieve a ‘turn around’ in its 
performance?  
What were the consequences for the organisation? 
As set out in Figure 4.1, the case study included qualitative analysis of documents, audio 
and video recordings and interviews with the senior management team, as well as 
compilation of quantitative time series data on key performance metrics, financial data and 
staff morale. These data were collected and analysed in an iterative process, initiated by a 
preliminary quantitative analysis of key performance metrics and a brief review of 
university documents and reports, followed by the qualitative interviews, and then a return 
to complete a more detailed analysis of the university’s key performance metrics and the 
document review. 
4.5.1 Time period 
The study of organisational change focused on the period from 2007 to 2013. In addition, 
some quantitative data for the period 2002–2006 and University documents from 2006 
were examined to provide historical context. The interviews with senior management were 
conducted in 2016 and 2017, providing a retrospective view of organisational change from 
either the interviewee’s time of initial appointment or in the case of long-term employees 
from 2007. 
This period was selected to coincide with the commencement of a new Vice-Chancellor in 
2007, and to enable a narrative leading from a low point in the University’s performance 
on multiple metrics in 2007 through a turnaround process to recovery by 2013. Given the 
lagged nature of the data used in global rankings, the University’s improved performance 
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from 2010 started to emerge in the global rankings from 2013, beginning with the QS in 
2013 and the QS ‘top 50’ in 2015, and followed by the THE and THE Young Universities 
in 2016. By 2016, many of the ‘pre-turnaround’ metrics from the University of Canberra 
were progressively moving out of the system pipeline for global rankings appraisal. For 
example, the THE 2016 global rankings drew on research output for the period 2010 to 
2014, citations from 2010 to 2015 and an academic reputation survey conducted in 
December 2014 and January 2015, giving some time for the changing research reputation 
of the University to become more widely known. 
4.5.2 Documentary review and analysis 
The documents examined and analysed were extensive. Resources included all media 
releases, Monitor Online articles, University of Canberra Annual Reports and the Minutes 
of all meetings of University Council and Academic Board for the period from 2007 to 
2013. A sample of the recordings of the Vice-Chancellor’s Staff Forums was also reviewed 
for supplementary evidence. Details are presented in Figure 4.4. 
Source  Quantum Comment 
University of 
Canberra Council 
Minutes 2006 to 2013 
53 Council 
Meetings  Publicly accessible at https://www.canberra.edu.au/about-
uc/governance/council/proceedings 
(excluding minutes of items held in confidential 
sessions.).  
Academic Board 
Minutes 22007 to 
2013 
47 Board 
Meetings Accessible to University staff only. Content used only for corroboration of material obtained from 
other documents 
Monitor Online 21 relevant 
articles Publicly accessible at https://www.canberra.edu.au/monitor 





Publicly accessible at 
https://www.canberra.edu.au/media-centre 
Annual Reports of the 
University of 
Canberra 2006 to 
2013 




Vice Chancellor Staff 
Forums 2008 to 2013 
10 of 36 
staff forums  Presented in a public forum at the University but available in audio on-line format (from 2008) only 
to University of Canberra staff 
Figure 4.4 Summary of resources examined for the documentary analysis. 
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The document review was the major resource in developing the narrative of events at the 
University during the study period. These documents also provided contemporaneous 
records of key achievements, strategic priorities and areas of concern as the relevant 
entities saw them at that point in time, unaltered by processes of retrospective recollection. 
A preliminary and partial review was undertaken prior to the qualitative interviews with 
senior managers, while the systematic review was undertaken after the interviews were 
complete. 
The volume of material reviewed had the potential to overwhelm the research agenda. 
Filters were applied at two stages. The first occurred at the initial review stage, and 
involved the selection of material that captured key events, and/or were relevant to the 
agendas of either ‘recovery’ or ‘rankings. The second filter was part of an iterative process 
of writing and review, identifying elements that occurred and re-occurred in either the 
documents or the qualitative interviews, and became identified themes addressing the two 
key research questions. 
The key performance metrics were primarily extracted from annual reports and the public 
university websites. Oweing to some data inconsistencies, supplementary data on some 
metrics was subsequently requested from the University’s planning unit. 
4.5.3 Qualitative interviews 
I conducted qualitative interviews with eleven members of the senior management team in 
2016–2017 (see Table 4.2). All senior managers employed during the study period and 
remaining on staff in 2016 were included. In addition, one senior executive who had been 
employed in senior professional positions throughout the study period but accepted a 
position elsewhere in 2015 was interviewed. With only two senior professional staff in this 
institution, this was an important perspective to include, and the recent replacement 
incumbent had no knowledge of the study period. Interviews ranged in length from 50 to 
115 minutes. In four cases, interviews were conducted in two separate sessions. All but 
two lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, with the total being 842 minutes. The interviews 
were recorded and subsequently transcribed in full, generating 178 pages of transcripts.  
Notes were taken during the interviews as a kind of contemporaneous preliminary analysis, 
identifying key points from the perspective of the respondents, further questions suggested 
by their responses, points that challenged my own thinking (and therefore helped identify 
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pre-conceptions). In the later interviews, I was also drawn to note down both new 
perspectives, and themes that were re-emerging. Selective note-taking during interviews 
also serves as a useful non-verbal device to manage silences from the respondent, 
encourage elaboration and allow respondents to reflect when they do not appear ready to 
move on to the next element of the interview. 
The interview guide is included in the Appendices (Appendix 4A.1). The interview process 
was flexible. The focus was on how senior staff saw events, strategies, behaviours, beliefs, 
successes and failures coming together to enable the turn-around of the University’s 
performance and the achievement of rankings success. Importantly, a flexible qualitative 
approach generated information from the ‘expert’ and ‘insider’ perspective of the senior 
management team, including but not limited to the elements they believed to be important 
in improving the university’s rankings performance.  
Table 4.4 Interviewees by university role 
Category Number 
Vice-Chancellor 1 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor/Vice President (academic positions) 2 
Vice President (professional positions) 2 
Faculty Deans and Research Institute Directors 5 
Chair, Academic Board 1 
 
The preamble and the first item on the interview guide were asked consistently, but the 
remainder was used as a conversational guide, either to assist in transitions over changes in 
terrain, or to encourage the interviewee to consider the issue from a different angle. 
Common ‘prompts’ that recurred in the interviews included looking back over what had 
happened in the past and considering what might happen in the future, looking outside the 
university to contextual factors as well as looking within, and discussing challenges and 
things that didn’t work as well as things that did. The priority accorded to different aspects 
was determined by the interviewees. A sample of transcript material is included at in the 
Appendices (Appendix 4A.2). 
These qualitative interviews were conceived as on the continuum between un-structured 
and semi-structured in type, and this proved an effective strategy given the level of 
engagement and expertise among interviewees. As is not unusual in qualitative 
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interviewing, however, there is a tendency to veer toward one type or the other (Bryman, 
2012, Ch.20) and these interviews were closer to unstructured than semi-structured. Most 
interviewees expressed their appreciation for the experience of reflecting on the matters 
raised in the interviews, and the way in which it had contributed to their thinking, 
reinforcing that these interviews were closer to a conversation than to a more traditional 
semi-structured style of interview. 
Analysis of the interview data 
The interview data were analysed using thematic analysis (Bryman, 2012, Ch.24). The 
early stage of this process began informally during the interviews themselves, and 
proceeded through the reading and rereading of the interview transcripts. Drawing on 
Pettigrew’s (1997) processual approach to the study of organisational change, components 
of the interviews relating to either the process of change, the content of change, and the 
inner context and outer context of the organisation were identified, and relevant sections of 
the interviews coded to one or more of these over-arching categories. Within each of these 
broad categories, themes were identified based on either recurrence (reinforcement of 
similar perspectives or arguments), contradictory views on similar or related topics, or on 
occasion because they were outliers (as for example in the case of one respondent who 
mentioned the key role of ‘luck’ in achieving positive outcomes). The themes that emerged 
from the interviews were coded at a high level using a combination of sub-headings that 
could be retrieved and re-organised through the navigation panel in Microsoft Word, and at 
a more detailed level using in-text comments with key words. This method proved an 
effective way of navigating the 178 pages of interview transcripts. A sample of coded 
transcript pages is included in the Appendices (Appendix 4A.3).  
The process of analysis continued through the writing stage. As themes and sub-themes 
identified in the early stages of coding were written up, the emerging patterns were then 
taken back to the interview texts to review the context of excerpts, and to look for other 
evidence that supported or contradicted the points being made. The volume of written draft 
material generated by this process was substantial, but produced an account of what the 
senior managers were saying that was deeply embedded in the interview content. A major 
revision was then undertaken to remove material that was not closely linked to the core 
research questions of the thesis, and to reduce the amount of verbatim material. At this 
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point, the material was also examined for its connection to the theoretical material 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
This was a painstaking process but three key factors were in play. First, as I was myself a 
senior manager in the University, it was important to continually check that the themes 
were those of the interviewees, and not perspectives imposed from own experience. 
Second, the case study explores a changing organisation over a seven-year period, and the 
mode of qualitative analysis selected had to take account of a protracted period of elapsed 
time. It was important to take account of the retrospective nature of these interviews, and at 
the same time reflect the temporal context. Third, as the interviewees describe their 
perspectives on what happened, why it happened, and what the consequences were, the 
story of organisational change emerges at the same time from the analysis of documentary 
evidence and the tracking of key performance indicators. Interweaving these different 
sources of information necessitated an iterative process and only through writing was it 
possible to draw the material together into a set of coherent findings with a solid 
evidentiary base. 
4.6 Reflection and discussion 
At the heart of this thesis is a question about how the University of Canberra achieved 
significant improvement in its global rankings position. The question emerged from the 
intersection of my own institution’s pre-occupation with rising in the global rankings, and 
the knowledge of the international higher education sector that I was acquiring through my 
DBA HEM journey. As a staff member of the University of Canberra, the Vice-
Chancellor’s explicit strategic aim to achieve a top 100 young university ranking by 2018 
was quite simply one of the metrics by which individual and institutional performance was 
to be judged. As an emerging scholar of higher education, however, I became aware that 
not only was the public statement of such a goal unusual for its time, the subsequent 
improvements in constituent metrics and eventual movement into the global rankings was 
unusual for a non-elite university with neither reputational nor financial resources to drive 
it forward. I realised I was working within a university which was experiencing something 
akin to that reported in the ‘company turnaround’ literature. The decision to employ a case 
study approach in combination with the empirical analysis of the broader international 
rankings context resulted from this confluence of my employment as a senior manager at 
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the University of Canberra, and my scholarly journey as an international student at the 
University of Bath. 
4.6.1 Reflexivity 
It is not necessarily a standard practice to locate one’s personal journey within the 
methodological frame, and particularly so in a thesis methodology chapter. Yet studying 
one’s own institution requires an acknowledgement of the researcher’s role as both 
observer and actor, particularly (but not exclusively) in relation to the use of qualitative 
methods. No matter how careful the self-scrutiny, the self nonetheless remains in the 
research setting. A related constraint concerns the important role played by the Health 
Faculty in the growth and turnaround of the University, given my own role as the inaugural 
Dean of that Faculty. The delicate negotiation between ‘outsider’ and ‘insider’ did not lend 
itself to an exploration of faculty-based differences, which meant that change within and 
between faculties did not form part of the present study. This was a necessary limitation of 
the present research in order to manage the balance between peer/colleague and academic 
researcher (McDermid et al., 2014). 
There are benefits to being an ‘insider researcher’(Bonner and Tolhurst, 2002); in this case 
they were largely to do with knowledge of the organisation including its history and its 
documents and a level of pre-existing trust among senior managers. There are also 
disadvantages, including the possibility that participants will assume the researcher knows 
the answers, the possibility that sensitive information might be disclosed as a result of the 
‘peer to peer relationship, and the question of power differentials (McDermid et al., 2014, 
Unluer, 2012, Floyd and Arthur, 2012). In managing the qualitative interviews, it was 
necessary from time to time to remind interviewees that I wanted to hear their views (in 
response to comments that suggested I already knew about the topic under discussion). 
There were very few instances where sensitive information was disclosed, partly because 
senior managers are sophisticated in their approach to what they do and do not say, and 
partly because of the presence of the tape recorder and my own very obvious note-taking 
during the interview. Any such instances were excluded from the research process. The 
question of power differentials did not figure strongly in this research, as the interviewees 
were either peers or senior to me in the organisation. The Vice-Chancellor had left the 
University at the time of his interview, which avoided a situation where I was in a direct 
reporting relationship to the interviewee. 
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Perhaps the most important remaining issue is that of continued attention to the way in 
which the role of insider researcher may introduce bias at every stage of the research, from 
design, to the interviewing process itself, and particularly the analysis. The unstructured 
form of the interviews provided some assistance with this, as the interview guide allowed 
interviewees to range widely across topics, and to determine the content of the interview to 
a considerable degree. The importance of reflexivity, of subjecting the research process 
and the results that emerge to critical self-reflection, is important throughout (Finefter-
Rosenbluh, 2017).  
The process of establishing a narrative that is not unduly influenced by one’s own pre-
conceptions is challenging. This process of reflection led me to interrupt my analysis of the 
qualitative interviews to undertake a more extended analysis of documentary evidence, 
before returning again to the qualitative interview material. It led me to undertake many 
more iterations through the interview data than I would have done as an outsider. But just 
as the researcher remains part of his or her research in any research project, so do attributes 
of the insider researcher remain part of the present research.  
4.6.2 Ethics 
The two major ethical considerations in relation to this study both related to the case study. 
The first was consent, and the second confidentiality. In relation to consent, approval to 
undertake the case study research was obtained from the Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of Canberra. The project was also discussed and approved at a meeting of the Vice-
Chancellor’s Group. Given the University’s rankings aspiration, there was a high degree of 
interest in the project. This agreement is documented in the Appendix (Appendix 4A.4). 
The protocol for securing individual consent began with a subsequent invitation to 
participate in an interview. All interviewees agreed to participate, and after agreement was 
obtained times and dates were set for the interviews. Interviewees were offered an 
opportunity to review the interview guide ahead of the interview process, and one took up 
that offer. At the commencement of the interviews, respondents were given some early 
results of the quantitative analysis, and further details of the case study research approach, 
including the period that the case study period would cover, the aims of the study, and the 
way in which excerpts from the interviews would be used in the qualitative analysis. They 
were advised that their names would not be used in association with those excerpts, and 
that participants would be identified by number only. At that point, their agreement to 
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participate in the interview was re-confirmed, and their permission to tape the interview 
obtained. They were advised that the recordings would be transcribed by a professional 
transcription service, and that I would personally analyse the transcripts, which would be 
kept in a confidential location. These processes ensured that the respondents were fully 
informed, and were deemed to be a reasonable basis for a study which involved elite 
interviews with senior managers. They follow, for example, the procedure set out by the 
University of Leicester in relation to consent in elite interviews (2016). 
All interviewees agreed to proceed, and to the interview being recorded. The tape recorder 
was in plain sight at all times. On three occasions interviewees asked for it to be turned off 
while a particular matter was discussed, and that was done. One interview transcript 
contains a retrospective request that a particular comment not be used, and that wish was 
respected. These examples indicate the awareness of these senior managers of the research 
process in which they were engaged. The material was stored in a locked filing cabinet 
identified only by number, and the on-line version was similarly anonymised, and 
password secured. 
The issue of full confidentiality is complex in a single case study. The comments of 
individual interviewees can be anonymised, and hence their confidentiality protected to a 
considerable degree. In the analysis, comments are occasionally linked to a particular 
position (non-academic senior manager or dean, for example) where that aspect is highly 
relevant, but where possible that type of attribution was avoided. In the selection process as 
to which excerpts were used to illustrate particular themes, the issue of potential risk to 
participants was one of the factors taken into account (McDermid et al., 2014). The 
historical nature of the case study (2007–13) offers further protection in that few of the 
senior management team remain at the University of Canberra, and those that do occupy 
different positions following personal movements or structural change. 
The case of the Vice-Chancellor was more challenging in the instances where the analysis 
relates specifically to that position. While personal identifiers have been removed from all 
excerpts, it is possible for the Vice-Chancellor to be identified by combining the time 
period of the study with the name of the University. The use of a pseudonym for the 
University was considered, but discarded on the grounds that the University could be 
identified from both the global rankings analysis and the case study material, a not 
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infrequent circumstance in the case of studying higher education institutions (Trowler, 
2011). 
4.6.2 Limitations of the study 
The limitations of the research include the instabilities that underlie rankings metrics, the 
selection of a single case rather than multiple cases, the limited scope of interviewees to 
senior management, the retrospective nature of the qualitative interviews, and the problems 
posed by insider research. The latter limitation, relating to insider research, was discussed 
above. 
University rankings tables are susceptible to fluctuations over time for a number of reasons 
including data quality and internal methodological changes, which can have consequent 
effects on trend analysis. This was addressed by the development of the methodology 
described earlier in this chapter, which endeavoured to distinguish and identify trends 
while taking account of the intrinsic uncertainty (Tofallis, 2012, Waltman et al., 2017).  
The selection of a single case rather than multiple cases severely restricts the capacity to 
develop and test hypotheses based on the research, and to generalise from the results. The 
study, like all doctoral theses, was inevitably constrained by the resources and time 
available to a single doctoral researcher. Similarly, the restriction of qualitative interviews 
to the senior managers of the institution meant that the views of staff were not captured in 
this way, although some indications of their perspective were presented through the use of 
the quantitative voice survey data. This case study, then, is a study of change from the 
perspective of senior management. The seven-year time frame, in combination with the use 
of multiple sources of quantitative and qualitative evidence, offer a detailed exploration of 
the specific case, and some insights into the nature of organisational change in the 
university sector, rather than a generalisable set of findings.  
The problem of the quality and reliability of retrospective interviews was partially 
mediated by the qualitative paradigm within which these interviews were undertaken. 
Interviewees provided their perspective of events, and their differing accounts and 
perspectives form part of the study results. Another useful mitigating factor was the 
alignment of the study period with the appointment of a strong new Vice-Chancellor, 
giving informants a useful reference frame in locating their responses. Finally, the use of 
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documentary evidence provided contemporaneous accounts of key events, outcomes, and 
organisational perspectives, allowing for triangulation from different data sources. 
4.7 Conclusions  
The methodology for the thesis utilises a mixed methods approach, drawing on quantitative 
techniques to analyse publicly available international rankings data in Stage 1, followed by 
a case study design employing a combination of semi-structured qualitative interviews, 
document analysis and quantitative analysis of statistical data relating to university 
performance in Stage 2. The logic underlying the selection of this approach has been 
systematically set out in relation to each stage of the research design process in this 
chapter. 
While the ‘hard divide’ between quantitative and qualitative research remains intact at the 
methodological, ontological and epistemological levels for many researchers, there is 
increasing recognition and legitimacy associated with the ‘third way’ of mixed methods 
research. As a guiding paradigm, pragmatism allows for effectiveness to be a central 
criterion in the choice of methods, rather than a pre-established commitment to a particular 
approach. This frame guided the development of the research methodology. 
The quantitative analysis of the global rankings performance of individual institutions in 
their national setting enabled the comparison of the University of Canberra’s performance 
in the national and international context. The focus on comparing rankings trends at both 
the institutional and national level led to the development of an innovative methodology to 
present these data in a way which compressed the data to manageable proportions while 
recognising the inherent variability over time in rankings tables.  
The case study design allowed the research process to focus on the subject of the inquiry 
(universities that succeed in the global rankings ‘game’), to take account of context, and to 
explore the interaction of the content, process and context of change from the perspective 
of a processual analysis. The qualitative components of the design allow for an inductive 
approach whereby research leads to the generation of, if not theory, findings which may 
inform our understanding of the strategies universities may employ in the current globally 
competitive environment. This approach also enables a focus on the understanding of 
social behaviour and its context from the perspective of the senior managers who are 
Chapter 4 Methodology 
114  
driving change in educational institutions. The quantitative components provide 
complementary evidence on performance outcomes.  
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Chapter 5 Australian university rankings in international context 
5.1 Introduction 
The central question that initiated this thesis was how universities as individual institutions 
might go about improving their global ranking position. As set out in Chapters 2 and 3, 
there is now a substantial body of literature on the influence of global rankings on higher 
education institutions, on national policies and on the higher education sector. There is also 
considerable discussion of national responses and the pursuit of world class university 
status. While there is material to be gleaned on how individual universities might climb the 
rankings and/or pursue world class status, there is less analysis of the extent to which 
individual institutions have access to levers which can alter and improve rankings 
performance, and very little documentation of universities that have succeeded in climbing 
the rankings ‘against the odds’. 
The strategic aim publicly set for the University of Canberra by its Vice-Chancellor in 
2012 was to enter the ‘young universities’ global ranking by 2018, or in more colloquial 
terms ‘the top 100 under 50’ (University of Canberra, 2013b). It was viewed as a stretch 
target by both the University senior executive team (known as the Vice-Chancellor’s 
Group or VCG) and the University of Canberra Council. Despite clear improvements in 
internal performance metrics over the preceding five-year period, the University 
community was not confident that it could meet the challenge set by this particular goal. 
Even the concept of a young university ranking was a relatively unfamiliar one at that 
time; the first THE young universities ranking was not published until 2012, followed by 
the QS in 2013. Yet the University of Canberra not only met the rankings target, but did so 
ahead of schedule, entering the QS top 100 young universities in 2015, and the THE top 
100 young universities in 2017. 
This achievement immediately raises questions about the drivers, including strategic 
planning and organisational change, that led to a significant improvement in global 
rankings position for this University. These questions are the focus of the following two 
chapters (Chapters 6 and 7). But universities function in a particular national context, as 
well as a global higher education environment. Understanding what happened at the 
University of Canberra begs the question of what was happening to the global ranking of 
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other Australian universities. Was the University of Canberra winning in a national 
competition? Or were there factors at work in the Australian university sector more 
broadly? If, as the rankings literature tells us, there is little point in mid-level universities 
setting targets to move up the rankings tables (Altbach and Hazelkorn, 2017a, Marginson, 
2009, Shattock, 2017), and few succeed, which institutions are succeeding? And is that 
pattern affected by how ‘success’ is measured? 
In this chapter, a quantitative investigation of the extent to which universities improve their 
global rankings is presented. The question as to which, or indeed whether, universities can 
systematically move up the global rankings is an important context to understanding how it 
can be achieved—and it is the former question that is the focus of this chapter. The intent 
of the chapter is to provide context by progressively broadening the perspective from the 
individual institution, the University of Canberra, to the national perspective, and finally to 
the international perspective.  
5.2 The University of Canberra 2008–2018 
In 2012, the young university rankings were in their absolute infancy. The THE rankings 
group were the first movers in this space, publishing their first top 100 ‘young universities’ 
global ranking (top 100) in 2012. It was heralded by THE as providing: 
a glimpse into the future, showcasing not those institutions with centuries of 
history, but the rising stars which show great potential. [The methodology was] 
carefully re-calibrated to reflect the special characteristics of younger 
universities, giving less weight to subjective indicators of academic reputation. 
(Times Higher Education World University Rankings, 2012) 
QS followed suit with their first global ranking of the ‘top 50 under 50’ released in 2013, 
subsequently the top 100 from 2016. The THE expanded their scope to include the top 150 
universities from 2016 and then the top 200 from 2017. 
As indicated in Table 5.1, the University of Canberra entered the QS young university 
ranking in 2015 in the 90–100 band, and the THE young university ranking in 2016 in the 
101–150 band. By 2018, it had reached the 81–90 band in the QS ranking, and 58th 
position in the THE. 
While achieving a position in the ‘all universities’ global ranking was not specified in the 
University’s 2013–2017 strategic plan, this aspiration was a natural correlate of the young 
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universities ranking goal, and consistent with the ten-year vision ‘to be a world-class 
university’ by 2018 set in the 2008–2012 Strategic Plan (University of Canberra, 2008a). 
The University of Canberra entered the QS global ranking in 2013 in the 601–750 band, 
and subsequently moved up to be ranked 551–600 in 2016, remainingd there in 2017 and 
2018. The University entered the THE rankings in 2016 at the 501–600 rank, and from 
there moved up to 401–500 in 2017 and 351–400 in 2018. It entered the ARWU rankings 
in the 601–700 band in 2017 (coinciding with the ARWU expansion from 500 to 800 
universities). 
Table 5.1 Global rankings metrics for the University of Canberra 2012 to 2018 
 ARWU THE QS THE Young QS under 50 
2012 Not ranked Not ranked Not ranked Not ranked. — 
2013 Not ranked Not ranked 601-750 Not ranked. N.R. 
2014 Not ranked Not ranked 2014/15 Not ranked. N.R. 
2015 Not ranked Not ranked. 651–700 Not ranked. 90–100 
2016 Not ranked 501–600 551–600 101–150 2016/2017 
2017 601–700 401–500 551–600 91 81–90 
2018 601–700 351–400 551–600 58. 81–90 
Note: ARWU ranked 500 universities from 2003 to 2016, and 800 in 2017 and 2018; QS ranked 500 
institutions from 2008 to 2011, 600+ in 2012, 700+ in 2013 and 2014 and 800 institutions from 2015 to 
2018; QS ‘Top 50 under 50’ ranked 50 universities in 2013 and 2014, expanding to 100 in 2015 and 
2016/17 and 150 in 2017 and 2018; THE ranked 400 universities in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, 
expanding to 800 in 2016, 980 in 2017, and 1000 in 2018; THE Young Universities ranked 100 universities 
in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, expanding to 150 in 2016 and 200 in 2017 and 2018. 
The University of Canberra outperformed its strategic goal of entering the top 100 young 
universities by 2018, achieving that benchmark three years early. It was an unexpected 
achievement given the University’s poor performance on a number of metrics at the 
commencement of the previous strategic plan in 2008 (see Chapter 6), and taking into 
account average data lags of two years that were intrinsic to rankings data metrics at that 
time. In the next sections, the national and international contexts in which this upward 
movement took place are examined.  
5.3 The Australian universities 
5.3.1 The number of Australian universities in the rankings 
This section presents data from five global rankings systems, the ARWU, the THE, the 
THE Young Universities, the QS and the QS Top 50 Under 50. The simplest measure of 
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performance at the national level is the number of universities in a particular ranking, and 
hence the simplest measure of change over time is time series data on the number of 
ranked universities. These data are presented in Table 5.2. In order to maximise 
consistency over time, only those years for which comparable data are available are 
included. (Further details are presented in Chapter 4).  
ARWU 
For much of its history the ARWU consistently focussed on the top 500 universities 
internationally. From 2008 to 2018, the number of Australian universities ranked in the 
ARWU top 500 grew from 15 to 23. By 2018, the ARWU had extended its ranking to the 
top 1000 universities, which included a further eight Australian universities. Australia has 
41 universities, 31of which were in the ARWU top 1000 in 2018. 
THE 
The THE group have progressively expanded the number of universities included in the 
ranking, commencing with 200 in 2011 and reaching 1000 in 2018. The first year to 
include 400 universities was 2012. Over the period 2012 to 2018 the number of Australian 
universities grew from 21 to 24. Broadening the focus to the top 800 reveals an increase 
from 31 to 35 Australian universities between 2016 and 2018. 
Table 5.2 Global rankings metrics for Australian Universities 2008–2018 
 ARWU  THE Top QS Top THE Young QS under 50 
 Top 500 400 800 500 800 Top 100 Top 100 
2008 15 — — — — — — 
2009 17 — — — — — — 
2010 17 — — — — — — 
2011 19 — — — — — — 
2012 19 21 — 25 — 14 — 
2013 19 19 — 25 — 13 9 in top 50 
2014 19 19 — 2014/15 2014/15 
33 
14 10 in top 50 
2015 20 20 — 23 16 16 
2016 23 22 31 21 33 16 2016/17 
2017 23 23 35 23 35 17 17 
2018 23 24 35 23 37 16. 15 
Note: ARWU ranked 500 universities from 2003 to 2016, and 800 in 2017 and 2018; QS ranked 500 
institutions from 2008 to 2011, 600+ in 2012, 700+ in 2013 and 2014 and 800 institutions from 2015 to 
2018; QS ‘Top 50 under 50’ ranked 50 universities in 2013 and 2014, expanding to 100 in 2015 and 
2016/17 and 150 in 2017 and 2018; THE ranked 400 universities in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, 
expanding to 800 in 2016, 980 in 2017, and 1000 in 2018; THE Young Universities ranked 100 
universities in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, expanding to 150 in 2016 and 200 in 2017 and 2018. 
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QS 
The QS rankings included 500 universities in 2012, 700+ universities in 2013, and 800 
from 2015 onward. Focusing on the top 500, there was no clear trend in the number of 
Australian universities over the period 2012 to 2018, but a small net decline from 25 to 23. 
There was a modest increase from 2015 to 2018 in the number ranked in the top 800 (from 
33 to 37).  
THE Young Universities 
In the top 100 young university rankings, the THE included 16 Australian universities in 
2018, up from 14 in 2012. However, this aggregate analysis conceals the fact that three of 
the universities included in 2014 had ‘aged’ past the 50-year cut off by 2017. This matter 
of aggregate versus individual levels of analysis is taken up further in Section 5.3.  
In 2017 when the scope widened to the top 200 universities for the first time, there were 23 
universities included, a large proportion of the 27 Australian universities aged 50 years and 
under.  
QS Top 50 under 50 
The QS young universities ranking included only 50 universities in 2013 and 2014, at 
which time 9 and 10 (respectively) Australian universities were included. For the latter 
period, from 2015 to 2018, the number of Australian universities remained reasonably 
static (see Table 5.2), despite two universities moving out of scope as they passed 50 years 
since their establishment.  
Overview of trends 
Taken together, these aggregate data suggest that Australian universities have performed 
well on the world stage over the past decade, with the number included in the ARWU 
increasing, the THE and THE Young Universities global rankings increasing to a smaller 
extent and a reasonably stable pattern demonstrated in the two QS rankings. The global 
rankings performance of the University of Canberra during this period therefore appears to 
be either better than or consistent with that of the broader Australian university system. 
Aggregate level data do not, however, provide any insight into the trajectories of individual 
institutions within the rankings tables. Concurrently, it conceals whether an increase 
reflects a solid core of stable institutions with a small number of additions, or a state of 
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flux with various institutions entering and exiting the rankings tables. It is to this topic that 
we now turn. 
5.3.2 The trend pattern of Australian universities in the rankings 
The main rankings employed in this thesis are the ARWU, the THE and the THE Young 
Universities. As discussed in Chapter 2, the ARWU and THE are the most highly regarded 
rankings, and both have a reasonable number of data points to support time series analysis. 
While the University of Canberra is not part of the ARWU top 500 rankings, the ARWU is 
highly regarded and therefore a robust basis for national and international comparisons. 
The THE Young Universities rankings are included as they are focussed on the newer 
universities, and hence are of particular relevance in providing context to the case study of 
an upwardly mobile young institution. The time series incorporates the top 500 universities 
for the ARWU from 2008 to 2017. For consistency, the top 500 cut off is also used in the 
THE time series (2012–2018), except for the early years when only the top 400 were 
ranked. The top 100 THE Young Universities time series runs from its commencement in 
2012 to 2018. (Further details are presented in Chapter 4.)  
The analysis of trend patterns for individual institutions is valuable because it moves 
beyond simple aggregate counts to explore the paths being taken by individual institutions. 
Nonetheless, compressing multiple years of data on over 20 universities posed a challenge 
for both analysis and data presentation purposes. Several approaches were considered, 
tested and discarded. The final approach was consistent with the primary focus of this 
analysis on rankings positions over time, and with Waltman and colleagues (2017) Ten 
principles for the responsible use of University rankings which supports the value of 
intuitive assessment in taking account of uncertainty and identifying distinguishing trends 
(see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion.)  
The strategy incorporates both the direction of change (moving up, maintaining position or 
moving down) and the degree of change (minor, moderate or substantial). Minor change 
corresponds to movement through one ranking ‘band’, moderate to movement through 
two, and substantial change to movement through three or more. As set out in Chapter 4, 
these ‘bands’ were derived on a sliding scale to accommodate both the amount of detail 
available in the relevant ranking as well as proximity to the top of the rankings table. Two 
additional categories of those universities that had recently entered the rankings and those 
that exited were added to enhance the face validity of these summary measures. 
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ARWU 
In 2008, fifteen Australian universities were ranked in the ARWU top 500. By 2017 a 
further eight universities had been added, and no universities dropped out over that time. 
Over the ten-year time series, four universities improved their rankings position 
substantially (three or more bands), three universities improved their position moderately 
(two bands), and seven to a minor extent (one band). There were two ‘new entries’ in the 
period from 2016 onwards. Two universities maintained their position, one moved down to 
a minor extent and one to a moderate extent. All 23 universities which were either ranked 
in 2008 or entered the rankings in subsequent years remained in the top 500 in 2017 (see 
Figure 5.1). The detailed data underpinning this and subsequent figures are included in 
Appendix 5. 
THE 
In 2012, 21 Australian universities were ranked in the THE top 400 universities. By 2018, 
there were 29 universities ranked in the top 500, with only two of those institutions 
entering the rankings as a result of the expanded scope in 2016. Over the period from 2012 
to 2018 six Australian universities moved up the rankings substantially, one to a modest 
extent and a further four to a minor extent. There were five new entries in either 2016 o 
r2017. Nine universities maintained their position. Three universities moved down to a 
minor extent and one to a modest extent. All 29 universities which were either ranked in 
2012 or entered the rankings in subsequent years remained in the top 500 in 2018 (see 
Figure 5.2). 
THE Young Universities 
The THE Young Universities ranking focuses on institutions less than 50 years old, and 
unlike the rankings discussed above, this means that institutions may exit the ranking due 
to age, freeing up positions in the ranking for other universities who continue to meet the 
age criterion. Between 2012 and 2017 three Australian universities, Macquarie, Newcastle 
and Flinders, reached their 50th year and therefore ‘dropped out’ of this ranking (see Figure 
5.3).  
Fourteen Australian universities were ranked in the THE Top 100 Young Universities in 
2012. Eight additional universities had entered the ranking by 2017. 
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    2017 rank     2017 rank 
Up 3+ bands  
University of Melbourne 39 
University of Queensland 55 
Monash University  78 
Curtin University  151–200 
 
Up 2 bands 
University of Adelaide  101–150 
Deakin University  201–300 
Qld Univ. of Technology 201–300 
 
Up 1 band 
University of Sydney  83 
Univ. of Western Australia 91 
Univ. of New South Wales 101–150 
Macquarie University  151–200 
University of Tasmania  201–300 
University of Wollongong 201–300 
La Trobe University  301–400 
Up 1 band (cont’d) 
Swinburne Univ. of Technology 301–400 
Griffith University  301–400 
Univ. of Technology Sydney 301–400 
 
New entry 2016  
University of Western Sydney 301–400 
RMIT University  401–500 
 
No trend  
James Cook University  301–400 
University of Newcastle  301–400 
 
Down 1 band  
Flinders University  401–500 
 
Down 2 bands  
Australian National University 97 
 
Figure 5.1 Global rankings trends for Australian universities, ARWU 2008–2017 
 
    2018 rank     2018 rank 
Up 3+ bands  
Monash University  80 
Univ. of New South Wales 85 
Univ. of Western Australia 111 
University of Adelaide  134 
University of South Australia 201–250 
Univ. of Technology, Sydney 201–250 
 
Up 2 bands Griffith University  251–300 
 
Up 1 band 
University of Queensland 65 
Qld Univ. of Technology 201–250 
Deakin University  301–350 
Flinders University  301–350 
 
New entry 2016  
James Cook University  201–250 
Victoria University  301–350 
University of Canberra  351–400 
RMIT University  401–500 
Southern Cross University 401–500 
No trend  
University of Melbourne 32 
University of Sydney  61 
Macquarie University  251–300 
University of Newcastle  251–300 
University of Wollongong 251–300 
Charles Darwin University 301–350 
University of Tasmania  301–350 
Curtin University  351–400 
La Trobe University  351–400 
 
Down 1 band  
Australian National University 48 
Swinburne University   401–500 
Western Sydney University 401–500 
 
Down 2 bands  Murdoch University 401–500 
 
Figure 5.2 Global rankings trends for Australian universities, THE 2012–2018 
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      2017 rank          2017 rank 
Up 3+ bands  
Univ. of Technology Sydney  15 
Univ. of South Australia  32 
Griffith University   35 
Deakin University   43 
Swinburne Univ. of Technology  61 
 
Up 2 bands 
La Trobe University   56 
Western Sydney University  79 
 
Up 1 band 
Queensland Univ. of Technology 24 
Charles Darwin University  34 
 
New entry 2016  
James Cook University   38 
Victoria University   56 
Central Queensland University   90 
University of Canberra   91 
Exit as over 50 years old 
Macquarie University 
University of Newcastle 
Flinders University 
 
No trend  
University of Wollongong  30 
RMIT     87 
 
Down 1 band  
Murdoch University   68 
Curtin University    84 
 
Entry/ Exit 
Southern Cross University  
 
Exit Edith Cowan University 
  
 
Figure 5.3 Global rankings trends for Australian universities, THE Young Universities 2012–
2017 
Between 2012 and 2017, five universities moved up substantially, another two to a 
moderate extent and two to a minor extent. Two universities maintained their position, and 
two moved down to a minor extent. Four universities (‘new entries’) entered the ranking in 
either 2016 or 2017; the category of new entry was employed to capture the upward 
movement, but also to recognise there is insufficient data for a trend description. One 
university entered and then exited the top 100, and another also exited. 
Overview of trends across the three ranking systems 
The predominant trend pattern among Australian universities was either an improved 
performance in the rankings (ARWU and THE Young Universities) or a combination of 
upward movement and maintaining ground (THE). A number of universities demonstrated 
substantial upward movement (four for the ARWU, six for THE and five for the THE 
Young Universities). No universities moved substantially downward, although one moved 
down to a moderate extent in each of the ARWU and THE rankings. Only one university 
in one ranking system (the THE Young University ranking) dropped out of the rankings, 
and another moved in and out on the border of the THE Young Universities.  
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Overall, this scrutiny of the data at the level of the individual institutions rather than at the 
aggregate level suggests a positive performance by Australian universities. The upward 
movement of the University of Canberra is therefore found to be consistent with a pattern 
of upward movement characterising several other Australian universities.  
5.4 Australian Universities relative to the other countries 
In preceding sections, data were presented to demonstrate that the University of Canberra 
and a number of other Australian universities were doing well in three ranking systems. In 
this section, this finding is subjected to a comparative analysis, using international data 
from the same three rankings systems in order to examine Australia’s performance relative 
to other countries. First, the focus is on the simplest and most commonly used metric for 
examining relative performance in global rankings across countries—the number of 
universities included from each country, and changes in those numbers over time. Second, 
the analysis shifts from the aggregate level to that of the trends in performance of 
individual institutions.  
For the purposes of this comparative analysis, only those countries with at least ten 
universities in the ARWU and THE rankings at some point in the time series were 
included. This decision was made for both analytic and pragmatic reasons, enabling a 
focus on countries with stronger performance in the rankings and reducing the volume of 
data problem posed by the large number of countries with at least one ranked university 
over the time period (45 for the ARWU and 80 for THE). For the THE Top 100 Young 
Universities, given the smaller total number of universities, the inclusion threshold was set 
lower at five universities. 
5.4.1 The number of universities in the rankings—international comparisons  
ARWU 
In the 10 years to 2017, the number of Chinese universities in the top 500 grew 
substantially from 30 to 57 (see Table 5.3). The number of South Korean universities also 
increased, as did the number of Australian universities. Spain improved slightly, and the 
Netherlands and Sweden remained steady. Canada, France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom lost some ground. Italy dropped from 22 universities to 16, Japan from 31 to 17 
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and the United States from 159 to 135. Nonetheless, the numerical dominance of the 
United States in the ARWU top 500 remained strong in 2017. 
Table 3 also presents data on changes in the high prestige category of the ‘top 100’ ARWU 
universities, revealing a similar but not identical story. China improved its position, 
moving from zero to two universities, while the Netherlands (from 2 to 4 universities) and 
Australia (from 3 to 6 universities) also gained ground. Canada and France remained 
steady, Japan and Sweden dropped by one and Germany and the UK by two. The United 
States dropped from 54 to 48. Again, the United States’ numerical dominance of the top 
100 remained strong. 
Table 5.3 Number of universities by country, ARWU 2008–2017 
Country  Top 100 Top 500  2008 2017 2008 2017 
Australia 3 6 15 23 
Canada 4 4 21 19 
China 0 2 30 57 
France 3 3 23 20 
Germany 6 4 40 37 
Italy 0 0 22 16 
Japan 4 3 31 17 
Netherlands 2 4 12 12 
South Korea 0 0 8 12 
Spain 0 0 9 11 
Sweden 4 3 11 11 
United Kingdom 11 9 42 38 
United States 54 48 159 135 
 
THE 
In the seven years to 2018, Australia and South Korea both experienced modest 
improvements in their performance in the top 400 THE ranking, echoing their performance 
in the ARWU (see Table 5.4). In contrast, and unlike the ARWU, the number of ranked 
Chinese universities declined. France and Germany made substantial gains (up from 8 to 
16 and 22 to 39 respectively), compared to either no change or slight losses in the ARWU 
ranking.  
Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States all maintained identical 
or very similar numbers of ranked universities in the THE ranking. This differs from the 
drop in numbers reported for the United States and Italy in the ARWU data. Canada, 
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Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom all had fewer universities in the top 400 in 2018 than 
in 2012, following a similar pattern to the ARWU, with the exception of Spain. 
The pattern for the top 100 is also presented in Table 5.4. Germany, and to a lesser extent 
the Netherlands and Australia, experienced increases in the number of universities in the 
top 100, while most other countries maintained a similar or identical pattern. The United 
States remained by far the largest player in this ranking, but nonetheless had dropped from 
51 to 43 institutions by 2018. 
Table 5.4 Number of universities by country, THE 2012–2018 
Country Top 100 Top 400 
 2012 2018 2012 2018 
Australia 4 6 21 24 
Canada 5 4 18 16 
China 2 2 10 8 
China non-mainland 2 3 14 8 
France 3 1 8 16 
Germany 4 10 22 39 
Italy 0 0 14 14 
Japan 2 2 11 7 
Netherlands 4 7 13 13 
South Korea 2 2 7 9 
Spain 0 0 8 4 
Sweden 3 3 10 11 
Switzerland 3 3 7 8 
United Kingdom 12 12 52 40 
United States 51 43 113 110 
 
THE Young universities 
For the THE Young Universities, the time series for the top 100 runs from 2012 to 2017. In 
2017, the THE Young Universities ranking expanded its scope to include 200 universities, 
and those data are included for additional context in Table 5.5. The number of universities 
that ‘left’ the rankings as they reached the age limit of 50 years is relevant in interpreting 
these trends, and is also included in Table 5.5. 
France, Germany and Italy all substantially increased their representation in the top 100 
Young Universities between 2012 and 2017 (from four to 12, four to nine and two to 10 
respectively). Each of these countries also ‘lost’ at least one university from the ranking as 
they reached 50 years. The number of Australian universities increased from 14 to 17, with 
three exiting due to reaching their 50th year. Another notable trend was the United 
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Kingdom, dropping from 20 to four, with 16 institutions (most of the 1960s universities) 
reaching their 50th year. The USA had only a modest profile in this top 100 ranking, with 9 
institutions in 2012 and 5 in 2017. 
In considering the broader picture presented by the top 200 data in 2017, the countries with 
the strongest representation are the United Kingdom (27) and Australia (23), followed by 
France (16), Spain (15), and China (14). These five countries account for almost half the 
rankings. Some countries discussed earlier in this section in relation to the ARWU and 
THE rankings (e.g. the Netherlands) are not included in the Table as they did not meet the 
threshold requirement of a minimum of five universities included at some point over the 
time series period. 
Table 5.5 Number of universities by country, THE Young Universities 2012–2017 
Country  Top 100 2012 Top 100 2017 Exit due to age 50+  Top 200 2017 
Australia 14 17 3 23 
Canada 4 1 4 3 
China 9 5 1 14 
France 4 12 3 16 
Germany 4 9 2 11 
Italy 2 10 1 10 
Japan 1 3 .. 5 
Portugal 2 1 .. 5 
South Korea 2 3 .. 5 
Spain 5 4 .. 15 
United Kingdom 20 4 16 27 
United States 9 5 4 5 
 
Overview of trends across the three ranking systems 
As previously described, Australia is well-represented in the global rankings and has seen 
an increase in the number of ranked universities, reaching 23 in the ARWU top 500, 24 in 
the THE top 400 and 17 in the THE top 100 Young Universities. Australia has 41 
universities in total, and currently 27 less than 50 years old, meaning that over half the 
eligible universities in the country are listed in each of those rankings. 
But Australia has not been the only ‘winner’. France and Germany gained ground in both 
the THE and THE Young University rankings, although this result was not echoed in the 
ARWU. South Korea was more strongly represented over time in both the ARWU and 
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THE rankings. China gained substantial ground in the ARWU, and Italy achieved a robust 
increase in the THE Young Universities ranking.  
Rankings are, however, a zero sum game. Consequently, a number of countries were less 
well represented in numerical terms, including the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Both countries, however, remain strong performers in global rankings. It is, of course, not 
only about the number of universities in the rankings. Other key metrics include position. 
There were, for example, no Australian universities in the ARWU top 20 in 2017, while 
the United Kingdom has 3 and the United States 16).  
The core question in this thesis, however, is about upward movement in the rankings. It is 
less about the continued presence of universities such as Harvard, Stanford, Cambridge and 
Oxford at the top of the global rankings, and more about the universities that move up the 
rankings, and the way that phenomenon plays out at the institutional and national level. 
This requires a focus not simply on position, or aggregate numbers, but rather on 
movement within the rankings table. That analysis is presented below.  
5.4.2 The trend pattern for universities by country—international comparisons 
The pattern of movement across rankings positions over years for individual institutions 
reveals more detail about how institutions in a particular country are faring than do 
aggregate numbers. However, as previously discussed in Section 5.3, the volume of data 
generated is large. This section follows the method already established in Section 5.3.2 to 
describe the Australian situation, in order to generate a comparison with the countries 
discussed in the preceding section.  
Each of the three rankings systems are addressed in turn. Countries are grouped under the 
headings of ‘moving up’, ‘maintaining’ and ‘losing ground’, reflecting national patterns 
across respective institutions, rather than individual institutions within nations. The total 
number of universities named in the ranking is included for each country to place the trend 
analysis in the context of national scale. Institutions that appeared only once in the time 
period were excluded as no trend could be generated. 
Moving up (ARWU) 
In the ARWU, 14 countries met the criterion of a minimum of 10 HEIs in the top 500 
ranking. Of these, Australia, China, the Netherlands, South Korea and Sweden demonstrate 
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an upward pattern in the rankings positions of their HEIs when viewed at the national level 
(see Figure 5.4).  
China has been a strong performer, with 62 universities included in the trend analysis. (Of 
these, 47 were in mainland China and 15 in Hong Kong or Taiwan.) Six Chinese 
universities moved up the rankings substantially, 11 to a moderate extent and another 15 to 
a minor extent. Ten universities maintained their position, and another sixteen universities 
entered the rankings for the first time in either 2016 or 2017. Four universities exited the 
rankings, all of which were located in Taiwan. 



















Moving up           
Australia 4 3 10  2 1  1   
China 6 10 11 15 5      
China (non-mld)  1 4 1 4     5 
Netherlands 2  4  5 1    1 
South Korea   5 2 5     2 
Sweden  1 3  6 1     
Maintaining           
France  2 2 1 12 2 1  2 3 
Spain 1 2  1 2 5   1 3 
Losing ground           
Canada  1   9 8 1   4 
Germany  2 6 1 13 12 3   5 
Italy  1 3 1 5 4 2   9 
Japan  1 2  5 5 2 2  14 
UK (top 50) 1 1   5      
UK (51-500)  2 3 3 14 4 4 1  6 
USA (top 50)   2  23 4     
USA (51-500) 1 4 6 3 25 38 22 7  30 
Figure 5.4 Global rankings trends, international comparisons ARWU 2008–2017 
Of the 21 universities included in the trend analysis for Australia, four showed substantial 
upward movement, three modest upward movement and 10 minor upward movement. Two 
maintained position and two moved downward. 
The Netherlands had 13 universities in the trend analysis, South Korea had 14 and 
Sweden 11. Each of these three countries were categorised as strengthening their national 
position, taking into account the balance of upward movement, maintaining position and 
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downward movement. The Netherlands had two universities move up substantially and 
another four to a minor extent, while Sweden had one university demonstrate moderate 
improvement and three minor improvement. South Korea’s upward momentum comprised 
five universities with minor improvements and two new entries since 2016.  
None of them, however, have the same degree of upward momentum possessed by China 
and Australia. 
Maintaining position (ARWU) 
Two countries were classified as broadly maintaining their position in the ARWU 
rankings—France represented by 25 universities and Spain by 15. Two French HEIs 
moved up the rankings to a moderate extent and another two to a minor extent, and there 
was one new entry since 2016. The majority of French HEIs (15) maintained their position 
with five losing some ground. For Spain the picture was more varied, with one HEI 
moving up substantially, three to a moderate extent, one new entry and three institutions 
maintaining their position. Although 7 HEIs moved down to a minor extent, on balance 
these trends placed Spain in the maintaining ground grouping. 
Losing ground (ARWU) 
Six countries were classified as losing ground. One of these, the United States, very much 
dominates the ARWU top 500 rankings in terms of sheer volume, with 165 institutions 
falling within scope for the trend analysis. Numbers of this size do not easily lend 
themselves to a trend analysis. Additionally, the United States is atypical given its 
numerical dominance in the ARWU top 50. 
To assist with the volume of data, but also to aid accuracy of interpretation, the 24 
American institutions in the ARWU top 50 are treated separately (see Table 5.6). In all 
cases, these institutions maintained their position, remaining within 10 rank places of their 
position throughout the period, a very strong indication of stability and continued 
dominance for American universities at the ‘top end’.  
For the 141 remaining United States institutions, however, the overall pattern is dominated 
by downward trends. Although 13 moved up to some extent and 24 remained stable, 71 
moved down the rankings table and an additional 30 dropped out entirely. There were only 
3 new entries since 2016. 
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The 43 United Kingdom universities included 7 HEIs in the top 50, five of which 
maintained their positions and two of which demonstrated clearly defined upward 
movement to enter the top 50 over the course of the time series. While these numbers are 
much smaller than the United States, the United Kingdom is the only other country that can 
claim a significant presence in the top 50. Consequently, it was similarly separated into the 
top 50 and 51 to 500 categories for the purposes of interpretation. 
Of the United Kingdom institutions in the 51–500 band, the largest single group (14 
universities) showed no trend. However nine universities moved down the rankings to a 
greater or lesser extent, and six exited entirely. Although there were five institutions that 
moved upward to either a slight or moderate extent, and one new entry, the preponderance 
of the trends were either downward or stable. This led to the overall classification of losing 
ground.  
For Canada (23 HEIs) and Germany (42 HEIs) the majority of institutions were roughly 
equally distributed across maintaining their position or moving downwards to a minor 
extent. Seventeen of the 23 Canadian institutions fell into one of these two categories and 
24 of the 42 German institutions. Four Canadian and 5 German institutions exited the 
rankings completely during the period. Canada had only one university which improved its 
rankings position. By contrast, Germany had eight institutions that moved up the rankings, 
and one new entry, but on balance insufficient to alter its overall categorisation.  
Italy had 26 institutions in the trend analysis, and Japan 31. The majority of their 
universities either maintained their position (5 and 5 respectively), moved down slightly (5 
and 5 respectively) or exited the rankings entirely (9 and 14 respectively). Japan, with 2 
institutions moving down 3 or more bands and fourteen exiting the rankings altogether, 
around half of its 33 institutions, showed a strong downward pattern overall. 
Moving up (THE) 
Five countries moved up the THE rankings over the period from 2012 to 2018 (see Figure 
5.5). They were Australia, mainland China, Germany, the Netherlands and South Korea. 
These results are generally consistent with the ARWU trends, with the exception of 
Germany. German universities had trended down in the ARWU rankings, but they moved 
strongly up the THE rankings. Twelve German universities moved substantially up the 
rankings and another five to a moderate extent. Four moved upward to a minor extent, five 
Chapter 5 Australian university rankings 
132  
additional institutions entered the rankings and another 8 maintained their position. Only 
nine universities moved down (and only one substantially) and none exited. 



















Moving up           
Australia 6 1 4 6 9 3 1    
China (mainland) 5 2 1 2  1 2   2 
Germany 12 5 4 5 8 2 6 1   
Netherlands 5 0 5  2 1     
South Korea 2   3 4 1  1 1 1 
Maintaining           
Spain  2 1  2 1 1   3 
Switzerland  1 2  4 2  1   
Losing ground           
Canada    1 5 7 3 2 1 2 
China (non- 2 2   1  4 2  4 
France  1  7 1 3 5 4  5 
Italy   1 3 11 10 3 5  1 
Japan       4 6  3 
Sweden     6 5     
UK top 50  1 1  4      
UK (51-500) 1 4 7 5 17 10 6 3  4 
USA (top 50)     20 2 2    
USA (51-500) 1  7 8 19 23 13 30  14 
Figure 5.5 Global rankings trends, international comparisons THE 2012–2018 
Maintaining ground (THE) 
Both Spain and Switzerland maintained their standing in the THE ranking. This pattern 
was consistent with the ARWU for Spain. There is no point of comparison for Switzerland, 
as Swiss universities was not sufficiently well represented in the ARWU ranking to meet 
the threshold criterion for inclusion in the analysis.  
Losing ground (THE) 
Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the USA had all lost 
ground in the THE rankings by 2017. As in the analysis of the ARWU data, Figure 5.5 
shows those United Kingdom universities in the top 50 separately, as it does for the United 
States, given the limited opportunities for mobility in this part of the table, and their 
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dominance of the top 50 positions. This pattern matches that observed in the ARWU data 
for Canada, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA.  
France was categorised as maintaining ground in the ARWU data interpretation, and while 
their position there was not strong, it is undoubtedly weaker in the THE data series. 
Sweden’s loss of ground in the THE series is modest, but nonetheless contrasts with its 
(again modest) upward movement in the ARWU data. 
ARWU and THE 
Overall the patterns are generally consistent with two strong points of divergence. The first 
is Germany, which performed very strongly in the THE rankings but lost ground in the 
ARWU. The other notable difference is China. Although Chinese universities moved up in 
both rankings systems, the upward movement in the ARWU rankings was notable stronger 
than in the THE. The trends also differed for Sweden, although to a lesser extent. 
THE Young Universities  
The THE Young Universities ranking differs from the two previously discussed in several 
ways. The small number of institutions is one, and the associated lower inclusion criterion 
of a minimum of five rather than ten universities. Another difference is the volatility 
imposed as institutions ‘age’ past the 50 year point and automatically drop out of the 
ranking, and how that intersects with national trends in creating higher education 
institutions. In the United Kingdom, for example, 16 institutions reached their 50th 
anniversary and moved out of this ranking between 2012 and 2017, reflecting the creation 
of 23 new universities in England during the 1960s. In France, the major re-structing of 
French universities with the Higher Education Policy Act of 1968, and the subsequent 
more recent wave of mergers in the period 2012 to 2016, led to the disestablishment of 
institutions as well as the creation of ‘new’ young universities in the course of the time 
series. 
Given these factors, interpretation of national patterns needs to be undertaken with 
considerable caution. The same three categories of moving up, maintaining ground and 
losing ground were used in the analysis, but the small numbers blurs the separation, 
particularly between the maintaining position and losing ground groups (see Figure 5.6). 
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Moving up (THE Young Universities)  
Australia, Germany and Italy can clearly be identified as following positive trajectories, 
with significant upward movement (Australia and Germany) and several new entries (4 in 
Australia, 4 in Germany and 8 in Italy). On the downward movement side, Australia had 
one university move down slightly, one enter and exit again, and one exit. Germany had no 
negative movements, while Italy had one institution move down to a substantial extent 
(although remaining in the top 100). 





















Moving up            
Australia 5 2 2 4 2 3 2   1 1 
Germany 1 1 3 4  2      
Italy  1  8  1   1   
Maintaining            
France    7 1  2 1 1 1 3 
Japan    2     1   
South Korea    1 2     1  
USA    1 2 4 2     
Losing ground            
Canada      4 1    1 
China  1 1  2 1   1  4 
Portugal       1    2 
Spain     2   1  1 2 
United Kingdom     4 16     2 
Figure 5.6 Global rankings trends, international comparisons THE Young Universities 2012–
2017 
Maintaining or Losing Ground (THE Young Universities) 
Of the remaining countries, only France (in the maintaining ground category), China and 
the United Kingdom (both in the losing ground category) had sufficient numbers of 
institutions to justify discussion of a national trend. The French pattern was bifurcated, 
with 7 new entries counter-posed to four moving down the rankings, one entering and 
exiting and three exiting. China was less successful than might have been expected, with 
only two universities moving up (neither substantially), two maintaining their position, one 
moving down substantially and four falling out of the top 100. The United Kingdom had 
four universities maintaining their position and two exiting, but combined with no 
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institutions moving up and the loss of 16 institutions due to reaching the 50 year point, the 
overall picture is one of losing ground.  
Before leaving this analysis, it is important to re-emphasise that the trend analysis on 
which this chapter is primarily focussed does not negate other kinds of rankings 
description and analysis. If one focusses on the top 10 Young Universities, Switzerland has 
held the top ranking for the past three years, and Germany, Hong Kong and South Korea 
each have two universities in the top 10. Italy, the Netherlands and Singapore round out the 
remainder of the picture with one institution each. These are positive performances, and 
serve to demonstrate the way in which the rankings game can vary according to the 
particular lens in play. 
Overview of trends across the three ranking systems 
Taken together, this analysis of trends across all three rankings confirms and strengthens 
the preliminary finding in Section 5.4.1 (based on the number of institutions ranked) that 
Australian universities have indeed done well in comparative terms in the international 
global rankings ‘race’. This is demonstrated by strong upward movement, numbers of ‘new 
entries’ and the relatively limited number where there is downward movement or exits. Not 
only has the number of institutions increased over time, but their performance is 
improving. Relative to other countries, Australia is indeed ‘gaining ground’. 
It is not, however, the only country in this position.  
China’s numerical improvement in the ARWU ranking was reflected in improvements in 
the trend analyses not only for the ARWU but also for the THE, where no numerical 
improvement was observed. Perhaps surprisingly, though, China was not a strong 
performer in the THE Young Universities ranking. 
South Korea had demonstrated increases in the number of ranked universities in both 
ARWU and THE rankings, and this finding was reinforced by the evidence that their 
universities were not only staying in the rankings but moving up. Like China, South Korea 
was not a performer in the Young Universities ranking. 
Germany had an increase in the number of universities in the THE and THE Young 
University rankings, and the trend analysis reveals that these universities were also likely 
to be climbing up the rankings. This pattern was not found in the ARWU data in either 
absolute numbers or the trend analysis. 
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While the Netherlands and Sweden had not improved their representation in the ARWU 
and THE rankings in terms of absolute numbers, the trend analysis revealed that 
universities in both countries were moving up the rankings (the Netherlands in both the 
ARWU and THE, Sweden in the ARWU).  
For other countries the results are either mixed or negative. Italy performed strongly on 
both metrics (absolute number and upward movement) in the THE Young university 
ranking, but lost ground in both the ARWU and THE rankings. While France demonstrated 
increases in the number of ranked universities, this was accompanied by either a steady 
state or a downward movement when the trend analysis is considered. Spain and 
Switzerland could best be summarised as maintaining their positions. Canada, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States have all lost ground, albeit with the proviso that the 
latter two countries have retained their strong showing in relation to the ‘top 50’ in both the 
ARWU and THE rankings.  
Overall, the data presented in this chapter are sufficient to demonstrate that Australia has 
done well and is continuing to do well in the global rankings ‘competition’. Unlike 
countries such as China and South Korea where there has been substantial national 
investment and support in the university sector, or the German Excellence Initiative, the 
Australian government approach to the university sector can at best be characterised as 
benign neglect, combined with an element of non-evidence based policy experimentation. 
In the absence of strategic national investment, what factors explain the positive 
performance of Australian universities in the rankings? This question is explored in the 
following chapters. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has described the improved rankings performance of the University of 
Canberra, and placed that upward movement in both national and international contexts. 
The analysis shows that the University of Canberra has indeed performed well, but so too 
have several other Australian universities. Overall, Australia has done well in the global 
rankings ‘arms race’, and its performance is even more positive if trajectory is used as the 
basis for analysis rather than simple aggregate counts. Australia is not alone, however, and 
several other countries, including China, South Korea, and Germany, have also done well 
in the global rankings game. Unlike China, South Korea and Germany, however, there has 
been no increase in investment in higher education by the national government in order to 
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boost the standing of Australian universities and their rankings performance. The one 
element that does advantage Australian universities, the high level of internationalisation, 
is hardly a product of recent government policy. This derives in part from high numbers of 
international students, an historic policy setting in Australian higher education that has 
remained largely unchanged for decades, and in part from the strong international 
orientation characteristic of a small ‘settler society. Possible explanations for Australia’s 
performance are explored in further detail in Chapter 8. 
The chapter has also explored rankings trends by examining individual institutions over 
time and within their national context, rather than the more commonly presented aggregate 
analysis. The results offer a more nuanced understanding of university performance in 
national context, and using multiple global rankings, that is available from point in time 
comparison of aggregate counts. In the process of the analysis, an innovative technique 
was developed to facilitate the interpretation and presentation of the large volume of data 
on individual university trajectories. This method allowed the compression of the data to a 
manageable size, while allowing the analysis to remain close to the actual data, an 





Chapter 6 The University of Canberra: a time of change  
6.1 Introduction 
My interest in the way in which universities viewed and interacted with global rankings 
began with the public declaration in 2012 by my own institution, the University of 
Canberra, that it would become one of the ‘top 100 universities under 50’ by 2018. This 
explicit statement of strategic intent was consistent with the ‘vision’ set out in 2008 in the 
previous strategic plan of becoming an internationally recognised and world class 
university by 2018, but ratchetted up both the specificity and the external visibility 
(University of Canberra, 2008a, 2013b). There were some early indications of improving 
internal performance metrics by 2010, but that improvement followed a period of very 
poor performance across all major metrics—student load, educational quality, research 
output and quality, financial status, physical infrastructure and staff morale. From 2005 to 
2007 there was clear evidence that the University was an organisation in decline. Being in 
the top 100 universities under 50 was a highly aspirational goal for one of the smallest 
Australian universities, let alone one confronting performance challenges on multiple 
fronts. In the period from 2007 to 2015, the University of Canberra staged a substantial 
turnaround in its finances, teaching quality, research performance and industry 
engagement. The goal was achieved when the University entered the QS young 
universities top 100 ranking in 2015, and subsequently the THE young universities top 100 
in 2017.  
In Chapter 5, analyses were presented which demonstrated the extent to which universities 
can and do move up the global rankings, both within Australia and in international context. 
The data demonstrated that Australian universities have been particularly successful in this 
regard, although Australia is not alone in having an improved performance at the national 
level. In Australia, however, there has been no national investment to promote upward 
movement in the rankings. This in turn shifts attention to the levers that are available to 
individual institutions to improve their positions in the rankings game, and the 
consequences of activities which target improved rankings performance. In this chapter, 
the University of Canberra is explored as a case study of an upwardly mobile Australian 
university whose achievement, let alone early achievement, of its top 100 under 50 goal 
was, at the very least, unexpected.  
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This chapter brings together analyses of University documents and interviews with the 
senior management team to describe the external and internal contexts, the strategic 
planning, the processes of organisational change and the outcomes of those changes over 
three key change periods—2007, 2008–2010 and 2011–2013. As historical context is an 
important element in understanding organisational change, the chapter begins with a brief 
history of the University of Canberra (Section 6.2), followed by an overview of its 
circumstances prior to the commencement of the study period in 2007 (Section 6.3). 
Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 set describe the changes that occurred at the University of 
Canberra, exploring the process and content of change, the internal context and the 
interaction with the external environment. The case study draws on documentary analysis 
from each time period, as well as interviews with members of the senior management 
team, defined in this study to include Faculty Deans, Directors of University Research 
Institutes, the Chair of Academic Board, Deputy Vice-Chancellors, Vice-Presidents and 
the Vice-Chancellor.  
6.2 A brief history of the University of Canberra 
The history of post-secondary education in Australia can best be understood in terms of 
three broad categories of institutions. The first, and most straightforward, are the 
universities, commencing with the foundation of the University of Sydney in 1850, 
spreading outward from the capital cities to regional Australia and to major industrial 
cities. The second category also dates from the nineteenth century, and included a broad 
canvas of educational institutions ranging from institutes of technology to conservatoriums 
of music, from colleges of agriculture to colleges of art, from forestry to teaching, nursing 
and divinity. The third category, the colleges of advanced education, did not come into 
being until much later, under the States Grants (Higher Education) Act 1966 (Polesel and 
Teese, 1998).  
The diversification and expansion of the non-university sector had been recommended by 
the Committee on the Future of Tertiary Education in Australia (Committee on the future 
of tertiary education in Australia, 1964) as a cost effective strategy to expand tertiary 
education without the costs incumbent on the university sector (Davis, 2017, p.87). This 
was the genesis of Australia’s binary system of tertiary education, with research focussed 
universities on the one hand and education focussed CAE’s on the other. 
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The Colleges of Advanced Education progressively ceased to exist following the review of 
higher education instigated in 1987 by John Dawkins, then Minister for Employment, 
Education and Training (Australian Government Department of Employment Education 
and Training, 1988). The creation of the ‘Dawkins universities’ in the early 1990s was the 
most recent major expansion of the Australian university system, and it is with this 
background that the University of Canberra came into being.  
Figure 6.1 University of Canberra Strategic Plan 1999–2003: Objectives 
The University of Canberra was initially established in 1967 as the Canberra College of 
Advanced Education (CCAE). It was the first CAE in the country, and notably the only 
CAE to be re-created as a University without the mergers or restructures that typified the 
Dawkins reforms. At the CCAE, there was a strong emphasis on excellence in teaching, 
and on the preparation of graduates who were well prepared to enter the workforce.  
With the commencement of operations as the University of Canberra in 1989, the focus 
continued to be on teaching and on preparing professional people professionally’, with 
some silos of research activity. Over a decade later, the ‘smell of the place’ (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett, 1988) remained largely intact, as is evident in the University’s Strategic Plan 
1999–2003 (University of Canberra, 1999). The organisational culture continued to 
emphasize connection to the ‘real world’, the professions, and a strong sense of loyalty to 
Strategic Plan 1999-2003 Objectives 
1. To provide a learning climate in which undergraduate, postgraduate and continuing 
education programmes focus on students needs, are intellectually stimulating, are 
appropriate to the professions, and develop the capacity for lifelong learning. 
2. To create, collect, advance and disseminate knowledge and enquiry in ways which are 
closely linked with and enrich the University’s professional focus and that strengthen the 
knowledge and intellectual base of the professions. 
3. To maintain and develop support systems which will improve and enhance the work of 
the University. 
4. To ensure that the University’s academic programmes, infrastructure and facilities 
provide for flexible learning practices which maintain quality and focus on student needs 
to ensure the wide availability of the University’s professional education. 
5. To provide intellectual leadership and service to the professions, industry, 
governments and to the wider society, particularly Canberra and the Australian Capital 
Region. 
6. To provide a complete intellectual resource, from training for admission to the 
professions, to continuing education within the professions, and research for the 
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the origins of the University as a CCAE (see Figure 6.1). There was a sense in which the 
organisation remained focused on its past: 
There wasn’t a strong identity from 1990 onwards.  There is this historical 
quirk that UC became a university with no restructuring, no amalgamation, no 
nothing.  One day it was CCAE the next day it was the University of Canberra.  
One day it was one of the best CAEs, with quite a strong sense of identity, the 
next day it was drifting around wondering where it fitted in the firmament.  I 
think that’s quite an important part of its history. So one day you’ve got that 
self-pride of being best in class, the next day you don’t know where you are in 
class but you’re pretty bloody sure it’s down the bottom, not the top. SM8 p.8. 
6.3 Drifting down 2005 to 2007 
The study period explored in this thesis is from 2007 to 2013. But it is in the period from 
2005 to 2007 that the declining circumstances of the university occurred. Data from this 
precursor period demonstrate the very difficult situation confronting the University, and 
hence the level of change required to achieve the turnaround that followed. Evidence of the 
decline can be seen in metrics relating to educational performance (student load and 
teaching quality), research performance, financial difficulties, and in the low levels of staff 
morale recorded in 2005.  
Education Metrics 
Student load began to decline in 2005, dropping by 12.7% in 2006 and a further 1.7% in 
2007 (see Table 6.1). The decline was evident in both international and domestic 
enrolment trends, despite the fact that competition for domestic students from other 
universities was constrained by the tightly capped Federal funding system, and 
international enrolments were growing steadily at the national level (Australian 
Government Department of Education and Training, 2007). These data suggest the 
university reputation was declining with prospective students. Already one of the smallest 
Australian universities at 8,400 EFTSL (equivalent full time student load), the university 
was not well placed to deal with a decrease in critical mass. 
The University’s teaching performance, although a source of internal pride (Dearn, 2007), 
was not in fact ranked highly in the national context. Data from the Australian Graduate 
Student Course Experience Questionnaire reveal that the University was ranked in the 
second lowest quartile for good teaching from 2003 to 2005, slipping to the lowest quartile 
by 2006. On generic skills, highly relevant to the core mission on educating professionals, 
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the University was consistently ranked in the lowest quartile, and dropped to the lowest 
quartile for overall student satisfaction by 2005. The 2007 ‘Good Universities Guide’, the 
main source of information for students at that time, awarded ‘one star’ experience to the 
University of Canberra in 2007. Although rates of graduate employment remained high, 
this was heavily influenced by a strong local economy and a higher than average 
proportion of already employed part-time students among graduates.  
Table 6.1 Key performance indicators University of Canberra 2003–2007 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Student Load (EFTSL) 
Total 
   Domestic 





















Growth per annum 6% 3.7% -1% -12.7% -1.7% 
National Education Quality (Rank) 
   Good teaching 
   Generic Skills 
   Overall satisfaction 


























Good Universities Guide (education quality) 3 stars 2 stars 3 stars 2 stars 1 star 
National Research Performance (Rank) 
   National competitive grant income 
   Total research income 
   Weighted publications 
   HDR completions 



























































On most metrics, for most of the period from 2003 to 2007, the University of Canberra was 
sitting in the lowest quartile for research performance (the ranking at that time included 35 
universities). Research income per capita was half the sector average ($49,000 compared to 
$99,000 in 2007) and weighted publications per capita were just below the sector average. 
Rather than showing a downward trend, these data reflect the historically weak research 
performance of the University of Canberra, and its continued attachment to its origins as a 
college of advanced education.  
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Financial standing  
The financial data were telling a somewhat mixed story until 2006, but one that became of 
grave concern by 2007. Small operating surpluses of around 1% in 2005 and 2006 and 
3.7% in 2004 suggest a reasonably positive picture, albeit in a context where the 
recommended minimum operating surplus for an Australian university is around 4 to 4.5%. 
However, the cash reserves of the organisation were steadily depleting, from $20 million in 
2002 to $129,000 in 2007 (see Table 6.2). In 2007, the University posted a $15.8 million 
deficit (12.9% of revenue). This was a large by Australian standards, with the sector 
average at the time being an average surplus as a percentage of income of 9%, with very 
few institutions reporting a deficit (Grant Thornton, 2016). 
Table 6.2 Financial Indicators University of Canberra 2003–2007 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 


















Total Revenue (UC) ($’000) 114,673 118,877 120,815 126,684 123,097 
(Deficit)/ Surplus (%) (0.3)% 3.7% 1.2% 1.2% (12.9)% 
Cash and cash equivalents ($’000) 12,463 10,349 8,300 4,223 129 
 
Morale and engagement metrics 
The measurement of morale in the workplace is complex. The ‘Voice Project’ survey 
presented here incorporates a standard core as well as industry specific measures 
(Langford, 2010) and is widely used by Australian universities. The results are standardly 
reported using a traffic light system—‘low’ (red) where less than 50% of staff respond 
favourably, ‘medium’ (yellow) where 50% to 79% respond favourably and ‘high’ (green) 
where 80% or more respond favourably. 
The survey data indicate low levels of staff morale and engagement at the University of 
Canberra in 2005. Of the 36 subscales, the University scored low on 15, medium on 20 and 
high on only one. Only 51% of staff indicated they intended to stay at the institution, only 
37% viewed the organisation as having clear objectives, a low 31% were favourable about 
university leadership and 25% about career opportunities. The one ‘high’ score was for 
teamwork, which crept over the line at 81%, and echoed two other moderately favourable 
results relating to colleagues (talent (73%) and motivation and initiative (70%) and one 
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relating to the organisational mission and values (73%)). Detailed data including time 
series and sector benchmark data are included in Appendix 6.1. 
6.4 Creating a platform for change 2007 
In early 2007, the metrics on education, research, financial standing and morale were 
indicating a university in decline. There was, however, no apparent air of concern, or 
seeming awareness of difficulty inside the University. But 2007 proved to be a year of 
major upheaval for the University, commencing with the arrival of the new Vice-
Chancellor in March of that year.  
6.4.1 No need for change 
While the performance metrics may have been signalling cause for concern, available 
evidence from early 2007 suggests the University’s leaders and its community were either 
unaware of the problems they faced, or unwilling to engage with them. The achievements 
of the departing Vice-Chancellor were celebrated in terms that highlighted the disjuncture 
between organisational rhetoric and metric reality by a senior Deputy Vice-Chancellor at 
the time:   
We find ourselves in 2007 a highly respected University, near the top of 
Australian universities in terms of learning and teaching, and for our size, at 
the top for research. (Dearn, 2007). 
Staff in the organisation remained proud of its teaching orientation and the quality of its 
teaching, a narrative which derived from its years as a CAE, and was retained as an 
organisational truth despite evidence to the contrary. Evidence of the support for that 
narrative can be found in the stories celebrated in the University’s online magazine 
Monitor (O'Daly, 2006b, 2006c, Tozer, 2007) as well as in comments made in early 2007 
by both the outgoing and incoming Vice-Chancellors on the recognition of teaching quality 
by the Federal Government (Dean, 2007, Parker, 2007).  
The incoming Vice-Chancellor was initially tasked by Council to build the University of 
Canberra from a solid basis to a high performing institution. At the announcement of his 
appointment in October 2006, he had stated publicly: 
it will be a privilege to continue building the University of Canberra as a high 
quality teaching and research institution serving its many communities and 
adapting to their needs (quoted in O'Daly, 2006a). 
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By the time the incoming Vice-Chancellor had taken up his post on 1st March 2007, it 
became clear that far from building on a solid foundation his task was more akin to 
organisational ‘re-building’. In his first column in Monitor, released on his 6th day as Vice-
Chancellor, he had adopted a more cautionary tone. He described ‘a reasonable base from 
which to improve the performance of the University’, and a financial position where ‘there 
were some acute pressures at the end of 2006, and the 2007 budget has involved some 
difficult decisions’(Parker, 2007). In the same column he discussed several significant 
reviews or exercises, signalling the need to overhaul a broad array of existing activity (see 
excerpt in Figure 6.2). This was a clear signal to the University community that a new 
leader, committed to change, had arrived. 
Figure 6.2 Reviews and exercises proposed by the Vice-Chancellor in his first week in office  
Within 3 months of the new Vice-Chancellor’s commencement, the University Council 
and the Vice-Chancellor came to understand they were in a grim financial situation. 
Significant errors were identified in the 2007 University Budget, and it became necessary 
to borrow funds (including but not limited to a prepayment from the Commonwealth 
Government against future student revenue) to cover staff salaries. In June, external 
financial consultants were brought in to undertake a comprehensive financial analysis. 
While the Council Minutes relating to the University’s financial performance are not on 
public record, the information that is available hints at the difficulties the University faced 
and puts on the record the need ‘to re-build its financial position’ (University of Canberra 
Council, 2007b). There was also a substantial level of deferred maintenance. Taken 
together, the factors had put the University on the radar of the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations in 2007: 
There are some exercises we need to conduct this year, in my view.  These include a 
consultative strategic planning process, to ensure that our current directions are 
correct, well-expressed and feel owned by the staff; students and University Council, a 
Quality Self-Review, to ensure that our systems are appropriate for the second audit of 
the University by the Australian Universities Quality Agency (probably in 2009); a 
review of our courses and discipline profile, to ensure that we are currently in the 
fields which will serve us well and relate to our current and emerging research 
strengths; and a Key Performance Indicators exercise which brings together in a 
similar format and using the same methodology critical information about our 
progress, to ensure that we know how we are travelling... (Parker, 2007) 
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[W]hen I joined we were actually on a list of the Department of 
Education, or whatever it was called then, we were on their list….. of 
universities that they might have to step in and remedy SM8 p.9. 
Ultimately, the University posted a $16 million deficit in 2007, not huge by sector 
standards but large relative to the small size of the University, and the worst financial 
performance of any Australian university (University of Canberra, 2012, p.5). Key 
components were $4.7 million for voluntary separation packages, $7.3 million for 
repayments to the Commonwealth Government in respect of over payments in both 2006 
and 2007, a $2.7 million increase in bad and doubtful debts (largely from earlier years) and 
a $1.4 million increase in depreciation resulting from a revaluation of assets in 2006 
(University of Canberra, 2008b, p.57). This deficit in effect bundled together into one end-
of-financial year result several elements that had accumulated from past years and some 
that could potentially have been accrued in subsequent years, thereby ‘clearing the decks’ 
but also reinforcing in a public way a strong internal message of financial crisis. 
The way in which senior members of the University community responded to the deficit, 
and how they came to recognise that there was a problem that needed to be addressed, is 
evident in the following reflection by a senior manager who was on staff at that time: 
Because we were in dire straits at that stage.  2007, minus $16 million in our 
budget, …..  If that was not brought to the attention of administrators and 
executives it would have been swept under the carpet …...  So pulling it [the 
deficit] together was a good first step as the base line and say, ‘Here we are 
here and we want to try and get there, above the red line.’ SM9 p.4.  
6.4.2 A new leader arrives 
From his earliest days, the documentary evidence reveals a new leader with a large change 
agenda in mind, and having already completed a careful analysis of the University’s 
internal strengths and weaknesses and external challenges at the time of his arrival. What is 
also evident from those documents is that the Vice-Chancellor was travelling a carefully 
judged path, revealing sufficient of the difficulties the University faced to justify large 
scale organisation re-structures, while presenting a positive way forward and highlighting 
the potential of the university in the future. ‘Never let a good crisis go to waste’ became 
something of a signature phrase for the Vice-Chancellor in various contexts in subsequent 
years (see Section 6.5.2), and while it is not evident in public documents in 2007, it is clear 
that it was a driving force in his approach during 2007. There is evidence of a deliberate 
strategy to create a sense of urgency around the need for significant change. 
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Communication around the difficulties the University faced, the actions that would be 
required, and the opportunities that existed commenced in the Vice-Chancellor’s first week 
in office, and those messages were repeated in the University on-line magazine, Monitor, 
in the Vice-Chancellor’s reports to both Academic Board and to Council, and in the Vice-
Chancellor’s Staff Forums which commenced in the first week of his tenure, and continued 
on a regular basis throughout 2007 and indeed subsequent years. The clear and consistent 
messaging revolved around a small number of key themes: the immediacy of the financial 
difficulties, an unwieldy administrative structure and the need to identify organisational 
efficiencies, and the potential for the organisation to achieve strong performance in the 
future.  
6.4.3 The formal structure 
One of the first exercises undertaken under the leadership of the Vice-Chancellor was an 
Administrative Review, aimed at achieving cost savings via centralising administrative 
functions and reducing the number of administrative staff. This was closely followed by a 
review of Academic Structures, completed in parallel with a review of University systems, 
processes and procurement. 
By June 2007, the Administrative Review had been completed, and an aggressive 
restructure announced aimed at producing a leaner administrative structure, effectively 
slicing a tier of middle management out of the university. Voluntary redundancies were 
offered to administrative staff, and the Round was completed quickly, by the end of July. 
Administrative staff numbers were reduced by around 100; 80 through packages and a 
further 20 positions via ‘natural attrition’.  
The new, leaner administration has eliminated duplication of service provision 
around the University to meet the needs of the years ahead and lead to 
substantial savings in salaries. ‘I am grateful to the University of Canberra’s 
staff for their constructive understanding and professional attitude in this 
difficult but vital period of renewal,’ Vice-Chancellor [xx] said. 
‘The savings we have made in the restructure can now be reinvested in our core 
business of teaching and research. I am confident we now have the 
administrative team to move the University of Canberra forward as Australia’s 
Capital University’ (University of Canberra, 2007b). 
The senior executive portfolios were re-organised by mid-year, and a Review of Academic 
Structures was well underway, with a mission to ‘examine whether the existing 10 Schools 
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provided the right discipline mix and organisational structure for the courses offered by the 
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Figure 6.3 Key 'Exercises and Actions' in 2007 
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within the University followed, involving staff at multiple levels. The cumbersome three 
Divisions/10 Schools model with each Division headed by a Pro Vice-Chancellor who 
reported to a Deputy Vice-Chancellor was replaced by a flatter Faculty-based structure 
headed by Deans who reported directly to the Vice-Chancellor, effective from 1 January 
2008. Council minutes and the University’s Annual Report also document the completion 
of changes to governance and committee structures during 2007. Reviews of the 
membership and functions of Council, Academic Board, and Senior Management along 
with their respective sub-committees occurred, and various committees were disbanded or 
re-shaped. Most particularly, there were two recurrent themes to do with simplifying 
existing arrangements and with clarifying the distinction between advisory and decision-
making groups in the University. This simultaneously served to make a clear statement 
about Vice-Chancellors’ decision-making power in Australian universities: 
the Vice-Chancellor’s Advisory Committee (VCAC) has been re-named the 
‘Vice-Chancellor’s Group (VCG)’ and reconstituted with a more unambiguous 
advisory role rather than one that implied it was a formally established 
decision-making committee. The various subcommittees which had developed 
around VCAC are being discontinued. As part of the review of Academic Board 
consideration will be given to what functions previously exercised by VCAC 
and its sub-committees should more properly be returned to Academic Board 
(VC’s report to May 2007 Academic Board). 
6.4.4 Strategic directions 
This period also saw the development of a new strategic plan for the University, informed 
by consultation with internal and external stakeholders. The University of Canberra 
Strategic Plan 2008-2012: the 39 Steps (University of Canberra, 2008a) set an ambitious 
vision to be ‘a world class university’ by 2018, and included specific targets in terms of 
improved teaching, research, engagement and financial performance, and an associated set 
of key performance metrics. The Vice-Chancellor was establishing a ‘future vision’ for the 
University, using a combination of messages and strategies, and employing a mixture of 
leadership styles.  
The Strategic Plan, while developed through consultation, was a ‘top-down’ process. By 
contrast the Courses and Disciplines Review (2007–08) was led by a task specific 
committee, charged with investigating the teaching strengths of the University, and 
identifying which existing and new areas should be emphasised in future, and which areas, 
such as those with low enrolments or little research activity, could be cut. At the same 
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time, a revised positioning and marketing strategy was completed, sending a message to 
staff within the organisation as well as external stakeholders. UC was re-positioned as 
Australia’s ‘Capital’ University, a word play that emphasised a commitment to quality, but 
also to the Australian Capital Territory and the surrounding region. This regional strategy 
differentiated UC from the nationally oriented mission of the major local competitor, the 
Australian National University.  
Consultation began on the re-development of a Campus Masterplan, a step which appeared 
modest at the time but was to snowball in its implications over coming years. Agreement 
was reached to privatise management of existing student residences, and for a major 
private sector funded expansion of student residences under a 30 year ‘build, own, operate, 
transfer’ arrangement (University of Canberra, 2007a) . The shift opened the door to the 
diversification of revenue sources and potential commercialisation of the campus, 
improved the University’s financial position, upgraded infrastructure and sent a marketing 
message about a positive direction for the University, all consistent with the early stages of 
a university moving to a more entrepreneurial culture. 
6.4.5 The informal structure and the people 
The scale and pace of change at the University of Canberra during 2007 was remarkable. 
There is little doubt that the dire circumstances facing the University, judiciously and 
consistently shared with staff through regular Vice-Chancellor’s forums and reinforced in 
media releases, reports to Academic Board and reports to Council, provided a platform 
from which to drive change. By the end of 2007 senior managers were on board with the 
need for change, driven in no large part by the enormity of the financial challenge.  
Yet the evidence from the 2007 Voice Survey indicate very little by way of improvement 
in staff morale and engagement (see Appendix Table 6.1 for detailed results). On most of 
the 36 subscales there were only minor fluctuations in staff views between 2005 and 2007, 
and overall staff responses fell into the low category (less than 50%) on 17 sub-scales, the 
medium category (50–79%) on 18 subscales and high (80% and over) on only one. Two 
noteworthy results were the positive movements in the organisational direction scale (from 
37% to 68%) and the leadership scale (31% to 41%). However, 41% is not a strong show 
of support for the University leadership, and staff were more likely to be negative about 
their sense of wellness in 2007 (down from 55% to 45%). Given the uncertainty created by 
large scale re-structuring of administrative and academic structures, that overall pattern is 
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not surprising. While the Vice-Chancellor was working with Council and Senior 
Management to create a momentum for change, these data suggest staff were not yet 
engaged with the changing nature of the University.  
Several senior managers described a lack of ambition, and a lack of awareness of the need 
for change and the changing external environment. As the Vice-Chancellor put it: 
When I arrived at UC it seemed to have no ambition.  I just think that’s a 
fundamental requirement.  If any university is going to go up in the world it’s 
got to be really hungry for it.  It’s got to take on things even if it thinks it can’t 
do it.  Safe universities in closeted systems, if they still exist, they have no 
ambition, so they don’t go anywhere.  …..  So we had to have ambition in the 
years 2007, ’08 and ’09.  SM8 p.4. 
Another senior manager, also a long-term staff member of the University described a 
culture with elements of narrowness and insularity. 
some of the HDR supervisors that we have, they’ve learnt on the job, they were 
our own graduates, they finished their PhDs here and in that sense can be quite 
narrow I believe.  Whereas once you get newbies from outside, from other 
universities, you get new ideas, new ways of doing things. SM9 p.6. 
6.4.6 Reconstruction 2007: summary  
By the end of 2007 a number of significant changes had been made in the formal structure, 
internal reviews completed in areas of core business, and a number of new strategic 
direction initiated. The focus was on driving home the urgent need for change, and on 
visible changes including new formal structures, a new strategic plan, and consultative 
reviews of core business. The primary short-term target was the turn-around of the 
University’s financial performance, by cutting costs (e.g. administrative reform), building 
business (e.g. the Branding and Marketing review), improving efficiency (structural 
change) and seizing commercial opportunities (privatisation of student residences). Less 
evident, but of equal importance in the medium term, was the development of a platform 
from which to build quality and capacity in the period from 2008 to 2010 (the Academic 
Review and associated re-structure, the Courses and Disciplines Review and the new 
Strategic Plan). 
6.5 2008–2010 The First Evolution 
Following the flurry of ‘clearing the decks’ in 2007, the period from 2008 to 2010 was one 
of re-building, or in the language of a senior manager at the time, ‘laying the foundations’. 
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The internal context had changed considerably during 2007. The restructure had achieved 
significant economies and centralised executive power, the financial pressure remained 
present but less urgent, and a clear strategic vision had been developed and publicly 
released. The new strategic plan (The 39 steps) set out a five year plan ‘to remake 
ourselves as an institution’ and a ten year vision ‘to be a world class university’ by 2018 
(University of Canberra, 2008a). Given the University’s relatively poor performance on 
key metrics and limited financial resources, this was a remarkably ambitious agenda. 
By 2008, it is possible to detect a shift in emphasis in the reform agenda. While formal 
organisational change was very much underway as new systems and structures were 
implemented, the focus was shifting to the essential nature of organisation—the informal 
organisation, the people, their values and their behaviour. While improved financial 
performance remained important, there was a growing emphasis on academic quality—in 
both education and research. 
6.5.1 The external context 
Nationally, the external context was also changing. In 2008 the Bradley Review of higher 
education (Bradley et al., 2008) recommended expanding access to university education 
and the 2009 Federal Budget announced the uncapping of university places, with full effect 
from 2012 (Australian Government, 2009). Awareness of the external policy context was 
very much part of the rebuilding of the University. Speaking at a staff forum, the Vice 
Chancellor described the period from 2007 to early 2010 as follows: 
[The] underlying logic was to strengthen the organisation and its finances, 
whilst improving academic performance, in the knowledge that the sector was 
changing, so that we could have more control over our destiny and could make 
strategic choices if the need arose. Vice-Chancellor’s Forum, February 2010. 
The uncapping of Commonwealth Supported Places followed a period of stringent 
regulation. (University fees, as distinct from the number of places, remained centrally 
controlled and largely unchanged.) For the University of Canberra, this accelerated an 
existing drive to increase the number of domestic students, partly to reverse the decline 
that had occurred from 2005 to 2007, partly by a concern that the relatively small size of 
the University was below the critical mass required to service fixed costs, and partly by the 
desire to grow reputation and revenue alike. It was according to a professional senior 
manager: 
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a once in a lifetime opportunity to grow without having to renegotiate places 
with the government. SM2 p.4. 
Senior management’s view that increased student load was central to future financial 
security is evident in the Council Minutes (June 2009), the interviews with senior 
managers (see Section 7.2.1) and was a recurrent narrative in the Vice-Chancellor’s public 
forums. 
There was also a sustained push from within the University to engage with the external 
context at a local and regional level. Led by the Vice-Chancellor, it was part of the 
performance expectations of senior management and staff that they would do their part in 
building external relationships at multiple levels of the organisation.  
This is evident in the number of on-campus functions hosted by the University, the 
appointment of a Director Innovation and Engagement in early 2008 (later a Pro-Vice 
Chancellor Innovation and Engagement), the active engagement with local and regional 
media, and the emphasis on partnerships at multiple levels. Document analysis shows that 
agreements were signed with the other two major educational institutions in Canberra, the 
Australian National University and the Canberra Institute of Technology, and with other 
educational institutions in the region. Locally, an agreement with the ACT government led 
to the creation of ‘UC Schools’—two government schools were rebranded to incorporate 
the University of Canberra name. Other partners included a large aged care provider, the 
National Museum of Australia, the Australian Institute of Architects, the Federal 
Department of Finance and a funding agreement with ‘headspace’, a national youth mental 
health service, to run their regional programme from the within the University.  
Of particular importance, however, was the relationship with the Australian Capital 
Territory Government, an investment that was to prove particularly valuable as the 
University moved to extend and replace ageing infrastructure, develop the campus and 
expand its disciplinary offerings. ‘Turning around’ local political opinion of the University 
was seen as critical by several senior staff, and by the Vice-Chancellor: 
the ACT government has been important. It helped us get essential government 
funding for student residences, it seed-funded some new disciplines and, by and 
large, it’s said positive things about us, whereas previously it was sending 
negative signals about UC.  
[Int ]How much work did it take? 
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Quite a lot.  Quite a lot of work, just one-to-one with the Minister and Chief 
Minister, and so on.  I know shortly before I arrived [name removed] the then 
Chief Minister, addressed the university council and gave, reportedly, a ticking 
off about the direction that UC was going in, so I really worked on him and that 
came good. SM8 p.4.  
This interaction between internal and external context, of capacity and strategy, was an 
ongoing theme among senior managers at the University between 2008 and 2010.  
6.5.2 Changing the people, changing the work 
The 2008–2012 strategic plan was not only a statement of direction. Its ‘39 steps’ were 
underpinned by a suite of 19 Key Performance Indicators and a further 70 Key 
Performance Dimensions, all approved by Council and held up as an unrelenting mirror, 
year by year, to staff and management alike. These targets were simultaneously measure 
and drivers of performance: 
the strategic plan … was very clearly laid out, in terms of having education, 
research and community engagement aspects to it, but most importantly 
targets.  I mean it was more a series of targets even than a strategic plan really. 
…..[Its] impact on setting up the university to improve its performance over 
that period of time cannot be underestimated.  It also became an internal 
organising mechanism around resourcing SM2 p.1. 
By 2009, attention had turned from the formal and informal structures of the organisation 
to a focus on the people and the work of the organisation, and a set of procedures began to 
roll out under the rubric of academic renewal. This was a focus on improving the  
Figure 6.4: Drivers of the Academic Renewal Plan  
[The Vice-Chancellor] commented that the Academic Renewal Plan was the most 
critical element of the University’s programme of reform and was supported by the 
deans and senior management of the University. Professor Parker also made the 
following comments.  
• The University derived a significant proportion of its research income from a small 
number of staff, some of whom were nearing retirement. 
 • The teaching performance of the University was not satisfactory with the University 
ranking low against most criteria.  
• There appeared to be two cultures within the University reflecting its initial 
development as a college of advanced education with emphasis on teaching, and its 
later establishment as a university with more emphasis on research and problem 
solving.  
• The performance indicators for academic staff incorporated into the Enterprise 
Agreement had not been actively pursued with few staff having their performance 
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performance of staff in both teaching and research; the core drivers of the Academic 
Renewal Plan are summarised in Figure 6.4, in an excerpt from the Council Minutes 
(University of Canberra, 2009). 
The pursuit of improved academic performance through academic renewal led to changes 
in senior management, changes in academic staff, and changes in the nature of academic 
work. 
Senior management 
While no senior executives had been displaced in the 2007 re-structures, changes ‘at the 
top’ did occur. Of the eight senior executives in December 2006, only four remained in 
December 2007, and only one by December 2008. By early 2009 an entirely new 
leadership team was in place, all appointed by the new Vice-Chancellor. Part of the 
management renewal strategy had been the recruitment of four Deans to head the four new 
major faculty structures, all explicitly hired from outside the University. The new Deans 
were hired as both a lever and a symbol of change: 
the new deans were the ones who were tasked with the jobs of not only 
recruiting students at the undergraduate level but also postgraduate level but, 
more importantly, in terms of recruiting a new team of staff who could … sing 
from the same song sheet and see the vision of moving forward, in terms of the 
university SM9 p.3.  
These Deans were given significant autonomy and reported direct to the Vice-Chancellor. 
Their performance agreements comprised most of the performance indicators underpinning 
the 2008-2012 strategic plan. The Deans were tasked with implementing change and held 
accountable for achieving outcomes, at the interface between a Vice-Chancellor with 
strong performance expectations and a staff who were neither ready for change nor 
comfortable with it. By the end of 2010, two of the four Deans had left the University, and 
a third had been moved into a senior management role with responsibility for major 
projects. 
The nature of the work 
The drive to improve quality meant better performance in both teaching and research. Staff 
at the University of Canberra saw teaching as a core function, but less so research, and 
there was little evidence they had embraced the need for quality improvement in either or 
both domains. There was a need for change in how they saw their work: 
Chapter 6 A time of change 
159  
one key challenge had to do with culture change among academic staff 
members.  If you think back, prior to 2007, the ethos was, ‘No, I come here, do 
my teaching, do a bit of research and then I go and I’m happy,’ whereas with 
this new idea the culture change had to be one where, ‘That’s not good 
enough,’ you have to achieve certain levels of [performance] SM9 p.5. 
The strongest change emphasis was placed on the requirement for staff to become research 
active. This was a point at which external and internal context interacted with the direction 
of change, reinforcing the need for change to occur. In the words of the Vice-Chancellor:  
 I also tried to create what you might have described as the burning platform 
because Throughout this period there was some sense that some universities 
might be designated as teaching only, that the sector could have been formally 
stratified and we didn’t want to be in the teaching only category.  Of course 
there was the ERA as well.  So … the knowledge that a mirror was going to be 
held up and you were going to be shown not to be research active, when there 
was talk of teaching only universities around, that did create a burning 
platform.  Never let a good crisis go to waste, and I played that, I played that 
narrative to the council as well as to staff. SM8 p.6. 
Academic staff 
The University was resource poor, so the change strategies essentially had to come from 
within. In the early months of 2009, the senior management team crafted a radical strategy 
to change the academic workforce—the Academic Renewal Plan—which was rolled out a 
scant few months later. The Plan was an eclectic mix of incentive, risk, marketing, 
performance management, exit options, industrial negotiation and the direct alignment of 
University KPIs with individual performance metrics. It focussed on changing the 
university by recruiting a new wave of research active staff and by changing the behaviour 
of existing staff. 
In terms of recruitment, a new type of academic role for the Australian context, the 
Assistant Professor, was created. The new role was used to boost the University brand via 
a marketing campaign, with the positions targeted at high performing research staff with 
clear career ambitions. There were substantial financial incentives for appointees, and an 
aura of fast-tracking one’s academic career. The risk to individuals was that appointees had 
seven years to gain promotion to Associate Professor, or else have their employment 
terminated.  
The second major arm of Academic Renewal concerned existing staff, and comprised the 
development of a set of Performance Expectations for Academic Staff (PEAS) and an 
accompanying programme of Annual Performance Review. The metrics were selected 
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based on the level of performance that would be required by all staff to enable the 
University as a whole to meet the Key Performance Indicators underlying the Strategic 
Plan. The expectations were not onerous, but they were well above what many staff were 
achieving.  
In combination, the metrics and the implementation of annual reviews was a clear signal 
that staff would be required to increase their research productivity, and to meet required 
standards in teaching quality and community engagement, as a condition of continued 
employment. It symbolised a change to University culture. Implementation began almost 
immediately, with a variety of arrangements put in place to smooth the transition, some 
focussed on the short term, including an early retirement scheme with attractive taxation 
benefits, some extending out to 2012 to allow academic staff a ‘grace period’ to adjust to 
the new requirements or depart.  
Although the Academic Renewal Programme was heavily targeted on boosting the 
University’s research capacity, performance and reputation, educational quality was still 
firmly in focus. Indeed, educational reform garnered a large part of the University’s change 
agenda in 2008 and 2009, including new curricula developed and rolled out following the 
completion of the Courses and Disciplines Review, and a new educational quality 
enhancement process implemented. 
While these changes targeted the people at the University, they were simultaneously 
changing the nature of the work, and the messages that were sent about what constituted 
excellence at the University of Canberra. In December 2009, the University appointed a 
new Deputy Vice-Chancellor Research, herself a high performing research team leader, 
and in 2010 another wave of reform rolled out across the University. This time, it was 
directed to the strategic research focus of the University, including the need to restrict 
research investment in a limited number of research areas with potential for national and 
international excellence, engagement with Australia’s first national assessment of research 
excellence (ERA 2010) and the pursuit of the University’s research KPIs.  
6.5.3 Financial management and service quality 
While the focus was on the people and their work, financial management and financial 
resources remained a concern. The quality of financial management had been poor, and 
problems persisted. Structural solutions such as the appointment of a Chief Operating 
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Officer, and subsequently a Chief Financial Officer, did not appear to address the issues. 
Both personnel and reporting lines changed over time, in 2009 to become a direct report to 
the Vice-Chancellor and in 2011 to the Registrar. The minutes of Council are scattered 
with references to problems relating to the timelines and quality of financial reporting, as 
well as accuracy. The latter was particularly a concern where finance reports were broken 
down in relation to staffing (a priority area for any university).  
There was an attempt to improve internal efficiency across the administrative units of the 
University by requiring better quality services to the Faculties. A process of developing 
and implementing service-level agreements was commenced and a Services Committee 
established. Responsibility for this function was located with the Deans, a cross-university 
governance model that was completely without line management underpinnings. The 
Services Committee continued through 2008 to 2012, albeit with limited buy-in and even 
more limited outcomes in terms of service quality. 
Following the out-sourcing of student accommodation management in 2007, further cost 
savings were sought through the outsourcing of ‘back room’ information technology and 
business processing functions, this time to an off-shore company in an innovative ‘first’ for 
an Australian University. Despite predictable staff objections, in-principle agreement was 
received from the University Council in December 2008, the final agreement was signed in 
mid 2009, and implementation commenced. 
Revenue diversification and campus development 
In 2008, planning continued to boost and diversify revenue through development of the 
campus ‘land bank’, 118 hectares of land in close proximity to major urban centres, a 
major hospital and other education and research institutions. Prior to 2007, there were 
strongly held views that the campus was a precious resource to be held in trust for the 
future growth of the educational institution rather than a vehicle of potential commercial 
gain. There were values-based objections from more conservative members of the 
University’s Council, as well as significant legislative barriers and potential political 
opposition. Looking back, the Vice-Chancellor described his early reaction to both the 
potential and the constraints: 
That was the big frustration that on Day 1 I walked around the campus and saw 
all this degraded pasture land ….. and I couldn’t get any money out of it.  As 
you probably know, it took something like 20 pieces of legislation for it to even 
start to flow. SM8 p.10. 
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By 2009 internal consultations were complete and a Campus Masterplan approved. In 
2010, negotiations began in earnest with the ACT government concerning the legislative 
changes and political issues involved in achieving a commercial gain from large scale 
development of a public asset. While not directly linked to academic performance, the 
campus development strategy contributed to the University of Canberra’s reputation for 
innovation and agility in the ensuing years.  
Table 6.3 Key performance indicators University of Canberra 2007–2011 
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6.5.4 2008–2010: summary and reflections 
By the end of the period, the impact of change was starting to appear in the performance 
metrics (Table 6.3). Student load, arguably a ‘lead indicator’ of reputational turn around, 
increased by 51% between 2007 and 2011. The Strategic Plan goal of 9,000 EFTSL by 
2013 was achieved early, in 2010. Educational quality metrics started to improve, 
particularly on the ‘good teaching’ scale, where the Strategic Plan goal of being ranked in 
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the top one third of Australian universities by 2013 was also achieved early. There were 
some early indications in the 2010 metrics that the research performance was improving, 
which was to become more evident in 2011. The University was ranked 19th among 
Australian universities on some of the metrics (for example research income per capita in 
2010) with 19th being the point at which the University met the strategic plan goal of being 
in the ‘top half’ of universities on research performance. There were no real indications of 
improvement in staff morale and engagement in the 2009 Voice Survey, and although 
changes were generally quite minor, on 21 of the 36 sub-scales results worsened. (Detailed 
results are in Appendix Table 6A.1). 
The major turnaround was in the University’s financial performance. By 2010, total 
revenue had increased to $177 million, up by 44% from 2007. In 2007 the University had 
run a $15.8 million deficit. By 2010 the University achieved an $8 million operating 
surplus, equivalent to a respectable 4.5% surplus of total continuing revenue (Table 6.4). 
Table 6.4 Financial Indicators University of Canberra 2007–2011 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 


















Total Revenue (UC) ($’000) 123,097 138,108 158,579 176,989 192,652 
(Deficit)/ Surplus (%) (12.9%) 0.1% 1.1% 4.5% 4.8% 
Cash and cash equivalents ($’000) (1,860) 8,728 5,863 3,259 5,007 
 
Just as the radical organisational changes of 2007 had provided breathing space to allow 
the organisation to address improvements in teaching and research performance and build 
student load during 2008–2010, so too did the gains achieved in this period set the stage 
for a more ambitious change agenda in 2011–2013. The renewal of the management team 
had brought more change management capability to the university, and by 2011, the 
management team was dominated by people who were both attracted by and committed to 
an ambitious change agenda. 
6.6 The second evolution (2011–2013) 
By 2011, with much of the ‘rebuilding work’ accomplished, the stage was set for a shift to 
greater levels of innovation as an upwardly mobile university with an adventurous and 
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agile approach to its interactions with the external environment. While some tweaks to the 
formal structure continued, the focus of change internally was very much the people and 
the work, and through these an attempt to drive changes in culture. There were also several 
partnership attempts aimed at using the external context to enhance and further leverage 
change in the core identity of the institution—core identity as perceived both from within 
the organisation and from without. 
6.6.1 The external context 
Externally, the uncapping of student places announced in the Federal Budget of 2009 came 
into full force in January 2012, bringing opportunities for expansion but also setting the 
stage for enhanced inter-University competition for student load. This was particularly the 
case for universities like the University of Canberra that were ‘recruiting universities’ and 
for those (again like the University of Canberra) where critical mass was felt to be 
borderline by the senior management team. Faced with both opportunity and threat, a 
major strategic response of the University was to continue its drive to increase student load 
in a bid to ensure future viability, but to expand it strategies to seek opportunities for 
expansion outside the ‘landlocked’ capital city of Canberra, and through partnerships with 
educational institutions with complementary missions that could deliver additional students 
to the door.  
The process of altering the perceptions of the university by external stakeholders, and 
thereby modifying the context in which the University functioned, continued and indeed 
gain pace through this period. External engagement continued to be a major feature of life 
at the University of Canberra, with regular (usually weekly) major events on campus 
hosting a diversity of groups including embassies, school principals, the many and various 
partners of the University, visiting delegations, professional groups and community 
leaders, and celebrating various university achievements. Senior staff of the University 
attended these events, and the reciprocal events hosted by stakeholders and associates of 
the University. Breakfasts, lunches and dinners featured in the diary of every senior 
executive of the University. 
This engagement was an important part of building relationships, but also a way of 
building a brand and communicating a consistent narrative about the various successes of 
the University: 
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He [the VC] was very good at - he actually managed a broad range of 
stakeholders.  So people that should think highly of the university.  So in that 
period of 2010 to 2015, …you think of how many times in social situations or 
events that people play back to you that the University of Canberra was doing 
very well.  So he communicated the successes, he wrote the story, he was 
willing to engage with those stakeholders, the Embassies, the schools, the 
departments and he tried to engage in both sides of politics, so a bit bi-
partisan, which is important SM1 p.3. 
The relationship with the ACT government had been carefully cultivated in earlier years, 
and the relationship continued to develop between 2011 and 2013. This work, particularly 
at the political level, was generally the sphere of the Vice-Chancellor and to some extent, 
influential members of Council. At a government department level, it was backed up by the 
relationships between senior managers, particularly Faculty Deans, and local government, 
two examples being the Education and Health Directorates.  
Apart from relationships, the Vice-Chancellor, supported by Council, led a significant push 
to persuade key stakeholders in the local region that Canberra was in fact ‘a university 
town’ and that tertiary education was central to the Territory’s economy. Internally 
commissioned analysis was used to provide evidence of this claim, and helped establish an 
emphasis on collaboration between the universities and the ACT government to market 
Canberra as a destination for international students. One example was the ‘StudyCanberra’ 
initiative funded by the Territory government in 2013, and another was the 
‘StudyCanberra’ delegation to China included the Vice-Chancellors of both ANU and UC 
as well as the then Chief Minister (ACT Government, 2013). As one senior manager 
commented, being part of international business or educational delegations led by local or 
federal governments provided an opportunity to be ‘seen and heard’: 
unless you’re seen and heard no one takes notice, in the sense of being part of a 
delegation.  It gives you quick access or easy access to the powers that be in the 
ministerial level, in the educational industry level and so forth. SM9 p.2. 
This collaboration ultimately led to a jointly commissioned ANU–UC report from a major 
private consulting company, completed in 2014 and showing the two major universities 
contributed $1.7 billion and 11,500 jobs to Canberra and its region (Deloitte Access 
Economics, 2014). Increased political and business engagement followed. A senior 
manager enthusiastically explained the value of this strategy: 
So all of the years of negotiating with local government to give us land use 
changes, the hospital coming on campus, all of that, the myriad of 
conversations and then the economic analyses done from various consultancies 
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and through various offices to support the economic value of higher education 
in this university in this town is really extraordinary and it’s only going to go 
up.  So we already now in a university town where X percentage of the 
population work in universities. SM6 p.15  
Strategically, this reinforced not only to local government but also to local business the 
central role played by Canberra’s universities, and in turn the value in partnering and 
supporting the University of Canberra.  
6.6.2 The rankings aspiration comes into play  
From 2011, the focus on quality and performance metrics evolved into a firm aspiration to 
enter world rankings. Originally a ‘soft’, internal target, by 2012 it was explicitly and 
publicly written into the 2013–2017 strategic plan. In fact, the Vice-Chancellor had quietly 
examined the option as early as 2008: 
When you’ve got more autonomy and you’re kind of in charge you want to build 
a brand and you see rankings as things that can really help you build a brand. I 
certainly did so. I had some modelling done, around about 2008, as to how far 
away from any world rankings we were and it was telescopically small. In other 
words, the distance seemed huge, rankings were so small in the distance. SM8 
p.2. 
Only four years later, ‘To achieve world ranking as a young university’ was one of the 
three broad objectives set for the 2013-2017 Strategic Plan. Even more emphatically, the 
plan took its title, Breakthrough, from this intention to compete on the world stage, as set 
out in the Introduction: 
UC needs to break through the ranks of younger universities and establish itself as a 
leader in professional education and applied research. (University of Canberra, 
2013b).  
And, by now typically for the University’s planning documents, this was tied to a specific 
performance metric—entering ‘at least one of the world rankings of young universities’ 
(University of Canberra, 2013b, p.5). 
The 2013–2017 Strategic Plan was accompanied by a carefully revised set of research 
performance metrics, directly linked to the improvements that would be required to 
achieve global ranking. Those metrics were based on detailed modelling work 
commissioned in 2011 by the Deputy-Vice Chancellor Research on exactly what 
improvements in research outputs would be required to get into the Times Higher 
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Education ranking. The Times Higher Education was judiciously selected as the target 
ranking: 
the ARWU, the Shanghai Jaio Tong, was just practically out of reach because 
of its science focus, which is not the disciplines that we’re going to have that 
sort of impact and because QS seemed dodgy, but nevertheless I figured if we 
got into Times Higher we’d probably also get into QS as well, so I didn’t 
dismiss QS but it was going to be a side wind anyway. SM8 p.2. 
Similarly, the selection of the consultant to undertake the modelling was based on the very 
specific target, and his demonstrated performance at another Australian university. One of 
the University Deans commented on this in a way that also reveals the general awareness 
of rankings performance among Australian universities eight years ago: 
The reason why he was brought in was because if you recall within about 18 
months […] turned [University X] around so that it got into the top 400 and 
[…] was the DVCR at the time and then he left and set his own consultancy up, 
that’s why he was brought in. SM6 p.7. 
The University was using rankings metrics as a source of performance measures, and as 
part of the strategic decision-making in allocating scarce resources. 
6.6.3 The people and the work . 
The period from 2008 to 2010 had seen real improvements in performance metrics related 
to education, in the University’s reputation and ability to attract students as indicated by 
student load, and in financial performance. There was much less evidence of success in 
relation to research metrics. As senior managers were fully aware research performance 
was integral to any global rankings success, research performance, research strategy and 
research investment became a predominant focus for the university from 2011. There was 
also a steady pressure exerted to achieve those goals through performance management 
processes.  
Along with the selection of research metrics came a research strategy that focussed on a 
judiciously selected sub-set of research areas, with financial investment targeted to areas 
likely to yield measurable dividends: 
Taking it from a goal into what we need to do to achieve it and then putting 
money into it are three of the important steps along the way of having got there.  
[….]. 
I think, too, and this comes back to investing, is picking areas that you’re going 
to invest in.  I mean if  If you’re going to put in money, they kind of go hand in 
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hand, you have to pick areas. While it’s not a popular thing to do, it’s probably 
the only way to do it, if you’re going to put money in. SM4 p.2 
The five areas chosen in 2011 were ‘the research domains of environment, governance, 
communication, health and education’ (University of Canberra, 2013b, p.10). These areas 
of focus were certainly selected based on the potential to improve performance metrics, but 
they were also balanced across the major structures of the University, and took into 
account the national ERA performance as well as international metrics. Importantly, the 
research strategy was driven by metrics derived from international rankings, but modified 
to take account the national research excellence exercise and the historical strengths—or 
potential future strengths—of the University.  
So I think that a much quicker way of achieving the outcome that we got could 
have been to put a lot more money into areas and recruit a lot more people in 
the science and medicine areas, for example, where you’ll get a lot bigger bang 
for your buck, or not for your buck, but you’ll get a bigger bang with any 
publication or any one output because you’ll get more citations.  But we didn’t 
want to lose all of the social science and humanities area, so we had to pay 
some attention to those areas, given the strengths we had and the background 
we had in those areas. For example, the poets and what have you, in terms of 
international ranking we don’t get much value out of them at all really, but we 
do in ERA, and we do, in terms of a reputation in the humanities and creative 
arts area.  So I think you’ve got to balance the international rankings against 
that broader research agenda. SM4 I1 p.11 
[…..] 
So it wasn’t all about getting to that ranking, it was really doing good quality, 
collaborative work on big enough topics that were important that then could 
get you there. So it’s not reducing everything to a metric was really important. 
SM4 I1 p.12 
The research strategy laid out a plan of investment that was focused on two main 
strategies. First, research investment was targeted on University Research Institutes and 
‘emerging research institutes’ that were to sit outside the Faculty structure and report 
directly to the Deputy Vice-Chancellor Research. This was a significant structural change, 
creating an explicit division between the work of the Research Institutes and the work of 
the Faculties.  
The second major investment was in dedicated research appointments, and the most 
prominent of these was the Centenary Professor programme. Developed in 2012, the 
University went public with the programme in mid-2013, announcing the plan to hire 10 
new Centenary Research Professors to help break through into world rankings by 2018 as 
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part of Canberra’s centenary celebrations. As was the case for Assistant Professors, the 
Centenary Professors campaign again served double duty as both a recruitment exercise 
and a marketing and branding strategy to disseminate, nationally and internationally, the 
University’s aspirations: 
We are serious about entering world rankings for research by 2018 and these 
10 research professors, working with our current high performers, will help us 
get there. (Deputy Vice-Chancellor quoted in Media Release (University of 
Canberra, 2013d)). 
The Centenary Professors were offered very high salary loadings, varying amounts of 
research support, and typically employed under those terms for five years. By the end of 
2013, seven Centenary Professors had accepted appointments, with four more positions 
under recruitment. In this sense the programme was a success, as the University was able 
to attract star researchers, albeit by paying a premium. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor rated 
it as a success ‘as a whole’, and also noted that it had ‘contributed to perception, as well as 
reality’. Other senior managers noted the benefits for research leadership and recruitment 
as well as their individual impact on research metrics. In the words of one, the scheme 
enabled the University of Canberra ‘to punch above its weight in terms of its recruitment 
potential’, not just in terms of the Centenary Professors, but the ‘knock on effects to the 
other people that then come to join’. 
Focused research investment, structural change to create the research institutes and the 
Centenary Professor initiative all drove change, partly by bringing in high performing 
research staff, partly by investing in the research focus areas, and partly by shifting 
perceptions, both within the organisation and in the outside world. Within the university, 
this shift was further re-inforced by a tightening of performance review and appraisal 
across the University, a process specifically aimed at changing the way in which academic 
staff saw the nature of their work, and at changing the culture of the organisation.  
At both the individual and faculty or institute level, performance standards were set in 
terms of the metrics that would bring the University into global rankings contention. As 
one academic senior manager put it: 
The strategic plan was that we would be well-ranked and they just worked 
backwards from the strategic plan, the Breakthrough plan to enter the 
university rankings.  Got [xx] [to assess] our performance, on a range of 
research and other metrics, and from that was … able to identify where we 
were on those measures and where we needed to get to.  Then that filtered 
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across to everything from faculty and research institute performance 
requirements through to individual PEAS [performance expectations for 
academic staff]. So there was the explicit mapping of indicators and how we 
were going to get there. SM7 I1 p.2. 
It had a flow on into KPIs, into faculty plans, into the strategic goals, and we 
were held to account for them.  Individually and collectively we were held to 
account. SM7 I1 p.6. 
In 2010, despite the roll-out of the annual performance appraisal process, many staff 
remained unconvinced that it would be fully implemented. But as academic renewal 
ramped up with the appointment of new staff to the ‘contingent continuing’ Assistant 
Professor track, and as successive waves of annual performance review cycles were 
completed, and the standards for teaching, research and service/external engagement 
continued to be applied, the reality of the new environment increasingly took hold. Some 
staff who were not willing or able to adapt chose to leave: 
My belief is that those who could not hack it, so to speak, said, ‘Okay, that’s not 
for me, not my cup of tea, I’m not happy, I’ll find another place where I can do 
what I’ve been doing for the last 10 or 15 years.’  That brought about some 
change and renewal. SM9 p.5-6  
There were many staff who were already meeting the new performance expectations, and 
some for whom the new environment offered the opportunity to flourish: 
And people who had been here for a long time, once it became clear what the 
university’s expectations were around research and teaching excellence, really 
stepped up and started to deliver SM7 I2 p.7. 
For those who chose to remain and challenge the new requirements, where successive 
‘unsatisfactory’ ratings were conferred and performance improvement plans ignored, 
involuntary separations followed. As a result, the number of staff remaining at the 
University who did not meet performance standards trended down over this period, and 
continued to do so in the years that followed.  
A long term staff member and former Chair of Academic Board summed up the process in 
a way that covers that change to people, the nature of the work, recognises a changing 
culture, and even references the role of industrial legislation: 
If you think back … the ethos was, ‘No, I come here, do my teaching, do a bit of 
research and then I go and I’m happy,’ whereas with this new idea the culture 
change had to be one where, ‘That’s not good enough,’ ‘You have to achieve 
certain levels of PEAS’ ….  That was a whip in hand, in a sense, that, ‘Okay, 
you’re an assistant prof or you’re an associate prof or a prof, these are your 
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PEAS, this is what you have to try and achieve.’  There was a lot of gnashing of 
teeth and, shall we say, reluctance to wholly take up the challenge.  But after a 
while it sort of seeped into the ethos and culture of people that achieving of 
PEAS is a serious matter.  That helped also because it was written in to the EA. 
SM9 p.5.  
Senior Management 
At the senior management level, the pressure to achieve research performance metrics was 
significant for Faculty Deans and Research Institute directors alike. But the broader suite 
of University performance indicators fell to the Faculty Deans, who were held accountable 
not only for outcomes relating to education, external engagement, public profile and in 
some cases campus development activity, but also for University revenue, particularly as 
derived from student load. 
Faculty performance was assessed annually in intensive two-hour reviews, with detailed 
scrutiny and questioning against all performance metrics. For most University wide 
performance metrics, it was at the Faculty level that the ‘rubber met the road’ in terms of 
failure or success, with the Deans being held accountable by the Vice-Chancellor for their 
attainment, and the Vice-Chancellor in his turn by the University Council. The executive 
team, including the Deputy Vice-Chancellors, were also held to an annual performance 
cycle. 
Each Faculty Dean and Deputy Vice-Chancellor was required to present to Council on 
strategic directions, opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses on an annual basis. 
The senior managers were also regularly assessed on management and leadership skills, 
and on processes as well as outcomes. Data from the Voice Survey were reviewed at the 
Faculty level, and in the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Registrar’s portfolios. In 2009 the 
Vice Chancellor added in a ‘360 degree feedback’ survey for members of the Vice-
Chancellors Group (deans and the executive team), repeated in 2010 and then biennially. 
This information became an integral part of the annual VCG performance cycle.  
For all members of VCG, these reviews carried financial and reputational risk. All 
members were on three or five yearly contracts, and all could be terminated with 3 months 
notice. Remuneration consisted of an annual salary plus a performance loading linked to 
both individual performance and University level performance as assessed by Council. The 
three level performance ratings (‘Satisfactory’, ‘Significant’ and ‘Outstanding’) were in the 
context of a fourth, ‘Unsatisfactory’, colloquially and discreetly referred to among 
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members of VCG as ‘fired’. The pressure on senior staff to perform was high. The Vice-
Chancellor modelled a high standard of performance and an unrelenting work ethic, and 
expected a similar level of performance and commitment from his senior managers. 
Working at the University of Canberra was often a 24 hour a day seven day a week affair 
for senior managers; and weekend work was a norm. The Vice-Chancellor started his day 
around 5am. One senior manager, reflecting back on this period commented: 
a few people have said to me, ‘It’s quite pleasant not waking up at 6 o’clock in 
the morning and finding 30 emails that all needed to be addressed.’ SM1 p.14. 
Another commented on rising expectations and work load: 
The expectations grew of what they had to deliver.  The time I was here, been 
here five and a bit years, we’ve gone from seven to four faculties and the 
expectation of what we’ve got to deliver has increased, plus every one of us has 
been tasked with other jobs in parallel and, in some cases, several of them.  So I 
think the four of us have been really operating under the pump and I get 
concerned about all of us at different times, about the toll it’s taking on us. SM7 
I1 p.7. 
By the latter part of 2013, the ‘new management team’ that were in place in 2009 had in 
the main left the University. Seven senior managers had moved on, one had been promoted 
internally, and two (the Registrar and one Dean) remained in their 2009 positions. Three 
new Deans and one Vice-President commenced during 2011, and a new Deputy Vice-
Chancellor in 2012.  
6.6.3 The pursuit of a new kind of institution 
The 2011-13 period was a time of innovation oriented to changing the nature of the 
organisation. While a full account is well beyond the scope of this thesis, a brief overview 
will serve to capture the mood of growth, change, ambition and agility prevailing at the 
University. The account also illustrates the pre-occupation with growth in order to secure 
financial and academic sustainability, and with building brand and reputation in pursuit of 
both growth and recognition in the global rankings. 
The uncapping of university places announced in 2009 was accompanied by a Federal 
Government Structural Adjustment Fund (SAF), and from 2010 the University of Canberra 
was actively engaged in planning to restructure the University in ways that would win 
much needed infrastructure funding and simultaneously build student load to achieve 
critical mass. Activity revolved around three main themes: connecting with the vocational 
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education sector, developing satellite campuses in the surrounding regions, through on-line 
learning, or partnerships with other institutions both locally and interstate. 
The first and ultimately unsuccessful strategy (2010–2011) was to establish campuses in 
several regional towns with a 150 mile radius of Canberra. There was a significant senior 
management investment in this project over a two year period (see text box on the 
Regional Strategy). 
 
The second strategy (2011-2012) was focused on a merger with the local public vocational 
education provider, the Canberra Institute of Technology (CIT), in order to create a dual 
sector university. The re-creation of the University of Canberra as a dual (tertiary plus 
vocational) sector university would have been a major structural change, and brought 
extensive infrastructure reserves and student numbers into the University. After 18 months 
The Regional Strategy 
The Regional Strategy began in 2010 as the centrepiece of a Stage 1 application to the 
Federal Government Structural Adjustment Fund. The application proposed 
establishing regional campuses in Cooma, Bateman’s Bay and enhance existing 
educational infrastructure on the south coast of NSW. The pitch to the government lay 
in enhancing social equity goals through increasing access to tertiary education for 
disadvantaged regional students, including Indigenous students. The proposal built on 
successful 2009 initiatives in regional engagement and enhanced student pathways.  
In March 2011 the Vice Chancellor advised Council that while the Stage 1 application 
had been unsuccessful, the University had been invited to resubmit a revised proposal. 
There was significant investment of senior management and other staff resources in 
revising the application and subsequently developing a detailed Stage 2 submission. 
Potential physical sites for regional campuses were identified and assessed, regional 
media brought into play, and key figures in local Councils and regional towns closely 
engaged. Senior management strategic retreats were conducted in regional areas, 
giving the University the opportunity to maximise both profile and engagement with 
local stakeholders. Potential partnerships were negotiated with local institutions 
including the ANU and the Illawarra Institute of TAFE. 
In November 2011, the University was awarded $25.9 million but the bid had shifted 
away from a regional strategy to a focus on enhancing access through state of the art 
distance education technologies and expansion of the University’s pathways college. 
Delivery of courses in regional areas remained as a theme, played out in the occasional 
course or intensive education offering, but gradually fading into the background. One 
of the Deans cites the Regional Strategy as an example of something that did not work 
at the University of Canberra: 
Goulburn, the first retreat I went to, … I walked away from that thinking the 
university strategy is a regional strategy, we’re going to go into Goulburn, 
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of negotiations this proposal went from having gained formal approval from the local 
government to an unhappy conclusion (see text box on the merger with CIT). 
 
The University of Canberra Polytechnic 
From 2011, the University of Canberra had also been involved in a series of discussions 
concerning the creation of a University of Canberra Polytechnic (later the Australian 
Polytechnic Network or APN). Planning initially occurred in parallel with the CIT merger 
negotiations described above, but in final form involved expansion of the University’s 
wholly owned ‘pathways college’, the University of Canberra College, and partnerships 
with vocational entities outside the ACT. In early 2011 the proposed Polytechnic was 
The merger with Canberra Institute of Technology (CIT) 
During 2011, the Vice-Chancellor and the University Council became closely engaged in 
negotiations concerning a potential merger of UC and the Canberra Institute of 
Technology (CIT) to create a dual sector University. Amongst other activities, the 
University developed key principles for the merger, undertook due diligence analysis of 
CIT finances, and the University Council made a formal submission supporting the 
merger to the ACT government. Greater integration between the two institutions had 
been recommended in two major reviews (Bradley et al., 2008, Hawke, 2011). The 
Hawke report suggested ‘a formal marriage’, while the Bradley review recommended 
amalgamation to create a dual sector institution. 
The benefits included gains in critical mass for the University, the innovation and 
synergies associated with a dual sector institution, financial economies for both UC and 
the ACT government (CIT being wholly owned and heavily subsidised by the ACT 
government) and enhanced integration in the diploma, advanced diploma and associate 
degree space within the Australian Capital Territory. A merger with CIT would also 
have brought into the University high value real estate and infrastructure assets, a 
proportion of which would have been surplus to requirements in a combined institution. 
In the following months, however, it became increasingly clear that CIT was less than 
enthusiastic about the proposed deal, and both willing and able to advocate against the 
merger (Macdonald, 2012b). 
In December 2011 the ACT Minister for Education and Training announced that no such 
merger would occur, with both institutions remaining separate, while a third institution, 
the University of Canberra Institute of Technology, would be newly created from 2013 to 
focus on associate degrees and diplomas. The new institution was to be based on the 
University of Canberra campus (Morozow, 2011). By March 2012 the new institution 
was in doubt, and by early May 2012 the proposal had been put on indefinite hold by the 
ACT Government. The University’s Vice-Chancellor was uncharacteristically blunt in 
his public comments, describing the sequence of events as having ”wasted a lot of time 
and energy” from the University’s point of view, and that by ignoring Professor 
Bradley’s recommendations ”the same long-term issues Denise Bradley highlighted for 
the ACT have not gone away” (Macdonald, 2012a, para.7,10).  
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described as ‘a high end vocational institution offering diplomas and associate degrees’ 
(University of Canberra, 2011). In June 2011 Council Resolution C142/33 had endorsed 
the ‘re-visioning’ of the 2008–2012 Strategic Plan to incorporate the creation of University 
of Canberra Polytechnic, underlining the significant change involved in the nature of the 
University. 
The successful $26 million SAF bid was an important enabling step in establishing the 
University of Canberra Polytechnic (UCP) but the path to the creation of UCP hit a major 
bump in the road in November 2011 when the Federal government announced that 
Universities would not be able to use Commonwealth Supported Places for associate 
degrees and diplomas. The major benefit to the University was to be in enhanced critical 
mass, via teaching at the diploma and associate degree level, as well as via pathways into 
degree programmes. The University’s strategy would need to change again. 
By 2013, UCP had become the Australian Polytechnic Network (APN). The APN 
preserved the intent to bridge the gap between higher education and vocational education 
providers, retained the commitment to develop pathways and build student load (and 
critical mass), and took the University of Canberra out of the geographically subscribed 
Australian Capital Territory to wider potential markets in Brisbane, Sydney and 
Melbourne. The vexing problem of associate degrees and diplomas lacking eligibility for 
Commonwealth funding had been resolved by a serious of negotiations with partners and 
the Federal Department to enable the University’s Commonwealth Supported Places to be 
used at partner campuses where students opted to enrol in degree programmes. The 
University announced its new polytechnic network, a first in the Australian context, in 
May 2013 (University of Canberra, 2013a, p.25). 
While the APN was not ultimately to achieve the goals that had been so eagerly 
anticipated, it demonstrated a high level of agility, drive, innovation and tenacity by the 
University of Canberra. There was a growing sense that the University of Canberra was 
‘on the move’, and the APN was one key factor in taking that perception from the local to 
the national level. While in one sense a failure, as one of the senior managers points out 
below, it also served as an important step in organisational learning. 
The APN, in its original conception, didn’t work but what will emerge, after 
several false starts, will be something that does. ….. I think the APN, as a 
concept of universities working in partnership with other higher education 
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providers to do domestically what we do internationally with T&E programmes 
will work, it’s just the first couple of attempts haven’t. SM7 I1 p.7.  
… They talk about organisational leaving, it’s become a cliché, but it is true, 
whether we want to or not we learn from these experiences and we know how to 
do them better the next time. SM7 I1 p.8.  
The initiatives described above were accompanied by a range of activities concerning 
international partnerships, as well as others focussed on the campus and the local region. 
For example, the University had entered into an agreement with the Act Government that 
created two University of Canberra schools. The ‘UC Schools’ initiative was part of a 
vision to create a cradle to grave educational environment at the University, taking into 
account the already existing child care centres and an existing partnership with the 
University of the Third Age—‘a lifelong learning system unprecedented in the world’ 
(University of Canberra, 2013c). 
6.6.4 Financial management and service quality 
The successful financial turnaround of 2008–2010 continued through 2011–2013, with 
tuition revenue growing and a record financial surplus achieved in 2013. The stronger 
financial position provided the funds to invest in research performance described in 
Section 6.6.2. The $25.9 million of Federal Government structural adjustment funding 
allowed investment in teaching and learning, including enhanced use of educational 
technology, curriculum development, and support for student pathways into the institution. 
But all was not entirely well within the University.  
The volume of innovation and change outlined in preceding sections was not seen to be 
accompanied by equivalent levels of resourcing, and constraints on resources and 
escalating workloads were both extraordinarily consistent themes in the interviews with 
senior managers. The perception of limited resources was emphasised by one senior 
manager in a comparative context:  
Yes, so University of Canberra has very, very limited resources.  It would probably be 
one of the least well-resourced universities in Australia ….. in terms of the financial 
resource it has to invest in any aspects of its work, whether we’re talking about 
infrastructure, student learning or in research. SM5 I1 p.5.
 
177 
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Others pointed to the gap between the vision and the volume of work on the other hand, 
and the availability of resources on the other. The following two excerpts from interviews 
point firstly to the implications for workload, and secondly to the implications for 
successful implementation: 
Well, the challenges were just the sheer volume of what we had to manage.  New 
courses, growth, staff development, campus development, the Australian Polytechnic 
Network.  It was just everywhere you looked.  So that was the first challenge.  The 
second challenge was resource constraints.  There’s never enough money to do all of 
this, so you didn’t get more resources to do more work, you just had to do more work. 
SM7 I1 p.6. 
The breadth of the vision and magnitude of the vision was fantastic but we just didn’t 
have the resources.  When I say resources, I mean financial and human capital to be 
able to implement it successfully. SM1 p.10 
And these concerns about workload were reflected in the Voice Survey results. The 
proportion of staff who responded favourably to the sub-scale on workload did improve 
from 33% in 2007 to 46% in 2011, but did not improve further (see Appendix Table 
A6.1).In 2013, the sub-scales on wellness, work/life balance and workload were rated less 
favourably by staff at the University of Canberra than the average across Australian and 
New Zealand universities. In addition, University of Canberra staff in the faculties were 
less favourable in their responses than those elsewhere, suggesting the pressure was 
particularly strong on the ‘front lines’ of the University (see Appendix Table 6A.2). 
While the general sense of work at this time was by and large to ‘do more’, there were also 
periodic attempts to free up resources by cutting back or eliminating some activities within 
the University. The Discipline Viability Review (mid-2011) was one such attempt that 
related to academic work, but led to only minor efficiency gains, albeit including the 
politically contentious decision to discontinue language teaching from 2012. The more 
constant push to free up resources was a drive to reduce the proportion of professional staff 
in order to direct more funding to academic functions. The structural cut imposed by the 
Administrative Review of 2007 had signalled the start of this process, and the out-sourcing 
of various functions continued in that direction. The language of a ‘leaner administration’ 
was consistently re-iterated, and performance was tracked in terms of the ratio of academic 
to professional staff. In the words of the Vice-Chancellor: 
There was two aspects to it, dollars wise, one was just to get us back into 
surplus but the other was so we could move money from administration into 
academic, and that, I thought, was vital to the revival of the university. There 
was too much money going into doing our own washing.  SM8 p.7. 
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On the other hand there was a view that the size of the University may mean there were 
limits to the extent to which a ‘leaner administrative model’ could be pushed: 
I suppose the assumption of investing in academic performance requires leaner 
administration is to actually make as many dollars as you can go towards the 
academics. I think, for the most part, that’s probably true.  I know Stephen used 
to actually just use that very simple pie chart analysis and if it increased by a 
percentage, in terms of academic spend, it was on the right track. However, I’m 
not quite sure what the optimum is here because we’re a small university and 
we’ve already agreed that we need a strengthened steering core and a 
managerial model.  You can’t have your cake and eat it in this regard. SM6 
p.14.  
This concern was echoed in consistent complaints by University senior managers 
concerning the quality of internal administrative support and the adequacy of processes 
within the University. Similarly, in the Voice Survey, over half the university staff were 
dissatisfied with the adequacy of services (see Appendix Table 6A.1). There was a strong 
view that the University’s processes were an area of weakness that had proved resistant to 
reform. This issue is taken up further in Chapter 7. 
Campus development 
The development of the Campus land bank gained momentum and visibility during this 
time, but did not progress to the point of improving the University’s financial position. In 
previous years, much of the work had been behind the scenes, in negotiations to gain 
government support and to complete the 24 legislative changes needed to implement 
development activities beyond those that could be closely linked to the University 
education and research agenda—particularly a controversial private sector residential 
development on University land. These and other related developments are described in the 
Council Minutes and other related University documents. 
By 2013, some key health and sport development projects linked to the University’s 
education and research agenda had emerged. Agreement was reached with the ACT 
government to build a sub-acute hospital on campus, incorporating significant teaching, 
research and office facilities for the University. Second, the Health Hub, a partnership 
project housing the regional Commonwealth funded GP SuperClinic and the University’s 
student led clinics (funded by a grant from Health Workforce Australia) was under 
construction. Third, a multi-purpose Sporting Commons was under construction, funded by 
the University, the local rugby union franchise and the ACT government, accommodating 
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elite sporting teams, local not-for profit sporting organisations and access to sophisticated 
teaching and research spaces for academic sport scientists. 
By late 2013, the campus development prospectus was publicly released by the University 
seeking expressions of interest from potential business, community and government 
entities, with a particular focus on commercial structures that would provide significant 
mutual benefits:  
Our vision is that the campus will be a compelling and accessible environment 
that is exciting, stimulating and has a distinctive character. Faculties, 
University Research Centres, private enterprises, government and the 
community will operate in a network of mutually supportive relationships 
(University of Canberra, 2013e). 
Campus development was underway, by still in its early stages, and while it was 
consuming senior management and staff time, it had not yielded any financial returns, 
putting pressure on the University’s tight resources. 
6.6.5 Summary and reflections 2011–13 
The aggressive drive to improve research performance bore fruit during this period. The 
new set of ‘Breakthrough’ research performance indicators, revised to match the metrics 
required to improve the university’s global rankings, were moving steadily upward. 
Indexed publications, citations per paper, level of collaboration with international authors, 
national competitive grant income and HDR completions were all moving in the right 
direction, after a period of very little change from 2008 to 2010. A combination of a 
performance appraisal process linked to research metrics, winnowing of non-research 
active staff, recruitment of research active early to mid-career staff (through the Assistant 
Professor scheme) and of high reputation research leaders (Centenary Professor scheme), a 
Research Strategy characterised by investment in key focus areas and a shift in workplace 
culture combined to set the University on a new path in research performance.  
The 2011 Voice Survey showed remarkable improvement in staff morale and engagement 
on the majority of sub-scales, with either further improvements or stability evident in the 
2013 results. Overall, staff responses in 2013 fell into the low category (less than 50%) on 
only seven sub-scales, the medium category (50–79%) on 27 subscales and high (80% and 
over) on three. This is in marked contrast to the pattern in 2007, where the comparable 
pattern was 17 (low), 18 (medium) and one (high). The data also positioned the University 
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of Canberra above the average for Australian and New Zealand universities on 28 of the 38 
sub-scales included in the Voice Survey data in that year. 
Table 6.5 Key performance indicators University of Canberra 2011–2014 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2018 Target 
Student Load (EFTSL) 
Total 
   Domestic 





















Load ( % growth) 18% 2.4% 1.2% 3.6%  
National Education Quality ( agreement) 
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Good Universities Guide (education quality) 3 stars 4 stars 4 stars 4 stars  
Research Performance  
   Indexed publications per research active FTE 
   Citations per paper (5 year range)  
   publications with international authors 
   National competitive grant income (million) 

































Some progress had been made on campus development, albeit without financial gain at this 
early stage. There was an aura of innovation and agility building around the University, 
and a recognition both internally and externally of upward mobility. The attempts to 
reform and improve internal efficiency and processes, had however lagged behind other 
developments, and, perhaps exacerbated by the pressures of a series of innovation agendas, 
become an object of consistent criticism among senior managers. 
Table 6.6 Financial Indicators University of Canberra 2010–2014 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 


















Total Revenue (UC) $’000 176,989 192,652 226,415 242,359 258,215 
(Deficit)/ Surplus (%) 4.5% 4.8% 6.2% 6.0% (0.8%) 
Cash and cash equivalents ($’000) 3,259 5,007 5,397 4,383 3,327 
 
Finally, despite extensive activity aimed at growing student load, increases were modest 
(7% from 2011–2014) over this three-year period, significantly less than the 52% achieved 
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in 2008-2011. The per annum increases dropped off dramatically, from 18% between 2010 
and 2011, to only 2.4% from 2011 to 2012 (Table 6.5). Externally, the uncapping of CSP 
places had created a more competitive market place, and growth at the University of 
Canberra had not only slowed, but dropped well below the national average (Australian 
Government Department of Education and Training, 2015). The earlier gains in 
educational quality metrics were sustained through 2011–2013, but with no further forward 
movement. Employment rates dropped, co-incident with an increase in regional 
unemployment rates. The education reform agenda had stalled. 
6.7 Conclusion 
The three change periods described in this chapter encapsulate a dramatic turnaround of 
the University of Canberra, from the downward drift of the years prior to 2007, to an 
upwardly mobile organisation in 2013.There is evidence of financial turnaround, dramatic 
growth in student load, and substantial improvement in education and research 
performance metrics. The University community had become more aspirational, accepting 
at least the rhetoric of the stretch goal of entering global rankings, and encouraged by the 
steady improvements in internal performance metrics. Senior managers described a 
University that had become progressively more change ready, more agile, and more 
attuned to its external environment. Staff morale had improved substantially, although 
there were concerns evident relating to workload. By 2013, the University had entered a 
stage where it was willing and able to experiment with significant reform, to accept a lack 
of success, and to move on to the next reform agenda. 
This chapter has presented a summary of what changes occurred at the University of 
Canberra during this period, and how some of those changes were brought about. It also 
includes an account of the changing external environment in which the University was 
functioning, its responses, and the implications of those changes, with an emphasis on 
performance metrics associated with to finance, education and research. These 
achievements underpinned the subsequent performance of the University in global 
rankings (the 90–100 band of the QS Top 100 under 50 and the 650–700 band of the QS 
world university rankings in 2015, and the top 100 of the THE Young Universities in 
2017). By 2018, when the full effect of the shift in research performance of the University 
was being felt, with the publication performance window being 2011 to 2015 for the QS 
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rankings and 2012 to 2016 for THE, the University of Canberra was ranked 58th in the 
THE Young Universities rankings and in the 81–90 band for the QS Top 50 under 50. 
This chapter, then, has explored the what and the how of changes at the University from 
2007 to 2013. A further discussion of these findings is presented in Chapter 8. In the next 
chapter, the perspective shifts, drawing on the qualitative material from the interviews with 
senior managers to examine why these successes occurred, what worked and what did not, 
and to consider the consequences of this rapid period of change, in terms of the costs as 




Chapter 7 Change and consequence 
7.1 Introduction 
The achievements at the University of Canberra over the period 2007 to 2013 were 
sufficient to take it from decline to a point where it entered the one of the young university 
world rankings by 2015 well ahead of the 2018 vision announced as part of the 
University’s 2008–12 Strategic Plan, and framed as a specific goal in the 2013–17 
Strategic Plan (University of Canberra, 2008a, 2013b). By 2018, the University of 
Canberra was ranked 58th in the THE Young Universities rankings and in the 81–90 band 
for the QS Top 50 under 50, easily meeting its aspirational rankings target. 
The preceding chapter provided an account of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of organisational 
change at the University of Canberra from 2007 to 2013, drawing on documentary analysis 
and qualitative interview material with senior management. In this chapter, the central 
concern is with ‘why’, and more specifically with exploring from the perspective of the 
senior management team why the University of Canberra was able to move up the 
rankings. In the unstructured interviews with senior management, the interview guide was 
directed to exploring their perspective on why the university had been successful in 
moving up the rankings, what had worked, what had not worked, and what were the 
consequences.  
7.2 What worked 
A number of themes emerged from the interviews concerning the ‘reasons’ for the 
University’s success in moving up the global rankings. These included effective 
leadership, a strong management team, strategic planning and performance metrics, the 
research strategy, high quality academic staff, an external orientation, agility and an 
appetite for risk, and a changing culture.  
7.2.1 The ‘magic leader’ 
The ‘magic leader’ phrase was employed by Nadler and Tushman (1989, 1990) to describe 
the centrality of good leadership in organisational change, as well as its limitations. All of 
the senior managers attributed a major role in the success of the University to good 
leadership, and particularly to the Vice-Chancellor. The respondents with the longest 
history at the University emphasised the ‘turn-around’ of the University’s performance, 
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while those with a more recent history were focused on strategic goals and the continued 
communication to staff of the need to change, the direction of change, the achievements to 
date, and the potential for the future.  
One senior manager described 2007 as a time ‘when [the Vice-Chancellor] came in and 
restructured anything that moved’. The process of building of organisational awareness of 
the need for change has been described in the previous chapter. This manager reflected 
further on the way in which this awareness had been used to overcome resistance to 
change:  
the kinds of resistance that you’d normally get in that sort of process was not in 
existence, I guess, because we all knew that we were stuffed. We’d gone broke, 
we nearly got to the point where we couldn’t pay salaries, we had to get a loan 
from the government just to keep going. We all knew that the place was very 
run down in parts so I guess we all knew that if we didn’t change and if we 
didn’t get on and be constructive about it, then we were not likely to have jobs 
in the maybe even short term. SM2 p.7.  
Repeated and consistent communication of the key organisational goals was also 
frequently mentioned, including the multiple levels of engagement, through staff forums, 
faculty based meetings, a range of levels of university committees, annual review cycles 
and bi-annual strategic retreats. As described in the previous chapter, in the period from 
2007 to 2010, the repeated focus was on organisational efficiency, financial sustainability 
and the quality of the university’s performance in education and research. And the 
repetition was evident not only in the content, but also in the forms used, including in the 
words of one interviewee ‘the bloody mind maps’ (SM2 p.8) that were consistently used in 
the Vice-Chancellor’s Staff Forums and other presentations  
The importance of repetition was recognised, and described in relation to the way in which 
the Faculty and University Research Institute formal annual reviews were organised 
around the key strategic directions in order to keep the leadership team focussed on 
organisational goals. A similar pattern was evident in the bi-annual strategic retreats: 
They often seemed repetitive but, in hindsight, they were a mechanism to keep 
us all engaged, buy in, and on track.  …So what were the key elements to get us 
to a world ranking, and it was research, but also education and international 
and you had strategies for those three items.  SM1 p.5. 
Another theme that emerged from the interviews concerned personal drive and the demand 
for high levels of performance. The theme of a strong and exceptional leader was common 
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in the interviews, of ‘his usual frenetic kind of mode’ (SM2 p.8), and ‘a Vice-Chancellor 
who was quite clearly driven to change the university’ (SM5 I1 p.1). Another senior 
manager covers a number of elements of outstanding leadership in the following comment, 
including agility in changing circumstances, while simultaneously illustrating the high 
level of energy and demands on senior staff: 
So when we talk about the success of a university such as Canberra, it is really 
led from the vice chancellor and the energy that he had.  So I think a few people 
have said to me, ‘It’s quite pleasant not waking up at 6 o’clock in the morning 
and finding 30 emails that all needed to be addressed.’  But it was that really 
high energy, high commitment, strategic vision that [the VC] had, even though 
it sort of kept moving to the left or the right, depending on what it 
needed. SM1 p.14. 
The recognition of the Vice-Chancellor’s role was strong, and respectful, but was typically 
expressed in measured intellectual rather than fervent terms. As one senior manager said it 
was important to avoid ‘hagiography’: 
I can think of many things that were questionable and I can think of things that 
I think where he was – there were some areas where he did things that I didn’t 
really understand why he did them, but benefit to the doubt he was probably 
privy to – he knew things that weren’t obvious to others.  But, on balance, I 
can’t think of how anyone could have done a better job….. I want to avoid 
contributing further to the hagiography that’s associated with [the Vice-
Chancellor] by recognising that he was a human being but, in general, it was 
exceptional leadership on so many fronts. SM7 I1 p.5.  
Additionally, the Vice-Chancellor’s demonstrated willingness to replace senior managers 
who were not performing, accompanied by rigorous cycles of performance appraisal as 
described in the previous chapter, illustrates the implementation of high performance 
standards.  
7.2.2 Strong management team 
While the Vice-Chancellor’s leadership was viewed as a key feature in the University’s 
successes, the contribution of the senior management team was also regarded as essential. 
The Vice-Chancellor was seen as an important enabler of the leadership team: 
So the leadership and management of his [the VC’s] leadership team, I think, 
was fantastic and that’s why we were so successful.  There’s the summary of it. 
SM7 I1 p.6 
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The Vice-Chancellor was unequivocal and succinct about the role of a good senior 
management team: 
you should set clear directions, have a strategy, appoint good people and let 
them get on with it and help them where you can.  SM8 p.14.  
Both academic and non-academic managers reflected a similar view of the importance of 
senior managers and their role in making things happen. A Deputy Vice-Chancellor 
described the importance of the Deans and Research Institute Directors ‘pushing the 
message’ (SM4 I1 p.4), and one of the Deans the way in which Deputy Vice-Chancellors 
and Deans alike were tasked with doing certain things and then monitored on performance, 
rather than on the detail of process (SM7 I1 p.6). Similarly, a non- academic senior 
manager described ‘putting in place the right team to be able to implement the vision’ 
(SM1 p.6) as a key component of success. An academic senior manager put this in more 
managerial terms: 
in a competitive environment a strengthened steering core and a more 
managerial model is essential for university success. SM6 p.13.  
I think when you take a very low performing institution where it clearly could 
be argued that it was loosely coupled, that it didn’t have the stars that were 
performing, a loosely coupled environment without the stars performing is just 
a mess.  So to actually take that, to systemise it, to actually have a top down 
approach to how you will operate and how much money you’ll get and where 
we’ll make the savings and who we will employ was exactly what this university 
needed at that time. SM6 p.13.  
A clear statement of the role of senior managers from one of the long serving senior 
managers further underlines this position, but also raises a point about ‘addiction to 
change’ that will re-emerge in Section 7.3:  
If I had to say what the strengths are, and this is going to sound a little bit 
egotistical, but I think the management team is really strong.  But I think the 
interesting thing about the VCG group that [the VC’s] got, he’s actually got a 
whole group of people that are adrenaline junkies who like to change things 
and do things.  So I think we’d be a terrible team in a university that was just 
status quo, steady state, don’t change anything, take yourselves seriously and 
get involved in the pomp and ceremony. SM7 p.11.  
The two senior managers quoted above were emphasising the role of senior managers 
generally, but it is very likely that they were referring to the Deans in particular. Certainly, 
the Vice-Chancellor saw the role of ‘the entrepreneurial dean’ as an important part of the 
University’s success:  
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I don’t know whether the faculty restructuring really worked.  I suspect what 
worked more was giving deans and faculties a fair degree of autonomy.       So I 
don’t know whether the actual faculty structure that we ended up with did it, 
but the entrepreneurial dean and the dean that’s on the central executive 
committee, the VCG, I think that was part of the mix. SM8 p. 7. 
7.2.3 The Strategic Plans and Performance Metrics 
Senior managers agreed on the importance of the strategic planning in setting a vision for 
the institution. The strongest and most consistent emphasis, however, was placed on the 
alignment of organisational objectives and Key Performance Indicators to strategic plans, 
and the alignment of individual performance expectations and performance indicators to 
organisational objectives and indicators:  
that first strategic plan and the impact on setting up the university to improve 
its performance over that period of time cannot be underestimated.  The aspects 
to it were, as I’ve just said, the clear objectives and goals but it also became an 
internal organising mechanism around resourcing. SM2 p.1. 
This clear connection between strategy, operational goals and organisational and individual 
performance metrics was outlined as part of the change process and change content in 
Chapter 6. 
The alignment of organisational and individual performance metrics with those used by 
global rankings systems also played a key role, and one mentioned by several, but not all, 
senior managers. It appeared some were unaware that this rankings exercise had been 
completed in 2011, and none were aware of the original exercise undertaken at the behest 
of the Vice-Chancellor back in 2008. The external consultant: 
went through and compared our performance, on a range of research and other 
metrics, and from that was able to … identify where we were on those measures 
and where we needed to get to.  Then that filtered across to everything from 
faculty and research institute performance requirements through to individual 
PEAS for professors and others.  So there was the explicit mapping of 
indicators and how we were going to get there.  I think there was a holistic 
approach that then took on structures, investment, PEAS, HR, performance 
review and all those things. SM7 I1 p.2.  
The University of Canberra thus undertook a very explicit process of strategic planning 
and resource allocation in relation to the achievement of improved rankings performance. 
Within this context, however, it is worth noting the perspective put by the Deputy Vice-
Chancellor Research in Chapter 6 and re-iterated below regarding the mediating influences 
that were put in place to take account of other institutional agendas. 
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7.2.4 The research strategy: focusing resources, clear metrics and perhaps a sense of balance 
In addition to the metrics described above, research investment in areas of focus was 
generally seen as central to the improvements in research performance by the management 
team, even where there may have been limited direct benefit to specific areas. While the 
decisions on which areas would be more intensively resourced was a highly contested 
space among senior managers at the time, there was also a high level of support for the 
principle. Two academic senior managers described focusing resources on specific areas as 
potentially the major factor in the University’s success: 
A focus on a few things, rather than many. So the five research themes, and 
building teams around those themes, which included focusing very much on 
centenary professorial appointments against those themes and the resultant 
PhD scholarship processes that are around them. SM6 p.1. 
We’re a lot more focused in research and knowing what we stand for and 
having five clear areas identified in all of that … and that’s one of the key 
reasons why we’ve been successful in improving the rankings. SM7 I1 p.3. 
While focusing resources on limited areas and the role of performance metrics were widely 
discussed, it was only the DeputyVice-Chancellor Research who explicitly drew attention 
to the need to be aware of a broader research agenda. The example of poetry research was 
used to demonstrate the need for balance across the organisation, recognition of existing 
organisational identity and expertise, and national research priorities, and that the most 
direct way to improve metrics (an emphasis on scientific and medical research) was not the 
optimum path for the University (as discussed in Chapter 6)). While this broader path may 
not have been evident to all members of the senior management team in relation to 
rankings success, the balancing of competing agendas may still have been an important 
element in sustaining the University’s research path. 
7.2.5 High quality academic staff 
The pursuit of high quality academic staff, generally described at the University as the 
process of academic renewal, was cited as an important driver of rankings success by 
academic senior managers. However, support for the constituent elements of academic 
renewal (performance review, assistant professor roles and centenary professors) was more 
equivocal, and some senior managers questioned the sustainability of the academic renewal 
process. Key aspects of these critiques are taken up in Section 7.4. 
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The high pay, high profile Centenary Professor Scheme was generally credited by senior 
managers as an important influence in raising the University’s research performance, with 
flow on effects for the global rankings. One senior manager described the process as very 
clever recruitment, and emphasised the way in which it had ‘knock on effects to the other 
people that then came to join’, allowing the university to ‘punch above its weight in terms 
of its recruitment potential’ (SM5 I1 p.4). It was also seen as successful in some areas 
because of enhanced mentoring and development capacity—‘really playing that broader 
mentoring role and helping to foster that research culture’ (SM11 p.7). However, there was 
also the view that it had been ‘a mixed success’, and while successful ‘to the extent that we 
bought back catalogues’, it was less clear as to ‘the extent it’s been successful 
prospectively’ (SM 7 I1 p.2). Despite reservations, including a comment that a similar 
scheme had been strikingly unsuccessful at another institution, there was overall consensus 
that this had been successful as a ‘one-off’ initiative. 
 The Assistant Professor scheme, targeting ambitious and research active recruitment, was 
described as ‘a major contributor towards our research outputs’ by only one senior 
manager (SM3 p.2.) and positively but somewhat less than enthusiastically by several 
others: 
The academic renewal bit, which was mostly the assistant prof scheme, ….. I do 
think in general it has probably contributed to lifting the performance of the 
university, across the board. SM4 I1 p.3. 
So I think, yes, mixed results, but I’d certainly keep the assistant professor track 
where we are in time to build that accelerated capacity. SM11 p.8. 
Others expressed concern about the consequences of the scheme, an aspect that is taken up 
further later in this chapter. 
The implementation of an annual performance review cycle linked to individual 
performance metrics for academics was well regarded by senior managers, and has been 
discussed in Chapter 6, and above in relation to performance metrics. Several senior 
managers described the strengthened performance review process as an important 
management device in building the success of the University. One put this view in a 
comparative context: 
One thing ….. which has been very important in our capacity to do this thing 
has been the PDR, the performance, development and review process, which I 
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think has been much more focused than the previous university I was in, 
certainly in terms of driving up standards. SM5 p.1. 
Annual performance review cycles, although unpopular with staff, were perhaps the only 
element of the academic renewal process that appeared to be unequivocally supported by 
senior managers.  
The recruitment of new academic talent was mentioned in one form or other by everyone, 
and in a positive way. One related aspect not already covered concerned the increased 
internationalisation of the University’s academic staff by virtue of the combined 
recruitment strategies described above (and therefore more international academic staff), 
and the positive consequences for metrics relating to international co-authorships:  
So I think this whole strategy around the academic renewal, this increase of 
recruitment for staff with PhDs and from outside of Australia, bringing their 
networks in, so obviously people like me and a number of people that came 
from outside of Australia at that time, we already had co-authorships with 
people in [XX] so it was a very easy way of actually increasing that 
international exposure, which is one of the metrics that they use in the 
international ranking, you know, ‘How many co-authors outside of Australia do 
you publish with?’ SM11 p.1–2.  
As well as adding the element of international metrics to the discussion, this response also 
provides an illustration of the high level of familiarity characteristic of many University of 
Canberra senior managers concerning the constituent elements of global rankings scales, 
most particularly as they related to research performance. 
Noticeable absent from the interviews were comments about staff departures, whether 
through voluntary or involuntary redundancies, ‘early’ retirements, or forced exits 
underpinned by unsatisfactory ratings on performance appraisals. This was the negative 
side of academic renewal, but it was addressed directly only by the Vice-Chancellor, who 
pointed out the need to ‘change the people’: 
academic renewal was fundamental.  … it’s a sad fact but after you’ve done 
what you can, if you want to change an institution you’ve got to change the 
people.  You can squeeze a bit more out of it, you can tidy things up, you can 
introduce performance management, which we did do by the way, but you’ve 
got to change the people.  That’s why I did it first of all with the management 
team and then we started with the academics. SM8 p.4–5. 
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7.2.6 An external orientation  
Senior managers were clear on the importance of the external environment, including 
stakeholder engagement but also awareness and responsiveness to the changing policy 
environment.  
Non-academic managers and longer serving academic managers described dramatically 
enhanced stakeholder engagement as an important contributor to the University’s success, 
while other academic managers who had joined the University midway through the 
changes were more equivocal: 
Those stakeholders, professional groups, governments and whatever are 
critical but I don’t think you could say it’s universally been positive, neutral or 
negative, I think it’s a real mixed bag.SM7 I1 p.5.  
Perspectives appeared to relate to the degree of exposure to those external relationships, as 
well as an awareness of change from the previous era of the University. As one non-
academic senior manager put it: 
The other success factor I think is also working out key stakeholder 
relationships and we couldn’t have had the success that we did without the 
support of the ACT government.  SM1 p.2. 
There was an emphasis on the role of the Vice-Chancellor by some, but also on the 
importance of engagement by multiple levels of the University, and on the ability to create 
an image of a successful institution: 
I guess there are two times in my career when I’ve been in an institution that’s 
been growing like this.  …..  Both of them had in common this ability to really 
get stakeholders engaged and to almost believe, ahead of the fact, that 
something good was happening.  …..  Not talk it up to such an extent that it’s 
unbelievable, but talk it up to the point where it’s almost – it is believable, but a 
little bit ahead of the game.  ..  So I think that’s really important but I do think 
all the different levels have to play a role in order for it to be believable at the 
end of the day, otherwise it’s one person blowing their own trumpet and I don’t 
think that is really good for an institution. SM4 p.6. 
This excerpt also serves to emphasise the importance of involving multiple levels of the 
University in good stakeholder engagement and the importance of consistently 
communicating a vision of success outside the University, as well as inside it. 
Other themes in the interviews related to the broad range of stakeholders, not only the local 
ACT government but the Federal Government, the embassies, the schools and local 
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industry. There was also mention of the impact of the changing external environment, 
albeit by a minority of interviewees. These matters were raised by those with non-
academic roles, or who had been at the University for a longer period of time. In the 
context of policy changes, the key points raised were the impact of removing the caps, the 
associated opportunity for growth and threat of increased competition, and the capital 
funding that was made available for enhanced infrastructure. As one non-academic senior 
manager described it: 
So the external environment kind of favoured a university that was really very 
eager and hungry to expand. SM2 p.3. 
7.2.7 Agility and the appetite for risk  
The importance of organisational agility was frequently raised in the interviews, not 
surprising in the case of an institution which was engaged in a process of changing itself 
amidst an external environment of change for Australian universities. Several senior 
managers described the willingness to take risks and the appetite for change as key 
elements in the University’s success. Generally, these discussions were specific to the 
University of Canberra, but the Vice-Chancellor put this into a wider Australian university 
context: 
Australian universities have had a fair degree of autonomy for quite a few years 
whereas that’s not the case around the world.  It’s coming, but for the last 
decade or two Australian universities have not been particularly overseen by 
the Department of Education.  …..  But I think that degree of autonomy has 
enabled some experimentation, some risk taking and enabled a degree of 
distinctive identity to emerge whereas the highly regulated countries tend not to 
want to leave the pack.  That’s my feeling. SM8 p.1-2. 
In a national context that enabled a degree of risk-taking and change, the University of 
Canberra managers who mentioned risk-taking consistently paired it with organisational 
agility and the willingness to change ‘on the run’:  
we’re prepared to take risks.  We’ve done a few things that we’ve talked about 
that have failed, but I think that’s important that you do do that.  Some things 
come off, some things don’t, so I think we’re fairly nifty. SM3 I2 p.1.  
I think that was actually part of the success is because it wasn’t a long time 
before the strategy was adapted.  So between we’ll try this strategy, if that 
doesn’t work then we’ll try the next strategy.  But it’s not as if two years would 
pass before you had a change in tack, it was quick, agile.  …..I don’t think we 
could have actually achieved what we did without that continual refinement to 
meet either changes in internal or external circumstances. SM1 p.6. 
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Of particular importance was the widespread acceptance of the need for change, indicative 
of a substantial cultural change in comparison to the pre-2008 era. As one research institute 
Director commented: 
Things are fit for purpose at a particular time in the evolution, aren’t they, and 
then you move on and things need to change.  That’s the thing, it’s always for 
everything – in our world it’s always about change. . SM11 p.7. 
This particular excerpt also illustrates the way in which senior managers saw the value of 
combining both strategic planning and agility, and hence the capacity to adapt to change.  
7.2.8 Changing culture 
Elements indicative of a changing culture have already been discussed in this section, 
including the external orientation, the emphasis on research performance and its links 
through metrics to rankings performance, as well as the acceptance of risk and change. By 
contrast, at the beginning of the study period the University was both change averse and 
largely divorced from (and unaware) of the external environment and the need for change. 
One senior academic manager described culture change among academic staff members as 
a key challenge for the University, but one that had ‘sort of seeped into the ethos and 
culture’ (SM9 p.5) of the place. 
Certainly, the new culture was fully accepted at the senior management level. There are 
indications in these interviews, however, that at least some senior managers felt that it 
would be easy to lose ground, and that there was ‘more work to be done’:  
it could be very easy to spiral down again ….. I think in a transition period 
that’s important, to not let it spiral down but try to keep the upward spiral 
going SM4 I1 p.10. 
For me the important thing was to embed, to not backtrack. SM3 I1 p.2 
A related theme that indicates the process was by no means complete related to the lack of 
ambition in the organisation, and a concern that there was too much ‘talking down’ of what 
had been achieved. These indicators suggest that while culture change had occurred, that it 
was an incomplete process, and not one that had fully permeated the institution. 
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7.3 What didn’t 
While culture change could be described as a mixed success, there were several areas 
where concerted efforts to bring about change were largely unsuccessful. These included 
the pursuit of enhanced critical mass and domestic partnerships, improved operational 
management, improved educational quality and the commercial agenda. 
7.3.1 The pursuit of critical mass and partnerships  
While growth rates were high in the early years of this study, the University experienced 
considerable difficulty in growing in the latter years, despite vigorous efforts and the 
removal of the funding caps from 2012. The domestic partnership strategies and the 
regional strategy described in Chapter 6 were all attempts to expand the student 
recruitment base, as was a substantially increased spend on ‘brand-based’ marketing under 
the Breakthrough Strategic Plan. None of this achieved the desired additional growth, and 
this was most commonly attributed to inter-university competition—in the words of one 
senior manager ‘a ridiculous level of competition’ (SM 11 p.5)—as a result of the changed 
external environment. 
The need to build student load (and revenue) to reach critical mass was strongly argued by 
the Vice-Chancellor almost from his arrival, and was generally accepted by the senior 
management team as an appropriate direction. A few senior managers did question the size 
and speed of the planned growth and the pressure placed at the Faculty level to achieve 
additional load targets from 2012. A minority view was that a small high quality 
institution, clear in its focus and offering excellence in teaching and research, was a viable 
alternative to rapid growth strategy. In the following excerpt, one of the academic senior 
managers puts the case for growth, the reason it was likely to fail, and what could have 
been an alternative;  
I did say, right from the outset, in 2011 and ’12, that I fundamentally disagreed 
with the growth strategy as part of our strategic plan…… I think the growth 
strategy was a means that got interpreted as an end. The end was 
organisational sustainability but [the VC] only saw that as being achieved 
through growth, and I disagreed with it. As it turns out, the writing was on the 
wall then that it wouldn’t work …..because we were attempting a dramatic 
growth, on top of what had already been about a 50 per cent growth, at the 
same time other universities were embarking on really ambitious growth. SM7 
p.8. 
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….. 
I think our strategy should have been that we really try to optimise the 
advantage of scale, of being a small scale, and become the best small university 
in Australia. SM7 p.9. 
Several accepted the growth targets in principal, but were very clear that there had been 
negative consequences, including the increase in offers to domestic students with lower 
tertiary entrance scores, and the pressure that expanding student numbers put on under-
staffed disciplines: 
We did, at that time, really admit low ATAR students, domestic students, in a 
whole range of programmes.  Arguably we didn’t really set them up well to 
succeed.  I also recall, in terms of our own employment practices, there was 
certainly a patch there where we didn’t have good coverage in a number of 
disciplines, in terms of the skill and experience of the staff and our preparation 
of casual tutors and others to actually deliver the programmes to the expanding 
student numbers. SM2 p.6. 
Perhaps the most consistent negative responses were made concerning the partnership 
strategies, both as an example of something that didn’t work well, and as an example of a 
change strategy that had not been sufficiently thought through: 
Another failure, I think, is we adopted an APN approach, Australian 
Polytechnic Network approach, where we were pretty sure we could work with 
TAFE partners…. in each state or capital city ….., in a way that would allow us 
to access markets that we simply weren’t accessing before.  But that hasn’t 
worked as well as we had hoped.  It’s certainly nothing like we envisaged.  SM3 
I2 p.1. 
The University had also attempted to grow load on the international front, with only 
modest success, but also with some reputational costs—an aspect which is discussed 
further later in the chapter. 
7.3.2 Operational management  
A key area of dis-satisfaction already set out in Chapter 6 was the failure to reform the 
University’s processes, across a broad range of areas from information technology to 
human resources. Financial planning and management was also an area of concern, as was 
inadequate financial resources for the University to achieve its academic mission. Despite 
concerns about financial management, however, senior managers tended to discuss 
inadequate financial resources in terms of inadequate revenue rather than in terms of better 
control over expenditure. The early large-scale reforms, specifically the radical re-structure 
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of the organisation and the out-sourcing of certain administrative functions, were 
successful in cutting expenditure in the short term, but were not backed up by careful 
operational and financial management in the medium to longer term. One academic senior 
manager attributed this failure to the Vice-Chancellor: 
The two [areas] where it [the VC’s leadership] wasn’t exceptional were that 
there were some structural and operational things that weren’t addressed, and 
his argument would be ‘I had staff, it was there responsibility to do that,’ he 
didn’t get into the detail.   
.......It frustrated me, some structural and operational things he didn’t deal with 
but he probably had good reason for it and he couldn’t do everything. SM7 I1 
p.5-6. 
Whatever the reason, the issue of poor processes and the failure of reform remained a 
source of frustration for staff and management alike, and as an area of poor performance 
that had adversely impacted on other areas of the University’s reform agenda. This concern 
was echoed in consistent complaints by University senior managers concerning the quality 
of internal administrative support and the adequacy of processes within the University, 
including non-academic senior managers and academic senior managers: 
I don’t know what goes wrong with our internal processes.  That’s really 
important because it’s the everyday life that we deal with and I don’t know why 
we can’t get those processes and admin infrastructures right and I just can’t 
fathom it, I don’t know why. SM11 p.9  
A failure to reform is an absolutely failure.  A failure to recognise problems 
and even if we are recognising them, we don’t have the guts to change them, is 
a failure.  That inaction is a failure.  So there are a number of things …  our 
admissions processes.  SM3 I2 p.2. 
I think the biggest hassle with finance is the clarity and the planning.. I don’t 
think we’ve got the foresight, I don’t think we’ve got the planning. SM3 I2 p.9. 
We never stood back and said, ‘This is what we’re doing,’ or I didn’t see a 
process by which we actually did that.  The budgeting wasn’t always 
understood, the corporate allocation model changed and people didn’t quite 
understand how it changed, or why it changed, and it didn’t really support, it 
didn’t enhance the delivery of teaching and research. SM1 p.12. 
Similarly, in the Voice Survey, over half the university staff were dissatisfied with the 
adequacy of services (favourable responses did improve from the 22% reported in 2007 but 
only to reach 48% in 2011 and 2013). There was a strong view that the University’s 
processes were an area of weakness that had proved resistant to reform. In interview after 
interview, senior managers returned on to this issue as a key weakness of the University, 
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and one that impacted adversely on progress across change agendas in research, education, 
infrastructure, facilities and in campus development. 
7.3.3 Improved educational quality 
There was universal agreement that there had been a prioritisation of research over 
teaching, and that this had been an effective strategy in pursuit of improved rankings 
performance. Opinion was more divided on as to whether it was a necessary strategy. 
Senior managers described a lack of sustained improvement in the quality of education, 
whether it be by an undermining of existing quality or a failure to improve. Certainly, the 
early gains were not built on in subsequent years. 
Several managers suggested that efforts in this sphere had been insufficiently strategic, 
with ‘far too many initiatives on the teaching side’ and a lack of focus. Others made the 
same point, but at a broader level, citing the broad array of agendas in play at the 
university (campus development, partnerships, pursuit of global rankings) as something 
that took away attention from the core business of the university—teaching. 
Senior managers offered thoughtful analyses to explain the subjugation of the educational 
agenda to the research agenda. The process of academic renewal, for example, was 
criticised in this context not for emphasising recruitment of academic staff with good 
research records, but rather for failing to set out to recruit ‘stars’ in educational 
performance:  
But what we haven’t done is grab elite leaders, elite teachers in the same way 
that we’ve gone to market to actually grab elite researchers to lead things. 
What we’re trying to do, on the teaching side, we’re trying to respond to 
increasing our QILT data, our metrics that we’re assessed by, with 
administrative and professional staff support mechanisms, as opposed to elite 
teachers. SM6 p.5. 
A related point concerned the emphasis on research performance, and lack of emphasis on 
teaching quality, in the way in which the University made decisions concerning staff 
retention and staff promotion.  
Metrics themselves were also blamed for the lack of achievement in improving educational 
quality. There was an argument put that the absence of well accepted teaching quality 
metrics was in itself a problem, in the sense that what could not be easily measured did not 
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matter. This was contrasted to the perceived ease with which research metrics could be 
employed to assess academic staff performance: 
Of course we cared about teaching, of course we wanted people to focus on it, 
but it was difficult to have those levers when the obvious metrics was 
research.SM3 I1 p.8. 
The link (or absence of a link) between certain metrics and rankings was also referenced, 
using the example of metrics relating to admissions procedures as something that was not 
picked up in the rankings, and therefore was not seen as strategically important: 
So one of my hypotheses would be that if a university such as ours commits 
considerable resources to the pursuit of KPIs that are linked to rankings and 
where you could demonstrate performance about certain things, and you can 
demonstrate growth and demonstrate teaching quality, but you can’t 
demonstrate in that way that’s linked to rankings. A good admissions 
procedure, now it matters because it will effect the number of students…SM3 I2 
p.3. 
Finally, there was an interesting contention that focusing effort and resources in the 
research space could not be replicated on the educational side—an argument that it was 
more difficult to drive a change agenda because it was intrinsically a much broader ‘front’: 
So it’s a job of work that involves a larger critical mass of academics to 
actually be involved in teaching. It’s down to far more than the way in which 
we’ve perhaps focused our research.  You can’t focus your teaching on a few 
courses, you have to look at the whole university, the whole gamut.  That’s what 
I mean by it being harder. SM6 p.5. 
Whether a result of a lack of focus, the breadth of the job that did not in fact lend itself to 
focus, the absence of intellectual leadership or the metrics themselves, there was agreement 
that ‘we haven’t handled the balance well at all’ (SM3 I1 p.6). This interviewee went on to 
argue, though: 
sometimes you have to design your management around sprints and a few years 
sprints in research was reasonable. SM3 I1 p.6. 
These seemingly contradictory statements reflects a broader view among interviewees that 
the emphasis on research was a necessary pre-condition to improving the rankings off the 
University, but that nonetheless there had been a failure to adequately address the 
educational agenda. 
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7.3.4 The commercial agenda  
Over the period under investigation, the major commercial activities were partnerships 
(discussed above) and development of the campus ‘land bank’. The campus development 
agenda was ambitious, extending (at different times) across planned health, sporting, 
science, education, innovation and public residential precincts. There were some successes, 
such as the large number of legislative and political hurdles overcome to enable the 
implementation stage to proceed. But the overall rate of progress was slow, and even by 
2015 (outside the present study period), there had been limited actual achievements, and no 
significant financial return to the university. There were concerns around resourcing, 
planning, governance and the degree of risk. 
Senior managers felt that the University did not have the human and financial resources 
that were required, raising issues to do with inadequate additional resources and the 
diversion of existing human resources (particularly but not only senior management): 
We never had enough resources to fulfil the ambition that we had and we did so 
well with – and that comes back to then strategic focus.  So we were always 
short of resources so the university operated on the smell of an oily rag. SM1. 
p.5.  
In addition to inadequate resourcing, senior managers who were closely involved in 
campus planning and development felt that there may have been issues with both 
governance and planning: 
.. we tried very hard to act commercially, particularly around property 
development, and I’m not sure that we had the right governance, I know that we 
didn’t have the right governance in place around them, but also we didn’t have 
the right partnership approach to them to really get them off to a good start and 
capitalise on them SM2 p.6. 
What we were trying to do was create the endowment so that we had the 
resources to continue growth.  In hindsight, I don’t think that we had an 
appropriately articulated plan and I think that’s because there were quite a few 
obstacles that we had to overcome before we could get to the position of 
actually being able to develop the campus….. we didn’t have a well-articulated 
plan, nor did we have an executive who had responsibility for it SM1 p.6. 
The organisational appetite for risk is closely connected to governance and planning. 
While agility and the willingness to engage with risk was described in the previous section 
as positive development, it was also raised as an area of concern: 
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Generally speaking, I’m not a risk averse person so I enjoy taking risks and 
seizing opportunities but there is a kind of barometer and - sorry, there’s a 
scale, let’s put it that way, and I do think that our appetite for risk was too 
high…… too much risk around some of the commercial activities that were 
being undertaken, particularly around the property development. SM2 p.10. 
This was a large-scale change agenda that grew over time, with the intention of producing 
additional resources to benefit the University, but in the time frame under study it was a 
drain on a thinly stretch University budget, and according to those most closely involved, 
inadequately resourced. 
7.4 Benefits  
Discussions of what worked and did not work inevitably blend and merge into discussions 
of both benefits and costs. In particular, the case history presented in Chapter 6, exploring 
the improvements in financial stability, attractiveness to students as indicated by growing 
enrolments, improved teaching metrics and improved research performance in many ways 
describe the benefits of the change process to the University. The benefits are in many 
ways the obvious part of the story of success, whereas the costs require some further 
critical analysis. Inevitably then this section on benefits is more a summary of what has 
come before than it is a critical analysis of consequences.  
Perhaps the most direct benefit was the achievement of significant improvements in the 
metrics that determine rankings performance and the upward movement of the University 
in those global rankings. There was the external and internal kudos of having achieved the 
University’s publicly stated and often repeated ‘top 100 under 50’ goal, and in achieving 
that from an unprepossessing base in 2007. 
There were simultaneous reputational benefits, some a result of the rankings improvement 
but some a result of the broader change agenda—most particularly the development of a 
sustained narrative that the University of Canberra was very much ‘a university on the 
move’. This narrative was disseminated out in to a range of stakeholders using a variety of 
mechanisms, and drawing on images and ideas as well as statistics and metrics.  
Senior managers referred to the Vice-Chancellor’s talent for building a narrative of success 
around the University, but also to the way those same messages were communicated by 
senior managers. One senior manager took an Orwellian turn of phrase to describe the 
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ability to not only celebrate achievements, but also ‘reinvent’ less successful ventures as 
achievements:  
One of them is just around the continual reminding staff of their achievements, 
which I think the vice chancellor was good at, which I think the senior 
management team have been good at actually.  I think we celebrate our 
achievements together.  So I think that’s been a good way of reinforcing it.  I 
think there’s been a very good approach to reinventing what we’ve done to be 
achievements as well.  I think even where things haven’t been successful we’ve 
been able to reinvent those successes in order to highlight the achievements and 
to retell the narrative around why we were doing things.  That’s not necessarily 
as Stalinistic as it might sound, or a Ministry of Truth type approach, but I 
think there has been – I think we’ve been quite good at reinventing the 
narrative in order to explain why we are where we are and why we should be 
able to celebrate at least some success from that. SM5 I1 p.12. 
This view of a University on the move enabled better and more sustained recruitment of 
academic talent, attraction of partners domestically and to some extent internationally, and 
a general sense among University senior management that they were working in an 
increasingly successful institution. Internally, the improving morale and commitment 
scores of staff as shown in the Voice Survey results (described in Chapter 6) also pointed 
to the growing shared sense of a successful institution. 
7.5 Costs 
Organisational change of this extent, rapidity and diversity does not occur without costs— 
some experienced at the individual level and some at the organisational level. These related 
to staffing, the nature of the work undertaken, and relationships within the University. 
There was also evidence of an addiction to change among senior managers that had 
implications for implementation, and of perverse outcomes.  
7.5.1 The impact on staff 
One common and interlocking set of themes as to the impact on staff was the lack of 
priority given to teaching functions, and the lack of value attached to them. Despite a 
surface rhetoric of improving educational quality, decisions on recruitment, retention and 
promotion consistently favoured achievements in research over achievements in education. 
This applied across levels, from Assistant Professors to Professors:  
regardless as to whether or not we say that the assistant professorial review 
process is an even scorecard, the perception is research is the driver.  The 
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perception when you’re employing someone is looking at their publications and 
their research connection networks, et cetera et cetera, more so than looking at 
QUILT data or any supporting evidence that they’re a good teacher.  So 
absolutely, and I actually think if you looked at the last 20 professorial 
appointments you’d be hard pushed if any one of them was brought in because 
they’re a good teacher. SM6 p.1. 
Over time, the implications of the Assistant Professor role reverberated through the 
University community, as virtually all junior staff were being appointed on these 
contingent continuing contracts. While the higher financial reward was initially attractive, 
after the first few years Assistant Professors frequently became concerned about their long 
term prospects. It was an intentional design feature of the process that staff who did not 
meet the criteria for promotion to Associate Professor within five to seven years would be 
‘let go’. This placed pressure on high and low performers alike, compounded by resource 
constraints that meant most Assistant Professors had substantial teaching loads. There was 
no option to retain staff who were unsuccessful in gaining promotion to Associate 
Professor, even if they were capable researchers and teachers at the senior lecturer level. 
This latter point impacted on teaching capability, in that faculties could not retain or recruit  
staff whose strengths lay in teaching rather than research. The options available to Deans 
were either Assistant Professor appointments, or short term teaching-focussed contract or 
sessional staff. At the same time there was also financial pressure at the Faculty level as 
resources were transferred to build research capacity: 
[T]he amount of money that’s available for faculties, as a percentage of their 
budget, has meant that the number of continuing academic staff that I have in 
my faculty has gone down dramatically and that we’re using now more 
teaching focused and sessional staff and have fewer continuing staff. SM7 I1 
p.7. 
This affected the broader academic staff body, not only Assistant Professors. There was 
evidence of unfavourable staff views concerning workload and poor work-life balance in 
the Voice Survey data, and as one senior manager put it,  
there is that perception from staff that these were punitive measures and there 
was more stick than carrot.  …...  That whole change management and culture 
change that people like you and me that came into that situation had to deal 
with, there was a huge change management challenge there, at every level.  
There’s always going to be fallout from that. SM11 p.2. 
As well as human costs, there were also organisational ones. One Dean explained this as 
follows: 
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But I think the key point about academic renewal has been that there was no 
real thought given to what would happen when staff didn’t perform, it was all 
about trying to create a high performance environment without really reflecting 
on the implications on the churn that will take place when staff haven’t met the 
performance criteria and the challenges that we face in managing that churn.  
The costs of doing that, both in terms of time and expense of recruiting new 
staff all the time.  I think that we didn’t think through the demands, not just on 
the senior executives’ time but also the potential loss of good staff who may be 
are very good but lack the confidence. 
…..I can point to two people in the last year who have left, and they’re very 
good researchers who would have had no problem getting promotion, but they 
lacked the confidence to believe they would get the promotion in the seven year 
timescale. So I have lost two very, very good researchers to other universities 
because they can get tenure in those other universities.  One of them has 
actually gone backwards in terms of salary, in order to take the post that will 
give her job security. SM5 I1 p.2-3. 
For other senior managers, however, the pressure on staff, and the churn, were seen as 
necessary both at the time and in the future:  
we need to keep that turnover going and that pressure… going a bit, to 
continue, because I think it would be very, very easy to drift down again SM4 I1 
p.3. 
that’s good that we’re tough enough to say, ‘We’ll let these people go and we’ll 
reinvest in new people and we’ll insist on the standards.’ SM3 I1 p.5. 
There were concerns raised about pressure on senior management staff:  
The expectations grew of what they had to deliver.  The time I was here, been 
here five and a bit years, we’ve gone from seven to four faculties and the 
expectation of what we’ve got to deliver has increased, plus every one of us has 
been tasked with other jobs in parallel and, in some cases, several of them.  So I 
think the four of us have been really operating under the pump and I get 
concerned about all of us at different times, about the toll it’s taking on us. SM7 
I1 p.7. 
7.5.2 The impact on the work 
Some attention has already been given in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.4.1 to the tension between 
research and teaching in the institution, particularly as it related to metrics and to staff. 
What deserves elaboration here is the actual change in the nature of the way in which work 
was perceived in the institution. The Vice-Chancellor had unapologetically set out to  
I kind of deliberately shifted it towards research.  Not only for rankings and 
recognition but I actually thought it was going to make for a healthier 
university, that it was too teaching focused. SM8 p.5. 
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Was the strategy successful? Certainly according to almost all senior management staff, 
but perhaps best and most unequivocally summed as follows: 
So has the balance been towards research?  Absolutely.  Is there a limit to 
people’s ability and time and effort?  Yes.  Where have we missed out on?  
We’ve missed out on the quality of our learning and teaching, particularly our 
student experience. SM3 I1 p.6.   
It was not only research that impacted on the teaching functions of the university. Another 
shift in the nature of the work had been the proliferation of activities relating to 
partnerships and commercial ventures, particularly campus development. While these 
ventures had met with varying degrees of success (discussed in Chapter 6), there was no 
doubt in the mind of this senior manager that it had detracted from ‘core business’: 
[w]e were so enthusiastic about doing deals and about the kind of commercial 
potential of the land and other assets, as well as leveraging our partnerships 
and trying to find ways to grow that the institution and the senior management 
team just lost some of the core business, so I didn’t really have confidence that 
the quality of education, the quality of the experience was really taken 
seriously.  I think that’s a weakness because it could be, for a place like the 
University of Canberra, such a strength.  ….. certainly my sense was that 
students were getting lost and the core purpose of the university was being 
lost….  SM2 p.10 
7.5.3 The impact on relationships 
An important aspect of organisational change was that it began to impact differently on 
different groups of staff as the implementation of more detailed change agendas rolled out. 
Various changes differentially affected professional and academic areas, increasing intra-
organisational conflict. The professional staff in areas identified for outsourcing were in 
very different circumstances to those unaffected. The increasing demands of new academic 
performance requirements benefitted some disciplinary areas and disadvantaged others, 
driving wedges between areas that were well-resourced for increased research performance 
and those that were not. 
The combination of a strong change agenda and a constrained resource environment 
inevitably led to tensions within the organisation. One of those, already discussed, was the 
tension between teaching and research. And the tension between the university’s core 
business and its commercial endeavours has also been outlined. Another was the consistent 
push to reduce the proportion of professional staff, to create a leaner administration, in 
order to free up further resources for additional pursuits.  
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There was evidence of a breakdown in trust relationships between the academic and 
professional areas of the University. In the words of one senior manager:  
I think the people in faculties have become increasingly critical of the quality of 
service and data and support we get. Simultaneously and unsurprisingly the 
central units have become increasingly cynical and critical of academics and 
faculties and research institutes. Whether it’s the research office, the teaching 
and learning area, finance, estates. I can think of many examples for each of 
those areas where they make certain decisions that suggests to me they either 
don’t value, understand or respect and appreciate the work that faculties and 
research institutes are doing. SM7 I1 p.13. 
But the issues were not only between the central units and the faculties. As more research 
resources were allocated to the university research institutes and research centres, tensions 
of varying levels emerged between those entities and the faculties, who remained the main 
revenue generating centres, but had a lower share of resources to devote to their teaching 
responsibilities and research activities. Over time, this led to some resentment between 
faculties and research centres or institutes relating to the funding of the ‘areas of research 
focus’:  
So the focus on the five areas, the funding hasn’t gone to the five areas, it’s 
probably gone to three or four of those five areas and that means that as a 
Dean I’ve had to try and look after the workforce for my two research centres. 
There’s an obvious difficulty because the only ability you have to support those 
research areas, if they’re in the faculty, is for the student load. SM6 p.2. 
Apart from the creation of actual or perceived silos associated with resources constraints, 
there were conflicting views about the way in which the senior management team 
functioned in the University. So while interviewees had agreed on the value of a strong 
management team in the organisation (Section 7.2), and the Vice-Chancellor’s support for 
that team, there was also ambiguity in the messages as to how teamwork was supported in 
the University: 
it was curious how he [the VC] didn’t call out some  –  maybe he did.  I think 
there were times when various people in the university should have been called 
aside and told to play as part of the team and cooperate and get over things 
and move on. SM7 I1 p.6.  
Another senior manager comments in a way that illustrates ambivalence: 
once you put the right team is they have to be focused on the outcomes that they 
need to achieve.  It’s quite interesting because if you think about it, were we a 
team? Building a team wasn’t something .. our Vice-Chancellor, actually 
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encouraged. We were sort of a team but it wasn’t the cohesiveness that I have 
seen in other teams. SM1 p.3. 
And from the same manager on the reason for university success: 
So if you put in place the right team, no you should just call it people because 
we often didn’t operate as a team.  So the right people focus, so I think it was a 
matter of focusing. SM1 p.2.  
Another piece of this mosaic in relation to teamwork and a cohesive environment at the 
University was illustrated by the management structures, both formal and informal. The 
Vice-Chancellor’s Group met every Wednesday afternoon, and comprised the Deans and 
the ‘Senior Executive’ (senior managers at the Deputy Vice-Chancellor/Vice President 
level), with a focus on strategic issues, information sharing and ‘keeping things on track’. 
But the Vice-Chancellor also met separately with the ‘Senior Executive’ every Monday 
morning, and held a ‘Dean’s breakfast’ at 7.30 am every Thursday morning to thrash out a 
variety of issues. At the Senior Executive meeting: 
there would be discussions than then did not get repeated at VCG.  Not a lot, 
but just a little bit more information would be shared than was shared at a 
VCG. SM1 p.14. 
There were also matters discussed at the Deans’ breakfasts with the VC that were not 
raised in the VCG context. Senior executives were unclear on the role the Dean’s 
breakfasts played, and on how influential they were, but the Vice-Chancellor’s continued 
weekly commitment during this period suggests he found them valuable. The Research 
Institute Directors met fortnightly with the Deputy Vice-Chancellor Research from 2010, 
but were not part of any of the forums described above. They did attend the monthly 
Senior Management meeting, which included all managers of professional units in the 
university (around 30 people). This created a spiderweb of communication paths, with the 
Vice-Chancellor at the centre, and served both to keep people moving in the same 
direction, but also to reinforce a degree of separation.  
Individuals, particularly Deans, were also tasked with functions that did not relate to their 
structural position, which in turn led to some challenges across the management structure 
of the institution:  
I think teamwork sometimes was a challenge between – generally we made it 
work.  If there were overlaps between functions, et cetera, but it could become a 
become a bit challenging to do your job when it overlapped with what other 
people were trying to do as well.  SM1 p.5. 
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 I think part of the thing that happened that’s now causing a little bit of an 
unintended consequence is that people tended to be tasked with things outside 
of their straight job, based on what he perceived as their capacity.  So different 
people would – I think there was a very deliberate strategy around leadership 
depth and the extent to which a person was fit for purpose. SM7 I1 p.1. 
While the evidence is not unequivocal, there is a sense in which the institution was being 
driven by a combination of strategies, on the one hand communication to build cohesion 
and direction, but on the other the creation of different senior management coteries, and the 
creation of individual specific roles, that served to create a degree of separation, and 
potentially competition, among senior managers. 
Performance metrics: another consequence 
This tension may have been reinforced by the performance review cycle for senior 
managers, the reliance on metrics, the associated use of performance bonuses, and in the 
case of the Deans the constant comparison of performance metrics across the faculties. 
While staff did not have the added element of performance bonuses, over the change 
period they were increasingly being ‘hired or fired’ based on performance metrics. 
Achievements across research, teaching and engagement were rated as either 
Unsatisfactory, Satisfactory, Significant or Outstanding. This form of performance 
appraisal was very much based on individual metrics, setting up a tension between 
individual and team performance which can have negative consequences for a sense of 
intellectual community. Specific metrics also pushed individuals in very specific 
directions, reducing flexibility and increasing the likelihood of competition, particularly 
where individuals are striving to demonstrate their performance in relation to others.  
the PEAS that were set, were set to solve a problem rather than to really set 
what are good expectations.  At one level they’re almost inconsistent with each 
other, in terms of what you expect a good researcher to do and what you expect 
a good teacher to do, and so on, and they were a one size fits all approach and 
didn’t allow as much flexibility as we might really think we would need in the 
workplace in order to create a team, as opposed to a set of successful 
individuals.  So I think it created a focus on individuals rather than on teams.  
SM5 I1 p.3. 
7.5.4 Addicted to change? 
While initially change averse, there can be little doubt that the University became not only 
change ready, but comparatively change adept. Indeed, as noted previously, one 
interviewee described the senior management team as ‘adrenaline junkies who like to 
Chapter 7 Change and consequence 
210  
change things and do things’. Staff may not have been universally so ‘addicted’ to change, 
but they did accept the need for it: 
the university is really amendable to change, it’s changeable.  It does 
understand we need to be flexible and be able to change and people don’t 
necessarily like change but they accept it’s going to happen, probably more so 
here than at other places that I’ve worked, so I think that’s a strength SM7 I1 
p.11. 
I’ve been surprised at how quickly people are to learn the new rules of the 
game SM5 I1 p.8. 
In one sense, this degree of acceptance of change can be seen as a strength of the 
organisation, particularly in the context where universities need to be able to adapt to 
change: 
In our world it’s always about change.  There’s never a time when you can sit 
back and sit on your laurels and think, “Well, that’s it now,’ and draw a line 
because the next day the government makes some other announcement to tip the 
cart. SM11 p.7 
The negative aspect of a high ‘change appetite’ was inadequate time and human and 
financial resources for implementation of ongoing waves of initiatives. Senior managers 
expressed the view that change initiatives were not adequately resourced, and that, partly 
as a consequence, they were not ‘thought through’: 
There’s never enough money to do all of this, so you didn’t get more resources 
to do more work, you just had to do more work. SM7 I1 p.6.R 
I think they’re change ready but the challenge is that I don’t think we think 
through the changes. ..….. We put in a change without understanding the 
implications that that change will become institutionalised and will become 
adopted very quickly by people SM5 I1 p.9. 
Academic renewal was cited as one such example: 
I think that probably academic renewal has been, it has been successful to some 
extent, but I think that was the biggest challenge the university faced, in that it 
wasn’t as clearly thought through as I think those who first conceived it thought 
they had done. SM5 I1 p.2.  
Another example was the pursuit of educational partnerships: 
There were challenges because it meant that we were massively diverted in 
pursuing relationships with partners who were not good bedfellows and who 
didn’t have our interests at heart and weren’t interested in quality themselves. 
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But also which weren’t actually going to yield anything, in the end, which were 
all kind of illusionary. SM2 p.5.  
Running through this commentary are ideas of risk, and of too many change agendas for 
the resources that were available. There was a sense that the organisation had become good 
at making changes, and at modifying strategy on the run, but that the level of agility had 
come at a cost in terms of ability to sustain implementation.  
The problem of a high appetite for risk was raised in Section 7.1 regarding campus 
development, but also surfaced in relation to the pursuit of growth in student numbers 
particularly through the various vocational partnerships.  
 We attempted to grow our international students, definitely one of the rankings 
criteria, and failed in that we lost sight, for good reasons of a change of senior 
personnel, but we lost sight of the risk we were running in pursuing students 
that looked to be keen but weren’t genuine students and were going to be picked 
up by Border Protection and therefore put us into a precarious position, in 
terms of our university’s reputation and our ability to attract further 
international students.  So that’s one failure.  We’re cleaning that mess up now. 
SM3 I2 p.1. 
The ‘mess’ referred to in this instance was the significant downgrading of the University of 
Canberra’s international student visa processing status by the Federal government as a 
direct consequence of the pattern of student recruitment through inter-state and inter-
institutional partnerships. 
There were, in a sense, too many directions, or too many good ideas — ‘the challenges 
really were about keeping balance’ (SM2 p.5). This was seen partly as a problem of limited 
resources, but also a problem of existing strategies not generating very much additional 
capacity: 
When you’ve got people fighting for money, all with worthy things to invest in, 
but not all of them things that were going to impact on rankings, that was a 
challenge.  Just how to carve up budgets in a way that kept the core headline 
things as a priority, because so many other things became worthy calls on the 
little capacity that we did generate. SM2 p.6. 
A Dean described this issue of ‘many directions’ in terms of ‘the institutionalisation of 
stuff’, the creation of small practices or units of operation that gain momentum ‘driving us 
in a particular direction’:   
As all good institutional theorists will know, the challenge with that is that 
when that institution starts to not deliver the direction that you wanted the 
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capacity to change the direction and to shape that institution a different way is 
very limited and institutions are social constructs so the more people you have 
invested in them the harder it is to change. SM5 I1 
I: So give me an example? 
I might go with Campus Developments on this one….. Campus Development 
now has a momentum all of its own ….. already I start to see the signs of the 
institution that was created, in terms of who’s responsible for what and what 
their roles are, and so on, and the way in which people then are working 
around them.  I can see already that that can have real potential to lose sight of 
the overarching mission of the university. SM5 I1 p.8-9. 
The balance between resources and aspirations continued to be a problem for the 
University, as the former did not grow at the same pace as the latter. 
7.4.4 Perverse outcomes 
Perhaps not surprisingly in a University where rankings had been a major goal for a 
number of years, the topic of rankings was itself of considerable interest to senior 
managers in this study. While they were aware of the benefits at a pragmatic level for the 
institution, several had an intellectual interest, and amongst the Deans in particular an 
interest in the costs. The excerpts in in the text box overleaf illustrate the kinds of concerns 
raised by three of the four deans, with the fourth demonstrating a similar preoccupation by 
embarking on this thesis. 
There are three potential perverse outcomes that emerged from the interviews with Deans. 
They relate either to ‘things not done’ or to perceived gaps between the global rankings 
push and other strategic agendas. The most significant of the ‘things not done’ was the lack 
of focus on education, whether it be the quality of the curriculum, the quality of teaching, 
the recruitment and retention of staff with a strong teaching focus, or the student 
experience. 
One ‘gap’ was described in relation to the lack of connection between the broad 
educational strategic agenda of the university, and also to the global agenda (largely in the 
Australian context the attraction and retention of international students). The perceived 
‘gap’ between an internationally focussed research operational plan and a domestically 
focussed teaching operational plan by SM6 is an interesting insight (see text box overleaf), 
particularly in the context of a ‘gap’ between the research agenda and the University’s 
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international student market, although it is not clear from the transcript whether this is 
viewed as a tension or simply an anomaly.  
 
Views of the Deans on aspects of the rankings focus  
[I]t goes back to my understanding of institutionalisation which is that you create – the 
rankings have created the rules by which we know what we should be doing. 
[I Which informs what we should measure, which informs…?] 
Yes, so circular and reductionist, in terms of what it’s achieving for universities.  Every 
now and then we do step back and say, “What we’re about is improving the knowledge in 
the world and communicating that knowledge effectively.”  That’s what universities are 
about really, I think.  About the search the knowledge and then the communication of that 
knowledge.  That communication takes various forms from publication through to 
lectures through to students actually leaving the university with improved knowledge.  
The rankings don’t necessarily drive that very effectively.  As we know, they drive all 
sorts of perverse behaviour, there’s no question about that. SM5 I2 p.6. 
I wonder if there is an element about the whole rankings and the gaming of ranking 
metrics and the more instrumental leadership and management that those things seem to 
lead to.  I’m wondering if though, at the end of the day, that the rankings aren’t a bit like 
happiness, in that if you pursue them too directly they’ll evade you.  By that I’m not just 
trying to be clever, what I’m actually thinking is that sometimes, if we were to step back 
and just say, “How can we provide a better education experience?” and “What we do if 
we really wanted to do better research?”  In answering those questions we’d probably be 
just as effective or possibly more effective than saying, “The KPI is a student satisfaction 
rating of 80.”  I don’t know.  If we just wanted to – if we genuinely wanted to provide 
fantastic learning opportunities, or we genuinely wanted good research we’d be 
successful anyway, if enough of us did, both the academics and the leaders. SM7 I2 p.8. 
I actually don’t think we’ve actually developed a mission or a vision that gives us the 
edge when we’re trying to market and say we’re a destination of choice.  That may come 
as we climb up the international rankings, perhaps there’ll be something out of that, but I 
think the job of turning around the ranking and the research efforts to climb up the 
ranking hasn’t necessarily been articulated to support the global portfolio. SM6 p.5. 
…..So we all have, at the faculty level, an operational plan where the research targets 
that I have to achieve are not so much focused on national priorities, it’s not about 
getting an ERA 3, 4 or 5 in the operational plan that cascades out of the DVCR office, it’s 
more about ensuring the per FTE outputs are X, Y an Z and pushing us towards targets 
that will supposedly guarantee a higher ranking.  …  Again, it’s another interesting issue, 
in terms of the difference between that and the teaching portfolio because the teaching 
portfolio is all about national ranking, not international ranking.  So it’s all about 
QUILT, it’s all about the perception of the local understanding where we sit, in the 
scheme of things in this country, on the operational plan and the research one is all about 
how to get internationally ranked.  I’ve only just really thought that through as I’ve been 
speaking to you, that’s quite interesting isn’t it, an operational plan that’s domestic in 
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The other ‘gap’ in the strategic interconnections of the University of Canberra and indeed 
the wider university world was that between the pursuit of conventional research metrics 
and the growing Australian Government pre-occupation with research impact. One senior 
manager suggested that universities with a stronger focus on research with ‘impact on the 
Australian economy and society’ might reap considerable benefits in the future through 
increased attractiveness to students, higher student satisfaction and higher graduate 
employment outcomes. But if strong performance on policy or industry relevant research is 
positively connected to both the educational performance of institutions and the national 
research priorities of government, then the type of research metrics currently monitored by 
global rankings may be disconnected from both educational strategies and the research 
priorities of the future:  
I actually can’t understand how some universities will unravel the academic 
workforce they’ve spent 15 or 20 years building to be at the top of those 
rankings how they can actually unravel it to be entrepreneurial and to be 
actually kicking the goals the government wants them to in the national agenda.  
I think it’s going to be fascinating. SM6 p.12. 
It is difficult to argue on the basis of this one case study exploration that the University of 
Canberra’s push to enter the global rankings directly led, in a causal sense, to these kinds 
of perverse outcomes. The themes do emerge strongly from the interviews, and remain 
evident in discussions that reflect back over a period of several years. While it is certainly 
possible to address multiple agendas within one university, in the context of universities 
that are resource poor, it is almost inevitable that the pursuit of one set of goals will come 
at the expense of others.  
The central question of this thesis concerned universities that achieved rankings success 
‘against the odds’. Such universities are, almost be definition, resource poor, at least in a 
comparative sense. It seems likely, then, that these kinds of perverse outcomes can be 
expected in cases where there is a strong pursuit of international rankings success.  
7.5 Conclusions 
While Chapter 6 was concerned with the process and content of organisational change at 
the University of Canberra from 2007 to 2013, in this chapter the focus of attention was 
with why that organisational change led to rankings success, and what were the 
consequences for the organisation. This analysis is presented through the prism of the 
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senior management team at the University of Canberra, and the ways in which they viewed 
what worked, what did not work, what were the benefits and what were the costs.  
Building on the events of the period, a number of reasons for rankings success have been 
identified. These included strong leadership from the Vice-Chancellor and the senior 
executive team, the strategic planning and focussing of resources, particularly in relation to 
research, a strong external orientation and a high level of organisational aspect for risk and 
change. Some of these same factors can be detected as undercurrents in the senior 
managers views of what didn’t work, and the organisational costs that came with the 
University’s rankings success. The strong emphasis on research metrics, the narrow 
focusing of resources and the strategic pursuit of rankings success were associated with a 
failure to achieve significant advances in educational quality, and the undervaluing of 
teaching staff and the teaching agenda of the university. The commitment to creating an 
agile, commercial and change ready institutional environment, while viewed as something 
that worked, was also seen to have negative consequences, most particularly the 
inadequacy of the resource base to successfully implement a wide range of university 
agendas—going beyond agility to the so-called ‘addiction to change’.  
Other costs discussed in this chapter include the impact on intra-university relationships, 
and the way in which the pursuit of research performance as measured by rankings metrics 
may have contributed to a disjointed university strategic agenda, with gaps evident 
between the research and educational portfolios, the research and global portfolios, and the 
research strategy and the Australian Government’s increasingly emphasis on research 





Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter draws on the empirical findings presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, relating 
each in turn to the literature explored in Chapters 2 and 3. In 2012, this thesis began with a 
question as to whether ‘underdog’ universities could achieve significant success in moving 
up the global rankings, or if in the immortal words of Billie Holiday ‘ them that’s got shall 
have, them that’s not shall lose’. Over time, however, the question shifted, as I observed 
the upward movement of my own University, and began to investigate the emerging and 
unexpected success of a number of other Australian Universities. 
The focus of my research subsequently evolved to the three core questions set out in the 
Introduction to this thesis—exploring firstly the University of Canberra’s rankings 
performance, and that of other Australian universities, in the international context, 
secondly how the University of Canberra achieved a ‘turn around’ in its performance, and 
thirdly the consequences of that success for the organisation. These three questions were 
addressed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. In this chapter, those findings are linked back to the 
established literature on global rankings and higher education in the international and 
national context, on what constitutes successful universities in the contemporary world, on 
organisational change and on the ways in which universities change or seek to change to 
enhance their performance in a changing world.  
8.2 Understanding why Australia has done well in the 
global rankings 
The analyses presented in Chapter 5 demonstrated that Australia has done remarkably well 
in the global rankings ‘arms race’. This was demonstrated by the strong upward movement 
of universities in terms of their position in the global rankings, the number of ‘new entries’ 
and the relatively few instances where universities have fallen in the rankings or exited all 
together. Not only has the number of institutions increased over time, but their 
performance is improving. Relative to many other countries, Australia is indeed ‘gaining 
ground’. 
In Australia, the past decade has not seen a pattern of increased national investment in 
either the higher education sector as a whole or, as has been more common elsewhere, in 
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specific institutions (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Lim and Øerberg, 2017, Mok and Hallinger, 2013, 
Shattock, 2017). The major policy change in Australian higher education in recent years 
was the uncapping of university places to create a demand driven system. Partial 
uncapping commenced in 2010 and was followed by full de-regulation in 2012. Unlike the 
United Kingdom, however, fees for domestic students remained centrally regulated and fee 
increases have been minimal. Where public funding to the sector has increased, those 
increases have occurred in line with increased student numbers.  
Given the source of improved performance in the rankings is not increased public funding, 
then alternative explanations must rest with either unintentional or intentional activities by 
Australian universities that have led to improved rankings performance, or attributes that 
have benefitted Australian universities in the rankings relative to those in other countries. 
This in turn leads to questions of what attributes might have benefitted Australian 
universities, and why Australian universities may have been more strongly attuned to 
achieving improvements in the global rankings in comparison to countries such as the 
United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America. The possible explanations for 
the results presented in Chapter 5 are discussed in this section. These include the nature of 
the Australian university sector itself, a long-established international orientation, the 
absence of a strong internal rankings system, and the reliance of the sector on international 
student fee income.  
8.2.1 Policy changes in the Australian university sector 
The demand driven system and the unleashing of competition for domestic students 
Competition for domestic students is often about securing the highest performing entrants, 
but in some policy environments, such as that in Australia when the higher education caps 
were removed from 2012 to 2017, it can be driven by intense competition for market share. 
Prior to the implementation of the demand driven system in 2012, the number of places 
available to domestic students was tightly controlled by the Commonwealth government. 
The shift to demand driven funding meant the opportunity for growth in Commonwealth 
Supported Places, and consequently a much sought after opportunity to boost revenue in 
what had become a very tight fiscal environment as a consequence of declining per capita 
student funding (Noonan, 2015). This led directly to increased competition, both for 
student numbers and for high performing students. The results were immediately evident in 
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increased advertising expenditure targeting the domestic market, in gaming of entry 
requirements, and in increased student numbers, particularly in recruiting universities.  
From 2010 to 2018, the level of competitiveness among Australian universities for 
domestic students reached new heights. This competition operated at a variety of levels, 
not only for the number of students but also for the ‘best’ students. While ‘recruiting’ 
universities such as the University of Canberra, Charles Sturt University and Western 
Sydney University may have been competing for student numbers, ‘selecting’ universities 
such as the University of Melbourne and the Australian National University were pre-
occupied with maintaining high numbers of the highest performing students—reinforcing 
their claims to educate ‘the best and the brightest’. Reputation and brand management were 
key elements of the competition among Australian universities, and global rankings 
provided an easily accessible and seemingly ‘objective’ metric of the quality of a 
university’s educational performance.  
Curiously, the role of students, in terms of numbers and in terms of the quality of students, 
was not found to be a particularly strong theme in the review of literature relating to 
building successful universities or enhancing rankings success as discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3. While the ability of rankings to attract students is certainly discussed, the idea of 
attracting more students or higher quality as an institutional lever to enhance university 
success or rankings performance was not particularly evident, with Salmi (2009) and 
(Morphew et al., 2018) being exceptions. In Australia, the uncapping of student places led 
to a situation where attracting more students was directly related to more revenue, and 
indeed the only reliable source of substantial additional revenue available to universities in 
this period. And as is evident from the literature, a strengthened resource base is a critical 
element in the pursuit of improved performance (Altbach and Hazelkorn, 2017a, Clark, 
2004, Enders, 2014, Salmi, 2009, Shattock, 2003). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the globalisation and internationalisation of higher education 
brought in its wake increased competition among universities and enhanced attention to 
global rankings (Enders, 2004, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Lim and Øerberg, 2017, Shattock, 
2017). These trends were in play in Australia, but appear to have been magnified by a 
national policy context of a period of benign policy neglect of higher education 
accompanied by a tightening fiscal environment, followed by the opportunity for increased 
revenue as student places were uncapped. Thus the timing of the demand driven system 
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provided fertile ground for Australian universities to be early adopters, and active users, of 
international rankings systems to measure and promote their relative positions.  
Sector growth and competition for staff 
A straightforward corollary of the expansion of the Australian university sector under 
demand driven funding was the exacerbation of the already strong competition for high 
quality staff, both locally and internationally. The globalisation of higher education has led 
to greater mobility of academic staff and increased competition for high quality staff 
(Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Wildavsky, 2010). Australia has traditionally been a 
strong importer of university staff from overseas, at all levels and across a broad array of 
fields of education. It is evident in Australia’s strong performance in the global rankings on 
metrics relating to the proportion of international staff. It is also readily demonstrated at 
the most senior levels of the sector. In May 2018 only 21 of the 41 Vice-Chancellors of 
Australian universities were Australian, with the remaining 20 from overseas (most often 
but not exclusively from the United Kingdom. Of the 21 Australians, seven had either 
overseas postgraduate qualifications (usually from the UK) or had previously worked in 
the UK higher education sector (or both).  
In an environment of scarcity, global rankings provided a valuable marketing tool to attract 
high quality staff in both national and international recruitment activity. Those Australian 
universities without a claim to an international ranking were at a disadvantage in 
competing for high quality staff, and hence in their capacity to gain research funding and to 
attract the undergraduate and postgraduate students whose tuition fees provide the major 
revenue source for Australian universities. In a self-reinforcing if not necessarily virtuous 
circle, high quality staff are a necessary pre-requisite in order to achieve improved 
rankings performance (Clark, 2004, Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Salmi, 2009, 2011), 
and improved rankings were an important part of the strategy to attract high quality staff. 
Australian universities were quick to recognise the value of a strong global ranking in 
attracting high quality staff and students. 
Talent, whether it be students or staff, and resources, were recurrent themes in the review 
of literature presented in Chapter 2 and 3, concerning the key elements in creating world 
class universities and rankings performance.  
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8.2.2 Australia’s reliance on the international student market 
The Australian higher education sector is unusual in international terms in its degree of 
financial exposure to the international student market. International students fees have been 
used to cross-subsidise domestic students and research activity for decades, and with the 
government retaining tight control over domestics student numbers and fees, there were 
strong financial incentives for universities to increase their international student 
enrolments, with rapid growth in numbers from the second half of the 1980s (Adnett, 2010, 
Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Marginson et al., 2010, Zigarus, 2011). 
In 2016–17 international education activity contributed $28.6 billion to the Australian 
economy, with the vast majority related to international students studying and living in 
Australia. Education services is Australia’s largest services export industry and third 
largest export industry overall (Australian Government, 2017). While this is a testament to 
Australia’s success in recruiting international students, it is also an indicator of the 
university sector’s risk exposure to downward movements in the number of international 
students choosing to study in Australia. This risk has the potential for impacts at the level 
of the individual institution, as well as at the national and regional level.  
The past decade has seen increased competition for international students, partly due to 
financial constraints following the global financial crisis, and partly the emergence of a 
burgeoning higher education sector in South-East Asia (Altbach and Welch, 2011, Green 
and Ferguson, 2012, Mok, 2011, Yang and Welch, 2012). In the context of increased 
competition, it has become ever more important for Australia to ensure it continues to be 
an attractive destination for higher education students, and there is evidence that global 
rankings are increasingly important to international students (and their parents), and that 
this trend is particularly strong in Asia (the major source of Australia’s international 
students). There are also indications that the relationship between rankings and choice of 
university may be stronger in Australia than elsewhere (Hazelkorn, 2015b, Ch.4) 
Rankings position, then, goes to international student numbers, which in turn underpins the 
economic viability of Australian universities, and this dependency dates back to the 1990s. 
It is little wonder that Australian institutions were attuned not only to the rise of 
international rankings and their use by institutions and governments, but also to the shift in 
how international students gathered information on institutions, and hence the importance 
of rankings to their continued financial stability. 
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8.2.3 Something to prove 
Unlike their European counterparts, Australian universities were never built to be 
‘dreaming spires’, but rather to educate the professions needed by a growing settler society 
(Davis, 2017). There is no long-term history of internationally prized scholarship of the 
kind that characterises Oxford and Cambridge in the United Kingdom, or Harvard and 
Stanford in the USA. Australia has never been able to rely on recognition for its world 
leading institutions through long established reputational advantage. Whereas nations with 
more established credentials may indeed have viewed global rankings as ‘a visible 
challenge to their hitherto dominant position in the global geography of higher education 
and knowledge production’ (Hazelkorn, 2015b p. xi), for Australia it was seized upon 
remarkably quickly for its potential as a source of competitive advantage.  
As a relatively small country, with relatively young universities, the rise of global rankings 
provided Australian universities with a particular opportunity to make their claims known 
on the world stage, and a currency with which to substantiate those claims. In this, some of 
the drivers of Australian pre-occupation with global rankings are not unlike those ascribed 
to Chinese or other East Asian universities, in seeking to measure themselves, and assert 
their value, against a particularly strong tradition of excellence associated with the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Hazelkorn’s analysis (2015b) indicated that universities in 
Asia, the Middle East and Australia are the most focused on improving their rankings 
performance. 
While it is common for rankings analysts to use the metaphor of ‘the game’, there have 
been a small number of authors who use metaphors of elite sporting competitions to 
explain the appeal of rankings. Chapman and colleagues (2014) suggest that like the: 
 ‘performance of a national’s football team in an international competition… 
[t]he image of the whole country is based upon the perception of a few’. (cited 
in Hazelkorn, 2015b p. xi)   
Similarly, Yudkevich and colleagues have described parallels between rankings and the 
Olympics (2015).This sporting analogy may indeed be particularly apposite for Australia, 
which has a long-entrenched habit of basing its reputation in the sporting world on ‘batting 
above the odds’, regardless of whether the game in question is cricket, football, the 
Olympics or the Paralympics. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that the rise of global 
rankings was a phenomenon that was peculiarly tuned to the Australian psyche. 
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8.2.4 An international orientation 
Another consequence of Australia’s relatively small size and recent history is its strong 
international orientation. This is evident in the higher education sector but pervades other 
sectors of Australian society. Unlike the large scale dominant economies with whom 
Australia has historically sought alliances, whether in war or peace, industry or culture, 
Australia has a small internal market and, aided by its multicultural pattern of immigration, 
a remarkably cosmopolitan world view. Where a country the size of the United States of 
America can easily afford parochialism, Australia cannot. One consequence can be an 
undervaluing of the local (sometimes referred to colloquially as cultural cringe). Another, 
however, is an openness to international engagement and international trends.  
Like Canada, Australia is a settler society, with strong cultural connections linking back to 
a variety of ‘home countries’. Unlike Canada, Australia is geographically isolated in terms 
of nearby English speaking developed economies with advanced higher education systems. 
It is not surprising, then, that Australian academics have traditionally oriented themselves 
to the United Kingdom and the United States of America in particular, as well as to a range 
of European educational powerhouses. Australian academics have always sought to spend 
sabbatical programmes overseas, and international conferences and publications attract a 
far greater premium in reputational advantage than do national ones. This is simply not the 
case in a country with a large scale higher education system such as the United States.  
This pattern is evidenced by Australian universities’ strong performance on the various 
international engagement metrics than underpin one vector on the leading global ranking 
methodologies. The use of internationalisation metrics is not without its critics, as is the 
advantage in conveys to countries like the UK and Australia (Marginson, 2007). 
Historically, this is not so much an example of a metric driving behaviour, but rather one 
of a metric matching a pre-existing orientation, and hence providing a competitive 
advantage for Australian universities. However, while it may not have been metrics-led, it 
is certainly an area where an underlying competitive advantage has been recognised and 
built upon as individual universities devise strategies to improve their rankings 
performance. 
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8.2.5 Absence of a strong internal ranking 
The United Kingdom and the United States have had a long tradition of reliance on 
national league tables. In the United Kingdom it was the Times/Sunday Times, Complete 
and The Guardian (Horseman, 2018) and in the United States, the USNWR. These were 
heavily used by prospective students for decision-making, and by universities in their 
marketing, both to prospective students and their own internal student body, to reinforce 
the value of their degrees (and presumably in turn to maximise the university’s 
achievements in terms of graduate satisfaction on graduate surveys). In 2014, the U.S. 
News saw a possibility of increasing the interest of the American public in global rankings 
by producing a ‘home grown’ version (Redden, 2014). 
In Australia, the only similar system was the Good Universities Guide, which was a rating 
rather than a ranking system, and by no means as well used or as well regarded (although 
universities were certainly willing to succumb to the lure of being able to place ‘5 star’ 
ratings on their websites if they had achieved them). The Good Universities Guide was a 
monopoly provider, and a useful source of information on course availability for 
prospective students, but there is no evidence that it was heavily relied upon by students to 
determine the educational quality of an institution. The absence of a strong internal 
university ranking system in Australia made the adoption of the global rankings a much 
more natural evolution. The choice between advertising one’s institution as either ‘having 
five stars in the Australian Good Universities Guide for graduate employment or good 
teaching’ or as ‘ranked in the top 100 universities internationally’ is not a difficult one to 
make for a marketing department. By 2012, when students and staff in the United 
Kingdom and the United States were still much more familiar with national rankings 
systems, Australia had already turned its attention to the international rankings. 
8.3 A time of change 
The second core question addressed in this thesis was ‘how did the University of Canberra 
achieve a turnaround in its performance?’ In the period prior to 2007, the University was 
an organisation in decline, as was evident across multiple metrics, including student load, 
educational quality, research output and quality, financial status and staff morale and 
engagement.  
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Despite the evidence of decline, documentary analysis suggested that the University’s 
leaders were either unaware of the problems they faced or else unwilling to engage with 
them. There was a narrative of positive performance that was in direct contradiction to 
available metrics. This reluctance to recognise problems and denial of the need for change 
resonates with Davies (2001) description of the pre-entrepreneurial culture. 
In the material that follows, the case study is initially tested against Nadler and Tushman’s 
‘principles of effective frame-bending’. The discussion reveals a high level of agreement 
between those principles and the evidence, often further re-inforced by consistency with 
the themes on successful universities that emerged from the higher education literature. It 
also identifies a number of elements that ‘go beyond frame-bending’, resonating much 
more strongly with the higher education literature. These elements are discussed in Section 
8.3.2.  
8.3.1 Frame-bending 
The arrival of a new Vice-Chancellor in March 2007 began a process of change which 
resonates with a number of elements in the organisational change literature, including 
those described by Nadler and Tushman (1989) in their ‘principles of effective frame-
bending’. This was particularly true of the three principles under the rubric of ‘initiating 
change’. 
In relation to the first principle, the early documents show that the new Vice-Chancellor 
had already completed an analysis of internal strengths and weaknesses at the time of 
commencement, and that the process of internal analysis continued in the months that 
followed, as indicated by the financial scrutiny that led to the discovery of substantial 
errors in the 2007 University Budget, and the establishment of a task specific committee to 
review the curriculum. By 2008, there was a growing focus on the external context, 
evidence of the continuing appraisal of external challenges as recommended by Nadler 
and Tushman (1989). Examples included awareness of the potential threat of government 
intervention on financial grounds, the concern that some universities may be designated as 
‘teaching only’ and the opportunities and threats posed by the uncapping of domestic 
Commonwealth Supported Places. But at the University of Canberra, the emphasis on and 
responsiveness to the external environment went beyond analysis in ways that resonated 
strongly with the recommendations of higher education analysts such as Clark (2004), 
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Davies (2001), Etzkowitz (2003) and Shattock (2003). This is discussed further later in the 
chapter.  
Nadler and Tushman’s(1989) second principle of initiating change, creating a sense of 
urgency to build momentum for change is consistent with the work of change management 
gurus such as Kanter (Kanter et al., 1992) and Kotter (1996) although not emphasised in 
the literature on building successful universities or achieving rankings success. The case 
study provides ample evidence of how this sense of urgency was established from the very 
first week, consistently built upon over the coming months and years, and was a quite 
deliberate ploy, as summed up in the words of the Vice-Chancellor himself—‘never let a 
good crisis go to waste’. 
Nadler and Tushman’s (1989) third principle of initiating change required the 
establishment of a clear vision, associated values, performance objectives, rationale, 
organisational structure or processes and operating style. This principle aligns strongly 
with the work of Davies (2001), Marshall (2007a), Salmi (2009, 2011) and Shattock (2003) 
who describe the importance of a bold vision, a clearly articulated strategic plan, concrete 
goals and target and the setting of stretch goals in building high performing universities.  
The case study shows that work on the vision began in 2007 with the development of a 
new strategic plan for the University. The 2008–2012 Strategic Plan set out a bold vision, 
underpinned by 39 specific objectives, including clear public statements on metrics such as 
performing in the top third of universities on educational measures by 2012, and being an 
‘internationally recognised’ institution by 2018. The importance of the University’s vision 
was also evident in the carefully constructed and repeated twin messaging combining the 
urgency of the need for change with the potential for the organisation to achieve strong 
performance in the future. Changes to organisational structures and processes were also set 
in play, with a leaner administration, simplified management structure and a clear 
distinction between advisory and decision-making groups. 
This consistent messaging—dealing with financial difficulties, improving administrative 
efficiency, focusing on core business and moving in a positive direction—aligns with 
Nadler and Tushman’s (1989) two principles of ‘change content’ which emphasised a 
focus on the core strategic issues of the organisation and sticking to a limited number of 
major themes in articulating the nature of the change. While the focus on core strategic 
issues does resonate with the role of a clearly articulated strategic plan as described by 
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Davies (2001), Marshall (2007a), Salmi (2009, 2011) and Shattock (2003), the aspect that 
relates to sticking to a limited number of themes is not present in the higher education 
literature. And while the experience at the University of Canberra did show the 
concentrated focus described above in the early years, in the latter years the focus 
expanded to emphasise the rankings aspirations, to drive toward a variety of partnership 
activities and in addition a focus on campus development strategies, suggesting a more 
diversified and potentially diluted approach.  
The first of Nadler and Tushman’s (1989) two principles for ‘leading change’ is that of the 
magic leader, and leadership is similarly seen as important by higher education scholars, 
particularly in relation to building high performing and entrepreneurial institutions (Clark, 
2001, 2004, Davies, 2001, Marshall, 2007a, Salmi, 2009, Shattock, 2003). There is a great 
deal of material in the case study that demonstrates the role of the Vice-Chancellor in 
relation to creating a vision for the University, as well as creating a sense of urgency to 
build a platform for change, and tenacity in sticking to key themes, with the latter element 
being closely attuned to Marshall’s concluding piece of advice to managers of change in 
higher education—‘Hold your nerve!’(2007a, p.16). Nadler and Tushman (1989) also 
described the role of the leader in energising an organisation through high standards of 
personal behaviour, energy and commitment, an aspect that was well demonstrated by the 
senior manager who commented on the Vice-Chancellor’s ‘high energy, high commitment, 
strategic vision’.  
The final element of the magic leader, the ability to use a mix of management styles 
(Nadler and Tushman, 1989), is evident in the case study, with different strategies being 
employed in different areas (e.g. the Vice-Chancellor led the strategic planning process in 
2007 in a top-down approach, but set up a task-specific committee on curriculum reform 
where he participated but did not lead). The importance of matching the right leadership 
style to the right situation at the right time was also emphasised by Davies (2001). Overall, 
however, as a great deal of change was driven from the top, the evidence suggests a 
directive style of leadership, albeit one ameliorated by a substantial amount of consultation 
through regular formal meetings (such as the weekly Vice-Chancellor’s Group), informal 
meetings (such as the weekly ‘Dean’s breakfast’) and one-off specific events. 
There was a strongly held view among senior managers that the Vice-Chancellor’s 
leadership was critical to the advancement of the University, and this view was present 
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even where senior managers disagreed with a specific direction or a specific decision. 
Perhaps the strongest area of agreement related to strategic capacity, and the ability to read 
and respond to both opportunities and risks in the changing external environment.  
This close linkage between effective leadership and change resonates with the emphasis 
placed on leadership by Middlehurst (1995), but also on the importance of adaption to the 
external environment evident in Davies’ (1987) early work on entrepreneurial universities. 
The case study of change at the University of Canberra and its upward movement through 
the rankings also co-incidentally substantiates Shattock’s (2017) recent argument that 
University Vice-Chancellors do not generally have sufficient time to create significant 
rankings improvements. While the incoming Vice-Chancellor’s first five-year term saw 
substantial change and renewal, rankings improvements only began to appear during his 
second term, and strengthened after his departure. 
The second principle of ‘leading change’, broadening of the leadership base into executive 
management and beyond, (Nadler and Tushman, 1989) occupies similar ground to the 
strengthened steering core set out in the seminal work by Clark (2001, 2004) and Davies 
(1987, 2001) on the entrepreneurial university, and by Shattock (2003) as an important 
element in managing for success. The case study suggests this was not a priority in the 
initial 12 months, but gained ground in subsequent years with the recruitment of a new 
leadership team. The establishment of a major leadership role for Faculty Deans from 
2009, including their membership of the Vice-Chancellor’s Group (VCG), and their 
financial autonomy and accountability, is a key example, as was the authority given to the 
newly appointed Deputy Vice-Chancellor Research from 2010 in setting the University’s 
research strategy. The push of financial and performance accountability out beyond the 
Deputy Vice-Chancellors to the Deans is consistent with the recommendations put forward 
by Shattock (2003, Ch.4,5) and with emerging trends suggested by De Boer and colleagues 
at that time (De Boer and Goedegebuure, 2009, De Boer et al., 2010). These strategies 
illustrate the development of a strengthened steering core and a broadened leadership base, 
moving out through the Deputy Vice-Chancellor level to include the Deans. The extent to 
which this extended further, permeating into the academic heartland as suggested in the 
higher education literature (Clark, 2004, Davies, 2001), is discussed later in this chapter. 
The final set of Nadler and Tushman’s (1989) principles relate to ‘achieving change’. 
There is certainly evidence of combining careful planning with opportunism in the case 
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study, well exemplified by the senior manager who used the analogy of driving a car to 
describe the strategic vision ‘moving to the left or right’ depending on what was needed. 
The world of the 21st century university, however, is one where agility and the capacity to 
deal with change are required to be more part of the standard institutional response than the 
occasional opportunistic foray (Etzkowitz, 2003, Etzkowitz and Viale, 2010). The role of 
agility and appetite for change is emphasised more heavily in the higher education 
literature, and is therefore discussed further in the next section. 
The higher education literature has much less in common with Nadler and Tushman’s 
(1989) second principle of ‘achieving change’, the ‘many bullets’ principle of motivating 
and initiating change at many levels and in many ways. The quantity and variety of change 
at the University of Canberra reflects the ‘many bullets’ principle, and the use of the 
extended leadership team to drive change goes to the issue of many levels, as does the 
implementation of an increasingly rigorous annual performance review cycle, and clearly 
documented individual performance expectations aligned with faculty and university level 
Key Performance Indicators. Similarly, the emergence of a series of strategies all driving 
toward the same end-point of enhanced University rankings and improved performance on 
specific metrics (education, student load, financial stability, diversification of revenue 
sources or research performance) is consistent with this principal.  
Nadler and Tushman’s (1989) final principle of ‘achieving change’ emphasises the 
significant investment of resources, including senior managers’ time, over the long term, 
and the ongoing need for organisational motivation. The motivational message concerning 
the ongoing need for change was articulated strongly and consistently by the Vice-
Chancellor to the University community. This ‘burning platform’ scenario was also 
communicated effectively to Council and to senior managers, who in turn adopted the 
requirement for change and adaption to the external environment as part of their own 
messaging. Despite the context of successive waves of change, momentum was 
nonetheless maintained. As early successes occurred, staff morale and engagement 
eventually started to show improvement as suggested by the results of the 2011 Voice 
Survey. 
The adequacy of resource investment is an area where the University struggled. While the 
strengthened steering core recognised the role of senior management time in the process of 
change management, the investment of significant resources was hampered, initially by the 
Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusions 
230  
straightened financial circumstances of the University, and over time by the amount and 
pace of change relative to available resources. This shortfall is evident in the comments of 
senior managers on the high demands that were placed on them, and on the lack of 
resources, as well as in the concerns of staff in relation to workload and work-life balance. 
The role of adequate resourcing in pursing improved rankings and a more successful 
university is a key theme in the higher education literature, and one addressed further in the 
following section.  
8.3.2 Beyond ‘frame-bending’ 
The ten principles of frame-bending put forward by Nadler and Tushman (1989) frequently 
overlap and intertwine with the ‘eight common themes’ (Figure 3.2) identified in the 
higher education literature on rankings and successful universities. The differences are 
generally to do with perspective and emphasis, but some are more dissimilar than others. 
The higher education literature had less emphasis on certain aspects of Nadler and 
Tushman’s principles that related to more managerial aspects, including building a sense of 
urgency, the ‘many bullets’ principle, and investment in management time and resources. 
The corollary was the five common themes that emerged strongly from the higher 
education literature and resonate with the findings from the case study, but were somewhat 
less present in the principles of frame-bending—these related to financial resources, human 
resources, the external orientation, agility and change, and the permeation of change 
through to the academic heartland.  
An emphasis on financial resources 
Many aspects of the change process at the University Canberra were heavily driven by a 
focus on managing financial resources, the importance of which emerges more strongly 
from the literature on higher education than it does from the framework put forward by 
Nadler and Tushman (1989). In the early years, financial management at the University of 
Canberra was particularly focused on containing costs through administrative efficiencies 
and careful financial management, consistent with Shattock’s (2003) work on turning 
around failure in the university context.  
As the financial circumstances of the University improved, attention turned to redirecting 
and refocusing financial resources toward selected areas of research activity as well as to 
expanding the resource base of the institution. These strategies are closely aligned to the 
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rankings literature and that on entrepreneurial and world class universities (Altbach and 
Hazelkorn, 2017a, Clark, 2004, Edgar and Geare, 2013, Enders, 2014, Froumin and 
Platonova, 2017, Salmi, 2009, 2011). Growing revenue by growing student load was an 
early and ongoing stream of activity, relatively traditional in nature, and with a strong 
narrative that the University was ‘sub-scale’ by Australian standards. From 2011, there was 
a flurry of more innovative activity aimed at growing student load relating to partnerships 
across sectors and across geographic regions, as well as attempts to diversify revenue 
streams through shorter term commercial opportunities such as the privatisation of student 
residences as well as the more ambitious long term project of campus development with its 
associated legislative and political challenges. 
An emphasis on the external environment 
At the University of Canberra, the emphasis on the external environment went well beyond 
the appraisal of external threats (Nadler and Tushman, 1989) to focus on exploring 
opportunities, high levels of engagement and the development of a wide array of active 
partnership agreements. This activity is consistent with the practice of external engagement 
described by higher education scholars such as Clark (2004), Davies (2001), Etzkowitz 
(2003) and Shattock (2003) in relation to the rise of the entrepreneurial university. This 
aspect of the case study also demonstrates the interplay between the content and process of 
change and the external context described by Pettigrew (1997) in his processual model of 
change.  
The threats (of government intervention due to poor financial results and the possible 
creation of teaching only universities) drove an emphasis on financial management and 
improved research performance in the content of change, while the opportunities (the 
uncapping of places) drove the strong pursuit of increased critical mass and institutional 
partnerships.  
The high level of external engagement resulted in a number of significant benefits for the 
University, but was also characterised by some less successful components. The successes 
included a turnaround in the way in which the University was perceived by external 
stakeholders, at the national level but particularly in the local region. The improved 
reputation undoubtedly contributed to and indeed enabled a number of the University’s 
achievements. Other elements intended to further enhance and build external commercial 
partnerships, most particularly those related to campus development, lagged behind.  
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By 2011, there was evidence of a further stage of external engagement which went beyond 
that described in the higher education literature reviewed in this thesis. These were the 
efforts to actively re-create the external context of the University of Canberra, rather than 
simply engaging with it. The most successful was the example of securing buy-in from 
competitor universities, local government and local industry to the idea of Canberra as a 
‘university town’, and the subsequent marketing of Canberra in that light both nationally 
and internationally. Examples of less successful attempts include the various partnership 
attempts, most particularly those involving the creation of new forms of connecting 
vocational and university education.  
The academic heartland 
While the principles of frame-bending include broadening the leadership base into senior 
management and beyond (Nadler and Tushman, 1989), the higher education literature on 
the entrepreneurial university goes further to emphasise the stimulated academic heartland, 
the importance of permeating ideas around change throughout the entire organisation, and 
the value of organisation coherence (Clark, 2004, Davies, 2001, Pinheiro and Stensaker, 
2014, Shattock, 2003, 2017, Thoenig and Paradeise, 2016, 2018). 
The evidence for this from the case study is mixed. There was, for example, a great deal of 
emphasis on communication and consistent messaging, initially and perhaps most strongly 
by the Vice-Chancellor, but over time picked up and echoed by the senior management 
team. These communications included a variety of public forums, external as well internal 
ones, through media releases and internal documents, and in written as well as oral form. 
There was also the intriguing use of repeated forms such as the mind map in oral 
presentation. The core messages were initially limited in number, following Nadler and 
Tushman’s (1989) ‘three theme principle’, although they evolved over time. So, for 
example, while administrative simplification and cost-saving were core messages in the 
first year, the performance on teaching quality came in from 2008, and the emphasis on 
research performance followed.  
On the basis of the biennial Voice Survey data, a significant uptake in staff engagement 
and commitment occurred in 2011, with staff being markedly more positive about the 
institution’s direction and leadership. At the same time, the process of Academic Renewal 
was starting to bite, with the emphasis on research performance now underpinned by an 
increasingly stringent annual performance review cycle. New appointments targeting 
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research performance, combined with exits through the early retirement scheme and 
contract terminations, meant that not only were people being asked to focus on a new kind 
of work, but there were also an increasing proportion of new people. The vision of the 
University as research active and upwardly mobile was inevitably accepted by some, but 
not by others, as was indicated in the views of senior managers. In this thesis, the 
perceptions of staff were explored only in relation to Voice Survey data, rather than 
through primary data collection, limiting the extent to which this aspect of organisational 
change can be addressed.  
The pace of change. 
Toward the end of the study period, the pace and scope of change appeared to accelerate. 
Moving far away from the ‘pre-entrepreneurial’ state described by Davies (2001) and an 
uncannily accurate depiction of the University of Canberra in 2007, the University became 
a progressively more agile institution, although opinions may have diverged as to whether 
it was ‘change ready’, ‘change addicted’ or ‘change weary’. A strong theme emerging 
from the higher education literature was the importance of agility—the ability to respond 
quickly and flexibly to changes in the external environment, and indeed to embrace 
change, as well as the willingness to experiment and to take risks (Clark, 2004, Davies, 
2001, Etzkowitz, 2003, Etzkowitz and Viale, 2010, Shattock, 2003). Senior managers at 
the University of Canberra were well aware of the importance of reading and responding to 
the external environment. The case study events reveal a pattern of change and response to 
the external environment, as well as a considerable degree of creativity, as evidenced by 
the three attempts to re-create the organisation with enhanced critical mass (the ‘regional 
strategy’, the CIT merger and the Australian Polytechnic Network).  
The importance of the ability to learn collectively from experience, also emphasised by 
Davies (2001), was described by one senior manager as a specific strength of the 
University. This aspect was not raised by others, but it is in the nature of largely 
unstructured interviews that the same ideas are not repeated. On the other hand, the failure 
to engage with areas of persistent weakness, as highlighted by the widespread concerns 
around university processes and central financial planning and reporting, suggest that the 
organisation’s capacity to learn from experience, while present in some areas, may well 
have been an area of weakness overall. The level of agility of the organisation, the sheer 
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volume of change, and the shortage of resources, may have combined to constrain the 
extent to which collective learning from experience could occur. 
Human resources 
The importance of human resources, and more specifically high quality academics (and 
high performing researchers) is a very strong element in the higher education literature on 
enhanced institutional performance (Clark, 2004, Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b, 
Marginson and van der Wende, 2007, Salmi, 2009, 2011). While much effort goes into 
recruitment and retention of high performing staff in the world of universities, it was not 
one of the principles of frame-bending (Nadler and Tushman, 1989), although arguably it 
is part of the fourfold typology of the people, the work, the informal organisation and the 
formal organisation that underpins Nadler and Tushman’s work (1997). Nonetheless, this 
seems to be a particularly clear point of divergence between the organisational and higher 
education literatures, and perhaps not surprisingly so given the unusual reliance on a 
collective of ‘individuals of excellence’ that underpins organisational success in the world 
of higher education.  
From 2009, there were a series of change strategies in place targeting academic staff, 
primarily to attract high quality researchers to the University, but also to push existing staff 
to improve their research performance. The Assistant Professors scheme, the Centenary 
Professors scheme and the rigorous implementation of annual performance reviews with 
clear research metrics all contributed to major changes in the human capital available to the 
University. This involved recruitment and retention, but also the departure of those staff 
who did not meet the new requirements. It was aptly summarised by the Vice-Chancellor’s 
reference to the ‘sad fact [that] after you’ve done what you can, if you want to change an 
institution you’ve got to change the people’   
Other themes from the higher education literature 
In addition to the strong themes discussed above, several ‘other themes’ were also 
identified in Chapter 3. While perhaps not as consistently mentioned, they were 
nonetheless noteworthy. These other themes are briefly reviewed here. 
The first was a competitive and ambitious approach (Clark, 2004, Shattock, 2003). 
Initially more noticeable for its absence at the University of Canberra, competition and 
ambition were deliberately nurtured by both the Vice-Chancellor and the Deputy Vice-
Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusions 
235  
Chancellor Research. Mentioned by both during their interviews, it was also evident in the 
near constant re-iteration of performance metrics comparing the University to others in the 
Australian sector at regular events like the Vice-Chancellor’s forums, and in the targets set 
in the Strategic Plans. Indeed, the rankings target (being in the top 100 under 50) is perhaps 
the quintessential example of this. Internally, too, there was an encouragement of ambition 
but also competition, particularly among the Faculties, with separate reporting and public 
internal comparisons very much part of the standard process. The consequences, 
particularly in relation to internal competition, are discussed later in the chapter. 
Internationalisation is recognised as an important consideration (Gunn and Mintrom, 2013, 
Mok and Hallinger, 2013) and is certainly an important matter for Australian universities, 
particularly in relation to international students (Marginson et al., 2010). Although there 
was some activity, including strategic overseas visits and a modification of English 
language entry requirements, it was not identified by senior managers as a major 
identifiable initiative. International student numbers did rise at the University, turning 
around the decline experienced from 2004 and significantly surpassing that number.  
The partnerships in major capital cities, core to the APN strategy, was viewed as an 
important vehicle to build international student numbers. While international numbers did 
rise, the partnership exposed the University to a disproportionately high number of high 
risk students leading to an impact on the University’s risk rating in the longer term. In 
general, of course, Australian universities do quite well on internationalisation metrics as 
they relate to rankings, and the University of Canberra was no exception. But even in terms 
of data submissions, international metrics were not a priority, with, for example, data 
relating to numbers of international staff not consistently collected, which almost certainly 
led to under-reporting.  
Marketing and branding (Espeland and Sauder, 2007, Marginson, 2007, Shattock, 2003) 
were at the forefront of University planning from 2007, and although resource-constrained 
compared to larger universities were carefully targeted to emphasise the local region or 
specific initiatives. Marketing the University was taken seriously by the Vice-Chancellor, 
and at his direction by the senior management team; marketing was everyone’s 
responsibility, and not only the realm of the marketing department.  
Mergers and acquisitions (Salmi, 2009, Shattock, 2017) also appear in the description of 
strategic change at the University of Canberra. Although unsupported by the external 
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policy environment, the University embarked on negotiation processes involving 
partnerships that came very close to ‘merging’ certain streams of business in the case of 
the attempted construction of the Australian Polytechnic Network, and what was in effect a 
planned merger with the University as a dominant partner in relation to the Canberra 
Institute of Technology.  
The role of good quality data (Bekhradnia, 2016, Espeland and Sauder, 2007, Locke et al., 
2008) in enhancing rankings performance, promoting a successful university and managing 
a successful university was certainly recognised at the University of Canberra. Some 
improvements, such as that to capture the proportion of staff with PhDs, and improved 
inclusion by staff of their institutional affiliation in research publications, were deliberately 
pursued. Others, such as staff-student ratios, and reporting of international staff, did not 
attract any specific strategies.  
Finally, educational quality was largely absent as a strategy to improve a university’s 
standing in the literature on establishing successful universities and achieving improved 
global ranking. In a sense it was noteworthy for its absence rather than its presence, 
although it was frequently mentioned as a potential casualty of the pursuit of rankings 
success. There were exceptions. Salmi (2009) and Morphew and colleagues (2018) both 
reference the importance of high quality students, and the latter also references educational 
offerings as a key element of strategic planning in North American institutions.  
At the University of Canberra there were a series of reforms aimed at improving education 
performance. Being in the top one third of Australian institutions on educational quality 
metrics was a key plank in the 2008–12 Strategic Plan, and teaching performance metrics 
were clearly specified in the staff performance reviews. There were significant 
improvements in the period up until 2010, but little improvement in the years that 
followed. Despite the inclusion of education as well as research goals and metrics, senior 
managers felt that research had been prioritised over teaching at the University, and that 
the resulting imbalance needed to be addressed. 
8.4 Change and consequence 
In the preceding discussion, a number of elements that proved effective in achieving a 
‘turn around’ of the University of Canberra were identified, placing the case study material 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7 in the context of the literature on global rankings and the 
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building of successful universities reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3.The ‘things that worked’ 
at the University of Canberra included a number of the principles of ‘frame-bending’ 
described by Nadler and Tushman (1989), in addition to the themes that emerged from 
analysis of the higher education literature (Figure 3.2). In this section, the discussion 
moves on from this second core question of the thesis (how did the University of Canberra 
achieve a turnaround in its performance?’) to the third and final question—'what were the 
consequences for the organisation?’ 
Inevitably there is a degree of overlap, and this is most particularly the case in relation to 
benefits and positive outcomes. For this reason, this final part of the discussion explores 
the costs of organisational change, some of which could have been predicted from the 
literature reviewed earlier in the thesis, and some of which were more unexpected 
consequences. The more easily predicted elements were the imbalance between teaching 
and research, the impact of an inadequate resource base, and perhaps increased internal 
competition, while the less easily predicted were the addiction to change, the problems 
posed by administrative process and the intriguing issue of the message conveyed by the 
metrics themselves. 
8.4.1 The imbalance between teaching and research 
The case study material generated unanimous agreement that the pursuit of improved 
rankings had led to the prioritisation of research performance over the educational mission. 
Opinions varied as to whether this had been a necessary consequence. Some senior 
managers laid the blame less on the research strategy, and more on the absence of strategic 
focus in the educational portfolio. Others noted not only the shortfall of resources needed 
for educational functions, but also the absence of investment in elite leaders in education, 
in contrast to the investment in elite researchers. Some senior managers also suggested that 
both energy and resources had been siphoned away from education as a result of major 
initiatives such as campus development. There were also views that the educational 
portfolio did not lend itself to the narrowly focused approach that enables a university to 
boost its research metrics, that in fact the educational mission of a university was both 
larger and more complex than the research agenda.  
The consequences for the educational mission of the University of Canberra are consistent 
with the early predictions of authors such as Hazelkorn (2007, 2011) and Marginson and 
van der Wende (2007), as well as more recent analyses (Pizarro Milian, 2017, Shattock, 
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2017). These authors suggested that the research focus of the metrics underpinning global 
rankings had the potential to distract from not only the resources allocated to teaching, but 
also the value associated with it. 
Faculty Deans certainly took the view that resources had been diverted from the 
educational mission. The second component relating to value was also evident, with 
limited opportunities for promotion or even continued employment for capable or more 
than capable teaching staff who could not meet the required level of research performance. 
Deans described the resulting challenges in maintaining the teaching functions that were 
the lifeblood of the University’s financial well-being. These consequences for staff, where 
research is ‘what counts’ and teaching is a sideline, were described by Altbach and 
Hazelkorn (2017a), Hazelkorn (2007, 2015b) and Marginson and Van der Wende (2007). 
Hazelkorn also pointed to the potential negative consequences for morale, and while staff 
were not interviewed in this study, the comments of senior managers suggest this was a 
consequence, with examples including the loss of good staff from the institution. For those 
who chose to stay, the perceived ‘pressure of work’ in meeting research performance 
metrics as well as teaching and service obligations described by Leisyte and colleagues 
(2009) was evident in both the comments made by senior managers and the proportion of 
unfavourable responses by academic staff in the Voice Survey iitems relating to workload 
and ‘work-life balance.  
Issues of morale have typically been considered from the perspective of individual staff, 
but the evidence in the case study also points to a ‘second order’ consequence at the 
organisational level of increased rates of staff ‘churn’. The cost was generally recognised, 
and indeed seen as acceptable, even necessary, by some, but for the Deans charged with 
delivery of the University’s curriculum it was an area of concern. The case study illustrates 
the role of the Deans in managing the tension between strategic directions and operational 
requirements (Shattock, 2003, De Boer and Goedegebuure, 2009, De Boer et al., 2010), 
exacerbated in this instance by the environment of sustained and significant organisational 
change.  
8.4.2 The adequacy of the resource base 
The adequacy of the resource base was an important driver of the tensions that arose 
between educational mission and research performance at the University of Canberra, as 
well as between the educational mission and the major projects relating to partnerships and 
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campus development. While the dire financial circumstances facing the University in 2007 
were largely resolved by 2009, the resource environment remained constrained. In 
interview after interview, across a wide array of topics from research performance to 
teaching quality, university processes, external engagement, partnership projects and 
campus development, the impact of insufficient resources was a strongly held concern, and 
a key factor in describing why objectives were not met, why work pressures were too high, 
and why the tensions between competing priorities became problematic and eventually 
divisive.  
This result is consistent with the emphasis placed on an adequate resource base in the 
higher education literature (Altbach and Hazelkorn, 2017b, Clark, 2004, Edgar and Geare, 
2013, Enders, 2014, Froumin and Platonova, 2017, Salmi, 2009, Salmi, 2011, Shattock, 
2003). The University of Canberra example demonstrates most aspects described by these 
authors, including careful financial management, an emphasis on financial accountability, 
the focusing of resources on key research areas and an increased funding base. From the 
perspective of senior management, there was an increased resource base but it was not a 
sufficient resource base. The increased student numbers had provided incremental 
increases in revenue, but the efforts to gain a more substantial shift through educational 
and commercial partnerships had proved largely unsuccessful. 
8.4.3 Competition  
The combination of a strong change agenda and a constrained resource environment 
inevitably led to the tensions described above between the educational mission and 
research performance and between the educational mission and its commercial endeavours. 
Another organisational tension was the consistent push to reduce the proportion of 
professional staff, to create a leaner administration, in order to free up further resources for 
academic pursuits. As increasing proportions of research funding were progressively 
directed to the identified areas of strategic research focus, so too did resentment develop 
within the organisation among faculties and between disciplines who felt that they were 
being disadvantaged. Not surprisingly, a number of these tensions took organisational 
forms, including the loss of trust between the professional areas of the University and the 
Faculties described in Chapter 7.  
The history of the University of Canberra had been one that placed a high value on a sense 
of community, consistent with its history as a high performing College of Advanced 
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Education. Staff knew what was expected of them, and there had been a sense of comfort, 
rather than one of ambition and competition. The journey of change at the University led to 
a much more competitive internal environment, and one where the mutually supportive 
informal relationships described by Clark (2004) and Davies (2001) as desirable hallmarks 
of the entrepreneurial university were declining. 
Yet the increased internal competition was not without its checks and balances. Effective 
teamwork or strongly performing teams were raised in most interviews as an important 
factor in the University’s success. But the language around team work was equivocal, and 
the senior management structures, both formal and informal, formed a spiderweb of 
communication and influence through and around the Vice-Chancellor as described in 
Chapter 7. The evidence suggests on the one hand an emphasis on communication, 
cohesion and organisational capacity (Davies, 2001, Clark, 2004, Marshall, 2007a, 
Thoenig and Paradeise, 2016) while on the other hand the subtle emergence of different 
coteries of senior managers, creating space for both competition and the pursuit of separate 
agendas.  
8.4.4 Addicted to change 
The pace and scope of change described in the case study is impressive, particularly for a 
small and relatively poorly resourced institution. The senior management team appreciated 
the value of a strong appetite for change and a high level of competence in managing 
change, and they were also confident that staff were at the very least amenable to change. 
The consistent messaging within the institution had not only built as sense of urgency 
around the need for change, but also sustained it in the longer term. The University of 
Canberra had transitioned from a change averse organisation to one that was change adept. 
While becoming alert and responsive to changes in the external environment is generally 
regarded as a positive attribute (Clark, 2004, Etzkowitz, 2003, Nadler and Tushman, 1989, 
Shattock, 2003), some senior managers suggested that the leadership team may have 
become ‘addicted to change’, taking this aspect of organisational robustness to an extreme 
level which was not beneficial to the organisation. The negative implications were largely 
around the impact of insufficient time and inadequate human and financial resources on the 
ability to implement successive, and indeed overlapping waves, of initiatives. This was 
about much more than the stress placed on staff and managers. 
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There was concern about the quality of implementation, and significant emphasis was 
placed on the failure to think through the consequences of some of the major change 
initiatives. There was also the suggestion that each wave of change tended to become 
‘institutionalised’, being adopted as part of the mainstream work of the organisation and no 
longer subjected to critical scrutiny. This was variously described as too many good ideas, 
too many directions, too much willingness to experiment and too high an appetite for risk. 
These were all signs that the University may, in fact, have become ‘too entrepreneurial’ for 
its own good. While ambition is an important attribute for a successful university 
(Shattock, 2003), this case study suggests the salience of balancing ambition, caution and 
capacity.   
An inevitable corollary of this situation of many change initiatives was that inadequate 
resources were available for critical assessment of change initiatives, for the assessment 
and management of risk, and the ability to learn collectively from experience, a key 
attribute of the entrepreneurial university set out by Davies (2001), was impaired. The 
principle of a limited number of major themes (Nadler and Tushman’s (1989) ‘rule of 
three’) had not necessarily been breached, but the number of projects associated with each 
broad theme had certainly proliferated. As the number of frontiers of change increased, it is 
plausible that the impact of the ‘many bullets’ was weakened by being scattered across a 
number of fronts. Leadership and strategy were strong, but the more pedestrian elements of 
project management appear to have attracted inadequate attention.  
8.4.5 The problem of process 
The problem of poor administrative processes within the University was much discussed 
but never resolved. The reform of operational management was one of the key failures in 
the turnaround that occurred at the University during the study period. This had 
consequences for staff and management morale, but also impeded progress across change 
agendas in research, education, infrastructure, facilities and in campus development. While 
the essential role of financial management and good governance are widely recognised in 
the higher education literature (Clark, 2004, Salmi, 2009, Shattock, 2003, 2006), the 
underbelly of university administrative processes appears to have received limited 
attention.  
At the University of Canberra, the large scale structural administrative reforms of 2007–08 
were successfully implemented, but the processes themselves proved more resistant to 
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change. There were improvements, but staff and management alike remained dissatisfied. 
Key processes, such as the admission of students to the University, remained problematic. 
While one senior manager attributed this to a lack of leadership by the Vice-Chancellor, he 
was also quick to note ‘he couldn’t do everything’. In the interviews, while all managers 
complained about a variety of problems, there were none who took ownership of any. 
Attempts to bring about change were sporadic at best, and as indicated by the example of 
‘Services Committee’, lacked the required authority and resourcing. Stephanie Marshall’s 
(2007b) valuable collection on leading change in higher education contains one chapter on 
process improvement, and in that chapter Evans (2007) firmly sets out the importance of 
both ownership by senior managers and a co-ordinated approach (a ‘diagonal slice’) across 
the organisation.  
These elements were not present at the University of Canberra, suggesting administrative 
process reform was not a sufficient priority. Quality improvement in administrative 
processes in higher education, rather than quality improvement in education processes, 
may well be an important and under-estimated area of University performance.  
8.4.6 The metrics are the message 
In a University where the change process was driven by and measured against a clear set of 
performance metrics, it would not be surprising if the metrics themselves became the 
dominant message. Certainly, the rankings goal to be one the top 100 universities under 50 
years of age, set as a target that was very much perceived to be a stretch goal externally but 
known to be achievable by a small internal coterie of executive staff, demonstrated the role 
of metrics as an organisational lever for strategic change (Enders, 2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b) 
as well as a change objective. 
At the University of Canberra, global rankings were an external manifestation of the 
internal focus on performance metrics. Senior managers were remarkably well informed on 
the nature and degree of alignment between internal metrics and global rankings, and on 
the explicit strategies that had been developed to drive behaviour at both the organisational 
and individual levels. Individual performance expectations were aligned to University Key 
Performance Indicators, and they in turn aligned to global rankings measures. As Enders 
(2014) and Hazelkorn (2015b) suggested, the goal of improved rankings performance 
helped to define the University as an organisation, as well as serving as a policy lever to 
drive its behaviour.  
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The alignment of internal research metrics (and the associated strategies) were widely 
regarded as a crucial factor in the University’s rankings success. Metrics were, however, 
also blamed for the lack of success in improving educational quality. This went beyond the 
previously discussed arguments that global rankings emphasise research metrics to the 
potential detriment of teaching, to the subject of educational metrics within the University 
itself. There was an argument put that the absence of well accepted teaching quality 
metrics was in itself a problem, in the sense that what could not be easily measured did not 
matter, an organisational level echo of Hazelkorn’s (2015b) argument in relation to global 
rankings and the absence of internationally comparable teaching metrics. 
The extent to which metrics, whether internal or external, drove the strategic directions of 
the University of Canberra is a particularly vital consideration. Enders’ (2014, p.16) 
warning about the ‘seductive and coercive power’ of rankings resonates just as well with 
other performance metrics, such as Key Performance Indicators. While lacking the elegant 
simplicity of a solitary metric, it is likely that the uncritical pursuit of Key Performance 
Indicators also has the potential to lead an organisation away from original strategic 
intentions. To paraphrase one of the interviewees in the study, the pursuit of metrics may 
be like the pursuit of happiness, that is if pursued too directly metrics (or happiness) will 
prove evasive. 
Several senior managers at the University of Canberra reflected on the way in which a 
focus on metrics (whether Key Performance Indicators or global rankings) supported a 
vision or mission of creating a better University. There were those who questioned whether 
the University would have done just as well in terms of its core business without its pre-
occupation with metrics, and those who questioned whether it might in fact have done 
better. This perspective was associated with an emphasis on the value of ‘stepping back’ to 
look at the broader mission of a university in the contemporary world, rather than a 
wholesale rejection of metrics themselves. 
At the same time, it should be recognised that the University of Canberra’s strategic 
directions were not only aligned to research performance on metrics relevant to global 
rankings, explicitly taking account of the University’s traditional strengths and research 
quality, exemplified by reference to the internationally recognised poetry program. It is 
also the case that the national research quality exercise (ERA) provided an alternative set 
of metrics in which areas like the poetry programme could be recognised, suggesting that 
Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusions 
244  
the limited work to date on the interface between national research assessment and global 
rankings (Edgar and Geare, 2013) may be worthy of further investigation.  
Apart from research, the rapid and expansive model of change occurring at the University 
speaks to the emphasis on a broader strategic mission. In the process of change described 
in Chapter 6, and the analysis of change that forms the backbone of Chapter 7, it is 
possible to identify three intertwined streams of activity. One of these reflects many of the 
elements described in the literature on entrepreneurial and successful universities, another 
the pursuit of strategies directly oriented to enhanced rankings performance, and a third a 
set of activities to do with driving organisational change. The case study demonstrates a 
change agenda that was targeting a change in the very nature of the organisation as well as 
in the metrics that measured its performance. Rankings proved to be an effective device in 
that change process, but it seems that the senior management team of the University did 
manage to avoid the very real risk of ‘ideological capture’ by the rankings game (Enders, 
2014, Hazelkorn, 2015b, Marginson, 2009, Sheil, 2012). 
Over half a century ago, Marshall McLuhan coined the evocative and enduring phrase—
‘the medium is the message’. He wrote:  
The medium is the message because it is the medium that shapes and controls 
the scale and form of human association and action. The content or uses of 
such media are as diverse as they are ineffectual in shaping the form of human 
association. Indeed, it is only too typical that the “content” of any medium 
blinds us to the character of the medium.(McLuhan, 1964, p.9)  
This complex construction that takes account of the way in which the form of the 
‘medium’ actually invades and alters the nature of the message, and the message in turn the 
nature of the medium, has some uncanny resonances with the way in which metrics and 
rankings in higher education have the capacity to alter and interact with both the perception 
and pursuit of broader strategic directions. It is well to be warned of the risks in being blind 
to the character of the medium. 
8.5 Conclusions 
This thesis has traversed a broad path, beginning with a general question concerning the 
impact of the rise of global rankings on the university sector, becoming progressively more 
defined as the focus shifted to the actions and responses of individual institutions in 
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relation to global rankings, before settling on the topic of how universities could achieve 
gains in the international rankings ‘against the odds’. 
The journey was informed by a deepening understanding of the relevant literature, as well 
as by the evolution of practice in the higher education sector over the past decade. My 
work placed me amidst that field of practice in the Australian higher education sector, 
while my study at the University of Bath exposed me to a broad array of international 
perspectives from my teachers and my fellow students. I became intrigued by the contrast 
between the relatively strong level of interest with global rankings in the Australian higher 
education sector and the much weaker level of interest in the United Kingdom, Canada, the 
United States and Ireland. In 2012, when I started to explore this area as a possible thesis 
topic, staff and students alike were more often puzzled by my interest than anything else. 
Times have certainly moved on. 
While the quantitative analysis of global rankings provided important context for the 
research questions addressed in this thesis, it was the case study of the upwardly mobile 
University of Canberra that enabled me to explore the nature and consequences of 
organisational change and the pursuit of improved rankings performance. In the process of 
completing this aspect of the research project, I became increasingly aware of the 
relevance of my role as an insider researcher. From the beginning of the journey, I had 
recognised the dangers of my own preconceptions influencing the research results. This 
was particularly the case given my position as Dean, as a member of the senior 
management team reporting directly to the Vice Chancellor, and as a relatively long 
serving member of the University. My strategies to mitigate the risk of producing a 
research narrative unduly influenced by my own inside knowledge included the 
incorporation of detailed documentary analysis from several sources and undertaking 
multiple iterations through the interview data, testing for alternative perspectives to those 
that had emerged in the previous stage of the analysis. 
As discussed in chapter 4, no matter how careful the self-scrutiny, the insider researcher 
nevertheless remains part of the research process. While cognisant of the risks, in 
completing this thesis I learnt more about the benefits. Indeed, this research project is 
perhaps inextricably linked to my position as an insider researcher. My role within my own 
institution, together with my experience as a student at University of Bath, strongly 
influenced the nature of my research questions. Being an insider researcher influenced 
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access to individuals and to documentary resources and drew on already existing trust 
relationships within the senior management team in ways that I had not fully appreciated at 
the commencement of the research. My planned strategies had been more focused on the 
data analysis stage than on the process of data collection and access. In the process of the 
interviews, I developed strategies such as active notetaking and adjusting the position of 
the tape recorder to remind respondents that this was a research process and not a 
conversation between colleagues. 
I went into the research process aware of the importance of reflexivity in qualitative 
research. As an insider researcher, however, this project required critical self-reflection in 
relation to research design, the data collection process and data analysis, as well as 
consideration of the way in which these three elements interacted. This awareness needed 
to extend not only to what was written, but also to potential areas of enquiry that were 
essentially precluded from the study by the need to balance insider and outsider 
perspectives, with the most obvious example being the exploration of faculty-based 
differences. This research project revealed multiple ways in which the researcher remains 
present throughout the research endeavour. 
In this concluding section of the thesis, attention is first directed toward a summary of the 
key findings, followed by an appraisal of the contribution the thesis offers to the current 
literature. The final section provides an overview of the methodology and its limitations. 
8.5.1 The research question and the response 
This thesis commenced with three core questions, concerning the ability of ‘underdog’ 
universities to move up the global rankings, the strategies by which it might be 
accomplished, and the consequences of such an achievement. In building a theoretical and 
empirical scaffold for that project, it proved necessary to traverse three intersecting but 
nonetheless distinct sets of literature. The first was the literature on the higher education 
system and global rankings, the second was the literature on successful, world-class and 
entrepreneurial universities, and the third that on aspects of organisational change. The 
three empirical chapters of this thesis successively presented an internationally located 
analysis of Australian universities’ performance in the global rankings, a case study of one 
such successful university, and an analysis of that success and its consequences. 
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Australia has done remarkably well in the global rankings ‘arms race’. The analysis 
presented in Chapter 5 showed that not only had the University of Canberra moved up the 
rankings tables, but so too had many other Australian universities. The Australian 
performance can be documented in terms of changes in aggregate counts over time, but 
emerges more positively when the trajectory of individual institutions are taken into 
account. The international comparisons revealed that Australia is not alone in this pattern, 
and several other countries, including China, South Korea, and Germany, have also done 
well in the global rankings game. Unlike these countries, however, Australian universities 
have not benefitted from an injection of government resources to boost their standing and 
enhance rankings performance.  
Drawing together these empirical results with the relevant literature, five inter-related 
explanations were put forward for the success of Australian universities. The first of these 
was the nature of the Australian university sector itself, and the changes that were 
occurring over the past decade. The policy shift to demand driven funding led to intense 
competition among universities for domestic students. This included competition for the 
‘best students’ as well as for market share, which meant that reputation and brand 
management were of particular importance at this time. Global rankings offered an easily 
accessible and seemingly objective metric of quality as well as relative standing. While 
elsewhere the globalisation of higher education was bringing greater levels of competition 
and enhanced attention to global rankings in its wake, the trends appear to have been 
intensified in Australia as the result of a tightening fiscal environment, and the opportunity 
for increased student revenue offered by the uncapping of student places after a period of 
restrictive government controls. And as the universities grew under demand driven 
funding, so too did the already strong competition for high quality staff intensify. Again, 
global rankings were a valuable marketing tool in the competition to recruit and retain well 
qualified staff.  
A second characteristic that differentiates the Australian higher education sector is its 
reliance on and degree of financial exposure to the international student market. The past 
decade has seen increased competition for international students from other countries, 
partly due to financial constraints following the global financial crisis of 2007–08, and 
partly the burgeoning higher education sector in South-East Asia. Global rankings have 
become increasingly influential in student-decision-making, and particularly so in Asia, the 
major source of Australia’s international students.  
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Thirdly, as a small settler society Australia has always had a strong international 
orientation, a trait which is also true of the higher education sector. That international 
orientation has led to high levels of international recruitment and high levels of 
participation in international research partnerships. These patterns have enabled Australian 
universities to perform comparatively well on the international metrics that form part of 
global rankings scales. The fourth and likely related factor was Australian universities are 
relatively young in world terms, and cannot rely on recognition through long-established 
reputation in the way that Oxford or Harvard can. Global rankings provided Australia with 
an opportunity to measure performance against ‘the world’s best’, and it is not surprising it 
was quickly seized. And fifth, the national ranking system in Australia had none of the 
prestige and influence of the UNSWR in the United States or the Times Higher Education 
in the UK. It was ripe for replacement. 
If these five factors were influential in the readiness with which Australian universities in 
general adopted global rankings, they were perhaps even more in evidence at the 
University of Canberra, and further leveraged by the fact that the University had fallen into 
a pattern of decline. The case study provided the opportunity to examine in detail how a 
particular Australian university could interact with this set of national circumstances to 
achieve a turn-around in performance and achieve its global rankings aspirations.  
The case study of the University of Canberra demonstrates the value of a number of 
elements drawn from literature on successful and entrepreneurial universities in achieving 
an effective turn-around of a university on a downward spiral. In addition, many of the 
principles of ‘frame-bending’ (Nadler and Tushman, 1989) were evident in instigating and 
sustaining the process of change. The ‘things that worked’ included the role of a highly 
effective leader, a strong senior management team, building and maintaining a sense of 
urgency around the need for change, consistency in messaging regarding the content and 
direction of change, a clearly articulated strategic plan connected to specific goals and 
performance metrics, a firm grasp of the organisation’s strengths and weaknesses, and 
informed appraisal of the external environment. There was a degree of emphasis on the 
creation of a high energy environment, of the importance of tenacity in bringing about 
change, and the progressive creation of an agile and change ready institution. 
There were also aspects of change that proved to be less successful, or at least of mixed 
success. These included the adequacy of the resource base, the pace and quantum of 
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change, the pursuit of a commercial agenda, improved educational performance and the 
administrative capacity of the University.  
In the final section of the thesis, attention turned to the organisational consequences of the 
pursuit of improved rankings. There was evidence in the case study of consequences that 
were discussed as probable or potential issues in the literature, including the creation of an 
imbalance between teaching and research, negative implications for morale, and the 
creation of a degree of internal competition. The literature also emphasised the importance 
of an adequate resource base in order to achieve rankings success, while the case study 
demonstrates the corollary—some of the potential consequences of achieving rankings 
success in the absence of an adequate resource base. This led in one sense to increased 
internal competition between, for example, research areas and the faculties, and in another 
to a loss of organisational cohesion, as indicated by the lack of trust between academic and 
professional areas of the University. 
One of the consequences not predicted by the literature review was the ‘addiction to 
change’ among senior managers, and the consequent presence of multiple change agendas, 
bringing with it inherent difficulties in effective implementation. Another was the 
consequence of insufficient attention to internal administrative processes, an area which is 
apparently as unattractive to academics exploring change and success in the University 
sector as it was to the senior managers at the case study institution. 
Finally, there are some intriguing considerations of the way in which metrics, including but 
not limited to global rankings, can serve as both a lever and a goal in the pursuit of 
strategic directions. As the use of metrics to set goals and push particular strategic 
endeavours grows in frequency, so to does the likelihood that the metric itself will become 
‘the message’, altering not only behaviour but the nature of the strategy itself.  
8.5.2 The contribution of the research 
This thesis sits at the juncture of the higher education literature on global rankings, the 
higher education literature on successful and entrepreneurial universities, and the literature 
on organisational change. It is this location at the intersection of different ways of 
exploring the world that underlies much of the potential for contribution to the literature, 
but it is nonetheless a location that proved to be a challenging one. What is common 
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knowledge in one field is not well explored in the other, and visa versa. The perspectives 
and frames differ, but sometimes blur and sometimes coincide.  
A personal major insight that emerged from this research endeavour was the realisation 
that my initial linear logic of inquiry, moving downward from the global to the national 
and then to the institutional level, did not ‘work’ as a way of organising my literature 
review. I had failed to appreciate the extent to which the frame of reference for the 
literature focussed at the national and global levels would not only shape the nature of the 
debates and the results of the analyses, but also create a kind of ‘conceptual silence’ in the 
literature on higher education institutions and rankings from the perspective of the 
individual organisation. Fumasoli and Stensaker’s (2013) historical analysis was critical to 
enabling me to understand both the power, and the attraction, of a dominant paradigm. 
This thesis is hardly of the order of work to challenge dominant paradigms or redress the 
imbalance described by Fumasoli and Stensaker. What it may do is provide a modest 
contribution to the higher education literature concerning the complex reality of a 
university during a period of change from the perspective of a university manager. 
The contribution to the higher education literature on change 
There are relatively few case studies of change in universities over a prolonged period of 
time, and even fewer that are associated with a substantial turn around in the fortunes of a 
university. However, this detailed case study of a University undergoing substantial change 
over a seven-year period is not a unique offering. It might more properly be described as a 
contribution to a relatively scant field.  
The detailed case study analysis provides insight into the kinds of levers available to an 
individual institution, the way in which those levers resonate with the relevant literature, 
and the consequences of a period of prolonged organisation ‘changing’. It brings forward 
some ideas that do not appear standard in the higher education literature, including the 
implications of significant organisational change in the absence of the required ‘adequate 
resources’, the notion of ‘addiction to change’ among senior managers, and the possibility 
that the administrative underbelly of universities, while lacking in glamour, may be both 
under-explored and important.  
It is a study of ‘rankings success’ against the odds, and simultaneously something of a 
cautionary tale. As such, it provides a testing ground for a number of attributes that have 
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been associated with ‘successful universities’, some consideration of the consequences of 
rankings success, and a reflection on the potential power of metrics themselves.  
The contribution to the rankings literature 
The analyses presented provide a detailed analysis of how Australian universities are 
performing in two leading global rankings and one leading ‘young universities’ ranking. In 
doing so, it goes beyond the more common single year comparisons, or aggregate 
‘headcounts’ at two different points in time to explore the trajectories of individual 
universities. This analysis was then extended to include international comparisons, with an 
analysis of trends spanning fourteen countries across the three rankings scales. It is the first 
comparison of its kind of the performance of Australian universities in international 
context. 
On the basis of the analysis, several explanations have been posited for the comparatively 
successful performance of Australian universities. While the advantage bestowed on 
Australian universities by a strong performance on various international metrics has been 
noted elsewhere, the explanations offered range more widely, incorporating several other 
characteristics of the Australian higher education sector, and drawing attention to the 
potential for interactions between national policies and global trends. 
The innovative method developed to support these analyses compressed a large quantity of 
data points while remaining close to the original form, enabling the incorporation of 
intuitive assessment as a strategy to take account of uncertainty and identify distinguishing 
trends. The method was developed based on an iterative process of detailed inspection of 
these data over time across multiple countries and within several rankings systems. This 
approach enables the systematic review of individual institutional trajectories within 
national contexts over time and is a potentially valuable tool in understanding what is 
happening in the world of international rankings at the institutional and the national levels 
alike. 
Directions for future research 
Inevitably, in the case of a single case study, questions arise as to the extent to which the 
findings presented here would be similar to or different from those in other institutions. 
Further detailed longitudinal case studies of universities that are undergoing significant 
change, especially if there is a turn-around in their fortunes, is therefore an attractive next 
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step for future research. A multiple case study design would go further, addressing the 
weaknesses inherent in a single case study approach. Cross national comparisons taking 
into account different national contexts and policy events may offer fertile ground for the 
understanding of the interface between the university as an organisation and its national 
milieu.  
There are also three areas that emerged from the study which may be fruitful topics for 
further investigation. The first of these is the important but seemingly inevitably inelegant 
administrative underbelly of universities, and the way in which processes, including the 
reform of processes, supports or impedes the pursuit of academic excellence. The second is 
at the interface between the strategies that offer success in national research excellence 
exercises, and those that might prove effective in pursuit of global rankings success. The 
third is to do with the kind of ‘conceptual silence’ in the literature on higher education 
institutions and rankings from the perspective of individual organisations and from the 
perspective of their managers.  
8.5.3 The methodology and the limitations 
The methodology employed in this thesis drew on a mixed methods approach, combining 
the analysis of quantitative time series data on global rankings with a detailed seven-year 
case study of my own institution, the University of Canberra. The case study was based on 
unstructured interviews with the senior management team, document analysis of all 
Council Minutes, on-line University media, press releases and Annual Reports for the 
period 2007–2013, and a compilation of detailed performance metrics employed in and by 
the University over that period of time. The Minutes of Academic Board and recordings of 
the Vice Chancellors Staff Forums were selectively reviewed for purposes of 
corroboration. 
The analysis of quantitative global rankings data enabled the rankings performance of the 
University of Canberra to be placed in national and international context. The case study 
design allowed the research process to focus on the subject of the inquiry (universities that 
succeed in the global rankings ‘game’), to take account of context, and to explore the 
interaction of the content, process and external context of change as well as its 
consequences. The combination of quantitative metrics with qualitative data within the 
case study reinforced the narrative of the ‘turnaround’ that occurred at the University of 
Canberra during this period. This mixed methods approach served the inquiry well, as did 
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the adoption of pragmatism as the guiding research paradigm. The qualitative components 
of the design allowed for an inductive approach whereby the research led to the generation 
of findings relevant to our understanding of the strategies that universities employ in a 
globally competitive environment. The combination of a pragmatic paradigm with a mixed 
methods approach also allowed the research methodology to evolve with the research 
questions, including the increased emphasis on detailed documentary analysis to better 
inform the shift from ‘whether’ an underdog university could move up the rankings, to a 
closer investigation of ‘how’ it had been achieved.  
The major limitations of the methodological approach are as follows. First, the constraints 
of resources and time that are part of a doctoral dissertation led to the adoption of a single 
case study approach. Multiple case studies would have provided more opportunity to 
develop and test hypotheses, and to generalise from the results. Second, the qualitative 
interviews were used to explore the views of the senior management team. The inclusion 
of interviews with staff at other levels of the University would have provided valuable 
additional perspectives, but again were beyond what could be accomplished with the 
constraints of resources and time.  
Third, while the position of an insider researcher brought with it benefits such as access 
and inside knowledge, it also brought the challenge of establishing a narrative that was not 
unduly influenced by my own pre-conceptions. While I took steps to reduce this influence, 
including the incorporation of a detailed documentary analysis and multiple iterations 
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Preamble: The University of Canberra has been very successful in moving up the global rankings over the past 5 years. Rankings are only one indicator of a successful university, and in some I am using rankings as a research device – it serves as an outcome measure for the study. I am interested in your views on the way that the University has been able to bring about such positive changes in a competitive national and global environment. 
1. Thinking back, what do you see as the main factors that have contributed to the University’s success? 
Interviewer’s note: possible areas to explore (but not all to be covered in any single interview) include internal aspects ( strategic planning; leadership and senior staff; resources and resource allocation; academic recruitment strategies; organisational change; research; teaching and learning) and external aspects (higher education funding and policy; internationalisation; external stakeholders or industry partners; the local community; philanthropy.) 
2. Was there any specific planning around rankings, or did that largely ‘just happen’? 
3. What were some of the challenges the University encountered over the past 5 years?  
4. Were there things the University tried that simply didn’t work? What happened? 
5. Were there things the University has identified that it wants to ‘stay the same’?  
6. Communicating ideas about change from the leadership through the organisation is not always easy – particularly in universities - how did that happen here? 
7. What do you see as the University of Canberra’s key strengths in 2016? Weaknesses? How do you see things changing by 2020?  
8. There are some ongoing debates in higher education that recur in the literature on university performance in rankings. I am interested in your views on any that interest you in the context of our interview today: 
 The ‘tension’ between teaching and research 
 The third space-the idea that the separation of academic and professional staff roles is eroding – and that this will make universities more ‘professional’ organisations. 
 The entrepreneurial university debate (or the triple helix) the increasing importance of the interplay between government, universities and industry. 
 Rankings and increased regulation of the sector have led to improved data collection and analysis by universities, benefitting planning and management. 
 In a competitive environment, a ‘strengthened steering core’ and a more managerial model is essential for university success. 
 Investment in academic performance requires a leaner administration – examples from my own university include outsourcing IT, payroll, admissions and recruitment functions. 
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Appendix 4A.2 Sample interview transcript 
Q Thinking back, what do you see as the main factors that contributed to the 
University of Canberra’s success over the past five years or so? 
A Leadership, focus and investment are the three factors.  I don’t think any of these 
things are possible without an element of luck.  I don’t mean that in any way to 
diminish the other three because I think the other three were significant.  In the 
absence of the other three it’s hard to see how luck would have improved us in 
the rankings to the extent that we have, but luck is a factor as well.  In fact, I’d 
like to categorise them differently, I’d like to say that there are internal and 
external factors.  Is that the next question, is it? 
Q No, they’re just my prompts. Internal and external are my prompts.   
A Sorry. 
Q No, not at all, it’s just the way I categorised them and that’s why… 
A So the internal factors are leadership, purpose or focus or strategy and then an 
investment.  The external factors are the behaviours of other universities, 
changes to the way the ranking systems have worked and some serendipity about 
some universities dropping out - getting to their 51st birthday and a little bit of 
luck and good timing.  So do you want me to unpack those? 
Q Yes, I’d love you to. 
A So the leadership one, I think we would say - I mean the obvious thing is the vice 
chancellor’s leadership but I think that the vice chancellor’s leadership also 
meant that, to a large extent, the vice chancellor was able to select people and to 
put them into roles where they would be - he was able to select a leadership team.  
I think part of the thing that happened that’s now causing a little bit of an 
unintended consequence is that people tended to be tasked with things outside 
of their straight job, based on what he perceived as their capacity.  So different 
people would - I think there was a very deliberate strategy around leadership 
depth and the extent to which a person was fit for purpose.  I won’t go into 
examples, you would know more than I do, but I do think, for all of us, he’s 
given us different jobs.  When I say “us” I’m talking about the VCG groups, so 
not just the DVCs or vice presidents, but the deans as well.  I think some of the 
academic structures we’ve got exist not for academic reasons but largely for the 
leadership capacity or whose got a bit of band width or whatever.  So XXXX 
was very careful about the resource management.   
 But specifically in the rankings, we’ve gone up in the rankings, I think, in 
relation to our research performance, our teaching performance and the extent to 
which we’re internationalised.  Not that all of those carry an equal weight, but I 
think there have been dramatic and planned improvements in each of those three 
areas.   
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Q Just thinking about that planning,  what do you mean by “planning”? 
A So it’s a deliberate plan or strategic planning.  The strategic plan was that we 
would be well ranked and they just worked backwards from the strategic plan, 
the breakthrough plan to enter the university rankings.  Got the former deputy 
vice chancellor of research from XXXXX, wherever it was, that guy who went 
through and compared our performance, on a range of research and other 
metrics, and from that was able to extrapolate - was able to identify where we 
were on those measures and where we needed to get to.  Then that filtered across 
to everything from faculty and research institute performance requirements 
through to individual PEAS for professors and others.  So there was the explicit 
mapping of indicators and how we were going to get there.  I think there was a 
holistic approach that then took on structures, investment, PEAS, HR, 
performance review and all those things.  So there was a consistent message, we 
were all on message about what we were trying to achieve. 
 The other part of the strategic plan was a centenary professor’s strategy, which 
I think has been a mixed success.  I don’t think it’s been universally successful 
but it’s clearly been successful to the extent that we bought back catalogues.  The 
extent to which it’s been successful prospectively, I’m not sure.  I mean not sure, 
I’m not questioning that it won’t be, I’m just not sure that it will be because what 
I think we’ve done with that plan is - I think there’s a gap now, in terms of how 
we develop talent and our only strategy seems to be the assistant professor PDR, 
increasingly explicit PEAS.  So I don’t think we’re really developing, in any 
deep way, the organisational capacity.  We are developing capacity but in any 
deep and significant meaningful way I don’t think we’re developing it.   
 Why?  Well, because what I see and [….] that as a result of the other challenge 
the university faced, and that is to be financially sustainable, the amount of 
money that’s available for faculties, as a percentage of their budget, has meant 
that the number of continuing academic staff has gone down dramatically and 
that we’re using now more teaching focused and sessional staff and have fewer 
continuing staff.  I do think that some of the fundamental structural problems 
with the academic programs, [….] have not been addressed.  The distribution 
and dispersion of effort across different academic areas are not being focused 
enough.  I don’t think we’re focused enough on our academic structure and 
organisation. 
 […] I’ll use the IT example, and there are many in the university.  There’s a 
current discussion about cyber security, that effects three different areas of the 
university.  So there’s Centre for Internet Security, which is semi-related to the 
university which is staffed by lawyers.  There’s information systems in BGL and 
there’s IT and engineering in the STEM.  So it’s a real challenge to quality 
assurance when these things are dispersed that way and they are dispersed that 
way for pragmatic and accidental reasons, not by design.  So I think there are 
some fundamental things about improving the overall quality and sustainability 
of our areas of academic activity that haven’t been focused on and that is how 
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do we develop our assistant professors and the next group of people coming 
through and how do we address some of these fundamental structural problems 
that seem to be incredibly persistent. 
Q Would you say that was consistent across teaching and research?  The example 
you’ve given me is actually a research example, with cyber security. 
A Well, we’re developing a course in that at the moment.  I don’t think the research 
one is - sorry, I cut you off. 
Q It’s not a way I thought about this, but as I listen to you talking the examples that 
are coming to my mind, the issues are largely along the educational axis of the 
university and less along the research specific axis of the university.  You raised 
this question in my head .. 
A I think the problems exist in research as well. 
Q You’ve got a convincing narrative that’s about lack of focus.  You, yourself, 
chose focus as one of the reasons for success. 
A No, there’s a focus on some of the research KPIs as part of the reason.   
Q So, as a researcher, this is, of course, an interesting question.   
A I’m not convinced, from an academic leadership point of view, that a strategic 
plan or a management - that research performance is as directly an outcome or 
consequence of deliberate management strategies, because as an education it is 
more manageable.  Because, fundamentally, it is up to individuals and their own 
areas of intellectual interest.  Now, you can moderate that and you can manage 
that through incentives.  I think there are different areas of academic activity to 
be able to influence. 
Q That’s an interesting way of thinking about it.   
A You have fewer levers with research.  Is there enough of a focus?  Well, I don’t 
think - let me put it another way.  Are we focused on research?  We’re a lot more 
focused in research and knowing what we stand for and having five clear areas 
identified in all of that, absolutely far more focused and that’s one of the key 
reasons why we’ve been successful in improving the rankings to the extent that 
the ranking improvement is about research and it’s, to a large extent, about that. 
 Is the focus right?  Are we as focused as we could be?  Is the job done?  No, no 
and no.  Of course we could be more focused, of course it could be more 
effective, of course we could take into account the latest data and recalibrate our 
focus, but I don’t see that as a fundamental problem or an overly critical position, 
I think that just makes sense.   
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 I often do just a little thought experiment, I think about what would it be like if 
, instead of organising the university - to some extent the university is organised 
around traditional academic traditions and to other extents it’s organised around 
field of practice.  So what would the - this is what I think about - what would 
research programs looked like if we did it around traditional disciplines?  
Because it seems to me there’s a potential overlap between IGPA and the Health 
Research Institute because they’re both, to varying extent, applying social 
science methodologies.  Public health policy, government policy and aspect of 
the biomedical sciences health research and sports sciences and even, arguably, 
forensics, to the extent that has a research program, and applied ecology are all 
applied science.  You could structure it around a social sciences group, an SBE, 
your sciences.  You could cluster your research groupings around field for 
research codes or even higher levels of abstraction.  There’d be pluses and 
minuses.  I think we’ve got things in really good shape but there’s still room for 
more refinement. 
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Appendix 4A.3 Samples of coding 
Appendix 4A3 consists of three sample documents from each  of the three main coding 
stages. 
4A.3a Sample of contemporaneous note-taking strategy for preliminary coding  
Although the interviews were voice recorded and transcribed in full, notes were also taken 
during the interviews as a kind of contemporaneous preliminary analysis, identifying key 
points from the perspective of the respondents, further questions suggested by their 
responses, points that challenged my own thinking (and therefore helped identify pre-
conceptions). These were then marked up in the preliminary stage of transcript analysis. 
4A.3b Sample of original transcript with high level themes and sub-themes  
The interview transcripts were coded at the high level of Outer Context (OC), Inner 
Context (IC), Process (P) and Content (C) of change, and then sub themes (e.g. leadership, 
competition, international, research, education) were identified and coded working across 
the preliminary notes from the interviews (see 4A.3a above), the marked up transcripts 
(4A.3b), and the combined primary code documents (see example in 4A.3.c below) in an 
iterative process. 
4A.3c Sample of primary code document theme and sub theme level for : ‘External Context’ 
The third stage involved compilation of four high level theme-based documents, and coded 
by subtheme. This sample relates to External Content. 
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4A.3a Sample of use of contemporaneous note-taking strategy for preliminary coding  
 




































4A.3c Example of primary code document theme and sub theme level for Outer Context  
Interviews coded: SM5 1&2, SM6, SM7  1&2, SM2, SM4 1 &2, SM9, SM10, SM1, SM3 1&2, SM11, 
SM8 
 
Please note content material under each sub-theme has been truncated in sections containing 
more than 500 words. This is indicated by the term [coding material truncated at this point].  
International 
I think that the broad environment in which tertiary education is developing in Australia is quite 
healthy.  It has its challenges but I think that there is a sense, more generally, in Australia that it 
actually has a good academic community and is therefore an attractive place, increasingly, for 
people to come and work.  I think we have a very good range of international scholars that come 
and work with us, either formally or informally, and Australia is an attractive place for scholars to 
engage with.  Partly, of course, because it’s English language, partly because it’s former British 
connections mean that many of its institutions and practices are similar.  So in some of the areas 
that I work in it’s actually easier for scholars to work in Australia than it is in the US, where there 
is less consistency in the approach. SM5 1 P9 
__________ 
 
I think there’s also a virtuous circle that as universities become world recognised so they are more 
appealing and more attractive.  I think that there’s - I’m not sure it’s understood globally, but I 
think it might play in that the very international nature of Australian academia probably makes it 
more appealing to international scholars than other parts of the world SM5 1 P10 
________________ 
 
Also I think though, the other thing that I know from when I was in the UK as an academic, was 
that it didn’t matter that where you went to a conference there was always Australians at the 
conference because Australians have a reputation for being more willing to go to international 
conferences than other nations. SM5 1 P10 
____________ 
 
I think some of the investment into international development, of recruiting international 
students and providing international placements, those investments have had an impact on 
rankings. SM7 1p4 
------------------------- 
Clearly there were a number of things that happened over the period of time, so massive 
expansion in international education and the university was able to capitalise on that, to varying 
extents with varying levels of risk associated with it over that period of time, but it was really a 
fantastic opportunity for the university.  There are a whole range of things in that environment 
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which changed, in terms of visa regulations and the recognition, more broadly, of the importance 
of international education as an export market and so on.  So the external environment kind of 
favoured a university that was really very eager and hungry to expand, so that’s another factor. 
SM2 p3 
---------------------------------- 
Then on top of that, our quest to grow international students and grow revenue rapidly also 
meant that we had less rigor around our entry requirements for international students, which had 
all sorts of implications in terms of visa processing, the visa status that we were able to maintain 
under the new visa processing regimes and a massive influx in fraudulent applications, without 
the resourcing base to adequately vet them. SM2 p5   
….. 
The government doesn’t provide enough funding and you have to cross-subsidise research 
through teaching students.  You get the most margin and therefore the most opportunity to cross 
subsidise through teaching international students, so all of the incentives that they had to get 
students in to give them a bad experience, because you try and do it on the cheap to put as much 
money as possible as you can into research because really that’s the thing that drives the 
rankings.  I think the University of Canberra committed that sin, if you like, voluntarily and 
without as much consideration for the risks around that as were warranted.  SM2 p5   
----------------------  [coding material  truncated at this point] 
--------------------------------- 
ERA /Research Assessment 
So I think that things like ERA have helped, to some extent at least, to create an academic culture 
and climate in which there is a capacity to focus on the types of things that really matter.  I’m sure 
other people will tell you that ERA also is a challenge for quality sometimes, in that it privileges 
Australian outputs, sometimes, over those which would be considered to be globally competitive.  
So where a world ranking is a world ranking the Australian - the extent to which an Australian 
focus is competitive can be a challenge, for example, in relation to citations, and I think that’s a 
real challenge that Australian universities have over UK universities, for example.  The UK scholars 
I think will have generally higher levels of citations, not necessarily reflecting the quality of their 
work but reflecting the community that they’re working in, which means that they’re more likely 
to get cited by other UK scholars, of which there are considerably more than there are Australian 
scholars.  I guess that would also be the case in the US.  SM5 I1 P10 
---------------- 
So if I reflect on that, I would suggest that things like ERA are helping to drive up quality.  I think 
there’s also a virtuous circle that as universities become world recognised so they are more 
appealing and more attractive.  I think that there’s - I’m not sure it’s understood globally, but I 
think it might play in that the very international nature of Australian academia probably makes it 
more appealing to international scholars than other parts of the world  SM5  I1 P10 
----------------- 
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[staff] …they’ll always be arguing about not doing so much teaching because they want to do 
more research because that’s the emphasis that we’ve given.  It’s not just this university, I think 
the whole system, certainly in the UK and Australia and probably other countries, where there are 
forms of research assessment have driven that culture.  I’ll give you an example, most of the 
people of my generation in the UK knew that publishing books was no longer worthwhile, that our 
measures of performance, certainly in political science and in the social sciences more generally, 
were around journal articles and in the leading journals.  You might still want to publish the odd 
book, but that wasn’t going to help your career very much, whereas the people that came before 
us, they were all promoted to professors on the basis of having got their first book, their first 
monograph out. SM5 2 P2 
… 
I think it’s driven by the performance metrics of research assessment in whatever format, 
whichever system you’re in, it’s an emphasis on a particular form of research quality.  It is a good 
proxy for research quality and I think it did address some of the underperformance in many 
universities and amongst many professors before that period who would have great thoughts but 
would never impart them to anybody else. 
------------------- [coding material  truncated at this point] 
_____________________________________ 
ANU 
I think that there have been some weaknesses at the ANU, in recent years, which UC have been 
quite ruthless and clever in exploiting.  That’s certainly played out in some of our recruitment 
strategies where we’ve been able to get very good scholars from the ANU to come and join us 
because they’ve been frustrated, particularly in certain areas, around the support they were 
getting at their university and the sense that they could achieve more here. SM5 1 P 11 
….. 
But if I come back to the ANU, so I think the ANU hasn’t necessarily been its own best friend at 
times and has created opportunities for UC to exploit.  I also think that just having the ANU down 
the road actually is an attraction for some of the people that come to work with us.  It’s a useful 
thing to have a good university, especially if we are telling a story about how we’re rising through 
the rankings.  To be next to a very good university is quite helpful SM5 1 P 11 
-------------------------------- 
In the course of that we got a bit of respect from the ANU and people were hearing it.  It was 
good for morale, they were starting to be taken slightly more seriously by the ANU.  I thought that 
mattered a bit actually.SM8 p5 
-------------------- 
People stop me in the shops to talk to me about UC, I’m sure it’s happened to you, and they 
invariably somewhere in the conversation does an ANU/UC comparison, in the most benign way.  
They might say, “Gee, isn’t UC going really well and weren’t you pleased to do that and I bet ANU 
is jealous.”  Or, “I see you’ve got that, I went to the UC open day and it was lovely and I went to 
the ANU one and they don’t.”  So they’ll tell me all is good, but it’s as if they think that it’s 
important for me to be beating ANU when, in fact, ANU is in such a different space.  I think the 
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community recognises that ANU is far stronger in research and I think Australia does and so do 
the world rankings.  So I think does industry recognise the University of Canberra, and the 
community more broadly, recognise that University of Canberra is going from strength to strength 
and doing amazing things?  Yes, they do, but mostly they see that as producing great graduates, 
producing great professionals, doing great teaching, involved in the community in lots and lots of 
different ways from schools to health placements to Brumbies and everything else.  I think they’re 
the things that the community thinks about and hears about and I think whilst we have lots of 
research stories to tell and we’re pretty good at advertising that through our media office, I don’t 
think the community and industry go, “Wow, that’s UC for the research.”  I think with such a big 
player, maybe the leading research university in Australia down the road, I think that for the next 
perceivable while we’ll be in that shadow, but that’s okay because industry values graduates 
--------------------[coding material  truncated at this point] 
 
ACT /ACT Govt 
The ACT government.  I probably don’t know much about this, but it does seem to me that the 
ACT government can’t make its mind up on the role of University of Canberra.  At times it’s being 
clearly very supportive of some of the things the university is trying to do and has done things like 
alter the territory plan in order for us to develop counter developments, in order for us to develop 
into a really serious university player.  So I think it has given us some support, but I don’t think it’s, 
until recently anyway, had the strategic understanding of the value of the university or the 
potential value of the university to the ACT economy.  I think we, as a university, together with 
the ANU, have had to work quite hard to build that narrative around how - what an important 
player we are in the economy and what future we could play in the ACT economy. 
Q So you’ve said you’ve worked quite hard… 
A When I say “we” I don’t think me personally, but I think the university has invested in a lot 
of effort to convince the various component parts of the ACT government that University of 
Canberra can be a very important part of its economic future. 
Q Who do you see as having driven it? 
A From within the university I think that was the vice chancellor, in particular, who had a 
very clear vision of what that messaging could be.  Maybe not initially, I don’t know, but I think 
over the last few years he had a very clear vision of the messaging that he could give to the ACT 
government around the role of the university in being at the heart of the ACT economy.  I think 
that we’ve also been able, as individual faculties, to reach out into the ACT economy more and 
more in the last few years.SM5 1 P11-12   
_________________ 
 
The other thing I would say, what he did, because it wasn’t just charisma, that he got on the 
agenda - he helped put on the agenda the economic value-add this university has to the ACT.  As 
we move forward it’s going to be even greater than it currently is.  So all of the years of 
negotiating with local government to give us land use changes, the hospital coming on campus, all 
of that, the myriad of conversations and then the economic analysis done from various 
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consultancies and through various offices to support the economic value of higher education in 
this university in this town is really extraordinary and it’s only going to go up.  So we already now 
in a university where X percentage of the population work in universities, XXXX described it, from 
a factual perspective, as the true university town, because it’s got the highest percentage of 
students relative to the population size in the country.  Well that’s only going to improve, it’s only 
going to go up.  I mean there’s good and there’s bad to that because, on the other hand, being in 
this position to me it’s still not self-evident.  We need reports like that to tell us we’re in this 
position, that this is a university town and that the value add to the economic prosperity is X, but I 
don’t think it’s commonly understood still by the community at large. SM6 P 15 
--------[coding material  truncated at this point] 
_________________ 
Industry 
There are probably examples in every discipline area, whether it’s in research or teaching, where 
we can think of partnerships and support we’ve got from local government or from local 
businesses or the professions that have enabled us to do more and to do better things, and there 
are probably some examples of frustrations we’ve had with those partnerships as well that have 
made it more difficult.  Those stakeholders, professional groups, governments and whatever are 
critical but I don’t think you could say it’s universally been positive, neutral or negative, I think it’s 
a real mixed bag.SM7p5 
--------------------- 
Look, UC could be very well placed to get into that triple helix space, so I think if it can continue to 
have that good relationship with government, at least territory government, and involve industry, 
particularly in the property development and in the health space, then it could do great things.  So 
the ACT really needs a vibrant entrepreneurial sector, because of its heavy reliance on 
government and services.  So being able to generate a vibrant entrepreneurial sector I think is 
critical and UC could play a big role in that.  SM2p 11 
---------------------- 
Locally, or otherwise, getting a bit more money in the door, Tech Health, for example, getting 
some of the clinical chairs, or money for Synergy, that kind of thing.  So getting the local 
government to actually believe in us and the money and therefore the money creates the 
opportunity to bring more people and so on.  So I think that cycle is probably important too.  I 
think that’s been a tough cycle, but I think it’s getting easier because I do think that the current 
ACT government, at least, have much more - we have much more credibility with them than we 
did five or six years ago, so moving that along.  But how do you ramp that up in a small 
jurisdiction.  There’s only ever a certain amount you can do with that.  If it was New South Wales 
and there’s a bucket load of money it might be a bit different.  But I think you can still use it and 
try to ramp it up a bit, even in a small jurisdiction. SM4 1p5 
----------------------- 
Probably, on the shoulders of Giants(?), for example, in the sense of being part of business and 
educational delegations led either by the ACT government or by the federal government.  I 
thought that was very important because unless you’re seen and heard no one takes notice, in 
the sense of being part of a delegation.  It gives you quick access or easy access to the powers that 
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be in the ministerial level, in the educational industry level and so forth.  So XXXX was very 
conscious of making sure that either himself or senior management went on some of these 
delegations and it has been important.  Even prior to that we had marketing and we had 
marketing delegations of the ACT government and I was part of one or two of those, which I 
thought was very important, just to sell the idea that there’s such a place called University of 
Canberra, rather than ANU.  When you say Canberra it’s ANU, “No, University of Canberra.”  
That’s very important. SM9 
----------------------- [coding material  truncated at this point] 
 
The Private Sector 
I think there’s some real challenges here and I think that universities are badly structured to take 
advantage.  One of the least discussed issues, and maybe because it doesn’t play out in other 
people’s areas as much as it does in my area, is the advent growth, massive growth of the private 
sector, private education sector in core areas of university who are not interested in being 
universities, they’re interested in making money from teaching students the core skills that they 
need and giving them the qualifications that they want. 
 If you wanted evidence of that, I was at a meeting with XXXX in Singapore a couple of 
years ago, with XXXX, our former vice chancellor, where they said that one of their key investment 
areas for the next 10 to 20 years was going to be education because there was so much money to 
be made from education.  You see it if you look at the growth of private providers providing 
actually reasonably high quality education in the business area.  It’s quite big.  Universities 
systematically underestimate how important the private sector is in Australia, in the UK and 
growing in the United States as well.  That’s more likely to drive that professionalisation than 
anything else.  SM5 2 P4 
___________________ 
The real notion of being entrepreneurial in universities isn’t there.  I think this university is 
probably more entrepreneurial than many but we’re still pretty much drawn back to type, I think, 
as soon as we go beyond the initial concepts of being entrepreneurial.  So if I look at my partner, 
(indistinct)21.28, as an example of the alternative and they are, of course, in that private sector 
that I was just talking about, their idea of entrepreneurial is coming up with an idea and getting it 
to market within a month.  By entrepreneurial there, I mean entrepreneurial in relation to 
teaching products and products that they get to market, and they do that.  They pay scant regard 
to the regulatory environment.  You probably wouldn’t in your thesis name the partner here.  
Maybe a degree of confidentiality might be useful, but they pay scant regard to the regulatory 
environment and they continuously want to play on the boundaries of what’s ethically acceptable 
in order to drive what actually turns out to be a very high quality product, in terms of what they 
can achieve with it.  And I think that that’s the nature of business is that good businesses that 
grow and accelerate because they are prepared to take chances and risks and so on.  The 
challenge for universities is that they’re big beasts which ...[….] which lumber, and consider 
themselves to be airlines, I think actually, in which the regulation environment has to be very tight 
in order to ensure that a plane doesn’t fall out of the sky or crash into each other or get blown up 
by a terrorist or whatever, whereas the commercial operators don’t see themselves as that, they 
see themselves as hunters, prepared to go out and take chances in their hunting SM5 2 5 
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------------------------- [coding material  truncated at this point] 
 
Entrepreneurial Universities 
.  I think there’s an interesting debate about the extent to which governments really want 
universities to be entrepreneurial.  So there’s a public policy issue here, I think, around the way in 
which - there’s a big debate around whether universities should be providing the core or the 
patents and realisation or commercialisation of ideas and so on, whether that should be driven 
out of universities and the debate around Australia’s lack of capacity to do that at the moment 
and the lack of funding to support that. 
 It looks to me as though Australia does pretty much the same stuff as I experienced in the 
UK, in terms of driving that sort of connection and everything and I think that the challenge is that 
the incentives to be an entrepreneurial university just aren’t there really, so it’s driven through 
linkage grants in Australia or knowledge transfer partnerships in the UK.  It’s driven by certain tax 
advantages that can be gained by setting up businesses in certain ways, through universities and 
so on, but it’s not highly institutionalised. SM5 2 P 5 
-------------------- 
. I  think the entrepreneurial university debate is going to be really interesting because - so again I 
know you’ve done a lot of the research on this so some of these comments might be quite naïve, 
but for me on the one hand if you move away from journal publications to applied research and 
industry connection you potentially do have, if you think about it, you potentially do have the 
ability for scholarly research to actually have greater impact on the Australian economy and 
society.  I do genuinely believe that that’s the case.  But it doesn’t necessarily play well in the field 
of metrics we are required to produce in order to climb up international rankings.  So there’s a 
tyranny there of potentially changing focus late on in the piece and seeing more institutionals move 
down the rankings than up the rankings.  That might be a very naïve thing to say, Diane, it’s just an 
instant sort of thought bubble because those that make the decisions about what metrics count seem 
to me to be a polar extreme to where the government would like universities to focus and the types 
of research they’d like us to engage in. SM6  
----------------------------------- 
The whole thing around that triple helix and the fact that this whole evolution from this ivory tower 
to entrepreneurial focus is quite a paradigm shift and, as I said, driven mainly my opinion by 
economic development underlying that really and the application of that knowledge into creating 
those social enterprises, those start ups, all the venture capitalism stuff.  I think there’s a bit of 




Leadership, focus and investment are the three factors.  I don’t think any of these things are 
possible without an element of luck.  I don’t mean that in any way to diminish the other three 
because I think the other three were significant.  In the absence of the other three it’s hard to see 
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how luck would have improved us in the rankings to the extent that we have, but luck is a factor 
as well.   SM7  1p1 
….. 
The external factors are the behaviours of other universities, changes to the way the ranking 
systems have worked and some serendipity about some universities dropping out - getting to 
their 51st birthday and a little bit of luck and good timing.  So do you want me to unpack those? 
SM71p1 
------------------ 
It is still in that stage where good leadership is going to make a lot of difference.  UC is not an 
institution that could survive bad leadership whereas there are plenty of established institutions 
around that could, at least for a while.   
Q There are institutions that can survive any kind of leadership because they don’t pay 
much attention, of which ANU would be an example.   
A Yes.  UC is not one of those.  So, to use your word, the critical variable there, I think, is the 
quality of the leadership.  Also other factors like luck and so on, but quality of leadership.  I think if 
campus development is really milked to put up some money…SM8 p12 
 
The Federal Govt 
I think some of the SAF funds have had an impact. SM71p4 
 
Federal Policy 
Then, lastly, over that period of time the Bradley Review occurred and the deregulation of student 
places occurred.  There was also a once in a lifetime opportunity to grow without having to 
renegotiate places with the government.  Again, UC was able to capitalise on that to varying 
extents and there were challenges associated with it but the university has grown and there 
hasn’t been the impediments that there would have been in previous systems, it’s been fully 
funded and it certainly has been of benefit to the university SM2p4 
….. 
.  One of them is just around the student housing predicament.  So with the expansion of 
international education there also became a housing problem and so the university was able to 
capitalise on the national rental affordability scheme so we won 1000 incentives under that 
scheme.  That then allowed us to put in equity around student accommodation housing, so we 
expanded into that area of business, I guess, in a quite massive way.  So that’s one sublayer.   
SM2p4 
------------------- 
.  We knew we were competitive in a research environment, but I think what’s happened, given the 
uncapping of undergraduate places, the role of ERA, ex-TECSA(?) regulation, the change to the 
student visa processings, all of those things have meant that every aspect of our business, every 
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aspect of our operation is operating in a highly competitive environment and it really sharpens your 
focus.   
--------------------------- 
You’re right, and he also worked out - so in that period 2010 to 2015 you have to remember that’s 
also when the government announced a change in policy for higher education and he took a 
stance what was contrary to other vice chancellors and that did not harm UC’s reputation.  I’m 
not sure that it was good for UC’s - it was good for XXXX’s reputation and the vice chancellor’s 
personal reputation, but it probably helped, in terms of profiling, of the university.  SM1p4 
----------------- 
 
.  One of the big risks to the university was about, this is question 3, changes in policy.  So the last 
five years and actually probably we should recognise this too, main factors that have contributed 
to the university’s success, that’s question 1, what we haven’t talked about is the uncapping of 
student places, because without the uncapping of student places then the university couldn’t 
have achieved the growth in student numbers.  You could have maybe achieved the growth in 
student numbers, but you were actually being paid for that growth.  So then when we talked then 
about the challenges the university’s encountered over the last five years is the university still on 
a growth path and then the government - the Commonwealth looks as though it’s going to change 
it’s policy agenda again, introduce efficiency cuts at a time when the university wasn’t profitable 
just yet and then also introduce a market driven system.  Those - so they were challenging 
because you kept operating in an environment that was almost beyond your control.  No matter 
how good your strategic plan was, the Commonwealth came along and actually changed the rules 
by which you played.  What XXXX did well with that was he did engage with council, so he planned 
to say, “Okay, if we face an efficiency dividend of X then what is the course, what are our 
options?”  So he did that on a timely basis.  So we forgot about that change in the political 
environment over those five years as well, which were almost like a roadblock and then he’d work 
out a way to get over the roadblock. SM1p 8 
------------[coding material  truncated at this point] 
Competitition 
, but one of the things that, in the five years that I’ve been here and particularly in the last three, 
that I’ve become increasingly aware of, now that you ask the question, might be a difference to 
the experience in the UK, is I don’t think there’s any university that’s in any doubt whatsoever 
that we’re in a highly competitive environment and that we need to be really sharp and on the 
ball with what we’re doing.  
 In my previous university, where I was for 10 years, the environment was entirely 
different.  While we aspired to get into the top 10 in the country and did, it was never around 
programs or course quality or recruiting students or internationalisation, it was around research 
strategy and whatever.  We knew we were competitive in a research environment, but I think 
what’s happened, given the uncapping of undergraduate places, the role of ERA, ex-TECSA 
regulation, the change to the student visa processing, all of those things have meant that every 
aspect of our business, every aspect of our operation is operating in a highly competitive 
environment and it really sharpens your focus.  What do you think? I think it’s intriguing.  I agree 
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we’re all aware that it’s a competitive environment, but the notion that different areas of policy 
converging to make the competition… 
A Evident in every aspect of the combinations. 
Q Yes, not just more competition more broadly but competition actually specifically within 
bits is, I think, an interesting and accurate observation. 
A I don’t think there’s any areas where we can be complacent. SM7  1p4 
_____________ 
I still fundamentally agree with it because I think the growth strategy was a means that got 
interpreted as an end.  The end was organisational sustainability but XXXX only saw that as being 
achieved through growth, and I disagree with it.  As it turns out, the writing was on the wall then 
that it wouldn’t work, as far as I was concerned, because we were attempting a dramatic growth, 
on top of what had already been about a 50 per cent growth, at the same time other universities 
were embarking on really ambitious growth, like ACU and Deakin and those ones.   
Q An external… 
A Yes, factor.  So I thought we were on a hiding to nothing with the growth strategy and I 
think evidence of the fact that we were on a hiding to nothing - and I think we hung on to the 
growth strategy for too long, I think we’re still holding onto it and we should abandon it.  We 
didn’t fail fast on the growth strategy, that’s our mistake.  So as a result we’ve ended up with 
deals with third parties that I think are completely unfavourable to the university, simply to get a 
growth target.  XXXX disagreed with me, Lindon disagrees me, but I’m still of that view and I can 
explain it.  SM7  1p8-9 
___________ 
I think we’re in a really competitive environment and we’re not necessarily winning all the battles 
SM7  1p11 
-------------------[coding material  truncated at this point] 
---------------- 
Uncertainty 
So I think the future is far from certain.  Mostly because I think there is such great uncertainty 
about the environment we’re operating in, in general, in Australia, and locally in Canberra.  So 
generally, in Australia, uncertainty around higher education policy, funding, international 
students, and then domestically, in Canberra, about demand levels for courses at UC, compared 
to ANU and ACU and other competitors in our region.  Uncertainty because of a third factor, 
which is the extent to which the campus development might result in us putting our scares 
resources into the campus development and taking them away from research productivity, 
research directions for the different institutes and faculty centres, course offerings and teaching 
quality.  So I think we’re facing several years of uncertainty.  SM7  2p1 
External Stakeholders nec 
Well, actually, yes, you’re right and he was very good at - that’s right, he actually managed a 
broad range of stakeholders.  So people that should think highly of the university.  So in that 
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period of 2010 to 2015, if I’ve got the right period, you think of how many times in social 
situations or events that people play back to you that the University of Canberra was doing very 
well.  So he communicated the successes, he wrote the story, he was willing to engage with those 
stakeholders, the Embassies, the schools, the departments and he tried to engage in both sides of 
politics, so a bit bi-partisan, which is important.  He wasn’t always successful.SM1  
-------------- 
Yes.  Then once the strategy was being implemented then he also had consultation.  You think of 
his engagement with the Canberra Business Chamber and the university’s participation on their 
various taskforce.  Our engagement with Innovation ACT, or whatever the name of it is.  It was all 
part of a strategy SM1p9 
------------- 
This harks back to, before, into media as well, but that building of this partnership between the 
universities and the Business Council and ACT government and the Innovation group was about 
the building of the Canberra brand and the positioning of the…SM1p10 
-------------------------- 
.  I think we could have done actually a bit more in positioning ourselves in the context of our local 
stakeholders.  I mean I always felt that we really don’t, and we still don’t work enough with our 
Commonwealth counterparts and the people that are on our doorstep.  I think in the region we’ve 
done a lot of work in that period, 2010 to ’15, our presence in the region, as a regional university, 
certainly was of a bigger profile and that was pushed, marketing and the communication 
externally was quite successful in pushing that region engagement, that broader region 
engagement.  Obviously we know about, my area’s in health, so I know in health the regional 
engagement through that period was much more prominent and visible. SM11p4  
--------------------- 
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5A.1 ARWU rankings 
Australia ARWU 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
University of Melbourne 73 75 62 60 57 54 44 44 40 39 up 3+ bands
The University of Queensland 120 125 125 86 90 85 85 77 55 55 up 3+ bands
Monash University 250 250 172 172 122 122 122 122 79 78 up 3+ bands
Curtin University 450 450 450 450 450 350 250 250 175 up 3+ bands
The University of Adelaide 250 250 250 250 250 250 175 175 125 125 up 2 bands
Deakin University 450 350 250 250 up 2 bands
Queensland University of Technology 450 450 250 250 up 2 bands
University of Sydney 97 94 92 96 93 97 125 125 82 83 up 1 band
The University of Western Australia 125 125 125 125 96 91 88 87 96 91 up 1 band
University of New South Wales 175 175 175 175 125 125 125 125 125 125 up 1 band
Macquarie University 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 255 175 up 1 band
University of Tasmania 350 350 450 350 350 350 350 350 250 250 up 1 band
University of Wollongong 350 350 350 450 350 350 350 250 350 250 up 1 band
La Trobe University 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 up 1 band
Swinburne University of Technology 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 450 350 up 1 band
Griffith University 450 350 350 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
University of Technology, Sydney 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
James Cook University 350 450 350 350 350 350 350 350 250 350 stable
University of Newcastle 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 stable
Flinders University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 down 1 band
The Australian National University 59 59 59 70 64 66 74 77 77 97 down 3+ bands
University of Western Sydney 350 350 new entry
RMIT University 450 450 new entry




2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
McMaster University 89 91 88 89 92 92 90 96 83 66 up 2 bands
University of Toronto 24 27 27 26 27 28 24 25 27 23 stable
University of British Columbia 35 36 36 37 39 40 37 40 34 31 stable
McGill University 60 65 61 64 63 58 67 64 63 67 stable
University of Alberta 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
Queen's University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
The University of Calgary 250 250 175 175 250 250 175 250 250 175 stable
University of Waterloo 250 250 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 stable
Western University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Concordia University 450 450 450 stable
University of Montreal 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 down 1 band
Dalhousie University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 down 1 band
Laval University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 down 1 band
University of Guelph 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 down 1 band
University of Manitoba 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 450 350 down 1 band
University of Ottawa 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 175 down 1 band
University of Saskatchewan 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 450 350 down 1 band
University of Victoria 250 250 250 250 350 350 250 250 250 350 down 1 band
Simon Fraser University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 450 450 down 2 bands
Carleton University 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Quebec 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 exit
University of Sherbrooke 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
York University 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit






2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Peking University 250 250 175 250 175 175 125 125 71 71 up 3+ bands
Tsinghua University 250 250 175 175 175 175 125 125 58 48 up 3+ bands
Fudan University 350 350 250 250 250 175 175 175 125 125 up 3+ bands
Harbin Institute of Technology 450 450 450 450 450 350 250 250 175 175 up 3+ bands
Sichuan University 450 450 350 350 350 350 350 350 250 175 up 3+ bands
Sun Yat-sen University 450 450 350 350 350 250 250 175 175 175 up 3+ bands
Shanghai Jiao Tong University 250 250 250 250 175 175 125 125 125 125 up 2 bands
Univ of Science and Technology of China 250 250 250 250 250 250 175 175 125 125 up 2 bands
Zhejiang University 250 250 250 250 175 175 175 125 125 125 up 2 bands
Huazhong Univ of Science and Technology 450 450 450 350 350 350 250 250 250 250 up 2 bands
Southeast University   450 450 450 450 350 350 250 250 up 2 bands
Wuhan University   450 450 450 450 450 350 350 250 up 2 bands
Xian Jiao Tong University   450 450 350 350 250 250 175 250 up 2 bands
Beijing Normal University    450 450 350 250 250 250 250 up 2 bands
South China  Univ of Technology     450 450 350 350 250 250 up 2 bands
Soochow University       450 450 250 250 up 2 bands
Dalian University of Technology 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
Jilin University 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 250 250 350 up 1 band
Lanzhou University 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
Nankai University 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
Shandong University 450 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
Tianjin University 450 450 450  450 450 450 350 350 350 up 1 band
Beihang University     450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
Central South University     450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
Tongji University     450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
East China Univ of Science and Technology       450 450 350 350 up 1 band
Capital Medical University       450 450 450 350 up 1 band
China  Univ of Geosciences (Wuhan) 350 350 new entry
Univ of Electronic Science & Tech of China 350 250 new entry
Hunan University 450 350 new entry
Kaohsiung Medical University 450 450 new entry
Nanjing Univ of Science and Technology 450 450 new entry
Ocean University of China 450 350 new entry
Wuhan University of Technology 450 450 new entry
China Medical University (Taichung) 175 new entry
East China Normal University 450 new entry
Harbin Engineering University 450 new entry
Huazhong Agricultural University 450 new entry
Nanjing Agricultural University 450 new entry
Nanjing Univ of Aeronautics & Astronautics 450 new entry
Northeastern University (Shenyang) 450 new entry
Northwest University 450 new entry
Nanjing University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
China Agricultural University 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 stable
Xiamen University   450 450 450 450 350 350 250 350 stable
Peking Union Medical College     450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
Nanjing Medical University       450 450 450 450 stable
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
The University of Hong Kong 250 250 250 250 175 250 175 175 125 125 up 2 bands
The Chinese University of Hong Kong 250 250 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 175 up 1 band
City University of Hong Kong 350 350 350 350 250 350 250 250 250 250 up 1 band
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University 350 350 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 250 up 1 band
Chang Gung University 450 450 450 450 350 350 450 450 350 350 up 1 band
National Cheng Kung University 350 new entry
The Hong Kong Univ of Science & Technology 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
National Taiwan University 175 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 175 stable
National Chiao Tung University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 350 stable
National Tsing Hua University 350 250 350 350 250 250 250 250 350 350 stable
National Cheng Kung University (NCKU) 350 250 250 250 250 350 250 350 450 exit
China Medical University 450 450 350 175 exit
National Central University 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
National Yang Ming University 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
National Sun Yat-Sen University 450 450 450 450 exit
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Ecole Normale Superieure - Lyon 450 450 450 450 250 250 250 350 250 up 2 bands
Aix Marseille University 250 250 250 125 125 175 125 125 125 125 up 2 bands
University of Lorraine 350 350 350 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 up 1 band
University of Bordeaux 250 250 350 350 350 250 250 250 175 175 up 1 band
University of Toulouse 1 350 new entry
Pierre and Marie Curie Univ Paris 6 42 40 39 41 42 37 35 36 39 40 stable
University of Paris Sud (Paris 11) 49 43 45 40 37 39 42 41 46 41 stable
Ecole Normale Superieure - Paris 73 70 71 69 73 71 67 72 87 69 stable
University of Strasbourg 125 125 125 125 125 97 95 87 125 125 stable
Joseph Fourier Univ (Grenoble 1) 175 175 175 175 125 125 125 175 175 175 stable
Univ of Paris Descartes (Paris 5) 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 stable
Claude Bernard Univ Lyon 1 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Paul Sabatier Univ (Toulouse 3) 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Univ of Nice Sophia Antipolis 450 450 350 450 450 350 450 450 450 450 stable
Univ Paris Diderot - Paris 7 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
University of Montpellier 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 stable
Paris Dauphine Univ (Paris 9) 350 350 350 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 stable
ESPCI ParisTech 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 down 1 band
MINES ParisTech 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 down 1 band
Ecole Polytechnique 250 250 250 350 350 250 350 350 350 450 down 2 bands
University of Auvergne 450 450 entry & exit
Toulouse School of Economics 250 250 entry & exit
University of Versailles SQeY 450 450 450 exit
University of Lille 1 450 450 450 exit
University of Rennes 1 450 350 450 350 450 450 450 450 exit





2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Heidelberg University 67 63 63 62 62 54 49 46 47 42 up 2 bands
TU Dresden 350 350 350 250 250 250 250 250 175 175 up 2 bands
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 175 175 up 1 band
University of Leipzig 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 175 175 up 1 band
University of Jena 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 350 250 up 1 band
University of Ulm 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 250 250 up 1 band
Hannover Medical School 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
University of Rostock 450 450 450 450 up 1 band
University of Potsdam 450 450 new entry
University of Munich 55 55 52 54 60 61 49 52 51 57 stable
Technical University Munich 57 57 56 47 53 50 53 51 47 50 stable
University of Goettingen 90 90 93 86 125 125 125 125 125 95 stable
University of Freiburg 96 125 125 125 99 100 125 125 125 125 stable
University of Bonn 97 98 93 94 125 125 94 97 125 125 stable
University of Frankfurt 125 125 125 100 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
University of Hamburg 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 175 stable
University of Kiel 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 stable
RWTH Aachen University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
University of Bochum 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 350 250 250 stable
University of Bremen 450 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
University of Hannover 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 250 250 350 350 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
University of Muenster 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 125 125 175 down 1 band
University of Tuebingen 125 125 125 125 175 175 175 175 175 175 down 1 band
University of Wuerzburg 125 125 125 125 175 175 175 175 175 175 down 1 band
University of Cologne 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 down 1 band
University of Duesseldorf 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 450 350 down 1 band
University of Halle-Wittenberg 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 450 350 350 down 1 band
University of Stuttgart 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 450 350 down 1 band
Technical University Darmstadt 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 down 1 band
Bielefeld University 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 up 1 band
University of Bayreuth 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 down 1 band
University of Konstanz 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 down 1 band
University of Regensburg 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 down 1 band
University of Mainz 125 125 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 down 2 bands
Technical University of Berlin 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 450 down 2 bands
University of Marburg 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 450 down 2 bands
Technical Univ of Braunschweig 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Duisburg-Essen 350 350 350 350 450 450 350 350 exit
University of Giessen 350 350 450 450 350 350 350 350 350 exit
University of Dortmund 450 450 exit
University of Greifswald 450 450 450 450 exit




2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
University of Milan - Bicocca 450 450 450 350 450 350 350 up 2 bands
Polytechnic Institute of Milan 350 350 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 up 1 band
University of Pavia 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 up 1 band
Univ of Roma - Tor Vergata 450 450 350 350 350 450 350 450 450 350 up 1 band
Vita-Salute San Raffaele Univ 450 450 new entry
University of Padua 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 stable
University of Bologna 250 250 250 250 250 250 175 250 250 250 stable
University of Florence 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 stable
University of Naples Federico II 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 stable
University of Trieste 450 450 450 stable
University of Turin 175 250 250 250 250 250 175 175 250 250 down 1 band
University of Ferrara 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 down 1 band
University of Palermo 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 down 1 band
Sapienza University of Rome 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 175 175 down 1 band
University of Milan 125 125 125 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 down 2 bands
University of Pisa 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 250 250 down 2 bands
Scuola Normale Superiore - Pisa 450 350 350 350 250 250 350 350 450 exit
University of Genova 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 exit
Catholic Univ of the Sacred Heart 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Polytechnic University of Turin 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Bari 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Cagliari 450 450 exit
University of Parma 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Perugia 450 450 450 450 450 350 450 450 450 exit
University of Siena 450 450 450 450 exit






2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Nagoya University 125 82 79 94 96 125 125 77 72 84 up 2 bands
Chiba University 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 up 1 band
Tokyo University of Science 450 450 450 up 1 band
The University of Tokyo 19 20 20 21 20 21 21 21 20 24 stable
Hokkaido University 175 175 175 125 125 125 125 175 175 175 stable
Okayama University 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 350 350 stable
Osaka City University 450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
The University of Tokushima 450 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
Kyoto University 23 24 24 27 26 26 26 26 32 35 down 1 band
Tokyo Institute of Technology 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 250 175 down 1 band
University of Tsukuba 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 down 1 band
Hiroshima University 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 350 down 1 band
Keio University 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 down 1 band
Kyushu University 125 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 down 2 bands
Kobe University 250 250 350 350 350 250 250 350 450 450 down 2 bands
Osaka University 68 71 75 82 83 85 78 85 96 125 down 3+ bands
Tohoku University 79 84 84 97 125 125 125 125 125 125 down 3+ bands
Kanazawa University 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 exit
Niigata University 350 350 450 450 450 450 exit
Tokyo Medical and Dental University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 exit
Waseda University 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 exit
Yamaguchi University 350 450 450 450 exit
Ehime University 450 450 exit
Gifu University 450 450 exit
Gunma University 450 450 450 exit
Kagoshima University 450 450 exit
Nagasaki University 450 350 350 450 450 450 exit
Nara Institute of Science and Technology 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Nihon University 450 450 450 450 exit
Osaka Prefecture University 450 450 450 exit
Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology 450 450 450 exit
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
University of Groningen 125 125 125 125 125 92 82 75 72 59 up 3+ bands
Erasmus University Rotterdam 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 73 up 3+ bands
Radboud University Nijmegen 175 175 175 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 up 1 band
University of Wageningen 175 125 125 175 125 125 125 125 125 125 up 1 band
Eindhoven University of Technology 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 350 250 350 up 1 band
Maastricht University 350 350 350 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 up 1 band
Utrecht University 47 52 50 48 53 52 57 56 65 47 stable
University of Amsterdam 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
VU University Amsterdam 125 125 125 125 125 125 100 98 125 125 stable
Delft University of Technology 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 175 175 stable
University of Twente 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 stable
Tilburg University 450 450 450 exit
Leiden University 76 72 70 65 73 74 77 82 93 88 down 1 band
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Seoul National University 175 175 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 up 1 band
Hanyang University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 250 up 1 band
Korea University 350 350 250 350 350 350 250 250 175 250 up 1 band
Sungkyunkwan University 350 350 350 350 250 250 250 250 175 250 up 1 band
Ewha Womans University 450 450 450 450 up 1 band
Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Tech 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Yonsei University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Pohang University of Science & Tech 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 250 350 stable
Kyungpook National University 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
Kyung Hee University 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 450 stable
Gyeongsang National University 450 new entry
Ulsan National Institute of Science & Tech 450 new entry
Pusan National University 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Catholic University of Korea 450 450 450 350 exit
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Pompeu Fabra University 450 350 450 450 350 350 250 350 250 up 3+ bands
University of Santiago Compostela 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 up 2 bands
University of Granada 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 250 250 up 2 bands
Universitat Jaume I 450 new entry
Autonomous University of Barcelona 350 350 350 350 350 250 250 250 350 350 stable
University of the Basque Country 350 450 450 450 450 450 stable
University of Barcelona 175 175 250 250 250 250 175 175 175 250 down 1 band
Autonomous University of Madrid 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 down 1 band
Complutense University of Madrid 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 350 350 down 1 band
Polytechnic University of Valencia 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 down 1 band
University of Valencia 350 250 250 250 350 350 250 350 450 450 down 1 band
Polytechnic University of Catalonia 450 450 350 entry & exit
University of Vigo 450 450 exit
University of Zaragoza 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Seville 450 450 450 exit
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Linkoping University 450 450 450 450 350 350 350 350 350 250 up 2 bands
Uppsala University 71 76 66 67 73 73 60 61 60 63 up 1 band
Stockholm University 86 88 79 81 81 82 78 77 81 74 up 1 band
University of Gothenburg 250 250 250 250 175 175 175 175 175 175 up 1 band
Karolinska Institute 51 50 42 44 42 44 47 48 44 44 stable
Lund University 97 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
Chalmers Univ of Technology 250 350 250 250 350 350 350 350 250 250 stable
Swedish Univ of Agricultural Sciences 250 350 250 350 350 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Stockholm School of Economics 450 450 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 stable
KTH Royal Institute of Technology 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Umea University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 down 1 band
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
King's College London 81 65 63 68 68 67 59 55 50 46 up 3+ bands
The University of Edinburgh 55 53 54 53 51 51 45 47 41 32 up 2 bands
University of Exeter 350 350 350 350 250 250 250 175 175 175 up 2 bands
Queen's University Belfast 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 up 2 bands
University of Southampton 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 125 125 125 up 1 band
University of Warwick 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 92 175 125 up 1 band
London School of Economics and Political Science 250 250 250 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 up 1 band
Bangor University 450 450 new entry
St George's Hospital Medical School 450 450 new entry
Heriot-Watt University 450 new entry
University of Cambridge 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 stable
University of Oxford 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 10 7 7 stable
University College London 22 21 21 20 21 21 20 18 17 16 stable
The Imperial College of Science, Tech & Medicine 27 26 26 24 24 24 22 23 22 27 stable
The University of Manchester 40 41 44 38 40 41 38 41 35 38 stable
University of Bristol 61 61 66 70 70 64 63 66 57 61 stable
Cardiff University 125 175 175 175 175 175 125 175 125 99 stable
The University of Glasgow 125 125 175 175 175 175 125 125 175 125 stable
University of Leeds 125 125 125 125 175 175 125 125 125 125 stable
University of Liverpool 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
Newcastle University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 stable
The University of Dundee 250 250 350 350 350 250 250 250 250 250 stable
The University of Reading 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 250 stable
University of Aberdeen 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
University of York 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
University of Surrey 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 stable
Brunel University 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 250 250 350 450 450 450 350 350 175 250 stable
Queen Mary University of London 175 175 250 250 250 250 250 175 175 175 stable
University of Birmingham 91 94 99 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 down 1 band
Lancaster University 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 down 1 band
University of St Andrews 250 175 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 down 1 band
Durham University 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 down 1 band
University of Nottingham 82 83 84 85 86 83 125 125 125 125 down 2 bands
University of Sussex 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 250 250 down 2 bands
University of East Anglia 175 175 250 250 250 250 175 250 250 350 down 2 bands
University of Leicester 175 175 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 down 2 bands
The University of Sheffield 77 81 88 97 125 125 125 125 125 125 down 3+ bands
University of Bath 250 250 350 350 350 350 450 450 350 exit
Royal Holloway, U. of London 350 450 exit
The Open University 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Essex 350 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Swansea Univ 450 450 exit
University of Hertfordshire 450 450 exit
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
Mayo Medical School 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 86 71 up 3+ bands
Georgia Institute of Technology 125 125 125 125 125 125 99 125 93 85 up 2 bands
Drexel University 450 450 350 350 350 450 350 350 250 250 up 2 bands
Northeastern University 450 450 450 350 350 350 250 250 250 250 up 2 bands
Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai 250 175 175 175 175 175 175 125 125 125 up 2 bands
Washington University in St. Louis 29 29 30 31 31 32 32 32 23 20 up 1 band
Northwestern University 30 30 29 30 30 30 28 27 26 22 up 1 band
University of California, Santa Cruz 125 125 125 125 125 125 93 93 83 98 up 1 band
The Univ of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center 175 175 175 175 175 125 125 125 96 125 up 1 band
Medical University of South Carolina 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 250 250 up 1 band
The University of Texas at Dallas 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 250 up 1 band
Boston College 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 350 up 1 band
Stony Brook University 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 up 1 band
University of North Texas 350 350 new entry
West Virginia University 450 450 new entry
The University of Texas at Arlington 450 new entry
Harvard University 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 stable
Stanford University 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 stable
University of California, Berkeley 3 3 2 4 4 3 4 4 3 5 stable
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 5 5 4 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 stable
California Institute of Technology 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 9 stable
Columbia University 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 8 stable
Princeton University 8 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 stable
University of Chicago 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 stable
Yale University 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 stable
Cornell University 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 14 stable
University of California, Los Angeles 13 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 stable
University of California, San Diego 14 14 14 15 15 14 14 14 14 15 stable
University of Pennsylvania 15 15 15 14 14 15 16 17 18 17 stable
University of Washington 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 13 stable
University of California, San Francisco 18 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 21 21 stable
Johns Hopkins University 20 19 18 18 17 17 17 16 16 18 stable
University of Michigan - Ann Arbor 21 22 22 22 22 23 22 22 23 24 stable
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities 28 28 28 28 29 29 30 30 33 34 stable
New York University 31 32 31 29 27 27 27 27 29 29 stable
Duke University 32 31 35 35 36 31 31 31 25 26 stable
Rockefeller University 32 32 34 33 32 34 33 33 37 36 stable
Univ of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 38 39 41 42 41 43 36 39 35 33 stable
The Univ of Texas Southwestern Medical Center Dallas 41 48 49 51 48 46 45 44 43 48 stable
University of Southern California 50 46 46 46 46 47 51 49 49 54 stable
Boston University 83 74 77 76 71 75 72 73 75 80 stable
Baylor College of Medicine 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
Emory University 125 100 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 stable
University of Delaware 175 175 175 125 125 175 175 175 175 175 stable
University of Miami 175 125 125 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 stable
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 175 stable
Georgetown University 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 250 stable
The Univ of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 350 250 stable
University of Houston 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
University of Missouri - Columbia 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 250 stable
University of Notre Dame 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
University of Oregon 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 250 stable
University of South Florida 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Yeshiva University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Brigham Young University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 350 stable
Indiana Univ-Purdue Univ at Indianapolis 350 350 450 350 350 450 350 250 250 350 stable
Saint Louis University 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 350 stable
Temple University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 stable




2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
University of Central Florida 350 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 450 350 stable
New Mexico State University 450 450 stable
Kent State University 450 450 450 450 450 450 stable
University of Kansas 250 250 250 175 250 250 250 250 250 250 stable
Univ at Buffalo, the State Univ of New York 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 stable
Florida International University 450 450 450 stable
University of Wisconsin - Madison 17 17 17 19 19 19 24 24 28 28 down 1 band
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 26 25 25 25 25 25 28 29 30 37 down 1 band
University of Colorado at Boulder 34 34 32 32 33 33 34 34 38 43 down 1 band
University of California, Santa Barbara 36 35 32 33 34 35 41 38 42 45 down 1 band
University of Maryland, College Park 37 37 36 38 38 38 43 43 52 53 down 1 band
The University of Texas at Austin 39 38 38 35 35 36 39 37 44 51 down 1 band
Vanderbilt University 42 41 53 52 50 49 54 53 60 52 down 1 band
University of California, Irvine 46 46 46 48 45 45 47 50 58 64 down 1 band
Purdue University - West Lafayette 65 65 69 61 56 57 60 61 63 77 down 1 band
Indiana University Bloomington 92 93 90 82 84 85 125 125 125 125 down 1 band
Oregon State University 125 125 125 125 175 125 175 175 175 175 down 1 band
Tufts University 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 down 1 band
University of California, Riverside 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 down 1 band
University of Iowa 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 175 175 down 1 band
University of Massachusetts Amherst 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 down 1 band
Univ of Massachusetts Medical School - Worcester 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 down 1 band
Colorado State University 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 down 1 band
Florida State University 175 175 175 175 250 175 250 250 250 250 down 1 band
George Mason University 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 down 1 band
Iowa State University 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 down 1 band
Oregon Health and Science University 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 down 1 band
University of Maryland, Baltimore 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 down 1 band
University of Tennessee - Knoxville 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 175 350 250 down 1 band
Virginia Commonwealth University 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 down 1 band
Brandeis University 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 250 350 down 1 band
Louisiana State University - Baton Rouge 250 250 175 175 250 250 250 250 350 350 down 1 band
The George Washington University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 down 1 band
The University of New Mexico - Albuquerque 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 down 1 band
University of Kentucky 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 350 down 1 band
University of South Carolina - Columbia 250 250 250 250 250 350 250 250 350 350 down 1 band
University of Vermont 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 down 1 band
Wayne State University 250 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 down 1 band
City University of New York City College 350 350 250 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 down 1 band
Thomas Jefferson University 350 350 350 350 250 250 350 350 350 450 down 1 band
University of New Hampshire - Durham 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 350 450 down 1 band
University of Oklahoma - Norman 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 down 1 band
University of Wyoming 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 350 450 450 down 1 band
Arizona State University 93 94 81 78 79 79 88 93 125 125 down 1 band
Oklahoma State University 450 450 450 450 down 1 band
Rush University 450 450 350 450 down 1 band
University of Alabama at Birmingham 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 250 250 down 1 band
University of Montana - Missoula 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 down 1 band
Carnegie Mellon University 62 59 58 55 51 52 62 61 68 80 down 2 bands
The Ohio State University - Columbus 62 62 59 63 65 65 64 67 79 80 down 2 bands
University of Arizona 77 77 78 80 77 78 86 90 125 99 down 2 bands
Case Western Reserve University 83 87 97 97 99 99 125 125 125 125 down 2 bands
Michigan State University 83 86 86 92 96 92 125 99 125 125 down 2 bands
University of Virginia 95 91 96 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 down 2 bands
Rice University 97 99 99 93 91 92 82 84 72 74 down 2 bands
Dartmouth College 125 125 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 250 down 2 bands
North Carolina State University - Raleigh 125 125 125 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 down 2 bands





2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Trend
The University of Georgia 125 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 250 250 down 2 bands
University of Hawaii at Manoa 125 125 125 125 125 175 175 175 175 250 down 2 bands
University of Illinois at Chicago 125 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 down 2 bands
The Univ of Texas Health Science Center at Houston 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 250 350 down 2 bands
University of Cincinnati 175 175 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 down 2 bands
University of Colorado at Denver 175 175 250 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 down 2 bands
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Univ 175 175 175 175 175 175 250 250 350 350 down 2 bands
The Univ of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston 250 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 down 2 bands
Washington State University 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 450 450 down 2 bands
University of Connecticut 175 175 175 250 250 250 350 350 350 350 down 2 bands
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh Campus 52 50 56 57 58 61 65 70 70 68 down 2 bands
Texas A&M University 88 88 95 100 93 125 96 100 125 125 down 2 bands
University at Albany (State University of New York) 250 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 down 2 bands
Pennsylvania State University - University Park 42 45 43 45 49 54 58 60 77 85 down 3+ bands
University of California, Davis 48 49 46 48 47 47 55 57 75 85 down 3+ bands
University of Florida 58 58 68 72 72 71 78 83 90 88 down 3+ bands
Brown University 71 69 65 65 65 67 74 75 90 125 down 3+ bands
University of Rochester 73 77 82 84 86 90 90 125 125 125 down 3+ bands
University of Utah 79 80 82 79 82 85 87 93 100 125 down 3+ bands
Rutgers, The State Univ of New Jersey - New Brunswick 54 55 54 59 61 61 52 64 96 79 down 3+ bands
Auburn University 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Medical College of Wisconsin 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Montana State University - Bozeman 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Southern Methodist University 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Idaho 450 450 exit
University of Kansas Medical Center 450 450 450 exit
University of Louisville 450 450 450 exit
University of Maine 450 exit
Univ of Tennessee Health Science Center 450 450 exit
Utah State University 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 exit
Lehigh University 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Maryland, Baltimore County 450 450 450 450 450 350 exit
The University of Texas at San Antonio 450 450 450 exit
University of Arkansas at Little Rock 450 450 450 exit
Clemson University 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 exit
Kansas State University 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 exit
San Diego State University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 exit
State Univ of New York Health Sci Center at Brooklyn 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 exit
Syracuse University 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 exit
Texas Tech University 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 exit
The University of Connecticut Health Center 350 450 450 450 exit
Tulane University 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 exit
University of Alaska - Fairbanks 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville 350 350 350 450 450 450 450 450 exit
University of Nebraska Medical Center 350 350 450 350 350 450 exit
University of Nevada - Reno 350 350 350 450 exit
University of Rhode Island 350 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 exit
University of Medicine and Dentistry New Jersey 175 250 250 250 250 250 exit
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 350 450 exit
Wake Forest University 250 350 350 350 350 350 350 450 450 exit
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
University of New South Wales 173 85 114 109 82 78 85 up 3+ bands
Monash University 117 99 91 83 73 74 80 up 3+ bands
University of South Australia 375 325 325 288 375 275 225 up 3+ bands
University of Technology, Sydney 375 325 238 225 225 225 up 3+ bands
University of Adelaide 213 176 213 164 149 142 134 up 3+ bands
University of Western Australia 189 190 168 157 109 125 111 up 3+ bands
Griffith University 375 275 275 275 up 2 bands
University of Queensland 74 65 63 65 60 60 65 up 1 band
Queensland University of Technology 288 263 288 288 275 225 225 up 1 band
Deakin University 375 375 325 325 325 275 325 up 1 band
Flinders University 375 375 275 375 325 up 1 band
University of Sydney 58 62 72 60 56 60 61 no trend
University of Melbourne 37 28 34 33 33 33 32 stable
Macquarie University 238 263 288 325 325 275 275 stable
University of Wollongong 263 325 288 288 275 275 275 stable
University of Newcastle 288 288 263 263 275 225 275 stable
Charles Darwin University 325 375 375 325 275 275 325 stable
University of Tasmania 325 375 375 275 325 325 stable
Curtin University 375 375 450 450 375 stable
La Trobe University 375 375 375 375 stable
Victoria University 375 325 New entry 2017
University of Canberra 450 375 New entry 2017
James Cook University 275 275 225 New entry 2016
RMIT University 450 450 450 New entry 2016
Southern Cross University 450 450 New entry 2016
Murdoch University 325 325 375 450 450 450 down 2 bands
Australian National University 38 37 48 45 52 47 48 down 1 band
Swinburne University of Technology 375 375 375 375 375 450 down 1 band
Western Sydney University 375 450 450 450 down 1 band







2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
University of Saskatchewan 450 450 450 new entry
University of Toronto 19 21 20 20 19 22 22 stable
University of Montreal 104 84 106 113 113 103 108 stable
University of Waterloo 213 238 238 263 179 173 225 stable
Western University 213 238 238 238 225 225 225 stable
University of Calgary 238 238 213 238 225 195 225 stable
University of British Columbia 22 30 31 32 34 36 34 down 1 band
McGill University 28 34 35 39 38 42 42 down 1 band
Dalhousie University 238 263 263 238 225 275 275 down 1 band
Simon Fraser University 238 238 238 238 275 225 275 down 1 band
University of Ottawa 185 171 185 188 225 275 225 down 1 band
Laval University 238 213 238 225 275 275 down 1 band
University of Alberta 100 121 109 124 137 107 119 down 1 band
McMaster University 65 88 92 94 94 113 78 down 2 bands
York University 288 325 288 238 325 325 375 down 2 bands
University of Manitoba 325 325 325 325 375 450 450 down 2 bands
University of Victoria 177 196 213 173 225 325 325 down 3+ bands
Queen’s University 173 213 238 263 275 225 275 down 3+ bands
Université du Québec à Montréal 450 450 entry & exit
Carleton University 238 238 288 238 exit
University of Guelph 288 325 375 375 375 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Tsinghua University 71 52 50 49 47 35 30 up 3+ bands
Nanjing University 263 263 263 263 275 225 169 up 3+ bands
Zhejiang University 325 325 325 325 275 225 177 up 3+ bands
Fudan University 238 213 213 193 225 155 116 up 3+ bands
Shanghai Jiao Tong University 325 288 325 288 325 225 188 up 3+ bands
Peking University 49 46 45 48 42 29 27 up 2 bands
Univ of Science & Tech of China 192 213 213 213 225 153 132 up 2 bands
Northeastern University 213 213 184 185 225 182 193 up 1 band
Huazhong Univ of Science & Tech 450 450 new entry
Xiamen University 450 450 450 new entry
Wuhan University 375 375 450 450 450 down 1 band
Sun Yat-sen University 288 325 375 325 375 450 375 down 2 bands
Renmin University of China 325 238 325 450 exit
Wuhan Univ of Technology 325 375 exit
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China (non–Mainland) THE 
 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Chinese University of Hong Kong 151 124 109 129 138 76 58 up 3+ bands
City University of Hong Kong 193 182 213 192 225 119 119 up 3+ bands
Hong Kong Univ of Science and Technology 62 65 57 51 59 49 44 up 2 bands
Hong Kong Polytechnic University 263 263 263 213 225 192 182 up 2 bands
University of Hong Kong 34 35 43 43 44 43 40 stable
University of Macau 288 450 375 375 down 2 bands
National Tsing Hua University 213 238 263 263 275 275 325 down 2 bands
National Taiwan University 154 134 142 155 167 195 198 down 2 bands
National Taiwan Univ of Science and Tech 325 375 375 375 325 450 450 down 2 bands
Hong Kong Baptist University 288 325 325 325 375 375 450 down 3+ bands
National Chiao Tung University 238 263 263 288 325 450 450 down 3+ bands
National Sun Yat-Sen University 263 325 325 375 exit
National Central University 375 375 375 exit
National Cheng Kung University (NCKU) 325 325 375 450 450 exit
China Medical University, Taiwan 375 450 exit





2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Paris-Sorbonne University – Paris 4 275 375 196 up 2 bands
CentraleSupélec 225 450 new entry
École des Ponts ParisTech 375 275 new entry
University of Lille 450 450 new entry
Paris Sciences et Lettres 72 new entry
University of Côte d’Azur 375 new entry
Univ de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines 375 new entry
Sciences Po 450 new entry
Aix-Marseille University 275 325 275 stable
École Normale Supérieure 59 59 65 78 54 66 down 1 band
University of Bordeaux 275 325 325 down 1 band
Federal Univ of Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées 325 375 down 1 band
École Normale Supérieure de Lyon 141 170 156 160 225 225 182 down 2 bands
Pierre and Marie Curie Univ 84 81 96 103 113 121 123 down 2 bands
Paris Diderot University – Paris 7 169 166 178 180 199 225 225 down 2 bands
Montpellier University 288 288 263 288 325 375 375 down 2 bands
Claude Bernard University Lyon 1 325 325 375 450 375 450 down 2 bands
École Polytechnique 63 62 70 61 101 116 115 down 3+ bands
University of Strasbourg 213 213 213 213 325 325 375 down 3+ bands
Paris-Sud University 92 114 120 188 179 181 down 3+ bands
Grenoble Alpes University 180 155 178 225 325 325 down 3+ bands
Mines ParisTech 238 193 238 275 exit
Paris Descartes University 225 225 exit
University of Nantes 450 450 exit
University of Nice Sophia Antipolis 450 450 exit
Panthéon-Sorbonne Univ – Paris 1 375 450 exit 




2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Heidelberg University 73 78 68 70 37 43 45 up 3+ bands
Technical University of Munich 88 105 87 98 53 46 41 up 3+ bands
University of Freiburg 189 144 152 163 84 95 82 up 3+ bands
Humboldt University of Berlin 109 99 94 80 49 57 62 up 3+ bands
University of Bonn 171 181 195 94 113 100 up 3+ bands
RWTH Aachen University 168 154 129 156 110 78 79 up 3+ bands
University of Tübingen 187 213 213 113 78 89 94 up 3+ bands
Free University of Berlin 151 128 86 81 72 75 88 up 3+ bands
University of Münster 288 263 238 263 125 161 173 up 3+ bands
University of Duisburg-Essen 375 375 325 225 197 225 up 3+ bands
University of Cologne 263 325 156 170 145 up 3+ bands
Technical University of Berlin 238 82 92 up 3+ bands
University of Würzburg 213 238 238 238 185 186 165 up 2 bands
Ulm University 213 213 213 192 135 155 up 2 bands
TU Dresden 263 288 263 135 158 164 155 up 2 bands
University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 213 238 288 123 160 162 up 2 bands
University of Stuttgart 325 225 225 225 up 2 bands
LMU Munich 45 48 55 29 29 30 34 up 1 band
University of Kiel 263 263 238 238 225 225 225 up 1 band
Technical Univ of Darmstadt 288 238 238 263 225 225 225 up 1 band
University of Hohenheim 325 275 275 up 1 band
University of Marburg 275 275 new entry
University of Siegen 450 450 new entry
University of Passau 225 new entry
University of Potsdam 225 new entry
Hamburg University of Technology 450 new entry
Bielefeld University 263 288 325 375 275 275 275 stable
University of Hamburg 238 180 225 stable
Ruhr University Bochum 263 288 375 375 275 275 225 stable
Leibniz University of Hanover 375 375 375 325 375 375 stable
University of Bayreuth 288 325 375 275 275 275 stable
University of Bremen 263 325 325 275 stable
Technical University of Dortmund 325 325 325 stable
University of Kaiserslautern 450 375 450 stable
University of Konstanz 194 213 238 238 175 194 225 down 1 band
University of Mannheim 106 102 125 down 1 band
Goethe University Frankfurt 181 199 213 213 225 225 275 down 2 bands
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 196 151 154 165 138 144 133 down 2 bands
Johannes Gutenberg Univ of Mainz 213 225 275 275 down 2 bands
Justus Liebig University Giessen 275 325 375 down 2 bands
University of Greifswald 325 450 450 down 2 bands
Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin 195 126 down 2 bands
University of Göttingen 69 70 63 67 99 112 113 down 3+ bands






2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna 180 190 155 up 1 band
University of Salerno 375 375 new entry
University of Bergamo 450 450 new entry
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University 225 new entry
University of Bologna 238 288 288 288 225 225 225 stable
University of Trento 288 288 213 263 198 225 275 stable
Polytechnic University of Milan 325 325 288 325 225 225 325 stable
Sapienza University of Rome 325 325 325 325 225 275 325 stable
University of Brescia 450 450 450 stable
University of Genoa 450 450 450 stable
Marche Polytechnic University 450 450 450 stable
University of Rome II – Tor Vergata 450 450 450 stable
University of Parma 450 450 stable
University of Siena 450 450 stable
University of Urbino Carlo Bo 450 450 stable
University of Pisa 325 325 325 325 450 450 375 down 1 band
Polytechnic University of Turin 375 375 375 450 down 1 band
University of Bari Aldo Moro 375 375 375 450 450 450 down 1 band
University of Salento 375 375 325 263 450 450 down 1 band
University of Pavia 325 263 263 325 325 375 down 1 band
University of Florence 375 375 375 450 450 down 1 band
University of Rome III 375 375 450 450 down 1 band
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano 275 325 down 1 band
University of Calabria 375 450 down 1 band
Verona University 375 450 450 down 1 band
University of Milan 238 263 288 288 325 325 325 down 2 bands
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia 325 375 375 450 450 down 2 bands
University of Naples Federico II 325 450 450 down 2 bands
University of Milan-Bicocca 238 263 238 238 325 375 450 down 3+ bands
University of Padua 238 325 325 325 325 325 375 down 3+ bands
University of Trieste 238 263 238 213 325 375 375 down 3+ bands
University of Turin 288 238 263 325 375 450 down 3+ bands
Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa 63 112 137 184 down 3+ bands
University of Ferrara 325 375 375 375 450 450 exit








2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
The University of Tokyo 30 27 23 23 43 39 46 down 2 bands
Kyoto University 52 54 52 59 88 91 74 down 2 bands
Nagoya University 213 213 213 238 325 325 325 down 2 bands
Kyushu University 263 325 325 375 450 375 375 down 2 bands
Tokyo Institute of Technology 108 128 125 141 225 275 275 down 3+ bands
Osaka University 119 147 144 157 275 275 225 down 3+ bands
Tohoku University 120 137 150 165 225 225 225 down 3+ bands
University of Tsukuba 263 325 325 325 450 450 450 down 3+ bands
Hokkaido University 288 325 325 375 450 450 450 down 3+ bands
Tokyo Medical and Dental University (TMDU) 288 288 288 288 450 450 450 down 3+ bands
Tokyo Metropolitan University 238 263 213 238 450 450 exit
Keio University 325 375 exit
Waseda University 375 375 375 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Delft University of Technology 104 77 69 71 65 59 63 up 3+ bands
Erasmus University Rotterdam 157 72 73 72 71 69 72 up 3+ bands
University of Amsterdam 92 83 83 77 58 63 59 up 3+ bands
University of Groningen 134 89 98 117 74 80 83 up 3+ bands
Maastricht University 197 115 98 101 88 94 103 up 3+ bands
Leiden University 79 64 67 64 67 77 67 up 1 band
Wageningen Univ & Research 75 70 77 73 47 65 64 up 1 band
University of Twente 200 187 170 213 149 153 179 up 1 band
Radboud University Nijmegen 159 127 131 140 125 121 122 up 1 band
Tilburg University 263 213 238 288 225 198 195 up 1 band
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 159 140 144 136 154 156 165 stable
Utrecht University 68 67 74 79 62 86 68 stable
Eindhoven Univ of Technology 115 114 106 144 176 177 141 down 1 band
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Seoul National University 124 59 44 50 85 72 74 up 3+ bands
Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU) 325 213 213 148 153 137 111 up 3+ bands
Chung-Ang University 450 450 new entry
Ulsan National Institute of Science and Tech 225 new entry
Yonsei University (Seoul campus) 225 new entry
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Tech 94 68 56 52 148 89 95 stable
Korea University 238 238 213 213 275 225 225 stable
Kyung Hee University 375 450 375 450 stable
Hanyang University 375 375 375 375 375 stable
Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology 325 325 375 down 1 band
Pohang University of Science and Technology 53 50 60 66 116 104 137 down 3+ bands
Ewha Womans University 375 450 450 entry & exit
Yonsei University 238 183 190 213 325 275 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Pompeu Fabra University 186 213 164 165 164 175 140 up 2 bands
Autonomous University of Barcelona 213 213 238 238 146 163 147 up 2 bands
University of Navarra 375 375 325 325 325 up 1 band
University of Barcelona 213 213 238 213 174 225 225 stable
Polytechnic University of Catalonia 375 450 450 450 stable
University of Rovira i Virgili 375 450 450 450 down 1 band
Autonomous University of Madrid 288 325 325 325 325 375 375 down 2 bands
University of Valencia 325 375 375 325 450 exit
Polytechnic University of Valencia 375 375 375 exit
University of Vigo 375 375 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Karolinska Institute 32 42 36 44 28 28 38 stable
Stockholm University 131 117 103 98 136 144 134 stable
Uppsala University 87 106 111 98 81 93 86 stable
KTH Royal Institute of Technology 187 140 117 126 155 159 173 stable
University of Gothenburg 213 213 213 238 180 170 198 stable
Chalmers University of Technology 238 238 288 288 225 275 225 stable
Lund University 80 82 123 119 90 96 93 down 1 band
Swedish Univ of Agricultural Sciences 238 288 263 263 225 275 275 down 1 band
Umeå University 213 263 325 375 275 275 275 down 1 band
Linköping University 325 325 325 375 275 325 375 down 1 band
Örebro University 325 375 375 down 1 band





2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
University of Fribourg 325 288 288 225 275 225 up 2 bands
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne 46 40 37 34 31 30 38 up 1 band
University of Basel 111 142 74 75 101 98 95 up 1 band
ETH Zurich – Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 15 12 14 13 9 9 10 stable
University of Geneva 130 133 124 107 131 137 130 stable
University of Bern 112 151 157 132 120 110 105 stable
University of Neuchâtel 450 450 450 stable
University of Lausanne 116 130 132 136 144 151 152 down 1 band
University of St Gallen 375 450 450 down 1 band
University of Zurich 61 89 121 103 104 106 136 down 3+ bands
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United Kingdom THE 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
University of Warwick 157 124 141 103 80 82 91 up 3+ bands
King’s College London 56 57 38 40 27 36 36 up 2 bands
London School of Economics & Pol Sci 47 39 32 34 23 25 25 up 2 bands
University of Glasgow 102 139 117 94 76 88 80 up 2 bands
Cardiff University 213 213 213 213 182 182 162 up 2 bands
Swansea University 375 375 325 275 up 2 bands
University of Edinburgh 36 32 39 36 24 27 27 up 1 band
University of Exeter 156 153 148 154 93 126 130 up 1 band
University of Leicester 197 196 161 199 167 172 159 up 1 band
Queen’s University Belfast 263 288 263 263 200 225 225 up 1 band
University of Surrey 325 375 375 275 275 275 up 1 band
Loughborough University 375 375 375 375 325 325 up 1 band
University of Kent 375 325 325 325 up 1 band
City, University of London 450 375 375 up 1 band
Anglia Ruskin University 325 325 new entry
Goldsmiths, University of London 325 325 new entry
Soas, University of London 450 450 new entry
Middlesex University 450 new entry
Brighton and Sussex Medical School 325 new entry
University of Cambridge 6 7 7 5 4 4 2 stable
University of Oxford 4 2 2 3 2 1 1 stable
Imperial College London 8 8 10 9 8 8 8 stable
UCL 17 17 21 22 14 15 16 stable
University of Manchester 48 49 58 52 56 55 54 stable
University of Southampton 127 130 146 132 110 121 126 stable
Queen Mary University of London 127 145 114 107 98 113 121 stable
Lancaster University 131 145 137 131 130 137 150 stable
University of Sheffield 101 110 112 121 97 109 104 stable
University of Dundee 176 213 196 213 185 180 187 stable
University of Birmingham 148 158 153 148 119 130 141 stable
University of Liverpool 181 171 169 157 157 158 177 stable
University of Leeds 133 142 139 146 133 133 139 stable
University of Nottingham 140 120 157 171 143 147 147 stable
University of Bath 263 288 288 325 275 275 275 stable
University of Stirling 325 375 375 325 375 325 325 stable
Aston University 375 375 450 375 375 stable
Heriot-Watt University 375 375 325 450 450 375 stable
St George’s, University of London 213 213 196 196 225 225 stable
The Open University 450 450 450 stable
Oxford Brookes University 450 450 450 stable
University of Bristol 66 74 79 74 69 71 76 down 1 band
University of York 121 103 100 113 131 129 137 down 1 band
Durham University 83 80 80 83 70 96 97 down 1 band
University of Aberdeen 151 176 188 178 172 188 185 down 1 band
Newcastle University 146 180 198 213 196 190 175 down 1 band
University of East Anglia 145 176 174 198 149 165 188 down 1 band
University of Essex 213 263 263 325 325 325 275 down 1 band
Bangor University 263 288 325 325 325 325 325 down 1 band
Aberystwyth University 288 288 325 375 325 325 325 down 1 band
University of Strathclyde 375 375 450 450 450 down 1 band
University of Sussex 99 110 121 111 140 149 147 down 2 bands
University of Reading 164 176 194 213 164 192 225 down 2 bands
Brunel University London 263 325 263 238 450 325 375 down 2 bands
Plymouth University 325 288 288 325 375 450 down 2 bands
University of Hull 325 450 450 down 2 bands
Royal Veterinary College 225 325 375 down 2 bands
Royal Holloway, University of London 107 119 102 118 129 173 197 down 3+ bands
University of St Andrews 85 108 117 111 86 110 143 down 3+ bands
Birkbeck, University of London 149 200 213 238 225 225 325 down 3+ bands
Keele University 325 375 325 450 450 exit
University of Hertfordshire 325 375 325 375 exit
Liverpool John Moores University 375 375 exit
University of Portsmouth 325 375 375 450 450 exit
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2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Purdue University 98 69 62 102 113 70 60 up 3+ bands
New York University 44 41 40 38 30 32 27 up 1 band
University of Virginia 135 118 112 130 147 121 113 up 1 band
University of Hawai’i at Mānoa 263 263 225 225 225 up 1 band
Michigan State University 96 94 83 82 99 101 83 up 1 band
University of Texas at Dallas 263 167 188 213 225 225 225 up 1 band
University of South Florida 325 238 288 263 225 225 275 up 1 band
North Carolina State University 325 275 225 275 up 1 band
University of Denver 325 325 new entry
Northern Arizona University 450 450 new entry
University of Tulsa 450 new entry
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 450 new entry
Hofstra University 450 new entry
University of Alabama at Birmingham 168 new entry
University of Colorado Denver 275 new entry
University of Alabama 375 new entry
Harvard University 2 4 2 2 6 6 6 stable
California Institute of Technology 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 stable
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 7 5 5 6 5 5 5 stable
Stanford University 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 stable
Princeton University 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 stable
University of California, Berkeley 10 9 8 8 13 10 18 stable
Yale University 11 11 11 9 12 12 12 stable
University of California, Los Angeles 13 13 12 12 16 14 15 stable
University of Chicago 9 10 9 11 10 10 9 stable
Johns Hopkins University 14 16 15 15 11 17 13 stable
Cornell University 20 18 19 19 18 19 19 stable
University of Michigan 18 20 18 17 21 21 21 stable
Columbia University 12 14 13 14 15 16 14 stable
University of Pennsylvania 16 15 16 16 17 13 10 stable
Carnegie Mellon University 21 22 24 24 22 23 24 stable
University of Washington 25 24 25 26 32 25 25 stable
Duke University 22 23 17 18 20 18 17 stable
Northwestern University 26 19 22 21 25 20 20 stable
University of California, San Diego 33 38 40 41 39 41 31 stable
Univ of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 31 33 29 29 36 36 37 stable
Brown University 49 51 52 54 51 51 50 stable
Dartmouth College 90 124 126 152 104 82 89 stable
Indiana University 123 134 132 150 225 150 117 stable
Arizona State University 127 148 146 182 189 131 126 stable
Georgetown University 138 174 160 173 94 104 123 stable
University of Cincinnati 213 238 238 288 325 225 225 stable
University of Texas at Austin 29 25 27 28 46 50 49 stable
Texas A&M University 164 156 159 141 193 169 159 stable
University of Miami 172 193 185 169 161 182 186 stable
Northeastern University 213 213 184 185 225 182 193 stable
George Mason University 325 375 375 375 325 325 325 stable
University of Houston 325 375 325 325 375 375 325 stable
Washington State University 325 325 325 375 375 375 325 stable
Appendices to Chapter 5 
324  
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Georgia State University 375 450 450 375 stable
University of Oregon 263 325 325 275 stable
Temple University 375 375 375 325 375 stable
Florida State University 225 225 225 stable
Florida International University 450 450 450 stable
Louisiana State University 450 450 stable
Georgia Institute of Technology 24 25 28 27 41 33 33 down 1 band
Washington University in St Louis 41 44 42 42 60 57 50 down 1 band
Rice University 72 75 65 69 101 87 86 down 1 band
University of California, Irvine 86 96 93 88 106 98 99 down 1 band
University of Minnesota 42 47 46 46 65 53 56 down 1 band
University of California, Davis 38 44 52 55 44 51 54 down 1 band
Boston University 54 54 50 57 64 64 70 down 1 band
University of Southern California 55 56 70 75 68 60 66 down 1 band
University of Delaware 180 165 174 180 275 225 225 down 1 band
University of Wisconsin-Madison 27 31 30 29 50 45 43 down 1 band
University of Florida 125 122 128 126 120 134 143 down 1 band
Colorado School of Mines 213 184 139 141 275 275 275 down 1 band
University at Buffalo 213 198 176 191 225 275 275 down 1 band
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State Univ 263 288 288 288 275 275 325 down 1 band
University of Connecticut 263 325 325 325 325 325 down 1 band
Oregon State University 288 325 325 275 325 325 down 1 band
University of Vermont 325 325 375 375 down 1 band
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 263 288 325 325 325 down 1 band
University of Alaska Fairbanks 288 325 325 325 down 1 band
San Diego State University 375 325 375 450 450 down 1 band
Oregon Health and Science University 225 275 275 down 1 band
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 275 275 325 down 1 band
Clark University 325 275 down 1 band
American University 450 450 375 down 1 band
Ohio State University 57 53 59 68 90 72 70 down 1 band
Univ of California, Santa Barbara 35 35 33 37 39 48 53 down 2 bands
Univ of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 43 42 47 46 63 56 56 down 2 bands
Emory University 75 79 80 93 90 82 98 down 2 bands
University of Colorado Boulder 77 91 97 97 127 116 100 down 2 bands
University of California, Santa Cruz 110 122 136 109 144 146 162 down 2 bands
University of Maryland, College Park 94 97 108 132 117 67 69 down 2 bands
Pennsylvania State University 51 61 49 58 75 68 77 down 2 bands
University of California, Riverside 143 154 148 150 167 165 198 down 2 bands
Wayne State University 263 325 325 325 375 375 375 down 2 bands
University of Kansas 288 288 288 325 375 375 down 2 bands
Binghamton Univ, State Univ of New York 325 375 375 375 450 down 2 bands
Univ of Maryland, Baltimore County 325 325 375 450 450 450 down 2 bands
University of Oklahoma 325 375 375 325 375 450 down 2 bands
University of Nebraska Medical Center 325 375 450 down 2 bands
Rush University 225 275 325 down 2 bands




2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Trend
Vanderbilt University 70 106 88 96 87 108 105 down 3+ bands
Tufts University 77 87 80 88 127 135 169 down 3+ bands
University of Massachusetts 64 72 132 91 141 165 191 down 3+ bands
University of Notre Dame 89 94 90 86 108 143 150 down 3+ bands
University of Pittsburgh 59 76 78 91 79 80 100 down 3+ bands
Case Western Reserve University 93 104 88 116 133 126 158 down 3+ bands
William & Mary 146 184 213 213 225 275 275 down 3+ bands
Stony Brook University 114 162 178 188 225 225 275 down 3+ bands
University of Utah 113 134 143 162 182 225 225 down 3+ bands
Wake Forest University 162 190 180 213 225 225 275 down 3+ bands
George Washington University 135 168 194 200 225 225 225 down 3+ bands
University of Arizona 97 98 103 86 163 156 161 down 3+ bands
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 144 174 181 238 275 275 325 down 3+ bands
Rutgers, the State Univ of New Jersey 81 99 103 144 123 141 172 down 3+ bands
University of Iowa 141 169 161 175 225 225 225 down 3+ bands
Iowa State University 184 193 183 193 275 375 325 down 3+ bands
Boston College 195 150 135 126 190 225 325 down 3+ bands
Drexel University 238 288 325 325 375 375 375 down 3+ bands
University of Illinois at Chicago 167 184 191 213 225 200 275 down 3+ bands
University of Rochester 81 102 95 121 158 151 153 down 3+ bands
Brandeis University 150 213 164 147 185 198 225 down 3+ bands
Tulane University 213 238 238 325 275 375 375 down 3+ bands
University of Georgia 213 213 288 288 275 325 375 down 3+ bands
University of South Carolina 213 288 263 288 375 375 down 3+ bands
Colorado State University 238 288 288 288 275 325 375 down 3+ bands
University of Missouri 238 238 325 375 375 375 450 down 3+ bands
University of Texas at San Antonio 288 375 375 375 450 down 3+ bands
University of Montana 288 288 325 375 450 450 down 3+ bands
Syracuse University 177 275 275 275 down 3+ bands
Saint Louis University 275 325 450 down 3+ bands
Yeshiva University 154 156 172 186 164 exit
Georgia Health Sciences University 197 238 238 exit
Kent State University 325 450 exit
Medical University of South Carolina 162 189 exit
Creighton University 238 325 288 325 exit
State University of New York Albany 238 325 325 238 450 exit
University of Kentucky 288 325 375 exit
Lehigh University 325 375 325 375 450 450 exit
Kansas State University 375 325 325 exit
Old Dominion University 375 375 exit
University of Idaho 375 450 exit
University of Wyoming 375 375 375 exit
Florida Institute of Technology 238 197 200 exit
University of New Mexico 263 375 exit
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5A.3 THE Young Universities  
Australia THE Young Universities 
 
Canada THE Young Universities 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Swinburne Univ of Technology 65 74 61 up 3+ bands
University of South Australia 65 48 49 35 57 32 up 3+ bands
Deakin University 78 66 59 45 50 43 up 3+ bands
Griffith University 81 86 84 82 48 35 up 3+ bands
Univ of Technology, Sydney 88 83 47 21 21 15 up 3+ bands
Western Sydney University 87 56 86 79 up 2 bands
La Trobe University 81 88 100 75 58 56 up 2 bands
Queensland University of Technology 40 26 31 33 28 24 up 1 band
Charles Darwin University 48 77 69 48 31 34 up 1 band
University of Canberra 91 new entry
Central Queensland University 90 new entry
Victoria University 56 new entry
James Cook University 38 38 new entry
University of Wollongong 33 43 33 31 37 30 stable
RMIT University 93 97 98 87 stable
Macquarie University 33 36 34 50+ exit
University of Newcastle 45 40 28 30 50+ exit
Flinders University 78 71 82 77 46 50+ exit
Southern Cross University 94 entry & exit
Murdoch University 57 60 65 82 68 down 1 band
Curtin University 75 87 82 81 92 84 down 1 band
Edith Cowan University 100 90 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
University of Calgary 28 23 19 22 18 50+ exit
Simon Fraser University 30 26 24 27 50+ exit
University of Guelph 50 55 73 50+ exit
University of Victoria 20 50+ exit
Univ du Québec à Montréal 84 85 97 down 1 band 
Concordia University 91 96 96 exit
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China THE Young Universities 
 
France THE Young Universities 
 
Germany THE Young Universities 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Hong Kong Polytechnic University 46 34 30 23 27 20 up 2 bands
City University of Hong Kong 18 18 17 14 20 7 up 1 band
Hong Kong Univ of Sci & Tech 3 4 4 4 3 2 stable
National Taiwan Univ of Sci & Tech 55 45 42 41 43 59 stable
Chinese University of Hong Kong 12 12 50+ exit
University of Macau 39 88 67 down 3+ bands
National Sun Yat-Sen University 30 37 40 49 exit
Yuan Ze University 70 94 exit
Feng Chia University 89 exit
National Yang-Ming Univ 95 98 96 100 96 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Paris Descartes University 28 28 new entry
Aix-Marseille University 40 50 new entry
University of Bordeaux 55 47 new entry
Paris-Sorbonne University – Paris 4 69 92 new entry
CentraleSupélec 40 new entry
Grenoble Alpes University 52 new entry
Federal Univ Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées 72 new entry
Pierre and Marie Curie University 6 9 9 11 9 12 stable
Toulouse 1 Capitole University 41 50+ exit
Lille 2 University – Health and Law 85 entry & exit
Paris Diderot University – Paris 7 15 17 17 17 25 31 down 1 band
Paris-Sud University 10 8 10 18 19 down 1 band
Montpellier University 46 32 26 36 63 63 down 2 bands
Claude Bernard University Lyon 1 57 54 65 90 85 down 3+ bands
University of Paris North – Paris 13 75 94 exit
Paris Dauphine University 82 86 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
University of Duisburg-Essen 69 67 59 17 13 up 3+ bands
Bielefeld University 42 40 51 57 23 22 up 2 bands
Ulm University 22 16 15 13 8 up 1 band
University of Bayreuth 40 49 72 35 29 up 1 band
University of Bremen 26 49 41 up 1 band
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology 8 9 new entry
Technical University of Dortmund 39 45 new entry
University of Kaiserslautern 69 62 new entry
University of Siegen 68 new entry
University of Konstanz 14 20 20 19 7 50+ exit
Ruhr University Bochum 26 60 54 50+ exit
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Italy THE Young Universities 
 
Japan THE Young Universities 
 
Portugal THE Young Universities 
 
Spain THE Young Universities 
 
South Korea THE Young Universities 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
University of Rome III 100 84 72 81 up 2 bands
Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna 10 9 new entry
Verona University 66 81 new entry
University of Rome II – Tor Vergata 81 92 new entry
University of Brescia 86 95 new entry
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano 42 new entry
University of Calabria 51 new entry
University of Salerno 71 new entry
University of Bergamo 94 new entry
University of Trento 37 50+ exit
University of Milan-Bicocca 25 23 21 24 51 55 down 3+ bands
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Tokyo Metropolitan University 92 100 new entry
Toyota Technological Institute 64 new entry
University of Tsukuba 39 49 44 50 75 79 down 3+ bands
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
University of Aveiro 66 66 79 69 83 81 down 1 band
NOVA University of Lisbon 85 92 87 89 exit
University of Minho 76 75 64 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Pompeu Fabra University 17 25 13 12 15 17 stable
Autonomous Univ of Barcelona 24 22 23 29 12 18 stable
University of Vigo 77 76 88 entry & exit
Autonomous Univ of Madrid 49 52 58 46 71 66 down 2 bands
Polytechnic Univ of Valencia 74 80 77 97 exit
Polytechnic Univ of Catalonia 86 99 95 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Gwangju Institute of Sci & Tech 33 26 new entry
Pohang University of Sci & Tech 1 1 1 2 5 4 stable
Korea Advanced Institute Sci & Tech 5 3 3 3 6 5 stable
University of Ulsan 90 96 entry & exit
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United Kingdom THE Young Universities 
 
USA THE Young Universities 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
University of Stirling 50 61 56 47 54 46 stable
Plymouth University 60 53 42 37 59 65 stable
University of Dundee 19 16 16 stable
University of Portsmouth 85 99 98 stable
University of York 8 7 50+ exit
Lancaster University 9 14 10 50+ exit
University of East Anglia 10 16 50+ exit
University of Warwick 13 13 12 9 50+ exit
University of Essex 20 29 22 50+ exit
Brunel University London 35 44 29 25 80 50+ exit
University of Bath 37 34 34 42 41 50+ exit
University of Surrey 56 71 63 65 43 50+ exit
Keele University 61 50+ exit
Loughborough University 69 65 71 83 62 50+ exit
University of Strathclyde 71 79 78 50+ exit
Heriot-Watt University 72 63 52 77 91 50+ exit
University of Kent 80 97 80 93 50+ exit
Aston University 83 96 81 70 77 50+ exit
City, University of London 90 97 88 50+ exit
University of Bradford 92 50+ exit
University of Hertfordshire 62 75 60 71 exit
Liverpool John Moores Univ 72 88 exit
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Rush University 22 33 new entry
University of Texas at Dallas 29 15 15 16 24 21 stable
Florida International University 84 84 73 79 89 stable
University of California, Irvine 4 5 7 7 50+ exit
Univ of California, Santa Cruz 7 11 11 8 50+ exit
University of Illinois at Chicago 11 19 13 18 50+ exit
Univ Maryland, Baltimore County 63 60 65 73 95 50+ exit
Univ of Texas at San Antonio 53 70 91 77 68 down  1 band
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Table 6A.1 Voice survey data for the University of Canberra 2005–2013 
Scale scores (% 
favourable) 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Benchmark data 
2009      2013 
PASSION/ENGAGEMENT 65 67 64 76 73 73 74 
Organisational Commitment 
Job satisfaction 























PROGRESS 42 43 48 65 61 54 53 
Organisation Objectives 























PURPOSE        
Organisation Direction 37 68 72 75 75 60 58 
Results Focus 52 51 65 79 77 67 62 
Mission and Values 73 79 73 84 80 79 78 
Ethics 67 63 58 77 74 70 66 
Role Clarity 76 74 74 86 84 81 79 
Diversity 70 73 66 74 75 72 67 
PROPERTY        
Resources 52 45 44 63 61 59 64 
Processes 26 22 30 46 48 41 43 
Technology 47 41 36 54 57 53 56 
Safety 64 61 56 71 69 68 68 
Facilities 51 39 27 37 42 47 41 
PARTICIPATION        
Leadership 31 43 42 60 56 43 34 
Recruitment and Selection 34 37 37 56 57 47 45 
Cross-unit Co-operation 16 17 23 36 36 28 51 
Learning and Development 40 37 34 52 57 52 51 
Involvement 33 35 34 49 49 45 39 
Rewards and Recognition 47 50 48 66 68 55 55 
Performance Appraisal 40 43 38 58 66 56 52 
Supervision 70 70 64 76 77 71 77 
Career Opportunities 25 26 28 45 41 36 32 
UNIVERSITY        
Research 53 52 49 63 63 58 56 
Teaching 68 66 56 67 65 62 59 
Community Engagement 51 54 49 61 61 52 47 
Entrepreneurship 37 31 38 45 44 39 47 
PEOPLE        
Motivation and Initiative 70 68 67 79 79 71 75 
Talent 73 75 70 80 81 76 80 
Teamwork 81 85 81 88 88 85 87 
PEACE        
Wellness 55 45 47 62 61 53 68 
Work/Life Balance 71 67 60 71 70 68 76 
Flexibility   59 71 71  63 
Workload 38 33 32 46 48 39 53 
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Table 6A.2 Voice survey data for the ‘Peace’ subscales University of Canberra and all 
faculties, 2009 and 2011 
 







PEACE     
Wellness 47 62 41 56 
Work/Life Balance 60 71 52 62 
Flexibility 59 71 54 69 
Workload 32 46 29 39 
 
 
 
